UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT  LOS  ANGELES 


GENERAL     BOTHA 


GENERAL    BOTHA 

THE    CAREER    AND    THE    MAN 

BY 

HAROLD    SPENDER 


"  This  is  the  happy  warrior  ;   this  is  he 

That  every  man  in  arms  should  wish  to  be  " — 

William  Wordsworth 


WITH   A    FRONTISPIECE    PORTRAIT    AND    FOUR    MAPS 


BOSTON   AND    NEW    YORK 
HOUGHTON    MIFFLIN    COMPANY 

1916 


Pi 


^ 


FOREWORD 


While  writing  this  book,  I  have  felt  all  the  time 
that  it  was  in  truth  "war  work."  For  what  better 
work  could  one  do  in  war-time  than  to  mirror,  as  faith- 
fully as  one  can,  the  actual  figure  and  performance  of 
a  man  like  Louis  Botha?  One  who  is  as  daring  and 
swift  in  battle  as  he  is  wise  and  merciful  in  victory, 
as  skilled  a  craftsman  of  peace  as  he  is  a  master  of 
war,  as  cunning  in  cure  as  he  is  potent  in  punishment  ? 
^  For  is  not  this  the  kind  of  ministry  after  which  all 
the  nations  now  crave — a  surgery  that  binds  together 
as  well  as  cuts  asunder,  a  cautery  that  heals  as  well 
as  scorches?  May  the  gods  soon  give  us  such  in  the 
Old  World  as  in  the  New! 

In  collecting  materials  I  have  been  deeply  indebted 
to  many  helpers,  but  chiefly  to  Mr.  and  Mrs.  R.  Craw- 
ford Hawkin.  Mrs.  Hawkin  is  a  sister  of  General 
Botha,  and  she  is  now  domiciled  in  England.  Thus 
she  has  been  able  to  help  me  continuously,  and  she 
has    never   grudged    any   time   or    trouble.      Of   Mr. 


6  FOREWORD 

Hawkin  I  need  only  say  that  he  is  now  perhaps  the 
closest  student  of  South  African  affairs  living  in 
England. 

I  have  also  been  greatly  helped,  for  the  period  of 
their  own  Governorships,  by  Lord  Selborne  and  Lord 
Gladstone  :  I  have  to  thank  Lord  Milner  for  his  kind 
courtesy  and  patience  :  and  the  Right  Hon.  Lewis 
Harcourt,  M.P.,  lately  Colonial  Secretary,  for  advice 
and  information. 

From  start  to  finish  I  have  had  the  cordial  and 
enthusiastic  assistance  of  the  Right  Hon.  W.  P. 
Schreiner,  K.C.,  ex-Premier  of  the  Cape  Colony  and 
High  Commissioner  of  South  Africa;  of  the  Colonial 
Office,  always  distinguished  among  departments  by 
their  courtesy  and  affability;  the  Colonial  Institute, 
whose  Librarian  has  spared  no  pains  or  labour;  and 
the  Empire  Parliamentary  Association,  of  64  Victoria 
Street,  S.W.,  a  most  valuable  institution,  especially 
fortunate  in  the  possession  of  a  skilful  and  devoted 
secretary,  Mr.  Howard  d'Egville.  Mr.  John  H. 
Harris,  the  secretary  of  the  Anti-Slavery  Society,  has 
given  me  much  aid  in  native  questions. 

I  must  also  acknowledge  a  debt  to  many  South 
African  members  of  Parliament  and  soldiers  visiting 
England  this  winter,  including  Senator  the  Hon. 
J.  A.  C.  Graaff,  Mr.  Alwyn  Vintcent,  M.L.A.,  and 
Captain  Meyler,  now  on  active  service;  to  Mr. 
Reinecke  Van  Stuwe,  Assistant  Military  Secretary 
to  Botha  during  the  Boer  War ;  and  to  several  troopers 


FOREWORD  7 

from  Botha's  Defence  Army,  who  have  given  me 
many  valuable  details  of  the  Rebellion  and  the 
German  War. 

The  books  and  blue-books  used  are  in  name  legion. 
But  I  must  pay  a  tribute  to  that  wonderful  monument 
of  labour  and  devotion,  the  Times  History  of  the 
War  in  South  Africa"  (6  vols.,  Sampson  Low  and 
Marston);  and  I  owe  a  deep  debt  of  gratitude  to  the 
files  of  the  South  African  Press ;  especially  to  "  South 
Africa"  and  the  "African  World." 

I  shall  be  always  grateful  for  any  new  information 
sent  from  any  quarter  on  the  subject  of  this  book. 


HAROLD  SPENDER. 


12  Harrington  Gardens,  • 
London,  S.W.,  1916. 


LIST    OF    MAPS 

South  Africa To  face  page  6i 

Plan  of  the  Battle  of  Colenso         .        .              „  69 

German  South-West  Africa          ...              „  307 

South  and  Central  Africa  ....              „  338 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER   I 


PACiE 


Childhood  and  Home 13 

CHAPTER   n 
Youth  and  Adventure 31 

CHAPTER    HI 
The  "New  Republic" 45 

CHAPTER    IV 
War.     (1899-1900) 61 

CHAPTER    V 
The  War  in  Flood.     (1900) 83 

CHAPTER     VI 
The  War  in  Ebb.     (1901) 103 

CHAPTER  VII 
Peace.     (1902) 125 

CHAPTER   VIII 
Salvage.     (1903-5) 149 

9 


10  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  IX 


I'AGR 


The  Transvaal  Prkimiership.     (1906-10)    .        .        .        .177 

CHAPTER    X 
The  Coming  of  Union.     (1908-9) 197 

CHAPTER  XI 
The  Union  Premiership.     (1910) 217 

CHAPTER  XII 
The  Hertzog  Split.     (191 2) 243 

CHAPTER    XIII 
The  Labour  Crisis      (1913-14) 263 

CHAPTER    XIV 
The  Rebellion.     (19x4) 285 

CHAPTER   XV 
The  German  War.     (1915) 307 

CHAPTER  XVI 
The  Man 323 

APPENDIX   I      Botha's  Life  Dates  ....  339 

APPENDIX   II     The  Dinizulu  Agreement      .        .        .  340 

APPENDIX  III    The  Vereeniging  Treaty       ...  341 

Index 343 


CHAPTER   I 
CHILDHOOD    AND    HOME 


GENERAL    BOTHA 

CHAPTER    I 

CHILDHOOD    AND    HOME 

"  Happy  he 
With    such   a   mother  !  " 

— Tennyson. 

Louis  Botha  was  born  on  September  27,  1862,  at 
Greytown — about  fifty  miles  from  Colenso,  in  Natal 
— at  his  father's  farm,  "  Onrust."  He  was  the  eighth 
child  and  the  third  son  in  a  family  which  in  the  end 
attained  the  respectable  size  of  thirteen — by  no  means 
a  rare  or  extravagant  figure  among  the  Dutch  families 
of  South  Africa.  Seven  of  these  children  were  girls 
and  six  boys,  and  all  of  them  were  born  on  the  Natal 
farm  except  the  youngest,  Marie. ^  They  must  have 
formed  a  large  and  cheerful  community  in  that 
spacious  and  roomy  South  African  farm-house  where 
they  were  born  and  bred. 

Louis  Botha's  parents  were  alike  of  mingled  Dutch 
and  French  blood.  The  original  Botha  family, 
indeed,  came  direct  from  France  and  probably  from 
Alsace-Lorraine.     Three  brothers,  of  a  name  akin  to 

1  Now  married  to  Mr.  R.  C.   Hawkin  and  living-  in  England. 

13 


14  GENERAL   BOTHA 

"  Botha,"  ^  are  believed  to  have  arrived  in  South  Africa 
on  one  of  the  waves  of  that  great  migration  which 
surged  out  of  France  after  that  great  withdrawal  of  re- 
ligious liberty  which  is  known  to  the  world  as  the 
Revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  (1685).  The  rem- 
nants of  the  persecuted  Huguenots  rallied  in  South 
Africa  with  black  thoughts  against  the  land  which  had 
cast  them  out ;  and  it  was  part  of  their  revenge  to  place 
a  fog  of  oblivion  between  them  and  the  country  of 
their  origin.  The  religious  persecutions  of  the  Pro- 
testants in  Europe  were  always  vividly  present  in  the 
memories  of  the  older  members  of  the  Botha  family. 
France  was  known  to  them  as  the  country  of  the  perse- 
cuting Catholics;  and  the  French  language  was  in  con- 
sequence a  thing  of  horror  to  the  pious  Calvinists  of 
South  Africa.  The  use  of  the  French  language  was 
actually  forbidden  by  law;  and  in  consequence  the 
French  names  were  either  changed  or  the  pronuncia- 
tion was  completely  altered.^  But,  in  spite  of  an  un- 
doubted change  of  surname,  there  is  a  strong  family 
tradition,  probably  correct,  that  the  founder  of  the 
South  African  Bothas  was  one  of  these  brothers,  a 
captain  in  the  French  Navy,  a  man  staunch  to  his  faith, 
but  of  standing  and  wealth.^ 

1  Botte,  Bode,  or  Bote.  One  of  the  Bottes  came  to  Eng-land 
in  1688,  and  others  went  to  South  Africa.  The  name  of  Isaac 
Butt,  the  Irish  leader,  is  said  to  have  originally  been  Botte. 

2  Louis  was  pronounced  "Leviss." 

3  The  epaulettes  of  the  uniform  of  a  French  naval  officer 
were  preserved  in  the  family  up  to  the  present  generation ;  and 


CHILDHOOD   AND   HOME  15 

The  first  clear  human  figure  that  emerges  is  Philip 
Rudolph  Botha,  born  on  August  22,  1749,  who  mar- 
ried on  May  7,  1770,  Elizabeth  Fourie,  a  member  of 
another  Huguenot  family.  The  Bothas  and  Fouries 
were  at  that  time  settled  at  the  town  of  George  in  the 
eastern  province  of  Cape  Colony,  four  miles  from 
the  sea  and  thirty-two  miles  from  Mossel  Bay. 
They  probably  belonged  to  that  group  of  Hugue- 
nots who  had  protested  against  the  monopolies  of 
the  Dutch  East  India  Company  at  Cape  Town  and 
moved  eastward. 

The  Botha  family  remained  in  Cape  Colony  until 
the  early  nineteenth  century.  Eleven  children  had 
been  born  to  those  early  Philip  Rudolph  Bothas. 
The  eldest  of  these  was  probably  the  Botha  who 
played  a  part  in  the  Slagter's  Nek  rebellion  (18 15) 
and  was  compelled  to  witness  those  tragic  hangings.^ 
The  third  son,  born  in  1773,  was  Theunis  Jacobus 
Botha.  It  is  from  him  that  General  Botha  is 
descended.^ 

In  1827  occurred  one  of  those  great  movements 
among  the  Boers  which  were  like  the  swarmings  of  bees 

Mrs.  Philip  Botha,  senior,  remembers  that  the  family  were 
possessed  of  many  valuable  French  naval  gold  decorations 
when  she  married  into  it.  The  French  Navy  contained  many 
Huguenots.  The  leader  of  the  French  emigrants  to  South 
Africa  v/as  a  nephew  of  Admiral  Duquesne,  the  head  of  the 
French  Navy. 

1  See  Mr.    G.    E.    Cory's   "Rise   of   South   Africa,"    Vol.    I., 

PP-  350-70- 

The  full  pedigree  is  set  out  on  page  27. 


i6  GENERAL   BOTHA 

from  a  hive.  This  time  it  was  the  "  trek  "  of  the  Cape 
Boers  away  from  European  rule  into  the  unoccupied 
territory  of  Natal,  where  they  vainly  sought  that 
freedom  from  State  interference  which  was  the  haunt- 
ing dream  of  their  race.  Among  these  migrants  was 
Philip  Rudolph  Botha,  the  only  son  of  Theunis,  along 
with  his  two  baby  sons,  the  second  of  whom  was  named 
Louis.  This  son  was  destined  to  be  the  father  of 
General  Botha. 

About  half-way  between  Pietermaritzburg  and 
Durban  there  is  now  a  railway  station  called  "  Botha's 
Hill."  It  was  in  this  neighbourhood  that  Botha's 
grandfather,  old  Philip  Botha,  settled  and  brought  up 
his  family.  The  little  Louis  had  been  born  in  1826, 
and  lived  there  with  his  father  till  he  was  twenty-one 
years  of  age.  During  that  time  he  passed  through 
troublous  days  of  war;  for  the  Boer  settlers  were 
placed  between  the  Zulus  and  the  British.  On  the  one 
side — the  north — the  great  Zulu  army  of  Chaka  was 
in  process  of  formation.  As  cattle-lifting  was  an 
ordinary  means  of  livelihood  to  those  hardy  and  for- 
midable warriors,  constant  vigilance  was  the  only  price 
of  possession  for  these  Boers  who  wished  to  keep  their 
herds  and  flocks.  Meanwhile,  on  the  other  side — to 
the  south  and  east — was  the  still  more  menacing  pres- 
sure of  offended  British  majesty,  peremptorily  dis- 
puting by  arms  the  claim  to  independence  on  behalf 
of  the  infant  Boer  Republic,  which  had  been  founded 
here  in  Natal  by  Pieter  Maritz  and  his  Voortrekkers. 


CHILDHOOD    AND   HOME  17 

In  1843  a  wise  British  Governor,  Sir  George 
Napier,  appointed  a  brilliant  Cape  Dutchman,  Dr. 
Henry  Cloete,  to  negotiate  terms  of  peace  between  the 
Republicans  of  Pietermaritzburg  and  the  British 
colonists  at  Port  Durban.  Cloete  knew  the  Boer  lan- 
guage, their  religion,  and  their  outlook  on  life.  These 
he  carefully  respected ;  and  it  was  owing  to  this  fore- 
sight and  his  anxious  attention  to  these  matters  that 
he  was  able  so  early  and  so  easily  to  persuade  the 
Natal  Boers  to  accept  the  British  flag. 

One  consequence  of  this  success  was  that  the  Botha 
boys  became  British  subjects,  while  at  the  same  time 
preserving  their  religion,  their  language,  and  their 
customs. 

At  the  age  of  twenty-one  Louis  Botha  the  first,  the 
second  son  of  Philip  Botha  the  third,  moved  to  Grey- 
town,  at  that  time  the  remotest  civilised  spot  in  this 
part  of  South  Africa,  just  on  the  borders  of  the  wildest 
part  of  Zululand. 

Here  Louis  married  Minnie  Van  Rooyen,  the 
daughter  of  Gerhardt  Van  Rooyen,  a  substantial 
farmer  of  good  lineage,  and  also  allied  in  blood  to 
the  French  Huguenot  family  of  Leroux.  Minnie  Van 
Rooyen  was  seventeen  years  of  age  and  the  beauty  of 
Greytown.^  The  old  folk  still  speak  of  that  prize  of 
the  town,  the  handsome,  elegant,  refined  young  girl 

1  As  a  baby  girl  she  had  helped  her  mother  to  make  bullets 
within  the  laager  while  the  Voortrekkers  defended  themselves 
against  the  furious  Zulu  onslaughts. 

B 


i8  GENERAL  BOTHA 

who  was  won  by  the  determined  young  pioneer — not 
a  man  to  accept  a  refusal. 

A  strenuous  life  opened  for  these  young  people  at 
Greytown — wars  with  Kaffirs,  hardships  innumerable, 
adventures  all  the  time.  Their  lightly  built  settlers' 
home  was  burned  down  several  times  over  their 
heads,  by  Kaffirs  or  by  sparks  from  the  great  kitchen 
fire.  All  around  were  savages  and  wild  animals. 
It  is  recorded  that  on  one  occasion  this  Louis  Botha 
met  a  lion  face  to  face,  and,  having  no  weapon  in  his 
hand,  stared  the  animal  into  flight  by  sheer  force  and 
fixity  of  his  gaze.  It  was  during  this  life  at  Greytown 
that  twelve  children  were  born  to  them,  including 
Louis  Botha  the  younger. 

From  the  mists  of  the  past  there  comes  back  a  pic- 
ture of  that  old  Boer  settler,  Louis  Botha  the  first, 
the  father  of  the  great  South  African — so  different 
from  that  caricature  of  Boer  character  which  became 
unhappily  popular  in  England  at  that  time — pious, 
it  is  true,  and  simple  in  his  faith,  but  a  quick,  go-ahead 
man  with  a  touch  of  Gallic  spring  and  energy  still  in 
the  blood.  Like  most  of  the  Boers  of  the  period,  he 
was  tall  and  a  splendid  shot.  Dark-featured  and 
blue-eyed,  he  was  in  his  youth  a  singularly  handsome 
man.  But,  although  athletic  and  fond  of  sport,  he 
was  by  no  means  wholly  devoted  to  country  pursuits. 
He  was  by  temperament  a  townsman  and  a  politician 
— a  man  keenly  bent  on  affairs,  interested  in  his  fellow- 
men,  quick  at  invention  and  eager  for  improvements, 


CHILDHOOD  AND   HOME  19 

progressive  in  character  and  shrewd  in  outlook.  As 
he  grew  older  he  went  more  and  more  into  the  towns, 
drawn  by  the  magnet  of  public  affairs,  leaving  the 
farm  more  and  more  to  his  sons.  His  brother,  the  Hon. 
Philip  Botha,  remained  near  Durban,  became  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Natal  Executive  and  a  colleague  of  Harry 
Escombe.  The  old  Louis  had  that  instinctive,  almost 
uncanny  sympathy  which  enables  a  father  to  frame  the 
horoscope  of  a  well-loved  son.  "  Mark  my  words, 
mother,"  he  is  still  vividly  remembered  to  have 
said  to  his  wife,  looking  towards  the  young  Louis 
and  speaking  with  emphasis,  "  mark  my  words, 
that  son  of  ours  is  going  to  make  a  name  for 
himself." 

Botha  probably  owes  to  this  father  a  certain  primary 
impulse  towards  public  affairs,  the  habit  and  passion 
of  a  larger  stage.  But  he  also  owes  something  more — 
a  certain  easy  geniality  in  dealing  with  men.  For  the 
elder  Botha  was  always  a  popular  man  with  the  crowd 
— a  Homeric  host,  living  with  doors  open  to  the 
world.  He  had  many  generous  social  tastes,  and 
especially  the  countryman's  passion  for  horses.  At 
one  time  he  even  owned  racehorses.  It  was  charac- 
teristic of  his  kindness  that  he  would  lend  money  to 
impecunious  friends  and  neighbours;  and  he  finally 
had  to  pay  the  not  unusual  penalty  for  such  indiscreet 
charity.  Having  backed  a  neighbour's  bill,  he  had 
to  meet  the  call,  when  it  came,  by  selling  his  farm  and 
shifting   into   the   Orange    Free    State.     There,   near 

B  2 


20  GENERAL  BOTHA 

Vrede  in  the  district  of  Harrismith,  he  built  a  mag- 
nificent homestead  called  "  Vroodepoort."  It  is  a 
crucial  evidence  of  the  stress  of  this  move  that  the 
thirteenth  and  youngest  child  was  born  in  a  temporary 
structure  of  wattle  and  daub. 

Six  years  later  the  family  moved  to  a  fine  up-to-date 
farm  called  "  Leeuwkop,"  which  was  bought  from  an 
Englishman,  and  here  they  commenced  ostrich 
farming. 

Thus  for  the  first  time,  by  a  mere  accident,  the 
Botha  family  left  the  British  Colonies  and  became 
citizens  of  one  of  the  Republics,  then  in  the  full 
romance  of  their  earlier  development. 

The  experience  of  these  years  must,  indeed,  have 
left  a  deep  mark  upon  the  younger  members  of  Louis 
Botha's  large  family.  They  had  to  journey  away  into 
the  depths  of  South  Africa,  over  the  great  range  of 
the  Drakensberg,  like  those  ancestors  of  theirs  who 
in  the  'thirties  fled  from  British  rule  at  the  Cape,  in 
that  strange,  sudden  outburst  of  anger  which  followed 
upon  what  they  regarded  as  the  unreasonable  exalta- 
tion of  the  black  races.  The  Bothas  now  found  them- 
selves living  in  a  country  where  wild  animals  were 
still  numerous,  including,  not  only  jackals  and  wolves, 
but  even  occasionally  lions.  Education  was  difficult, 
and  consisted  in  the  irregular  visits  of  those  vagrant 
tutors — men  with  little  qualification  of  training  or  char- 
acter— who  were  then  the  only  schoolmasters  available 
to  the  more  remote  South  African  farms.     The  whole 


CHILDHOOD   AND   HOME  21 

family  had  to  work  on  the  farm — husband  and  wife, 
boys  and  girls.  The  numerous  Kaffirs  had  to  be 
looked  after  and  controlled,  and  the  big  straggling 
farm,  with  its  wagon-houses,  mud-houses,  and  out- 
houses, was  more  like  a  village  than  a  single 
residence.  Such  a  life  called  for  every  resource  of 
self-reliance. 

Happily,  Louis  Botha's  mother  was  a  woman  well 
adapted  to  the  demands  of  this  adventurous  existence. 
As  the  years  passed,  she  became  a  handsome  matron, 
very  dark,  with  black  hair  and  dark  eyes.  She  was  a 
woman  who  combined  deep  religious  feeling  with 
intense  activity  in  the  affairs  of  everyday  life.  This 
mother  of  the  Bothas  has,  indeed,  left  a  deep  impres- 
sion on  her  children.  "A  lovely  mother,"  they  still 
call  her,  and  it  is  clear  that  she  played  a  great  part 
in  keeping  the  family  together  through  those  strenuous 
years. 

It  is  rather  difficult  for  Europeans  to  form  a  picture 
of  the  life  lived  on  these  South  African  farms  within 
the  Republics  in  those  far-off  days  of  the  'eighties. 
The  murky  fog  of  race-hatred  has  done  so  much  to 
obstruct  any  clear  vision  of  that  existence — to  exag- 
gerate its  faults  and  to  obscure  its  virtues — that  it 
may  be  worth  while  to  reconstruct  some  of  its  actual 
outlines. 

It  was  a  life  of  great  simplicity,  lived  largely  in 
the  open  air — a  life  of  strenuous  labour  for  all,  young 
and    old,    combined    with    an    unquestioning    piety. 


22  GENERAL  BOTHA 

There  were  prayers  twice  a  day — after  breakfast  and 
at  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening.  The  Bible  was  read, 
and  the  praying,  as  is  even  now  still  often  the 
habit  in  British  Protestant  households,  emerged  from 
the  feeling  and  inspiration  of  the  moment.  On 
Sundays  the  church  was  held  in  rotation  at  one  farm 
or  another,  and  sometimes  a  pastor  would  come  and 
stay  for  the  Sunday.  On  week-days,  during  the 
seasons  of  sowing  and  harvest,  the  boys  would  be  out 
in  the  fields  early  in  the  morning  ploughing  and 
sowing,  and  the  girls  would  rise  to  get  them  early 
coffee.  They  would  come  in  from  their  work  hungry 
as  wolves  for  their  breakfast;  and  sometimes  when 
the  work  was  very  hard  the  food  would  be  sent  out 
to  them  in  the  fields.  We  in  England  have  little  idea 
of  these  immense  5,000-acre  farms  on  those  treeless 
green  spaces — with  their  fine  crops  of  maize  or  lucerne 
or  oats,  and  the  black  Basuto  labourers  working  in  the 
fields — the  great  spaces,  the  great  distances,  that  sense 
of  the  vast  and  the  unconfined  which  is  the  very 
breath  and  atmosphere  of  freedom. 

On  this  farm  Botha  lived  from  an  early  age  much 
among  the  blacks.  He  became  familiar  with  those 
stern  patriarchal  relations  towards  the  negroes  which 
come  so  easil)  to  the  Boers,  and  which  we  British 
find  so  hard  to  understand.  In  those  early  years  of 
work  together,  he  grew  familiar  with  the  wants  of  the 
natives  and  developed  a  sympathy  with  them  which 
he  has  never  lost.     He  learnt  to  talk  their  languages  : 


CHILDHOOD   AND   HOME 


23 


he  can  still  speak  both  Zulu  and  Sesuto  ^  very  well. 
As  a  boy  he  could  talk  Sesuto  almost  as  a  native,  and 
would  love  to  click  it  out  as  he  talked  with  the  Kaffir 
"boys"  in  the  fields. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a  life  better  adapted 
to  teach  responsibility  and  self-reliance  to  young 
people.  The  only  danger  was  that  the  isolation  might 
narrow  their  natures  and  roughen  their  manners. 
Conscious  of  these  perils,  the  Dutch  colonists  in  South 
Africa  had  from  early  times  devised  methods  of  bring- 
ing social  amenities  into  these  scattered  farm-houses. 
The  visiting  teachers  were  unsatisfactory  enough,  and 
it  was  not  uncommon  for  Botha's  father  to  have  to 
ride  into  town  on  Monday  morning  to  fetch  the  tutor 
from  the  bed  where  he  was  sleeping  off  his  Sunday 
drinking-bout.  All  that  can  be  said  for  this  primitive 
method  of  education  was  that  it  just  enabled  the 
children  to  master  the  elements  of  knowledge.  More 
important  for  the  Boer  families  was  undoubtedly  that 
habit  of  assemblage  four  times  in  a  year  at  stated 
points  to  enable  the  young  people  to  receive  their 
first  Communion.  This  was  the  famous  "  Nacht- 
maal" — a  custom  brought  from  Europe  by  the  Pro- 
testant refugees. 

The  celebration  of  this  sacred  feast  lasted  some- 
times for  a  whole  week.  Families  journeyed  from 
great  distances  to  one  common  point.  In  those  days 
before  the  railways,  such  travels  would  be  undertaken 
1  The  language  of  the  Basutos. 


24  GENERAL   BOTHA 

in  wagons  or  on  horseback  and  would  require  much  toil 
and  endurance.  The  families  would  often  have  to 
journey  for  several  days  across  the  great  veldt.  But 
probably  the  effort  was  well  worth  the  while  :  for  it 
enabled  these  scattered  folk  to  see  and  meet  one 
another.  They  would  exchange  views  and  news. 
They  would  be  saved  from  the  worst  perils  of  isola- 
tion. They  would  take  a  pride  in  the  adornment  of 
their  children.  For  among  the  Protestants  of  South 
Africa,  as  among  the  Catholics  of  Brittany,  the  young 
people  are  dressed  up  for  their  first  Communion — the 
girls  in  white  and  the  boys  in  black  :  and  it  is  perhaps 
not  altogether  an  idle  fancy  that  perceives,  across  all 
the  gulfs  of  hate  and  prejudice,  a  certain  community 
of  reverence  between  the  "  Pardons  "  of  Brittany  and 
the  "  Nachtmaals  "  of  South  Africa. 

Another  custom  which  in  those  old  days  took  the 
edge  off  isolation  was  that  of  family  hospitality.  A 
large  Boer  farm  like  that  of  the  Botha  parents  at  Vrede 
became  a  great  centre  of  hospitality  to  the  children 
as  they  married  and  made  their  own  homes.  Before 
the  Boer  War  it  was  quite  customary  for  Dutch  and 
English  to  intermarry,  and  several  of  Louis  Botha's 
sisters  married  Englishmen  who  had  settled  in  South 
Africa.  When  the  children  married  they  were  always 
welcomed  back  readily  by  Mrs.  Botha  in  the  family 
farm-house  with  its  numerous  bedrooms  and  outhouses. 
The  growing  boys  would  be  turned  for  the  occasion 
out  of  the  house  into  the  outhouses,  or  even  into  the 


CHILDHOOD   AND   HOME  25 

wagon-house,  which  contained  many  beds.  There 
were  few  limits  to  the  hospitality  of  such  a  family. 
For  in  those  days  the  very  desolation  of  the  open 
veldt,  by  a  certain  law  of  opposites,  seemed  to  breathe 
a  human  welcome  into  the  few  lonely  houses  scattered 
over  these  great  spaces. 

It  was  a  happy,  friendly  existence — this  life  in  the 
farm-houses  on  that  high  plateau  under  the  lofty 
Drakensberg  mountains  in  that  glorious  South  African 
climate,  with  its  hot  summers  and  its  cold,  clear 
winters.  Hard  work  did  not  prevent  happiness,  but 
rather  helped  it.  All  the  children  rode  horses  almost 
from  their  infancy.  It  was  quite  an  ordinary  thing  to 
send  a  child  of  six  or  seven  with  a  message  for  a  long 
distance  on  horseback.  They  shot  as  soon  as  they 
reached  their  teens.  It  was  the  training  of  the  ancient 
Persians — "  to  shoot  straight  and  tell  the  truth."  The 
discipline  was  strict  and  the  work  was  hard ;  but  there 
were  compensations.  Their  father  was  a  stern  task- 
master during  the  week,  but  on  Saturdays  he  would 
often  give  each  boy  a  horse  and  saddle  and  tell  him 
cheerfully  to  go  out  into  the  world  and  court  the  best 
girl  he  could  find.  There  was  little  sombreness  in  such 
a  life.  On  the  week-ends  there  would  be  dancing  and 
lawn  tennis;  for  many  of  the  young  Boers  were  very 
fine  tennis  players  even  in  those  days.  There  was  a 
great  deal  of  simple  cheerfulness  and  comradeship,  as 
there  always  must  be  among  young  people  in  a  great 
expanding  country  with    that    sense  of    growth  and 


26  GENERAL   BOTHA 

opportunity  in  the  air  which  is  like  the  feeling  of 
springtime. 

In  the  midst  of  his  own  family,  the  young  Louis 
Botha  already  had  a  singular  supremacy  which  seemed 
to  have  no  relation  to  his  age.  For  even  his  elder 
brothers  would  already  turn  to  him  for  advice  and 
counsel.  "What  do  you  think,  Louis?"  would  be  the 
end  of  many  an  argument.  There  was  already  some- 
thing about  his  character  which  seemed  to  enforce 
obedience  and  respect.  It  is  the  confirmed  usage  of 
Dutch  families  that  deference  should  be  paid  to  the 
eldest,  but  this  seemed  to  be  an  exception  to  the  rule. 
"  It  is  so  hard  to  disobey  Louis,"  was  the  common  and 
quaint  complaint  of  his  elder  brothers.  It  was  not 
that  he  obtruded  his  advice  or  used  his  physical 
strength  to  enforce  it.  It  was  simply  that  he  was 
already  possessed  of  that  serene,  tranquil,  common 
sense  which  those  who  know  him  now  recognise  as  the 
crown  of  his  character.  It  was  then,  as  now,  more  than 
an  intellectual  quality.  There  was  always  about  him 
a  certain  splendid  strength  and  large-mindedness,  a 
valorous  selflessness,  such  as  has  so  often  made  him 
since  both  terrible  in  battle  and  merciful  in  victory. 

It  was  when  Louis  Botha  was  living  this  life  as  a 
young  man  on  his  father's  farm  that  the  first  Boer  War 
of  1 88 1  broke  out. 

The  Bothas,  it  will  be  realised,  were  not  directly 
drawn  into  this  struggle.  They  were  living  in  the 
Free  State,  which  then,  and  for  many  years  after,  was 


CHILDHOOD  AND   HOME 


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28  GENERAL  BOTHA 

on  very  friendly  terms  with  the  British  Government 
and  with  Cape  Colony.  They  had  recently  come  from 
Natal,  where  two  of  Louis  Botha's  sisters  had  married 
Englishmen.  In  those  happy  days  they  had  no 
thought  of  strife  with  England. 

One  morning  the  boys  came  running  in  with  the  cry 
— "  Majuba  Hill  is  retaken  and  Colley  killed  !  " 

I  do  not  think  there  was  any  rejoicing  in  the  Botha 
household  that  morning.  Rather  there  was  a  deep 
sense  of  the  seriousness  of  the  issue  raised.  The  most 
vivid  memory  from  that  fateful  day  of  their  early 
youth,  the  first  of  so  many  fateful  days,  was  that  as 
the  hours  advanced  the  sun  was  eclipsed  and  darkness 
was  spread  over  the  earth. 


CHAPTER   II 
YOUTH    AND    ADVENTURE 


CHAPTER     II 

YOUTH    AND    ADVENTURE 
"To  be  young-  was  very  heaven!  " — Wordsworth. 

At  the  age  of  twenty-two,  in  the  year  1884,  this 
happy,  industrious  life  of  the  young  Louis  Botha  at 
his  father's  farm  in  Vrede  within  the  Orange  Free 
State  came  to  a  sudden  and  romantic  close.  A  great 
adventure  called  him  "over  the  hills  and  far  away"; 
and  he  responded  to  the  call  with  that  eager  thrill  of 
the  blood  which  has  made  him  march  to  the  sound  of 
the  guns  at  all  times  in  his  life. 

His  father,  Louis  the  elder,  had  died  in  July  of 
the  previous  year,  valiant  in  face  of  death.  "  The 
poor  old  man,"  wrote  his  son-in-law,^  who  was  with 
him  at  the  end,  "  was  quite  strong  still,  only  complain- 
ing of  want  of  breath.  He  wanted  to  be  moved  higher 
up  in  bed.     Mama  leant  over  him;  he  put  his  arms 

1  Mr.    Charles  J.    Pritchard,    an    Englishman. 


32  GENERAL  BOTHA 

round  her  neck,  raised  himself,  but  then  sank  back  in 
her  arms  and  expired  about  ten  minutes  after.  We 
buried  him  in  the  churchyard  at  Vrede  on  Saturday, 
and  more  than  a  hundred  of  his  friends  followed  him 
to  his  grave." 

Perhaps  it  was  this  death,  and  the  breaking  of 
threads  with  the  past  and  the  old  home  that  made  the 
young  Louis  Botha,  like  the  mourning  Lycidas,  ready 
for  the  impulse  to  seek  "  fresh  woods  and  pastures 
new." 

Five  years  before,  in  the  deep  night,  the  watch-dogs 
had  suddenly  started  barking  at  the  home  of  the 
Bothas  in  the  Orange  Free  State ;  and  the  family  woke 
to  the  sound  of  wheels.  It  was  the  flight  from  Natal 
of  two  of  Botha's  sisters  who  had  married  and  settled 
in  that  country.^  The  Zulu  King,  Cetewayo,  was  on 
the  warpath. 

The  sisters  stayed  under  the  parental  roof  through 
the  incidents  of  the  bitter  struggle  that  followed 
between  the  military  machine  of  the  Zulus  and  the 
slowly-roused  strength  of  the  British  Empire — the 
massacre  of  Isandhlwana,  the  killing  of  the  Prince 
Imperial,  the  victory  of  Ulundi,  and  the  supposed 
conquest  and  partition  of  Zululand  by  Sir  Garnet 
(afterwards  Viscount)  Wolseley  (1879). 

The  effect  of  these  events  on  the  career  of  the  young 
Botha  was  profound  and  far-reaching.  They  brought 
him  into  touch  with  the  Natal  Boers,  and,  above  all, 
with    Lukas    Meyer,  then    Landrost  of    Utrecht,  his 


YOUTH   AND   ADVENTURE  33 

father's  old  friend  and  leader  of  the  Dutch  across  the 
Drakensberg.  It  was  some  forty  years  since  Meyer 
had  been  forced  to  surrender  the  Republic  of  Natal 
to  the  British  power ;  and  now  he  once  more  hungered 
for  the  old  freedom.  It  was  in  frequent  talks  with 
the  older  man  that  Botha  caught  the  first  shining 
glimpses  of  his  new  horizon. 

Lukas  Meyer  from  the  first  took  a  great  interest 
in  the  young  Louis  Botha.  He  looked  after  the  now 
fatherless  youth  with  an  almost  paternal  affection.  It 
was  on  his  suggestion  that  Louis  and  his  friends  at 
Vrede  began  in  the  winters  of  the  early  'eighties  to 
take  their  sheep  for  pasture  across  the  Drakensberg 
mountains  down  to  the  warmer  coast-lands  still  in  the 
grip  of  the  Zulus,  the  most  formidable  military  power 
ever  founded  by  a  black  race,  and  dangerous  enough 
even  then  in  the  day  of  its  decay. ^ 

These  winter  "  treks  "  of  the  young  Botha  were  full 
of  peril.  For  Zululand  was  subdued  only  in  name. 
It  was  now  harried  by  scattered  bands  of  hungry 
savages  who  laughed  at  the  authority  of  the  thirteen 
chieftains  established  by  Wolseley  in  place  of  the 
banished  Cetewayo.     Great  Britain  was  too  busy  with 

1  Their  military  power  had  been  founded  eighty  years  before 
by  a  shrewd  Zuki  who  had  learnt  military  methods  by  watching- 
the  British  soldiers  training  at  Capetown.  The  terrible  military 
machine  forged  by  this  man — Dingiswayo — had  been  carried  to 
higher  perfection  by  Chaka,  Dingaan,  Panda,  and  Cetewayo. 
By  a  policy  of  steady  frightfulness  they  had  desolated  large 
parts  of  South  Africa. 

C 


34  GENERAL  BOTHA 

other  troubles  at  that  moment  ^  to  desire  the  responsi- 
bility of  governing  this  distant,  explosive  land.  But 
the  British  armies  had  destroyed  the  only  power  that 
counted  in  Zululand ;  and  all  that  was  left  was  a  dance 
of  death. 

The  most  bloodthirsty  of  all  the  ruffianly  bands 
which  at  this  moment  ravaged  Zululand  was  the  gang 
of  Mapelo.  His  men  were  well  mounted,  and  armed 
with  rifles.  Mapelo  himself  was  as  daring  as  he  was 
savage.  It  says  much  for  the  courage  of  the  young 
Botha  that,  in  spite  of  the  activity  of  this  wild  man, 
he  brought  his  sheep  across  the  mountains  in  1882. 
But  valour  flourishes  side  by  side  with  danger  as  the 
dock-leaf  by  the  side  of  the  nettle ;  there  was  a  lull  in 
Mapelo's  activities  at  the  moment;  and  a  plucky 
missionary "  had  returned  to  occupy  his  old  mission 
station  at  Hlobane  about  six  miles  from  Botha's  camp. 

It  was  on  a  tranquil  day  in  the  midst  of  this  South 
African  winter  that  a  native  rushed  into  Botha's  camp. 
He  breathlessly  warned  the  young  Boer  to  fly  and 
save  his  life.  Mapelo  was  "  out."  Only  an  hour  or 
two  previously  he  had  cut  the  throat  of  the  mission- 
ary; the  native  had  just  left  the  body  of  the  unhappy 
man  lying  still  warm  on  his  own  dining-room  table. 

Botha  had  little  time  to  make  up  his  mind.  But 
one  thing  was  clear — he  could  not  desert  his  sheep. 
Most  of  them  belonged  to  his  brothers.     So  he  began 

1  For  instance,   Ireland  and   Egypt. 
-  A  German  named  Schroeder. 


YOUTH  AND   ADVENTURE  35 

to  prepare  to  face  the  raiders.  Looking  at  his  ban- 
dolier he  found,  to  his  dismay,  that  he  had  only  one 
cartridge  left.  Scarcely  had  he  realised  this  when  a 
body  of  Zulu  horsemen  appeared  about  a  quarter  of 
a  mile  away  over  a  rise  of  ground  in  extended  order 
and  charged  towards  the  wagon,  waving  their  rifles 
over  their  heads  and  shouting  like  demons  possessed. 

Louis  Botha  rose  and  very  deliberately  mounted  the 
box-seat  of  his  wagon.  He  laid  his  rifle  in  a  con- 
spicuous place  next  to  him.  Then  he  proceeded,  with 
an  outward  calm  very  foreign  to  his  own  inner  feelings, 
to  light  a  match  and  apply  it  slowly  to  his  pipe. 
Looking  up  he  found  that  the  native  horsemen  had 
drawn  rein  in  a  cloud  of  dust  within  a  few  yards  of 
the  front  of  the  wagon.  They  were  halted  in  a  semi- 
circle. 

A  few  seconds  of  dead  silence  followed,  the  natives 
glaring  at  Botha  and  Botha  eyeing  them  with  a  steady 
gaze  of  surprise.  Then  Mapelo  advanced,  and  stated 
that  his  men  were  very  hungry  and  wanted  something 
to  eat.  Botha  gravely  demurred  at  this  stormy  way 
of  approach,  and  coolly  bargained  with  these  fierce 
invaders  of  his  peace.  At  last  he  agreed  to  give  them 
one  sheep  on  the  strict  condition  that  they  would  with- 
draw some  distance  from  his  camp  and  not  disturb 
him  again.  The  condition  was  accepted;  and  so 
ended  an  incident  which  Botha  has  always  described 
as  one  of  the  most  disturbing  in  his  whole  life. 

In  1883  the  British  Government,  still  shrinking  from 

c  2 


36  GENERAL  BOTHA 

full  responsibility,  tried  to  stem  the  tide  of  anarchy 
of  Zululand  by  sending  back  Cetewayo.  The  old 
King,  softened  by  contact  with  civilisation  and 
weakened  by  its  strong  drinks,  inspired  no  fear  in  his 
old  subjects.  The  spell  of  his  power  had  been 
shattered  by  his  banishment.  For  a  short  time  the 
chieftains  turned  from  the  work  of  mutual  slaughter 
to  a  combined  blood-hunt  of  their  former  master. 
Chased  into  a  native  reserve,  he  died  there  in  1884, 
not  without  suspicion  of  foul  play.  On  his  deathbed 
Cetewayo  appointed  as  his  successor  his  son  Dinizulu, 
a  youth  of  sixteen ;  and  finding  the  British  Government 
deaf  to  his  appeals,  he  sent,  on  behalf  of  his  son,  a 
dying  message  to  the  Boers.  It  was  this  message  that 
was  now  conveyed  to  the  Boers  living  on  the  border 
by  Nyama,  the  chief  Minister  of  the  old  King. 

The  Boers  were  in  no  mood  to  face  the  enterprise. 
They  were  ready  for  a  new  "  trek."  But  they  knew 
the  Zulus  well,  and  they  would  take  no  risks.  Before 
undertaking  to  support  Dinizulu  they  were  determined 
to  be  quite  sure  of  their  ground.  They  would  give 
their  services  only  on  terms  of  compensation ;  and  they 
were  resolute  that  the  terms  should  be  strictly  ascer- 
tained and  guaranteed. 

The  first  step  was  to  secure  the  person  of  the  young 

King  and  to  place  him  in  a  position  to  make  a  free 

bargain.      Two  Boers  ^  undertook    this    task.      They 

travelled  in  a  horsed  trap  right  through  the  heart  of 

1  Messrs.  Von  Staden  and  C.   F.   Meyer. 


YOUTH  AND   ADVENTURE  37 

Zululand,  to  Nkandhia,  entirely  unarmed,  and  very 
ostentatiously  on  "private  business."  The  country 
was  swarming  with  murderous  bands;  but  at  that  time 
a  divinity  still  hedged  the  person  of  a  white  man 
among  the  blacks  of  South  Africa,  and  they  passed 
unscathed  through  the  midst  of  these  ferocious  men. 
Dinizulu  was  found  and  conveyed  in  safety  to  the 
Transvaal  border,  at  the  Pivaan,  in  April,  1884. 

Here  a  verbal  agreement  was  entered  into  between 
the  Ministers  of  the  Prince  and  his  Boer  allies.  The 
Boers  generally  undertook  to  restore  Dinizulu  to  his 
kingdom  and  his  country  to  peace  on  condition  that, 
in  return,  they  were  to  receive  grants  of  land.  Early 
in  May,  1884,  a  small  commando  of  Boers  entered 
Zululand  as  the  first  step  towards  carrying  out  this 
agreement,  and  on  May  3  encamped  at  Tinta's  Drift 
on  the  Umfolosi,  about  five  miles  from  Vryheid. 

It  was  this  expedition  which,  on  the  persuasion  of 
Lukas  Meyer,  Louis  Botha  now  joined,  together  with 
his  friend  Cheere  Emmet,^  a  descendant  of  the  famous 
Robert  Emmet  who  had  laid  down  his  life  for  Irish 
freedom  less  than  a  century  before.  Like  the  sons  of 
the  old  patriarchs,  and  perhaps  with  a  conscious  regard 
for  their  example,  the  sons  of  the  Boer  farmers  were 
always  ready  to  go  forth  and  conquer  new  lands  for 
farming  and  settlement.  The  risks  counted  for  little. 
At  any  rate,  it  was  a  better  life  than  staying  on  the 

1  Directly  descended  from  Thoma  Eddis  Emmet,  the  brother 
of  Robert,  who  was  himself  unmarried. 


'"'OlJiU 


38  GENERAL   BOTHA 

old  farm  as  a  dependent  or  perhaps  sinking  to  the 
level  of  a  "  By-wooner."  ^  So  Botha  was  following 
along  the  lines  of  old  traditions  when  he  set  out  on 
his  journey. 

It  was  a  great  affair — this  setting  forth  into  the 
wilds  of  a  new  wave  of  wanderers.  The  young 
Boer  had  to  take  with  him  on  such  ventures  everything 
required  for  sustaining  life.  The  wagon  was  the  key 
to  the  undertaking— the  ship  of  the  great  rolling  veldt. 
It  became  the  mother's  duty  to  load  this  ship  with 
victuals  for  months  of  wandering;  and  well  did  Mrs. 
Botha  perform  this  last  duty  to  her  son.  Those  old 
Boer  wagons  were  wonderful  structures — little  less 
than  houses  on  wheels,  drawn  by  long  teams  of  oxen 
and  driven  by  Kaffirs,  the  floors  crammed  with  pro- 
visions, while,  above,  the  beds  were  slung  on  ropes 
like  hammocks. 

Once  started,  the  wagon  would  travel  by  night  and 
by  day,  "  outspanning  "  now  and  again  for  two  hours 
at  a  time  in  the  heat  of  noontide,  while  the  oxen  grazed 
on  the  veldt.  The  young  Boers  would  often  prefer  to 
journey  through  the  cool  of  the  night,  sleeping  them- 
selves while  the  Kaffirs  drove.  The  food  would  be 
of  the  simplest.  There  were  piles  of  rusks  baked  for 
weeks  before  the  start,  w^hile  the  long  strips  of  meat 
would  be  drying  out  of  the  sun  under  the  trees  to 
make  that  wonderful  "  biltong  "  which  is  the  staple 
food  of  the  Boer  on  the  march.     Then  there  would 

^  A  casual  agricultural  labourer,  with  no  stake  in  the  farm. 


YOUTH  AND   ADVENTURE  39 

be  casks  of  butter  and  sacks  of  potatoes — no  wonder 
that  the  Boer  loved  his  wagon !  But  beyond  the 
hammocks  there  was  no  furniture  except  the  indis- 
pensable Boer  rifle — the  Martini-Henry,  at  that  time 
the  terror  of  the  Zulus. 

At  first  little  more  than  a  hundred  men  gathered 
round  Lukas  Meyer.  But  volunteers  soon  flowed  in 
from  all  parts — from  the  Transvaal,  in  spite  of  the 
veto  of  the  Republican  Government;  from  Natal;  and 
from  the  Orange  Free  State.  Registers  were  opened 
for  the  due  record  of  the  names  of  the  volunteers; 
and  by  the  end  of  May  the  numbers  had  grown  to 
400.  The  register  was  then  closed,  and  eight  Boers 
were  chosen  as  an  impromptu  Government  to  preserve 
order  and  to  conduct  the  enterprise.  Everything  was 
done  by  rule  in  this  strange  expedition.  Later  on 
the  numbers  grew  to  800,  and  the  registers  were  opened 
again;  but  the  later  comers  were  to  receive,  as  was 
most  just,  smaller  grants  of  land. 

On  May  21  the  verbal  agreement  made  with  Dini- 
zulu  was  solemnly  ratified  at  a  great  Indaba  of  the 
loyal  chiefs,  and  Dinizulu  was  formally  crowned 
King  of  the  Zulus  in  the  presence  of  a  great 
concourse  of  his  followers  on  the  Nyatisberg  at  a 
farm  now  called  "  Zalf  Lager "  (Anointment  Camp) 
in  commemoration  of  this  historical  ceremony. 
Dinizulu  was  now  left  to  the  protection  of  his  chief 
Ministers,  and  the  Boers  proceeded  to  the  business 
of  making  his  Kingship  a  reality. 


40  GENERAL  BOTHA 

Messages  were  now  sent  to  the  rival  chieftains  in- 
forming them  of  this  coronation,  and  among  others 
to  Usibepu,  who  had  raised  himself  by  personal  ability 
and  success  in  war  to  be  virtual  master  of  Zululand. 
On  May  12  the  messenger  returned  with  a  tale  of 
welcome  from  the  crafty  chieftain,  who  professed  to 
hail  with  delight  a  return  of  peace  and  the  restoration 
of  the  kingdom  to  Dinizulu.  But  he  did  not  attend 
the  Indaba,  and  his  warm  message  was  followed  by 
the  news  of  his  murder  of  four  men  and  women 
belonging  to  the  Usutus,  the  tribe  that  supported  the 
dynasty  of  Cetewayo.  Here  was  a  challenge  writ  in 
blood. 

It  was  clear  now  that  Usibepu  intended  to  fight, 
and  that  if  Dinizulu  were  to  become  King  indeed,  his 
rebel  chieftain  must  be  crushed.  Lukas  Meyer  and 
his  Boers  had  already  advanced  to  Tabankulu;  and 
they  now  promised  to  advance  directly  against  Usi- 
bepu if  the  Ministers  of  Dinizulu  would  collect  an 
"  Impi "  of  Usutus.  At  the  summons  of  the  young 
King,  some  7,000  warriors  instantly  gathered  from 
the  caves  and  fastnesses  of  the  hills  and  forests  of 
Zululand — men  lean  with  famine  and  so  cowed  by 
defeat  that  flight  had  become  their  natural  gait.  No 
crops  had  been  sown  or  reaped  in  Zululand  for  many 
seasons;  and  these  men  had  lived  on  fruits,  roots,  or 
such  wild  animals  as  they  could  kill.  To  this  harassed 
and  battered  body  Lukas  Meyer  added  over  100 
picked  Boer  fighters  and  advanced  with  Louis  Botha 


YOUTH   AND   ADVENTURE  41 

and  his  young  companions  against  Usibepu  in  the  first 
week  of  June,  1884. 

The  wily  Zulu  chieftain  had  retired  with  his  warriors 
and  his  cattle  to  the  thorny  coverts  of  the  Ubombo, 
a  land  then  of  thick  bush  and  marshes.  There,  along 
the  banks  of  the  River  Umkusi,  he  concealed  his  men 
in  deep  and  difficult  ambushes  and  awaited  the 
approach  of  the  Boers. 

Meyer  advanced  slowly  and  cautiously,  dividing  his 
forces  into  three  bodies — on  his  left,  along  the  river 
banks,  sixteen  Europeans  with  a  detachment  of  Zulus 
under  the  chief  Mamese;  in  the  centre,  the  main  body 
under  his  own  command  following  the  tracks  of 
Usibepu's  retreat;  on  his  right,  a  company  of  native 
scouts. 

The  Zulu  rebel  chief  had  devised  a  very  ingenious 
plan  of  battle,  well  worthy  of  the  Zulu  genius  for  war. 
He  had  placed  a  body  of  men  on  the  river  slightly  in 
advance  of  his  own  central  position,  which  was  about 
a  thousand  yards  from  its  banks.  This  detachment 
was  to  attack  the  pursuing  impi  on  the  flank  while  it 
was  passing  along  the  track  of  this  retreat.  By  thus 
diverting  the  attention  of  Meyer's  forces  to  their  left 
flank,  this  attack  was  to  give  Usibepu  the  opportunity 
of  assaulting  the  Boers  from  the  unguarded  rear, 
forcing  them  on  to  the  river,  and  possibly  hemming 
them  in  against  its  banks. 

But  the  division  of  Meyer's  forces  entirely  spoilt 
this  plan.    Mamese's  impi  with  its  Europeans  attacked 


42  GENERAL   BOTHA 

the  Zulus  posted  along  the  river  just  when  they  were 
preparing  their  onslaught  against  the  flank  of  Meyer's 
column.  At  the  same  moment,  the  presence  of  the 
main  Zulu  column  was  revealed  by  their  own  careless- 
ness or  undisciplined  zeal.  Meyer  halted  and  dis- 
mounted his  men.  Usibepu's  ""impis,"  seeing  that 
they  were  discovered,  instantly  advanced  to  the  attack. 
Meyer's  Boers  met  their  thundering  charge  with  steady 
volleys  from  their  rifles.  The  charge  was  broken  : 
none  of  the  Zulus  reached  the  Boer  ranks  :  in  ten 
minutes  they  broke  and  fled. 

Meanwhile,  the  Usutu  loyalist  warriors,  hearing  the 
war-cry  of  their  enemies  and  that  abominable  clatter 
of  shields  and  kerries  which  spelt  slaughter  to  their 
ears,  instantly  turned  and  ran.  A  force  of  Boers 
mounted  and  rounded  them  up,  threatening  to  fire  into 
their  flying  ranks.  Finding  that  there  was  nowhere  to 
fly  to,  the  Usutus  turned  and  realised  that  their 
enemies  were  already  in  flight  also.  This  welcome  dis- 
covery effectively  restored  their  courage.  They  turned 
in  pursuit,  and  now  their  greyhound  condition  served 
them  well.  There  were  old  scores  to  wipe  out;  and  the 
rest  of  the  day's  work  could  safely  be  left  to  them. 

Such  was  Botha's  first  battle,  full  of  ruses  and 
stratagems,  of  the  kind  that  he  himself  loved  to  prac- 
tise in  later  days.  It  was  a  decisive  conflict.  It  gave 
Meyer's  force  complete  command  of  Zululand;  and 
after  that  everything  was  over  except  the  shouting,  the 
negotiating,  and  the  division  of  the  conquered  lands. 


CHAPTER   III 
THE    "NEW    REPUBLIC" 


CHAPTER    III 

THE    "new    republic" 

"Seeing  that  every  State  is  a  sort  of  association  and  every 
association  is  formed  for  the  attainment  of  some  good,  it  is 
evident  that  as  some  good  is  the  object  of  all  associations,  the 
highest  good  is  the  object  of  the  supreme  institution  of  all,  the 
State." — Aristotle's  Politics. 

Looking  round  at  the  world  after  their  victory  at 
Ubombo  the  Boer  pioneers  came  to  a  momentous 
decision.  They  resolved  to  found  a  new  State  to  be 
called  the  "  New  Republic." 

There  was  evidently  a  great  task  of  government  to 
be  faced. 

For,  instantly  the  battle  was  over,  the  fugitive  Zulus 
appeared  in  multitudes  from  every  rock  and  cranny 
of  the  land,  trains  of  women  and  children,  lank,  hag- 
gard men — carrying  their  simple  household  goods  on 
their  shoulders,  and  streaming  down  from  the  hills  to 
reoccupy  the  plains.  Kraals  sprang  up  like  mush- 
rooms on  the  calcined  ground  of  their  burnt  villages ; 
and  soon  the  glint  of  the  hoe  in  the  August  sun 
recalled  the  joy  of  Tubal  Cain. 


46  GENERAL   BOTHA 

These  people  must  be  governed.  They  could  not 
be  allowed  to  sink  back  into  misery  and  anarchy.  So, 
in  the  first  week  of  August,  the  "  New  Republic  "  was 
started,  and  a  brand-new  Constitution  was  drawn  up, 
with  a  Volksraad  of  twelve  members,  a  President,  a 
General,  a  set  of  laws,  and  even  a  law  court.  A  Judge 
was  borrowed,  and  an  Executive  was  appointed.^ 
General  Joubert,  the  famous  Transvaaler,  was  asked 
to  become  President.  On  his  refusal,  Lukas  Meyer 
was  appointed. 

Surely  one  of  the  most  rapid  pieces  of  State-making 
that  the  world  has  ever  seen ! 

Louis  Botha  was  still  too  young  to  be  a  ruler  of 
men ;  but  he  was  appointed  one  of  the  Commissioners 
for  the  cutting  up  of  the  ceded  territory  into  the  farms 
promised  to  the  registered  Boers.  He  was  employed 
in  this  work  for  over  a  year.  Some  800  farms  were 
inspected  by  himself  and  his  colleagues  and  measured, 
sometimes  by  the  simple  old  process  of  letting  the 
owners  ride  round  the  ground  at  a  slow  walk.  It  was 
impossible  to  satisfy  everyone — some  of  the  farms  had 
to  be  fixed  in  remote  and  desolate  places;  and  their 
owners  gave  expression  to  their  feelings  by  such  names 
as  "  Jericho "  and  "  Thule."  Botha  himself  was 
fortunate.    He  had  drawn  a  farm  named  "  Fort  Louis  " 

^  State  Secretary,  D.  J.  Esselen  ;  Treasurer  and  Registrar, 
J.  R.  Bell;  Attorney-General,  J.  Henderson;  Native  Commis- 
sioner, R.  Wilhelm  ;    Landrost,  A.  von  Levetzow. 


THE  ''NEW  REPUBLIC"  47 

(after  the  Prince  Imperial)  near  Babawango.  But  it 
happened  that  a  Boer  who  had  drawn  a  farm  near 
Vryheid  and  close  to  the  Emmets  particularly  desired 
an  exchange.  His  relations  lived  near  "  Fort  Louis"; 
and  Botha  wished  to  be  near  the  Emmets.  The  bar- 
gain was  struck  to  the  advantage  and  satisfaction  of 
all  parties;  and  thus  Botha  came  into  possession  of 
the  beautiful  farm  which  he  was  destined  to  occupy  for 
the  next  fifteen  years. 

These  activities  as  Commissioner  of  Lands  kept 
Louis  Botha  away  from  the  centre,  and  he  was,  there- 
fore, not  then  involved  in  the  difficult  and  prolonged 
diplomatic  fight  for  existence  into  which  the  "  New 
Republic "  now  entered.  The  first  care  of  the  new 
Government  was  to  safeguard  their  position  with  Dini- 
Zulu  and  his  Ministers.  On  August  16,  1884,  the 
Zulus  were  sent  for,  and  formal  negotiations  began 
with  the  object  of  defining  precisely  the  extent  of  the 
land  ceded  to  the  Boers  and  the  extent  of  their 
authority.  The  King  was  assisted  by  Mr.  W.  Grant, 
of  the  Aborigines'  Protection  Society.  After  pro- 
longed discussion  and  explanation  a  settlement  was 
arrived  at,  signed  by  all  parties,  and  published  in  both 
the  Natal  and  the  Transvaal  newspapers.  It  guaranteed 
to  the  Boers  no  fewer  than  3,000,000  acres  of  land 
and  a  general  undefined  control  over  the  whole  of 
Zululand.^ 

This  was  too  much  for  the  surrounding  States,  both 
1  See  the  full  agreement  set  forth  in  Appendix  I. 


48  GENERAL  BOTHA 

Boer  and  British.  The  Orange  Free  State,  not  being 
directly  concerned,  had  agreed  to  recognise  the  "  New 
Republic."  But  neither  the  Transvaal  nor  Natal  would 
acknowledge  its  right  to  exist  as  an  independent  State. 
The  British  Government,  indeed,  issued  no  direct  veto. 
Lukas  Meyer  visited  Pietermaritzburg  in  October, 
1886,  to  explain  the  agreement  to  the  Governor.  No 
attempt  was  made  to  dispute  the  legitimacy  of  the 
agreement  with  Dinizulu.  But  the  British  refused 
absolutely  to  sanction  the  general  claim  to  control 
Zululand;  and  in  1886  they  placed  a  final  ban  on  that 
clause  of  the  agreement  by  proclaiming  Zululand 
within  the  British  sphere  of  influence.  There  was 
another  definite  limit  imposed.  When,  in  July  of 
1885,  some  more  enterprising  Boers  began  to  lay  out 
a  township  in  St.  Lucia  Bay,  naming  it  Eugenie  after 
the  French  Empress,  once  more  the  Island  Empire 
roused  herself  from  slumber.  Stretching  forth  a  long 
arm,  Great  Britain  firmly  thrust  back  the  Boers  from 
access  to  her  sacred  seas.^ 

The  troubles  of  the  "New  Republic"  did  not  end 
there.  In  1887  Dinizulu  entered  upon  the  course  of 
intrigue  between  Boer  and  Briton  so  tempting  to  the 
wily  Zulu  nature.  His  presence  was  demanded  in 
Vryheid,  and  a  commando  was  sent  to  fetch  him  from 
his  residence  on  Boer  territory.     He  fled  into  British 

'  The  matter  was  settled  by  the  ^rant  of  an  equivalent  amount 
of  land  in  the  interior,  which  consoled  the  Boers  as  amounting 
to  a  "  sort  of  "  recognition  of  the  New  Republic. 


THE  "NEW  REPUBLIC"  49 

Zululand,  where  he  soon  after  entangled  himself  in 
the  disturbances  which  led  to  his  exile. 

This  event  decided  the  Executive;  for  it  removed 
the  only  safe  guarantee  of  their  independence.  A 
movement  was  started  for  annexation  to  the  Trans- 
vaal, and  only  just  got  ahead  of  a  similar  movement 
of  annexation  to  Natal.  The  annexation  to  the  Trans- 
vaal was  swiftly  arranged  by  Lukas  Meyer,  and  in 
July,  1888,  the  "New  Republic"  closed  its  brief 
existence  and  became,  by  easy  and  almost  unconscious 
transition,  a  District  or  Magistracy  of  the  South 
African  Republic  with  two  members — later  on  four 
— in  the  Volksraad.  The  little  State  carried  a 
surplus  of  ;£6,ooo  into  the  Transvaal  Treasury,  a 
creditable  end  for  a  country  with  a  total  revenue  of 
i;i  5,000. 

Louis  Botha,  at  any  rate,  had  done  his  best  to  up- 
hold the  pillars  of  the  little  Republic.  When  he  had 
finished  his  work  as  Commissioner  of  Lands  and 
returned  to  Vryheid,  he  found  the  capital  of  the 
Republic  growing  rapidly.  The  houses  were  being 
built  with  that  rapidity  which  fills  the  atmosphere  of 
a  new  human  settlement  with  some  of  the  magic  of 
springtime.  Already  in  January,  1885,  it  is  recorded 
that  the  "  village  clocks  were  looking  very  pretty,"  and 
that  the  foundations  of  the  public  buildings  were 
already  visible.^ 

But  to  secure  the  new  State,  stern  work  was  still 
^  See  Natal  Mercury,  1885,  passim. 

D 


50  GENERAL   BOTHA 

needed.  Taxes  had  to  be  collected  and  justice  had 
to  be  executed.  The  sale  of  the  sites  at  Vryheid  was 
not  likely  to  supply  enough  money  to  run  the  State. 
A  hut-tax  had  to  be  imposed  on  the  natives — always  a 
difficult  tax  to  collect  and  explain.  A  Boer,  appointed 
as  Field  Cornet  and  collector  of  taxes  in  the  wildest 
regions  of  the  Ubombo  wildernesses,  fought  shy  of 
that  dangerous  duty.  Botha  volunteered.  He  held 
this  difficult  office  from  1886  to  1894.  As  Field  Cornet 
he  was  a  local  official  of  considerable  power  in  the  old 
Dutch  colonial  organisation.  He  had  to  keep  the 
military  roll,  having  the  duty  to  register,  summon,  and 
assemble  all  men  liable  to  military  service  in  time  of 
war.^  In  1894  he  was  appointed  as  Special  Native 
Commissioner  in  Swaziland.  There  he  resided  for  a 
whole  year  (1894). 

Thus  did  Botha  serve  his  hard  and  strenuous 
apprenticeship  in  public  duties. 

Before  entering  upon  this  hard  and  exacting  life, 
Botha  married.  After  the  victory  over  the  Zulu  rebels 
he  had  returned  home  to  VreSe  in  the  Free  State 
to  fetch  his  bride  and  take  her  back  to  his  new 
home. 

The  girl  of  his  choice  was  Annie  Emmet,  the  sister 
of  Cheere  Emmet,  his  comrade  in  peace  and  war. 
Thus  in  happy  wedlock  Botha  forged  a  golden  link 

1  The  Burghers  were  compelled  to  be  on  the  roll,  and  if  they 
neg-lected  to  respond  to  the  Field  Cornet's  summons,  they  were 
liable  to  fine  and  imprisonment  and  might  lose  their  votes. 


THE  "NEW  REPUBLIC"  51 

between  sunny  South  Africa  and  that  distressful  island 
in  the  far-off  grey  Atlantic. 

The  story  of  Botha's  engagement  to  Annie  Emmet 
is  one  of  those  love  romances  which  we  like  to  think 
of  as  the  special  pride  of  the  free  white  races.  As 
a  young  girl,  Annie  Emmet  had  been  the  life  and  soul 
of  the  house  on  the  farm  of  her  father,  John  Emmet. 
She  had  been  already  an  active  helper  in  the  day-to- 
day work,  even  looking  after  the  grass-burning,  one 
of  the  most  difficult  tasks  on  a  South  African  farm. 
She  was  South  African  born,  but  her  Irish  blood  came 
out  vividly  in  her  character — for  she  was  always 
graceful  and  charming,  full  of  sparkling  wit  and 
humour,  already  a  great  favourite  in  that  free  young 
life  of  the  open  veldt.  From  early  days  she  showed 
her  daring  and  independence.  When  almost  a  child 
she  had  drifted  into  an  engagement  with  a  man  for 
whom  she  ceased  to  care  as  she  grew  to  years  of  dis- 
cretion. Her  parents  tried  to  bind  her  to  this  youthful 
pledge;  but  Annie,  refusing  to  sacrifice  her  life  to  a 
childish  caprice,  left  her  home  and  trusted  to  her  own 
resources.  She  lived  at  a  well-known  school  called 
"  The  Home  "  at  Bloemfontein  as  a  pupil  teacher  for 
three  years,  acquiring  there,  perhaps,  that  wide  sym- 
pathy for  the  humble  worker  which  characterises  her 
to-day. 

When  she  returned  home  she  met  the  young  Louis 
Botha  as  her  brother's  special  friend,  and  there  sprang 
up  between  them  a  deep  attachment  which  soon  ripened 

D  2 


52  GENERAL   BOTHA 

into  love.  It  was  at  this  budding  moment  in  Botha's 
life  that  his  mother,  Mrs.  Louis  Botha — never  quite 
the  same  since  her  husband's  death — died  so  suddenly 
that  the  children  had  scarcely  time  to  reach  her  bed- 
side. Botha  returned  from  his  expedition  to  a 
saddened  home ;  and  as  there  was  now  no  tie  to  keep 
him  at  Vrede,  it  was  decided  that  the  marriage  should 
take  place  immediately  so  that  he  could  take  Annie 
Emmet  back  with  him  to  the  New  Republic.  There  was 
a  quiet  wedding;  a  honeymoon  in  the  old  home;  and 
then  the  first  long  "  trek."  Travelling  in  their  slow- 
moving  wagon,  the  young  couple  passed  across  the 
Drakensberg  by  way  of  Laing's  Nek,  journeyed  along 
beneath  the  fateful  shadow  of  Majuba  Hill,  and  then 
down  the  long  valley  through  the  lower  hills  until  they 
reached  their  new  home  at  Vryheid. 

Here,  then,  in  this  land  of  last-born  freedom,  Louis 
Botha  and  his  wife  settled  down  as  pioneers,  with,  as 
neighbours,  the  Lukas  Meyers,  the  family  of  the  State 
President,  and  the  Emmets.  They  were  in  the  newest 
of  new  countries.  It  was  for  them  to  carry  into  this 
land  that  tradition  of  orderly  and  industrious  living  for 
which  their  race  had  as  a  whole  stood  hitherto  in  South 
Africa.  It  now  became  their  task  to  help  and 
encourage  the  scattered  white  settlers  in  all  those 
difficulties  and  depressions  which  come  to  human 
beings  when  they  are  living  without  the  help  of  well- 
trodden  conventions  or  ordered  government.  They 
were  in  the  position  of  people  on  a  ship  at  sea,  where 


THE  ''NEW  REPUBLIC" 


53 


character  asserts  itself  and  develops  in  a  way  unknown 
to  the  well-guarded  inhabitants  of  great  cities.  It 
was  in  this  life  and  under  these  conditions  that  the 
qualities  of  Louis  Botha  grew  to  maturity. 

The  young  settlers  had  to  start  everything  for  them- 
selves from  the  beginning.  At  first  they  lived  in  a 
four-roomed  cottage;  then  they  gradually  built  for 
themselves  one  of  those  large  and  capacious  farms 
which  in  those  days  almost  took  the  place  in  South 
Africa  of  the  castles  which  landowners  in  the  Middle 
Ages  built  in  early  England.  Louis  Botha's  farm, 
indeed,  was  for  a  time  the  centre  of  government  for 
his  district.  With  that  strange  innate  faculty  of 
leadership  which  belongs  instinctively  to  some  men, 
he  stepped  in  a  moment  into  the  position  of  a  kind  of 
local  chief  to  his  district.  He  acted  as  judge  and 
ruler.  He  even  opened  on  his  farm  an  impromptu 
post  office,  to  which  all  the  letters  from  Vryheid  were 
brought  to  be  sorted.  The  clerks  lived  on  the  pre- 
mises. Thus  he  became  the  recognised  adviser  and 
counsellor  of  the  settlers  around  him.  They  came  to 
him  in  all  their  troubles.  He  led  them  and  guided 
them  in  ordinary  times ;  and  in  times  of  crisis  his  was 
the  deciding  voice. 

We  must  not  figure  the  government  of  this  young 
Republic  as  touched  with  any  of  the  grandeur  or 
dignity  that  attaches  to  European  Governments.  The 
Councils  sat  in  the  only  hotel  and  sometimes  debated 
in  the  bar.     There  was  no  law  of  extradition,  and  so 


54  GENERAL   BOTHA 

a  varied  population  drifted  in,  not  always  easy  to 
control. 

It  was  a  strange,  hand-to-mouth  existence,  making 
a  daily  call  on  a  man's  best  powers.  Probably  Botha 
could  not  have  asserted  his  authority  if  he  had  not 
been  the  ideal  of  all  that  the  young  Boers  loved  and 
admired  most — a  splendid  rider,  a  magnificent  shot, 
a  man  famous  for  his  daring  and  initiative.  At  that 
time  he  was  very  tall,  thin,  and  bony,  like  an  athlete 
ready  for  any  contest.  He  was  especially  famed  for 
his  skill  in  training  young  wild  horses,  and  perhaps 
there  is  no  art  better  calculated  to  prepare  men  for 
human  government. 

It  was,  indeed,  during  Louis  Botha's  farming  life 
at  Vryheid  that  an  incident  occurred  in  his  dealings 
with  animals  which  nearly  cost  him  his  life.  His 
brother,  Chris  Botha,  one  day  came  to  pay  him  a  visit. 
There  was  a  young  bull  which  was  a  special  favourite 
of  Louis  Botha's,  and  he  used  often  to  go  and  talk 
to  the  bull  and  scratch  its  neck.  Louis  and  Chris 
were  in  the  enclosure  together,  and  Louis  turned  his 
back  on  the  bull  and  engaged  in  conversation  with 
his  brother  Chris.  The  young  bull  was  seized  with 
jealousy,  and,  rushing  at  Louis,  tossed  him  and  drove 
one  of  his  horns  under  a  rib.  Chris,  a  man  of  greaf 
strength,  gripped  the  bull's  horns  and  held  on  with 
the  fierceness  of  one  who  is  face  to  face  with  death. 
Then  the  Kafhrs  came  and  secured  the  bull  with  ropes. 
As  soon  as  he  could  leave  the  bull,  Chris  ran  to  Louis 


THE   ''NEW  REPUBLIC  55 

and  picked  him  up.  He  had  been  gored  right  through 
the  ribs  and  stunned.  Chris  thought  that  his  brother 
was  dead.  He  went  straight  to  the  house,  fetched  a 
gun,  and  shot  the  bull.  Happily,  Louis  was  then,  as 
now,  of  a  strong  constitution,  and  he  made  a  wonderful 
recovery  from  his  injuries,  though  the  effects  were  felt 
for  years  afterwards. 

It  was  a  wonderful  farm — this  which  Louis  Botha 
built  at  Vryheid.  It  stood  near  a  river,  and  was 
named  by  him  "  Waterval."  He  planted  lines  of  trees 
along  the  avenues  of  approach  which  he  laid  out.  He 
collected  into  the  capacious  house  all  his  old  family 
treasures  and  portraits,  and  made  it  a  very  beautiful 
and  well-beloved  centre  for  his  young  and  growing 
family.  There  four  children  were  born — two  boys  and 
two  girls.  Unhappily,  this  beautiful  home  was  burnt 
to  the  ground  during  the  South  African  War.  With 
his  characteristic  refusal  to  disturb  old  memories, 
Louis  Botha  has  never  since  revisited  the  site  of  this 
farm. 

Looking  back,  this  life  springs  once  more  into  vivid 
movement  like  the  happy  past  in  Maeterlinck's  "  Land 
of  Memory" — the  merry,  busy,  eager  young  family — 
the  gatherings  of  the  young  settlers,  and  the  settlers' 
children — the  atmosphere  of  mingled  peril  and  hope 
— of  planning  and  building,  in  a  country  where  the 
future  filled  the  horizon  with  golden  mists  of  promise. 
For  this  life,  with  its  demands  for  gaiety  and  vigour, 
the    young    Mrs.    Botha  was    splendidly    fitted.      A 


56  GENERAL  BOTHA 

delightful  mother  to  her  children,  she  also  had  energy 
to  make  "  Waterval "  a  centre  for  the  pioneers  around. 
Her  charm  and  social  aptitude  gave  to  Botha's  life 
that  serene  background  which  is  the  best  aid  to  a  man 
increasingly  burdened  with  affairs. 

In  1895,  Louis  Botha  stood  as  Vryheid  candidate 
for  the  second  Transvaal  Volksraad,  Lukas  Meyer 
being  already  then  member  in  the  first  Volksraad.  He 
fought  against  a  powerful  official  Krugerite  candidate, 
one  Birkinstok,  and  was  returned  at  the  head  of  the 
poll.  It  was  a  sensational  victory  for  the  young  man, 
and  a  great  beginning  for  a  political  career.  The 
result  now  drew  him  within  the  inner  circle  of  that 
conflict  of  races  already  (in  1895)  working  towards 
such  tragic  and  momentous  issues;  for  from  this  time 
forward  he  had  to  live  during  six  months  of  the  year 
in  Pretoria.  He  was  obliged  to  resign  his  Field 
Cornetcy  and  to  hand  over  his  farming  to  managers. 

Scarcely  had  he  entered  into  politics  when  South 
Africa  was  startled  with  the  tremendous  challenge  of 
that  ill-starred  adventure — the  "  Jameson  Raid."  The 
story  of  the  "  New  Republic  "  will  have  taught  us  that 
Africa  is  not  Europe.  The  formative  period  of  a  con- 
tinent must  not  be  judged  by  the  standards  of  fixed 
and  ordered  communities — if,  indeed,  any  such  can 
still  be  said  to  exist.  But  the  evil  of  the  Jameson 
Raid  to  Botha  and  his  group  was  that  it  came  just 
when  they  were  pleading  and  wishing  for  peace  against 
the  rooted  suspicions  of  the  old  Dutch  party.     The 


THE  <'NEW  REPUBLIC"  57 

event  fed  those  suspicions  and  quickened  the  fever 
in  the  blood  of  South  Africa.  From  that  moment  the 
old  order,  challenged  at  its  centre,  began  definitely  to 
arm.  The  work  of  Botha's  party  became  a  forlorn 
hope. 

The  sense  of  this  catastrophe  gave  point  to  Botha's 
anger.  He  always  took  a  severe  view  of  the  enter- 
prise which  ended  in  Jameson's  capture  at  Doornkop. 
It  is  one  of  the  paradoxes  of  South  African  history 
that  Botha  was  definitely  in  favour  of  shooting  Dr. 
Jameson  and  the  leaders  of  the  raid,  while  Kruger 
was  in  favour  of  mercy.  Thus  for  the  first  time  did 
Botha  display  that  sense  of  the  rigour  of  war  which 
often  goes  along  with  the  profoundest  love  of  peace. 

But  in  spite  of  the  "  Jameson  Raid,"  both  before  and 
after,  Botha  did  not  despair  of  peace.  He  steadily 
gave  his  support  in  the  Volksraad  to  the  party  of 
opposition  to  President  Kruger.  He  was  a  faithful 
follower  of  Joubert,  Kruger's  great  progressive  rival. 
Throughout  these  last  years  of  peace  (from  1896  to 
1899)  he  steadily  voted  against  Kruger's  methods  of 
rule,  especially  the  habit  of  raising  money  by  granting 
concessions  for  cash.  He  spoke  now  and  again  in  the 
Volksraad;  but  he  already  had  the  rare  and  precious 
gift  of  silence  except  when  he  really  had  something 
to  say.  He  was  already  in  training  for  the  larger 
career  in  that  strange,  narrow  school  of  the  old  Repub- 
lican assembly.  Botha  was  already  fitting  himself  for 
the  future  guidance  of  South  Africa. 


58  GENERAL   BOTHA 

It  was  while  he  and  his  friends  were  still  striving 
to  preserve  the  friendship  of  the  two  white  races  that 
there  came  the  sudden  letting  out  of  the  many  waters 
of  strife. 

On  October  9,  1899,  Kruger  sent  to  the  British 
Government  the  famous  Ultimatum  which  meant  war. 

Even  at  that  supreme  moment  Botha  cast  his  voice 
for  peace.  He  was  one  of  that  small  body  of  seven 
Republicans  who  voted  in  the  Volksraad  against  the 
Ultimatum.^ 

1  The  others  were  De  la  Rey,  Lukas  Meyer,  Barnard, 
Loveday,  Depening-,  and  Labuschagne.  Lukas  Meyer  was  then 
Chairman  of  the  First  Volksraad. 


CHAPTER  IV 

WAR     (1899-1900) 


To  face  />age  6i. 


CHAPTER    IV 

WAR    ( 1 899-1900) 

"Tumultuous  wars 
Shall  kin  with  kin  and  kind  with  kind  confound." 

— Richard  II. 

There  was  probably  no  man  in  South  Africa  who 
less  desired  war  in  the  autumn  of  1899  than  Louis 
Botha.  He  was  even  slow  to  believe  in  its  possibility. 
A  few  weeks  before  the  outbreak  of  war  the  people 
at  Pretoria  had  already  begun  to  fly.  Botha  was  asked 
whether  he  would  advise  people  to  leave.  "  Well, 
they  can  run  away,"  he  said,  "  but  I'm  not  going  to 
move.  I  think  war  will  be  avoided."  It  was  then 
suggested  to  him  that  he  would  not  have  to  fight  as 
he  was  a  Member  of  the  Volksraad.  "  No  !  "  he  said. 
"  If  there  is  a  war,  I  shall  be  the  first  to  go,  but  we 
still  hope  to  avoid  war." 

This  was  certainly  Botha's  aim  right  up  to  the  eve 
of  strife.  Like  Falkland  in  our  English  Civil  War, 
he  ingeminated  peace ;  but,  unlike  Falkland,  when  the 
war  once  broke  out  he  turned  his  back  on  peace  until 
a  decision  had  been  reached  by  way  of  war. 


62  GENERAL   BOTHA 

For  Botha  and  his  family  this  was  actually  a  civil 
war.  Several  of  his  sisters  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
married  Englishmen,  and  some  of  the  sons  of  those 
marriages  fought  on  the  English  side.  No  one  can 
quite  appreciate  the  real  horror  of  that  great  struggle 
unless  they  realise  this  rending  and  cleaving  of 
families  which  took  place  from  end  to  end  of  South 
Africa. 

Botha  now  (in  October,  1899)  joined  Lukas  Meyer's 
commando  and  marched  with  him  towards  the  frontier 
of  Natal. 

The  causes  of  the  desperate  strife  between  Dutch 
and  English  which  opened  with  that  march  lie  far  back 
in  the  history  of  South  Africa — in  the  division  of  race, 
in  the  rivalry  of  racial  ambitions  for  power. 

It  is  not  for  us  here  to  revive  the  issues  which  were 
then  valorously  and  chivalrously  fought  to  a  finish  by 
two  heroic  races. 

"  Whatever  is,  is  best,"  sang  Pope.  It  is  good  to 
extend  that  view  to  the  past  of  mankind  and  say, 
"Whatever  was,  was  best."  Perhaps  by  no  other 
method  than  this  sharp  surgery  of  war  could  South 
Africa  have  been  united  in  our  times. 

When  Botha  marched  with  the  Boers  into  Natal  he 
held  no  great  position  in  the  invading  forces.  He  was 
just  a  Field  Cornet  in  the  Transvaal  Army,  under  the 
supreme    command   of    General    Joubert,   then  Com- 


WAR  63 

mander-in-Chief  of  the  South  African  Republic.  All 
that  Botha  knew  of  war  had  been  learnt  in  his  fight 
for  Dinizulu  in  Zululand.  Like  most  of  the  Boers, 
Botha  was  just  a  soldier-farmer  going  out  to  war.  As 
a  Field  Cornet,  he  held  some  small  disciplinary 
powers  over  the  commando  of  Vryheid,  but  throughout 
the  earlier  period  of  the  war  the  authority  of  the  Boer 
officers  was  always  a  doubtful  quantity,  and  rather 
political  than  military. 

Thus  Botha  fought  almost  as  a  private  soldier  under 
Lukas  Meyer  in  those  early  battles  on  the  borders  of 
Natal  and  the  Transvaal — Talana  Hill,  Elandslaagte, 
Dundee — when  the  Boer  army  so  signally  failed  to 
convert  success  into  victory.  But  even  in  that  posi- 
tion his  military  genius  soon  began  to  show  its  light. 
It  was  the  very  looseness  of  the  Boer  war  discipline, 
with  the  free  play  that  it  gives  to  personal  leading, 
that  enabled  him  to  show  his  work  in  the  field.  At  the 
battle  of  Dundee  he  played  a  leading  part  along  with 
old  Gert  de  Jaeger,  and  would  probably  have  sur- 
rounded General  Penn  Symons  if  he  had  been  properly 
supported.  Two  days  later  the  Boers  would  quite 
possibly  have  intercepted  General  Yule  in  his  wonder- 
ful march  from  Dundee  to  Ladysmith  if  Botha's  advice 
had  been  taken. 

At  the  opening  of  any  war  the  authority  of  the  older 
officers  is  always  paramount.  It  is  only  gradually  that 
men  perceive  the  vital  importance  in  war  of  youth  and 
all  that  goes  with  it — energy,  passion,  initiative,  and 


64  GENERAL  BOTHA 

that  open-mindedness  which  is  so  often  actually  killed 
by  the  timidity  bred  of  experience.  War  is  the  fertile 
mother  of  surprise  and  novelty  :  it  is,  perhaps,  the 
one  sphere  of  human  activity  where  experience  counts 
least.  Age,  too,  is  a  form  of  vested  interest;  and  it 
powerfully  resists  the  appeal  of  the  coming  generation 
that  knocks  at  the  door. 

Thus  it  is  not  remarkable  that  Botha  came  so  slowly 
to  the  front :  the  miracle  rather  is  that  when  he 
once  began  to  come  forward  he  advanced  so  swiftly. 
It  is  a  high  credit  to  the  older  Boers  that  when  Botha's 
military  genius  shone  out  beyond  denial  or  challenge, 
they  so  readily  gave  him  room. 

The  first  undeniable  proof  of  Botha's  powers  was 
the  battle  of  Rietfontein  on  October  30.  In  that 
battle  Sir  George  White's  army  was  driven  back  into 
the  basin  of  Ladysmith,  his  main  column  drawn  into 
a  cross-fire,  his  right  driven  back  in  disorder,  and  his 
left  entirely  captured  at  Nicholson's  Nek.  To  these 
astonishing  results  Botha's  strategy  was  reputed  to 
have  contributed  much;  and  his  reputation  steadily 
rose  with  success.  He  was  now  readily,  in  spite  of 
his  youth,  granted  a  right  to  speak  in  the  "  Krijgs- 
raad."i 

But  he  was  not,  of  course,  allowed  a  free  hand  in 
regard  to  Ladysmith.  He  was  still  without  any  mili- 
tary rank;  and  he  had  to  sit  idly  by  watching  the 
Boer  Generals  allow  the  golden  hours  slip  by  them, 

^  Council  of  W'ar. 


WAR  65 

and  until  the  attack  became  a  siege,  the  siege  a 
blockade,  and  the  blockade  slowly  lapsed  into  a 
defence.  The  "  elder  Generals  "  of  the  War  Council 
only  shook  their  heads  and  smiled  at  the  wild  rash- 
ness of  this  junior  who  really  wanted  to  capture  the 
beleaguered  town,  and  saw  that  the  siege  might 
become,  as  it  did,  an  entanglement  for  the  Boers  quite 
as  much  as  for  the  British.  For  these  old  Boer 
Generals  of  the  war  of  1881  had  little  Ideas  of  strategy 
beyond  the  defensive. 

The  Commander-in-Chief,  General  Joubert,  had 
opposed  the  war,  and  had  no  real  heart  in  the  plan 
of  invasion.  His  essential  idea  was  to  keep  on  the 
defensive.  A  kindly,  tender-hearted  old  man  of  a 
true  Christian  type,  he  even  shrank  from  the  shedding 
of  blood — a  trait  admirable  in  a  man,  but  embarrassing 
in  a  General.  It  was,  perhaps,  fortunate  for  us  that 
Joubert  was  still  in  chief  command  during  these  critical 
early  days  of  the  Natal  campaign,  when  the  Boers 
actually  outnumbered  us  and  could,  with  proper 
military  energy  and  daring,  have  swept  down  to  the 
sea  and  held  South  Africa  against  our  landing.  Botha 
saw  this  and  was  all  for  a  vigorous  and  daring  exercise 
of  aggressive  power.  All  that  Joubert  did  was  to 
lead  a  small  raiding  force  into  Natal  and  to  lead  them 
back  again. 

Through  October  and  November  (1899)  Botha 
looked  on  with  a  keen  and  hungry  eye  at  the  blunders 
of  his  superiors.     He  often  felt  inclined  to  weep  with 

E 


66  GENERAL   BOTHA 

vexation  as  he  saw  the  chances  of  victory  slip  away 
from  his  own  people.  He  watched  the  day  of  invasion 
vanish.  He  saw^  the  Boer  army  diminish  from  a 
majority  to  a  minority  as  the  troops  gathered  from 
every  part  of  the  world-Empire  whose  power  they 
had  challenged.  It  looked  as  if  the  dream  of  victory 
would  quickly  give  way  to  the  reality  of  dire  defeat. 

Then,  suddenly,  came  Botha's  opportunity.  At  the 
end  of  November  Joubert  was  thrown  from  his  horse 
by  the  explosion  of  a  shell  and  became  seriously  ill 
from  the  shock.  The  old  General  was  unable  to 
continue  in  the  fighting  line.  He  must  go  to  Pretoria 
to  recover.  A  successor  must  be  found  to  meet  the 
imminent  advance  from  the  south  of  Sir  Redvers 
BuUer  with  his  great  army  for  the  relief  of  Ladysmith. 
Always  generous  in  his  estimates  and  utterly  free  from 
jealousy,  the  old  man  recommended  Botha  for  the 
task. 

The  Commandants  met  and  consulted.  Unhappily, 
they  did  not  go  so  far  at  once  as  to  appoint  Botha  full 
Commandant-in-Chief.  They  kept  many  other  Com- 
manders still  in  power  at  different  points  on  the  lines. 
But  they  chose  Louis  Botha  to  be  Acting  Assistant 
General  for  the  defence  of  the  southern  lines  against 
Buller ;  and  thus  it  came  that  he  was  Commander  of 
the  Boer  forces  at  the  battle  of  Colenso. 

This  appointment  was  really  a  remarkable  occur- 
rence, equally  creditable  both  to  Botha  and  to  the 
Commandants.     For  among  the  Boers  age  is  held  in 


WAR  67 

great  respect,  and  most  of  the  Boer  Commandants 
are  old  men.  It  was  no  small  matter  that  these  old 
men  should  have  all  agreed  to  set  up  a  much  younger 
man — for  Botha  was  then  only  thirty-eight  years  of 
age — over  themselves.  Such  a  decision  could  only  be 
accounted  for  by  a  display  of  genius  beyond  dispute. 

It  was  such  genius  that  Botha  was  now  to  display, 
beyond  all  cavil  or  challenge,  in  the  battle  of  Colenso. 

Colenso  seems  a  small  affair  nowadays,  an  affair 
of  pigmies,  not  to  be  mentioned  in  the  presence  of 
Titanic  strifes.  Yet  in  some  respects  it  marks  an 
epoch. 

For  it  was  the  first  battle  that  clearly  and  finally 
showed  to  modern  soldiers  the  power  of  the  defensive 
given  to  skilful  hands  in  modern  battles  fought  with 
modern  weapons. 

The  importance  of  battles,  indeed,  is  not  to  be 
measured  by  numbers.  At  Colenso,  Botha  fought 
with  only  6,000  men  against  Buller's  18,000.  But  the 
great  battles  fought  by  the  myriad  hosts  in  the  Great 
War  have  done  little  more  than  illustrate  and 
emphasise  the  lessons  of  that  day — when  an  unknown 
farmer-soldier,  extended  on  a  few  hills  with  a  river  in 
front  of  him,  set  at  naught  all  the  efforts  of  a  General 
of  valour  and  experience  leading  into  action  the  flower 
of  European  soldiery. 

It  was  at  one  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  December 
15,  1900,  that  Louis  Botha,  sleeplessly  vigilant,  learnt 

E  2 


68  GENERAL   BOTHA 

from  a  Boer  scout  that  the  whole  British  camp  was  lit 
up.  At  last  he  knew  that  the  attack  was  coming; 
and  the  word  was  sent  along  the  silent,  watching 
lines. 

Perhaps  Botha  was  glad  that  the  long  suspense  was 
at  an  end.  For  two  days — December  13-14 — the  big 
naval  guns  which  had  been  brought  up  from  the  ships 
to  help  the  British  attack  had  been  pounding  away 
at  the  Boer  defences.  The  damage,  according  to  all 
credible  witnesses,  had  been  remarkably  slight;  and 
British  observers  even  saw  the  Boers  moving  about 
from  trench  to  trench  under  our  fire.  But  the  bom- 
bardment had  been  a  clear  warning  of  approaching 
attack,  and  Botha  had  wasted  no  moment  of  those 
days  in  preparing  to  receive  what  was  surely  coming. 
Night  and  day  the  Republicans  had  worked  cease- 
lessly at  those  deep,  protecting  trenches  which  the 
Boer  Generals  were  the  first  to  dig.  The  deep  fissures 
delved  in  those  early  months  of  the  Boer  War  were 
the  true  originals  of  that  great  labyrinth  which  has 
since  extended  from  Switzerland  to  the  North  Sea.^ 

The  terror  of  the  Boers  was  then,  as  ever  afterwards, 

of  a  night  attack.     For  three  nights  they  had  been 

lying  in  their  trenches  on  guard  against  such  an  attack. 

Hence  the  relief  on  finding  that  Buller  intended  to 

attack  by  day.     For  that  purpose  all  preparations  had 

been  made.     All  the  ranges  for  rifle  and  gun  fire  had 

1  After  the  Boer  War  the  Germans  sent  a  Bureau  to  South 
Africa  to  study  the  trench  warfare  of  the  Boers. 


Tp  face  page  6g, 


WAR  69 

been  carefully  taken;  and  commandos  of  picked 
marksmen  had  been  placed  on  selected  kopjes  to 
check  and  stay  the  British  advance.  Then,  as  always, 
the  Boer  Commanders  placed  all  their  confidence  in 
the  power  of  rifle  fire. 

Buller,  on  his  side,  was  very  sure  of  victory,  and 
there  was  the  pride  of  the  professional  attacking  raw 
farmer  levies  :  there  was  the  confidence  of  the  expert, 
still  trusting  in  fixed  rules  and  regulations.  The 
bombardment  had  drawn  no  reply.  The  Republican 
resistance,  therefore,  must  have  been  already  broken. 
Buller  himself  seems  to  have  even  imagined  that  the 
Boer  forces  had  been  withdrawn.  According  to  all 
the  rules  of  Aldershot  warfare,  the  next  step  was  to 
attack  and  prevail. 

Botha  himself,  with  a  remarkable  insight  into  the 
pride  of  the  expert,  had  selected  with  conviction  three 
spots  against  which  he  felt  quite  certain  that  Buller 
would  direct  his  attack — his  extreme  right  opposite 
the  western  Bridle  Drift,  his  centre  opposite  Colenso 
village,  and  his  left,  Hlangwane  Hill.  Botha  has 
often  since  declared  that  not  once  during  the  day  of 
December  15  did  he  have  to  make  a  single  change 
in  his  dispositions — surely  a  remarkable  instance  of 
that  insight  into  an  enemy's  mind  which  is  rightly  held 
to  be  among  the  highest  of  military  qualities.  It  is 
recorded  that  at  first  Buller  perceived  the  unwisdom 
of  a  frontal  attack,  and  prepared  that  flank  march  to 
the  north-west  which  was  always  open  to  him.     But 


70  GENERAL   BOTHA 

Botha  always  maintained  that  Buller  would  attack  in 
front ;  and  he  proved  right.  Really  it  almost  seemed 
as  if  Botha  subdued  Buller  to  his  will. 

But  Botha  left  nothing  to  chance.  A  day  before 
the  attack  he  had  reason  to  fear  that  the  British  had 
learned  the  detail  of  his  central  trenches  on  Fort 
Wylie  from  a  spy.  Without  a  moment's  delay  Botha 
evacuated  the  old  lines  and  dug  an  entirely  fresh 
trench  system  at  a  new  angle,  leaving  in  the  abandoned 
defences  a  row  of  shining  guns  of  corrugated  iron, 
asking  for  bombardment.  Safely  ensconced  in  their 
new  trenches  the  Republicans  watched  the  British 
shells  bursting  over  these  gaping  innocents,  with  every 
evidence  of  an  admirable  system  of  intelligence. 

All  through  these  hours  Botha  imposed  absolute 
silence  on  the  6,000  Burghers  awaiting  the  attack, 
forbidding  them  to  fire  a  shot  even  in  the  battle  itself 
until  a  signal  gun  had  sounded  from  the  top  of  Fort 
Wylie. 

Lying  in  these  trenches,  Botha's  men  had  no  mean 
position  to  defend.  Behind — the  mountain;  in  front 
— a  river  in  full  flood ;  and,  beyond  the  river,  an  open 
field  of  fire.  The  mountains — those  tangled  flat- 
topped  South  African  hills  which  teem  w^ith  unex- 
pected hiding-places;  the  river — that  devious  Tugela, 
as  erratic  as  that  Mseander  which  perplexed  the 
Greeks  on  the  plains  of  Troy,  and  here  boldly  em- 
bracing Botha's  defences  in  one  great  bold  loop 
before  trending  northwards.     Across  the  river  to  the 


WAR  71 

south — the  village  of  Colenso,  through  which  runs  the 
railway  that  linked  Ladysmith  with  Durban.  Botha 
had  destroyed  the  railway  bridge,  but  had  left  a  foot- 
bridge, as  if  inviting  the  British  army  to  cross.  That 
was,  in  fact,  precisely  what  he  wanted. 

Across  the  river  eastward  stood  a  hill,  Hlangwane, 
which  obviously  commanded  the  whole  position.  So 
reluctant  were  the  Boer  commandos  to  be  cut  off  by 
the  river  from  their  main  body  that  Botha  at  first  in 
vain  ordered  them  to  occupy  Hlangwane.  Not  until 
he  had  obtained  from  Kruger  and  Joubert  at  Pretoria 
telegraphic  orders  that  the  hill  should  be  held  at  all 
costs  did  the  recalcitrant  commandos  consent  to  obey. 
Then  lots  were  drawn  and  one  valiant  body  from 
Wakkerstrom,  together  with  some  volunteers,  crossed 
the  river  and  seized  the  hill.  Of  such  strange 
material,  fluid  as  a  rope  of  sand,  was  the  discipline 
of  these  soldier-farmers  who  were  now  to  astound  the 
world. 

Far  away  to  the  westward,  along  the  banks  of  the 
Tugela  where  it  runs  from  west  to  east,  behind  a  grove 
of  poplar  trees  and  in  trenches  dug  along  the  roots  of 
the  hills,  lay  the  Free  Staters  and  other  Transvaal 
commandos,  commanding  every  inch  of  the  river-banks 
with  the  prepared  ranges  of  their  deadly  Mausers,  and 
supported  by  artillery  concealed  in  the  hills  behind. 

Botha's  full  military  design  on  that  morning  of 
December  15  was  nothing  less  than  that  his  army 
should  lie  forgotten  and  lost  to  the  world  until  Buller's 


72  GENERAL  BOTHA 

whole  army  had  crossed  the  Tugela.  His  complete 
purpose  was  then  to  enfold  and  capture  the  whole 
force. 

From  that  worst  fate  Buller's  army  was  rescued  by 
one  of  those  blunders  which,  like  the  cackling  of  the 
geese  on  the  Roman  Capitol,  sometimes  save  nations. 

Very  early — shortly  after  5  a.m. — on  this  morning 
of  December  15 — a  very  calm,  clear,  hot,  windless 
morning  of  the  mid-South  African  summer — the 
British  forces  were  in  motion,  covered  by  the  fire  of 
the  naval  guns.  Three  main  columns  advanced  to 
the  attack — Hildyard's  in  the  centre.  Hart's  on  the 
left,  and  Dundonald's  on  the  right.  These  great 
bodies  of  men  could  be  seen  by  the  Republicans  in 
every  detail  as  they  deployed  into  open  order  over  a 
front  of  six  miles.  Still  not  a  shot  was  fired.  Then 
suddenly,  without  orders,  a  British  artillery  officer, 
Colonel  Long,  possessed  with  a  new  and  confident 
theory  of  aggressive  gunnery,  galloped  forward  in 
person  with  his  two  batteries  right  ahead  of  the 
infantry  regiments.  He  went  forward  until  he  had 
come  within  rifle  range  of  the  Boer  trenches,^  and  then 
proceeded  to  unlimber.  A  chance  shot  from  these 
guns  fell  into  the  new  Republican  trenches;  and  this 
incident  proved  too  much  for  their  discipline.  The 
rifles  began  to  go  off :  and  instantly  a  blaze  of  rifle 
fire  rapidly  acquiring  a  deadly  accuracy  converged  on 

1  The  Boers  say  1,300  yards.     Others  say  700. 


WAR  73 

the  doomed  gunners.  All  the  world  knows  how  the 
remnants  of  these  heroic  teams  were  forced  to  take 
refuge  in  the  donga  behind ;  and  how  during  that  fear- 
ful day,  effort  after  effort  was  made  to  save  the  guns, 
involving  the  loss  of  many  heroic  lives,  including  the 
only  son  of  Lord  Roberts.  But  these  gunners  by 
their  heroic  folly  had  unmasked  the  Republican  posi- 
tion. Those  Englishmen  did  not  die  in  vain.  For 
the  premature  outbreak  of  fire  made  it  finally  impos- 
sible for  the  British  troops  to  cross  the  Tugela,  and  the 
attack  was  stayed  on  the  southern  bank.  If  the  Boer 
riflemen  had  achieved  the  greater  miracle  of  restraint, 
it  is  not  impossible  that  Buller's  army,  crowded  into  a 
narrow  space  on  the  northern  bank,  might  have  been 
annihilated  by  the  concealed  fire  of  many  thousands  of 
mobile  marksmen. 

As  Botha  stood  watching  his  mighty  foe  arrested 
in  front  of  the  trap  which  he  had  set,  he  was  half 
subdued  to  wonder  and  admiration.  For  never  has 
the  spirit  of  British  courage  shone  forth  more  clearly 
than  in  that  forlorn  hour.  Botha  watched  with  amaze- 
ment the  wasted  daring  of  the  British  soldiery.  Never 
— so  he  has  often  since  declared — had  he  seen  human 
beings  rise  to  greater  heights.  Five  times  the  British 
infantry  charged  forward  before  they  would  yield  to 
that  ceaseless,  pitiless  hail.  Sometimes  they  advanced 
at  a  walk  in  regular  order,  and  when  those  in  front 
were  mowed  down  those  behind  simply  dropped  into 
the  grass  and  waited  for  others  to  come  up.     Never 


74  GENERAL  BOTHA 

had  the  world  seen  valour  so  surpassing,  so  woefully 
misdirected,  so  prodigally  misspent. 

All  was  in  vain.  The  attack  was  repulsed;  and 
before  the  close  of  that  day  Buller's  army  was  in  full 
retreat  and  the  guns  abandoned.  Botha  himself  was 
astonished  at  Buller's  collapse  when  it  came.  With 
such  material,  he  expected  greater  efforts.  But  the 
close  of  the  fight  was  in  keeping  with  the  excess  of 
confidence  that  saw  its  opening.  Not  for  the  first  time 
in  history  were  the  professionals  of  war  utterly  dis- 
comfited by  the  discovery  that  an  amateur,  too,  can 
sometimes  fight. 

Botha  had  now  shown  that  he  could  mould  the  Boers 
into  a  great  defensive  force.  But  not  yet  could  he 
forge  them  into  a  weapon  for  attack.  Not  even  he 
could  persuade  them  to  attack  Buller  before  he  could 
recover  from  his  blow.  The  Republicans  idly  waited 
behind  the  river  until  the  British  Army,  refreshed  and 
restored,  made  another  attempt  to  break  through  the 
blockade  of  Ladysmith. 

This  time  the  blow  was  struck,  after  much  fumbling, 
in  the  tangle  of  hills  to  the  south-west  of  the  Lady- 
smith  plain.  It  was  here — at  Spion  Kop — that  Botha 
became  the  hero  of  another  famous  fight. 

Spion  Kop — the  "  Scout's  Hill " — is  a  flat-topped 
eminence  which  rises  high  above  its  fellows;  and 
it  presents  certain  conspicuous  advantages  for 
attack  which  caught  the  imagination  of  soldiers  still 


WAR  75 

dazed  by  the  Colenso  reverse.  By  a  gallant  stroke 
of  arms  the  hill  was  seized  in  thick  fog  during  the  night 
of  January,  23-24,  1900,  and  the  Boer  commandos 
encamped  to  the  north  awoke  to  find  themselves  most 
perilously  dominated.  Worn  out  by  days  of  fighting, 
those  commandos  "  inspanned "  their  oxen  and 
hastened  to  retire  in  order  to  escape  the  imminent  shell 
fire  from  the  captured  hill.  It  really  seemed  as  if  the 
lines  were  pierced. 

It  was  at  that  moment  that  a  few  bolder  spirits, 
chief  among  them  Botha  and  Schalk  Burger,  rallied 
the  younger  men,  shifted  the  guns  under  cover  of 
the  still  lingering  mists,  organised  a  small  "  forlorn 
hope,"^  and  launched  them  on  an  assault  of  the  hill. 

The  attacks  continued  throughout  that  fearful  day 
of  blood,  and  Botha  manfully  supported  them  with 
fire  from  his  guns.  But  by  nightfall  the  assault  was 
held  up.  Both  sides  were  tired  out.  The  British 
infantry  had  the  advantage.  They  still  held  Spion 
Kop.  They  had  also  captured  the  "  Twin  Peaks," 
which  fully  opened  the  door  to  Ladysmith.  In  vain. 
Once  more  the  victories  of  British  valour  were  undone 
by  lack  of  British  generalship.  Those  splendid 
stormers,  the  Rifles,  were  called  off  from  the  "  Twin 
Peaks  "  by  BuUer ;  and  in  the  shielding  darkness  of 
that  night — January  24-25 — the  gallant  Thorneycroft, 
starved  of  supports,  exhausted  by  incredible  losses, 

^  Some  350  men  from  Carolina. 


76  GENERAL   BOTHA 

refused  to  face  another  day  of  such  shell  fire,  and 
abandoned  the  top  of  the  hill. 

All  through  the  day  Botha  had  stood  on  a  small 
hillock  down  in  the  plain  directing  his  men  and  his 
guns.  When  darkness  fell,  he  descended  from  the 
hillock  to  eat  and  rest.  He  was  not  at  that  moment 
very  hopeful.  The  greater  number  of  the  Boer 
fighters  had  scattered  towards  Ladysmith,  exhausted 
and  hopeless  of  victory.  Most  of  his  own  men  had 
gone,  and  only  a  scanty  remnant  remained.  A  few 
small  parties  of  stalwarts  hung  on  to  the  foot  of  the 
mountain,  waiting  to  resume  the  fight  on  the  morrow. 
Botha  and  his  staff  refused  to  desert  them.  He 
waited. 

Botha  knew  that  his  enemies  had  suffered  very 
severely.  He  had  an  instinct  that  they  would  abandon 
the  summit.  He  telegraphed  so  to  Joubert.  He 
truly  had  the  uncanny  Wellington  faculty  of  knowing 
what  "  the  other  fellow  was  thinking  of  on  the  other 
side  of  a  hill." 

At  3.30  a.m.  the  whisper  came  from  the  Republican 
scouts  that  the  summit  was  empty.  Others  crawled 
up  to  prospect;  and  the  whisper  became  a  shout.  At 
4.20  a.m.  Botha  went  up  himself.  He  found  there, 
on  the  flat-top  of  that  blood-stained,  hard-fought 
mountain,  not  a  single  British  fighting  man.  Standing 
there,  in  that  dawn,  alone  in  the  midst  of  that  terrible 
acre  of  British  dead  and  wounded,  he  looked  down 
on  the  valleys  to  the  south  and  saw  the  rising  sun 


WAR  -77 

touch  with  his  light  the  snowy  tents  of  that  great 
British  army,  so  splendid  in  its  valour,  so  proud  in 
its  numbers  and  equipment,  so  paralysed  by  defect  of 
commanding  will  and  brain. 

Is  it  wonderful  that,  standing  there,  Botha  saw  in 
this  scene  the  act  of  some  Power  higher  than  any  of 
this  world? 

"O  God,  thy  arm  was  here, 
And  not  to  us,  but  to  thy  arm  alone, 
Ascribe  we  all !  "  i 

If  our  Henry  thought  so  at  Agincourt,  Botha  may  be 
excused  for  thinking  so  on  the  summit  of  Spion  Kop. 

After  the  battle  a  British  chaplain  sent  to  fetch 
wounded  men  met  Botha  seated  on  horseback,  and 
talked  with  him  on  the  field.  Botha  allowed  him  to 
remove,  not  only  the  wounded  British  soldiers  from 
the  hill-top,  but  those  also  in  the  field  hospital— asking 
only  for  reciprocity.  Returning,  the  chaplain  con''- 
versed  with  many  of  the  rank  and  file,  who  stood  con- 
templating the  dead  British  soldiers  with  a  sadness 
amounting,  in  his  own  phrase,  to  anguish.  "  My  God  ! 
What  a  sight !  "  "I  wish  politicians  could  see  their 
handiwork  !  "  Such  were  the  reflections  of  the  farmer- 
soldiers  on  that  stricken  field. 

Botha  was  to  find  all  his  efforts  vain.  Happily  for 
us,  there  was  bad  leadership  on  the  Boer  side  as  well 

^  Henry    V. 


78  GENERAL   BOTHA 

as  on  the  British ;  and  Botha  was  not  yet  in  a  position 
of  supreme  command.  Perhaps  even  he  had  not  yet 
fully  realised  the  importance  of  increasing  aggression 
in  modern  warfare. 

Buller  was  let  off  again.  The  Boers — to  the  infinite 
amazement  of  German  witnesses  ^ — allowed  him  to 
draw  off  unpunished  his  cumbrous  transport  and  en- 
cumbered army;  and  at  long  last,  after  trying  every 
false  approach,  he  was  left  to  discover  by  sheer 
process  of  exhaustion  the  true  way  of  attack  by 
the  hills  to  the  east.  There,  on  Pieters  Hill, 
Botha,  embarrassed  by  a  divided  command,  appealing 
in  vain  for  help  to  Pretoria,  fought  his  last  fight  in 
defence  of  the  Ladysmith  blockade.  The  small  force 
of  heroes  left  to  him,  exposed  on  rocks  that  could  not 
be  trenched,  melted  away  under  the  hell  of  the  lyddite 
shells.  Those  that  survived  fought  till  they  could 
not  see  from  fatigue.  But  when  the  final  crisis  came 
it  was  not  at  Botha's  point  of  the  line  that  the  defence 
cracked.  He  called  in  vain  for  reinforcements  :  in 
vain  did  he  point  out  the  weak  link  in  the  chain  of 
defence.  At  that  point  the  valorous  charges  of  the 
impetuous  British  infantry — Irish,  Scotch,  and  English 
joined  in  splendid  rivalry — at  last  forced  a  break  in 
that  iron  leaguer. 

Outflanked  and  threatened  with  utter  destruction, 
Botha  sullenly  retired,  and  the  commandos  fell  away 

1  See   the    German    Official  Account    of    the    War    in    South 
Africa.     Translated  by  Colonel  Du  Cane  (John  Murray),  p.  178. 


WAR  79 

from  Ladysmith  in  a  retreat  which  it  would  have 
required  little  British  generalship  to  convert  into  a 
rout.  But  that  generalship  was  again  lacking;  and 
so  Lukas  Meyer  and  Botha  were  allowed  to  shield  the 
panic-stricken  torrent  of  Boer  fugitives  and  to  reform 
the  shattered  fragments  of  their  broken  commandos. 

At  that  moment  the  Republican  cause  seemed 
already  lost.  Out  of  the  blackness  which  on  that  day 
of  defeat  shrouded  the  Boer  cause,  one  star  of  hope 
alone  flickered — the  star  of  Louis  Botha. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE    WAR    IN     FLOOD     (1900) 


CHAPTER  V 

THE    WAR    IN    FLOOD    (19OO) 

"  That  island  of  England  breeds  very  valiant  creatures  :  their 
mastiffs  are  of  unmatchable  courage.  "—Henry  V. 

In  the  great  war  of  defence  which  developed  after 
the  fall  of  Ladysmith  three  great  figures  emerged  on 
the  Boer  side,  commanding  and  heroic — Botha,  De 
Wet,  and  De  la  Rey.  After  the  war  I  met  th^se  men, 
and  had  good  opportunities  for  observing  their  char- 
acters as  they  had  been  developed  by  the  war. 

De  Wet  was  certainly  much  the  most  impressive  of 
the  three.  Never  did  I  set  eyes  on  a  man  who  seemed 
to  stand  so  much  alone.  His  face  was  a  study  in 
resistance — it  recalled  one  of  those  graven  visages 
which  one  sees  far  up  the  Nile,  hewn  out  of  the  very 
rocks,  ancient  leaders  in  that  land  of  Africa.  His 
body  then  seemed  all  muscle — thickset,  pillar-like  in 
its  erectness,  "  four-square  to  all  the  winds  that  blow." 
Looking  on  him,  one  could  understand  the  fear  that 
he  inspired  in  his  own  men,  when  he  rode  on  through 
the  night,  wrapped  in  his  own  thoughts,  devising  one 

3.3  P  2 


84  GENERAL  BOTHA 

of  those  schemes  of  escape,  almost  miraculous  in  their 
cunning,  which  perplexed  an  Empire  and  puzzled  a 
planet. 

He  spoke  only  in  Dutch,  and  then  only  in  few  words. 
He  still  regarded  all  Englishmen  with  a  dour  reserve 
that  rarely  softened  or  melted.  Only  on  one  or  two 
occasions  have  I  seen  his  face  light  up  with  enthu- 
siasm, and  that  was  always  when  he  recalled  one  of 
his  own  achievements  in  evasion. 

Out  of  all  those  descriptions,  one  still  stands  out 
in  my  memory.  One  evening,  after  a  long  day's  march 
— so  he  told  us — all  his  wanderings  seemed  to  have 
come  to  an  end.  The  lights  of  the  British  bivouac 
fires  twinkled  from  every  point  of  the  horizon.  De 
Wet,  as  was  his  wont,  went  apart  from  his  men  :  he  sat 
alone  in  dumb  despair.  Then  there  came  to  him  softly 
one  of  those  wonderful  scouts  who  served  him  so  well. 
This  scout  had  discovered  a  slight  gap  in  the  British 
lines,  between  two  regiments  who  were  not  quite  keep- 
ing touch.  In  a  moment,  De  Wet  was  on  his  feet. 
Within  an  hour  every  horse's  foot  was  muffled  with 
cloth  or  wool,  and  every  wagon-wheel  was  swathed. 
The  Boer  camp  fires  were  lighted  and  were  left  burn- 
ing brightly.  Then  the  whole  Boer  force  crept  out 
through  the  darkness  of  the  night  in  utter  silence, 
penetrated  the  gap  in  the  British  lines,  and  started  on 
a  new  career  of  fugitive  and  elliptical  warfare.^ 

1  This  is  the  escape  of  De  Wet  referred  to  in  the  "  Times 
History  of  the  War  in  South  Africa,"  Vol.  V,  p.   145. 


THE  WAR   IN   FLOOD  85 

No  one  who  ever  heard  De  Wet  tell  such  stories 
could  ever  forget.  For  he  told  them  in  sharp,  short 
phrases  that  expressed  the  very  quickness  and  shrewd- 
ness of  action  that  marked  his  great  deeds. 

De  la  Rey  was  in  amiable  contrast  to  this  man. 
Benevolence  shone  from  every  feature.  Although  still 
under  sixty  at  that  time,  he  was  already  in  appearance 
a  veteran  with  a  flowing  beard,  and  kindly,  grand- 
fatherly  eyes.  Anybody  less  like  a  guerilla  leader  I 
have  never  set  eyes  on.  He  was  more  like  a  warm- 
hearted Norfolk  farmer,  the  popular  chairman  of  a 
weekly  market  ordinary.  He  was  as  kindly  in  speech 
as  in  appearance.  He  was  always  on  honourable  terms 
with  his  enemies  in  the  field.  There  was  an  affecting 
meeting  between  him  and  Roberts  after  Colenso,  where 
each  lost  a  son.  I  remember  his  phrase  about  Lord 
Methuen,  whom  he  captured  and  tended.  "  Methuen 
was,"  said  De  la  Rey,  "  a  perfect  Christian  knight — 
there  could  not  be  a  nobler  gentleman."  "  But  he 
burnt  your  farm  !  "  cried  one  in  the  company.  "  Oh  ! 
that  was  war  !  "  he  said  gently.  "  Just  war  !  "  He 
seemed  to  think  that  that  word  covered  many  things. 

Apart  from  both  these  two  stood  Louis  Botha — 
always  the  Boer,  but  the  Boer  of  affairs,  the  Boer  who 
had  been  brought  into  touch  with  the  outer  and  larger 
world.  He  conversed  readily  :  his  smile  was  always 
friendly.  He  aimed  at  conciliation.  He  was  a 
soldier,  but  also  a  statesman.  Alone  among  them  he 
was    already  a    man    of    the    great  world.     He    was 


86  GENERAL  BOTHA 

already  pursuing  a  policy — a  policy  of  unity.     Above 
all,  he  convinced  one  that  he  was  a  man  of  his  word. 

At  that  time  (1902)  his  was  an  alert  and  soldierly 
figure,  less  substantial  in  build  than  to-day.  He  could 
speak  English,  but  he  preferred  to  talk  Dutch.  The 
impression  left  was  that  of  a  keen  foe  and  a  good 
friend — one  to  be  trusted  in  peace  and  feared  in  war. 

This  was  the  man  who  was  now  destined  to  become 
the  chief  war  leader  of  the  Boers  in  the  two  years  of 
struggle  which  still  remained. 

Already  in  March,  1900,  the  Boer  cause  had  been 
thrown  definitely  on  to  the  defensive.  The  main  army 
of  the  Free  Staters  under  General  Cronje  had  been 
captured  at  Paardeberg  (February  27).  This  Boer 
disaster  was  followed  by  battles  in  which  for  the  first 
time  the  armies  of  the  Free  State  retreated  with- 
out due  cause;  and  on  March  13  Lord  Roberts  was 
able  to  enter  Bloemfontein.  During  the  same  weeks 
the  armies  of  the  Transvaal  withdrew  from  Natal 
with  a  swiftness  that  seemed  likely  at  any  moment 
to  become  a  rout.  Distant  observers  may  be  par- 
doned for  having  thought  that  the  main  resistance  of 
the  war  was  now  over. 

But  then  came  a  sudden  and  surprising  recovery. 
De  Wet  allowed  his  men  to  go  home  and  refresh. 
Botha  and  Lukas  Meyer  withdrew  their  armies  un- 
broken, without  any  effective  pursuit  from  the  British, 
from  Natal.    The  Boer  Governments  opened  negotia- 


THE  WAR   IN   FLOOD  87 

tions  and  offered  to  accept  peace  on  any  terms  short 
of  annexation.  The  British  Government  definitely 
announced  that  they  would  fight  until  the  Boers  sur- 
rendered their  independence.  The  Boer  Govern- 
ments refused;  and  instantly  made  a  new  striking 
appeal  to  their  peoples  to  defend  their  independence. 

From  that  moment  the  war  entered  on  a  new  phase. 
It  now  became — what  it  was  before  only  in  part — 
emphatically  a  war  of  freedom,  arousing  in  the  Boer 
the  deepest  passion  of  his  nature — the  passion  to  be 
captain  of  his  own  land  and  soul. 

And  yet,  in  spite  of  this  revival,  it  seemed  as  if 
Lord  Roberts,  now  at  the  head  of  a  great  and  grow- 
ing army,  must  inevitably  carry  all  before  him.  In 
the  course  of  the  next  few  months  he  was  able  to 
relieve  Mafeking  (May  17),  and  then,  advancing  along 
the  main  railway  line  with  his  chief  forces,  he  entered 
Johannesburg  (May  31)  and  Pretoria  (June  5).  But 
meanwhile  it  became  clear  that  in  South  Africa  the 
capitals  are  not  the  country.  Even  while  these  great 
operations  were  going  forward  the  Boer  recovery  had 
begun.  It  soon  appeared  that  conquest  was  not  the 
same  as  occupation. 

First  came  that  rapid  sequence  of  lightning  blows 
which  made  the  name  of  De  Wet  a  thing  of  awe — • 
the  ambush  of  Sannah's  Post  (March  31),  the  capture 
of  Reddersburg  (April  3),  the  siege  of  Wepener 
(April  25),  and  worst  of  all,  on  the  very  day  that 
Lord    Roberts    entered   Johannesburg,   the   extensive 


88  GENERAL  BOTHA 

surrender  of    Imperial  Yeomanry   at   Lindley  in  the 
Free  State  (May  31). 

Meanwhile,  Botha  was  steadily  and  cautiously  pre- 
paring for  the  next  great  defensive  of  the  Transvaal. 
Joubert  died  on  March  27.  Botha  succeeded  him, 
and  now  took  over  complete  command  of  the  Trans- 
vaal forces  as  Commandant-General.  After  the  cap- 
ture of  Bloemfontein  by  Lord  Roberts,  President 
Kruger  ordered  him  in  that  capacity  to  bring  the 
Transvaal  commandos  from  the  borders  of  Natal  in 
order  to  oppose  the  British  advance.  Botha  therefore 
peremptorily  recalled  his  men  from  their  leave,  and 
on  May  7  arrived  at  Virginia  Siding  with  3,000 
burghers  to  defend  Kroonstadt.  Here,  on  May  10, 
General  French  swept  round  his  right  and  forced  him 
to  retire  and  leave  Kroonstadt  in  British  hands.  Botha 
secured  his  retreat;  but  for  the  moment  the  Repub 
licans  were  given  over  to  one  of  those  panics  which 
periodically  seized  them.  The  Free  Staters  refused 
to  leave  their  own  country  undefended;  and  at  a  joint 
Council  of  War  it  was  decided  to  separate  the  armies, 
leaving  the  Free  Staters  south  of  the  Vaal,  to  be 
commanded  by  De  Wet,  while  Botha  retired  north 
in  face  of  the  advancing  British  hosts,  who  were  now 
marching  forward  at  great  speed  under  Lord  Roberts. 

On  May  7,  at  Pretoria,  there  took  place  the  last 
sitting  of  the  old  Volksraad.  All  the  usual  pomp 
was  observed  :  the  Consuls  and  Attaches  of  Foreign 
Powers  attended  in  their  uniforms;   President  Kruger, 


THE  WAR   IN   FLOOD  89 

in  his  scarf  of  office  and  white  gloves,  addressed  them 
for  the  last  time,  bidding  them  be  of  good  courage. 
Streamers  of  crepe  and  wreaths  of  immortelles  lay  on 
the  empty  chairs  of  the  fallen  Generals  and  members.^ 
The  Vierkleur  lay  across  the  seat  of  the  captured 
Cronje. 

But,  amid  all  these  signs  of  proud  resistance,  every- 
one present  knew  that  the  Transvaal  Government 
had  decided  to  abandon  the  capital.  Desperate 
schemes  were  afoot.  The  old  President  wished  to 
raise  revenue  by  a  general  sale  of  underground 
mining  rights;  but  the  Chamber  was  against  him — 
an  ominous  sign  of  the  national  weakening  produced 
by  the  pomp  and  glamour  of  finance.  Then  there  was 
a  proposal  to  blow  up  the  mines  on  the  approach  of 
Roberts.  Botha,  always  a  steady  opponent  of 
"  frightfulness "  in  war,  strenuously  resisted  this 
proposal,  and  threatened  to  lay  down  his  command 
if  the  attempt  were  made. 

Then  Roberts  leapt  forward  with  one  great  spring 
at  the  heart  of  the  Transvaal.  Botha  retired  steadily, 
forced  to  detach  some  of  his  best  fighters  to  oppose 
Buller,  but  now  reinforced  heavily  from  other  quarters 
of  the  field  of  war.^  With  a  mixed  force  of  4,000,  he 
made  a  big  stand  for  Johannesburg  at  Doornkop, 
where  Ian  Hamilton  and  French  drove  him  from  the 

1  Generals  Joubert  and  Kock  :    burghers  Barnard  and  Joser. 

2  He  sent  the  Wakkerstrom  Boers  to  Laing's  Nek;  but  he 
was  joined  by  Viljoen,  and  by  the  forces  set  free  by  the  capture 
of  Mafeking-,  and  by  the  evacuation  of  Natal. 


90  GENERAL  BOTHA 

ridges  by  the  dauntless  valour  of  their  charging 
troops,  led  by  the  gallant  Gordons.  Roberts  entered 
Johannesburg;  and  then,  without  a  pause,  marching 
sixteen  miles  a  day,  that  great  British  soldier  pressed 
on  for  Pretoria,  which  Botha  surrendered  to  him 
under  the  instructions  of  his  Government.  On 
June  5,  Botha  left  the  capital  to  the  British,  and 
retired,  shielding  his  retreating  Government,  along 
the  Delagoa  Railway.  Then  there  opened  some 
strange  negotiations  at  the  country  house  of  a  Trans- 
vaal Jew,  Mr.  Samuel  Marks,  where  the  Boer  Generals 
met  and  half  dallied  with  the  idea  of  peace.  But  the 
news  of  De  Wet's  successes  changed  the  whole  mood 
of  the  Transvaalers,  and  Botha  broke  off  the  negotia- 
tions by  announcing  his  intention  to  give  battle  to 
Lord  Roberts.  And  so  began  the  great  struggle  of 
Berg-en-Dal,  or  Dalmanutha,  the  last  set  battle  of 
the  Boer  War  (June  11-13). 

There,  on  a  position  thirty  miles  long  that  ran 
right  across  the  great  range  of  the  Western  Trans- 
vaal, Botha  fought  a  great  battle  against  the  combined 
attack  of  French,  Ian  Hamilton,  and  Bruce  Hamilton, 
directed  from  Pretoria  by  Roberts,  who,  even  in  the 
very  midst  of  the  battle-thunder,  was  still  playing 
with  the  hopes  of  peace.^ 

It  was  in  the  onslaught  on  Botha's  far-flung  line — 
6,000   men   along   30   miles — that   the    British   Com- 

'  A  peace  envoy  passed  from  Pretoria  to  Botha  in  the  middle 
of  the  fight. 


THE  WAR   IN   FLOOD  91 

mander  in  those  days  of  June  anticipated  the  German 
generalship  of  a  later  day,  achieving  success  by  the 
overwhelming  concentration  of  guns  on  a  small  section 
of  the  line  of  defence.  Against  these  tactics  Botha 
employed  the  method  of  extreme  mobility.  By 
exceedingly  skilful  handling  of  his  commandos,  Botha 
constantly  managed  to  strengthen  those  parts  of  this 
vast  line  of  defence  where  the  enemy  was  at  the 
moment  trying  to  break  through.  Here  again  he 
anticipated  the  tactics  of  a  later  day.  It  was  only 
when  the  swiftness  of  the  British  concentration  ex- 
ceeded the  swiftness  of  the  Boer  defence  that  the 
British  Generals,  with  superior  forces,  drove  General 
Botha's  army  back.  On  June  11,  the  Berg-en-Dal 
position  was  attacked  in  overwhelming  force,  and  the 
commandos  of  Dalmanutha  were  ordered  up  to  its 
defence.  But  they  arrived  too  late,  and  the  battle 
was  lost. 

On  the  night  of  June  12,  Botha  retreated  from  his 
lines.  Once  more,  as  at  Spion  Kop,  the  British 
Generals  were  unconscious  of  their  success.  They 
did  not  know  when  they  had  conquered.  Finding 
himself  unpursued,  Botha  withdrew  his  army  during 
the  night. 

At  this  battle,  and  during  the  months  of  1900,  Botha 
still  had  artillery,  amounting  probably  to  about  seven- 
teen guns,  three  "  Long  Toms,"  and  about  a  dozen 
quick-firers.  But  the  time  was  now  coming  when  he 
would  cease  to  have  either  guns  or  an  army  in  the  full 


92  GENERAL   BOTHA 

modern  sense  behind  him.  He  retired  slowly  and 
surlily  along  the  line,  profiting  by  the  activities  of  De 
Wet.  The  British  forces  pressed  him  steadily  east- 
ward, until  in  September  he  reached  the  Portuguese 
frontier.  There,  in  order  to  avoid  internment,  he  was 
compelled  to  abandon  and  bury  his  big  guns  and  to 
scatter  and  break  up  his  commandos.  The  less  stal- 
wart Boers  fled  across  the  frontier  and  passed  out  of 
the  war.  Botha  himself  passed  north  with  the  core 
of  his  fighting  forces. 

The  day  of  big  armies  was  over.  From  this  time 
forward  Botha  distributed  his  commandos  over  the 
country  in  the  district  which  they  themselves  best 
knew,  and  the  war  of  battles  passed  into  a  war  of 
small  forces  harassing  and  hindering  a  bigger  enemy. 
The  same  change  took  place  in  the  Free  State,  where 
the  surrender  of  4,000  Boers  under  Prinsloo  in  the 
Ladybrand  Basin  (July  28)  also  reduced  De  Wet  to  a 
war  of  small,  swift-moving  bands. 

Yet  in  spite  of  these  events  the  war  carried  on  by 
Botha  for  the  next  two  years  in  the  Transvaal  was  by 
no  means  a  "guerilla"  struggle.  Throughout  these 
years  he  remained  Commander-in-Chief  of  a  nation's 
armies.  During  the  whole  period  of  his  command 
every  unoccupied  district  in  the  Transvaal  had  its  own 
Land-drost  and  Field  Cornet;  and  every  commando 
had  its  own  officers  appointed  by  Botha.  He  kept  up 
the  complete  fabric  of  an  army  in  the  field,  with  three 


THE  WAR   IN   FLOOD  93 

Assistant-Commandant-Generals — De  la  Rey,  Beyers, 
and  his  brother,  Christiaan  Botha.  He  kept  up 
throughout  constant  communication  with  his  scattered 
forces,  which  still  acted  under  his  orders.  He  kept 
the  Government  of  the  Republic  always  in  being. 
When  at  the  last  he  came  to  terms  with  the  British 
forces,  he  was  able  to  negotiate  as  the  General  of  an 
actual  Government,  and  as  the  chief  of  armies  com- 
pletely obedient  to  his  commands. 

Yet  his  life  during  this  period  had  all  the  romance 
and  colour  of  a  Rob  Roy,  outlawed  and  yet  defiant, 
chased  and  yet  chasing,  conquered  by  all  the  rules  of 
the  game  but  still  often  victorious  over  his  conquerors. 
"  The  power  of  armies  is  a  visible  thing,"  and  it 
seemed  to  the  outward  eye  inconceivable  that  the  Boer 
resistance  could  go  on  in  face  of  the  great  armies 
which  the  British  Empire  now  poured  into  the  country 
from  every  corner  of  the  world.  But  South  Africa  is 
a  land  of  vast  spaces;  and  all  the  advantage  was  to 
those  who  knew  those  spaces  as  only  the  Republicans 
knew  them.  They  were  still  mounted,  and  mounted 
on  horses — mostly  Basuto  ponies — generally  two  to 
each  man — precisely  adapted  to  the  country.  There 
was  plenty  of  valour  and  skill  on  both  sides  in  this  war 
between  two  races  of  the  same  stock  and  the  same 
faith — heroism  and  chivalry  both  of  British  and  Dutch- 
man— doggedness  of  the  common  stock  from  which 
both  sides  had  sprung.  But  the  Burghers  had  now 
(from  March,   1900,  onward)  on  their  side  the  magic 


94  GENERAL   BOTHA 

power  that   belongs   to  men   who   defend   their  own 
land  : — 

"No  foot  may  chase, 
No  eye  can  follow,   to  a  fatal  place 
That  power,    that  spirit,    whether  on   the   wing" 
Like  the  strong  wind,  or  sleeping  like  the  wind 
Within  its  awful  caves." 

It  was  that  spirit  which  now  became  a  "  Will-o'-the- 
wisp  "  to  the  British  armies  in  South  Africa. 

General  Botha  has  published  no  record  of  those 
days. 

He  has  wished  to  throw  a  veil  over  memories  of 
strife.  Even  in  the  bosom  of  his  own  family  he  dis- 
courages talk  about  the  old  war  or  revival  of  its 
memories.  But  the  British  chronicler  can  afford  to 
glory  now  in  the  records  of  those  who  were  once  foes 
and  are  now  partners.  It  will  even  strengthen  us 
to-day  to  recall  the  mighty  past  of  those  who  now 
help  us  to  sustain  the  pillars  of  our  fate. 

What,  then,  was  the  kind  of  life  which  was  lived  by 
General  Botha  in  the  field  throughout  all  these 
struggles  ?  We  must  not  imagine  that  it  was  ever  an 
easy  life.  These  great  deeds  were  not  done  without 
sweat  and  agony.  Often  these  Boer  commandos 
escaped  only  as  by  fire.  Again  and  again  they 
emerged  from  the  jaws  of  their  pursuers,  breathless, 
stripped  of  their  possessions,  emaciated  with  long 
hunger,  ragged,  almost  foodless.    They  would  go  for 


THE  WAR  IN   FLOOD  95 

weeks  without  regular  sleep.  They  lived  for  long 
months  on  "  mealies,"  the  food  of  the  Kaffirs.  They 
would  often  have  to  beg  food  from  the  kraals.  After 
one  of  the  long  drives  they  were  often  as  lean  as 
laths,  hollow-cheeked,  heavy-eyed  with  sleeplessness. 
All  but  the  most  stalwart  fell  away.  The  married 
men  were  often  agonised  with  fear  for  their  wives  and 
children,  whether  in  the  dreaded  "  camps  "  or  at  home 
in  the  power  of  the  blacks.  It  was  often  necessary  to 
let  these  older  men  go  to  look  after  their  families, 
leaving  the  young  bachelors  to  carry  on  the  struggle. 

Often  when  the  commandos  settled  down  for  supper 
at  the  end  of  a  day's  march,  their  work  was  not  over. 
All  around  them  were  those  vigilant,  ebony-skinned 
neutrals,  indifferent  as  to  the  issue  between  their  white 
masters,  ready  to  sell  the  secrets  of  either  side  for 
cash  down.  As  soon  as  the  sun  had  set  the  Boers 
must  be  up  and  off  again  and  march  through  the  pitch 
night  till  they  had  reached  another  resting-place. 
Then  they  could  sleep  till  three  to  four  a.m.,  but  they 
must  be  up  before  the  red  dawn.  "  Opsaal, 
Burghers !  "  was  the  cry  before  the  first  grey  streaks 
of  light  on  the  eastern  horizon.  Saddled,  they  would 
wait  till  daylight,  ready  for  a  dawn  attack.  Then  they 
would  ride  on,  often  halting  in  the  daytime  to  snatch 
a  few  minutes'  sleep. 

Sometimes  so  near  were  pursuers  and  pursued  in 
these  wanderings  the  Boers  would  camp  on  one  side 
of  a  hill  and  the  British  on  the  other;  and  the  Boers 


96  GENERAL  BOTHA 

tell  us  to-day  that  they  felt  actually  safer  for  such 
neighbourhood,  because  they  knew  that  they  were  on 
the  blind  side  of  their  hunters. 

Through  all  these  experiences  Botha  lived  the  same 
life  as  his  men,  eating  the  same  food  and  sharing  the 
same  dangers.  In  fact,  it  was  always  his  first  principle 
that  the  Staff  should  suffer  more  than  the  men.  He 
was  always  ready  to  give  his  men  rest  before  himself. 
He  would  often  send  out  his  own  Staff  to  see  where 
the  pursuing  columns  were.  He  would  sometimes 
deliberately  use  himself  as  a  decoy.  "  It  is  I  they 
want — not  you,"  he  would  say  to  the  members  of  the 
Transvaal  Government,  and  he  would  leave  them 
snugly  resting  in  some  sheltering  valley  while  he  him- 
self would  be  riding  far  afield  with  all  the  columns  in 
full  cry  after  him. 

His  main  policy  was  to  exhaust  the  British  columns 
by  pursuit  while  giving  them  the  smallest  possible 
opportunity  to  capture  his  men.  "  No  Boer  need  ever 
be  captured  if  he  does  not  want  to  be,"  was  his  constant 
refrain;  and  he  proved  it  in  his  own  person.  Our 
soldiers,  of  course,  grew  quicker  and  cleverer  in  this 
novel  warfare,  so  trying  to  European  troops.  But  the 
Boer  always  had  certain  great  advantages.  It  was 
before  the  day  of  motors.  The  British  troops  had  to 
bring  along  provision-wagons  and  guns;  and  that 
meant  a  loss  of  speed.  The  Republicans  gradually  got 
rid  of  their  wagons.  The  British  horses  required  oats 
and  hay,  but  the  Boer  horse  could  feed  off  the  veldt; 


THE   WAR   IN   FLOOD  97 

while  the  men  themselves  could  live  easily  on 
"  biltong." 

Botha  had  already  displayed  before  Ladysmith  a 
natural  genius  for  war;  and  now  he  developed  it  in 
his  own  characteristic  way.  It  was  not  the  modern, 
scientific,  Teutonised  warfare — so  little  distinguish- 
able from  sheer  devilry. 

Botha,  for  instance,  was  then,  as  now,  always 
humane  and  chivalrous.  He  resolutely  set  his  face 
against  burning  and  devastation,  and  "  broke  "  one  of 
his  officers  when  he  burnt  a  British  farm  by  way  of 
reprisal  in  Zululand.  He  was  kind  to  prisoners,  gentle 
to  wounded  enemies,  chivalrous  to  captives. 

Humane  to  the  foe,  he  was  also  humane  to  his  own 
men.  It  was,  indeed,  essential  to  the  Boers  that  they 
should  spare  men.  "  Twenty-six  killed.  General," 
said  a  messenger  from  the  firing  line  on  the  occasion 
of  an  attack  on  trenches.  Botha  turned  swiftly  to  his 
aide-de-camp.  "Do  you  hear  that?"  he  cried,  and 
his  face  was  grey  with  agony.  To  him  it  seemed  worse 
than  defeat. 

There  was  more  of  instinct  than  of  method  about 
his  whole  conduct  of  the  war.  He  never  used  a  map. 
He  had  no  scientific  theories.  But  he  started  with  an 
extraordinary  knowledge  of  the  whole  countryside — 
the  lie  of  the  land,  the  signs  of  water,  the  distances, 
the  strategical  opportunities. 

He  would  be  sitting,  for  instance,  one  day  high  on 
a  hill  with  one  of  his  staff-officers — on  a  stone  just  on 

G 


98  GENERAL   BOTHA 

the  right  side  of  the  summit,  looking  through  field- 
glasses  over  one  of  those  immense  expanses  of  rolling 
country  which  can  be  seen  from  a  South  African 
hill-top.  They  would  be  reconnoitring,  and  they 
might  see,  perhaps,  two  columns  in  the  far  blue  dis- 
tances— one  marching  from  north-west  to  south-east, 
another  from  west  to  east.  Very  quickly  Botha  would 
have  worked  out  the  size  of  the  columns,  would  have 
calculated  the  rate  of  their  movements  and  their 
length  :  would  have  told  from  the  colour  of  the  grass 
where  there  was  water,  and  where  they  would  camp. 
At  the  end  he  would  say,  "  At  such  and  such  a  place 
they  will  stay  for  the  night";  "At  such  and  such 
an  hour  we  will  attack."  His  power  of  deduction  was 
extraordinary,  and  it  rarely  failed.  On  one  occasion, 
in  the  Vryheid  district,  he  allowed  himself  to  be  over- 
ruled by  his  officers.  He  transferred  his  commands 
from  a  hill  where  they  were  quite  safe  to  another 
which  his  officers  preferred.  The  result  was  that  they 
were  attacked  and  surrounded  in  the  night,  and 
escaped  by  a  bare  miracle.  It  was  his  nearest  shave 
of  capture;  and  he  had  allowed  his  judgment  to  be 
overruled. 

"  He  could  always  find  a  way  round,"  says  one 
observer.  "I  don't  know  how  he  did  it;  perhaps  he 
did  not  know  himself,"  adds  the  same  witness.  "  His 
judgment  was  perfect."  The  very  utterance  of  such 
opinions  by  the  men  who  were  with  him  is  evidence 
of  the  confidence  which  he  inspired. 


THE   WAR   IN   FLOOD  99 

In  dealing  with  his  own  men,  his  great  gift  as  a 

leader  was  his  power  of  composure — 

"  Self-reverence,   self-knowledge,    self-control, 
These  three  alone  lead  life  to  sovereign  power." 

This  is  especially  true  of  that  fiery  atmosphere  of 
war;  those  who  can  walk  serenely  in  that  furnace  are 
already  half-way  to  victory.  It  is  the  evidence  of 
those  who  were  with  Botha  throughout  this  war  that 
he  was  always  calm  and  tranquil.  He  would  listen 
carefully;  he  would  not  speak  until  he  had  made  up 
his  mind.  He  was  always  patient  with  his  men — 
kindly  and  long-suffering.  He  never  mistook  harsh- 
ness for  firmness. 

The  Boer  military  system  had  neither  the  virtues 
nor  the  faults  of  European  militarism.  The  Com- 
mander-in-Chief was  the  chosen  and  appointed  leader; 
the  system  of  service,  although  compulsory  in  form, 
was  in  the  essence  voluntary.  Its  strength  was  the 
diffused  intelligence  of  large  bodies  of  men  trained 
to  understand  individually  the  aim  and  object  of  the 
fighting  in  which  they  risked  their  lives.  Its  weak- 
ness was  want  of  discipline.  But  Botha  steadily 
strengthened  discipline.  He  weeded  out  the  weak- 
lings; he  gradually  tightened  the  screws  of  order  and 
method,  until  in  the  end  these  hardy  remnants  of  the 
armies  of  the  Transvaal,  steeled  by  suffering,  were 
worthy  to  meet  the  best  troops  in  the  world. 

It  was  by  such  means  that  he  prolonged  the  Repub- 
lican resistance  through  1900  and  1901. 

G  2 


CHAPTER    VI 

THE    WAR    IN    EBB    (1901) 


CHAPTER    VI 

THE    WAR    IN    EBB    (19OI) 

"This  battle  fares  like  to  the  morning's  war, 
When  dying-  clouds  contend  with  growing  light ; 
What  time  the  shepherd,   blowing  of  his  nails. 
Can  neither  call  it  perfect  day  nor  night." 

—Henry  VI. 

By  the  end  of  1901  the  war  had  passed  to  a  grimmer 
phase.  Exasperated  by  the  continued  resistance  of 
the  Boers,  the  British  Generals  had  changed  from 
leniency  to  severity.  The  country  was  gradually 
being  laid  waste  by  the  operations  of  a  war  which 
was  daily  becoming  more  bitter  on  both  sides ;  for  it 
remains  yet  to  be  proved  that  the  subjection  of  an 
independent  race  can  ever  be  achieved  by  gentle 
methods. 

Justifiable  or  not,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  these 
new  methods  of  warfare  played  a  great  part  in  bring- 
ing the  war  to  an  end.  The  destruction  of  the  farms 
deprived  the  Boers  of  food;  and  where  everyone 
might  become  a  soldier,  the  treatment  of  the  whole 
population  as  possible  combatants  seemed  to  the  men 
on  the  spot  the  only  effective  counter-measure.  In 
defence  of  their  independence,  even  the  Republican 


I04  GENERAL  BOTHA 

women  and  children  played  no  negligible  part;  and 
it  seemed  difficult,  therefore,  to  leave  them  entirely 
outside  the  war.  Given  the  political  object,  the  mili- 
tary policy  with  its  farm-burning,  concentration  camps, 
and  destruction  of  crops  and  cattle — what  Campbell- 
Bannerman  in  a  stinging  phrase  called  "methods  of 
barbarism " — seemed  to  the  soldiers  practically  in- 
evitable.^ 

In  pursuance  of  this  policy,  Lord  Kitchener  now 
brought  his  full  organising  genius  to  bear  on  the 
systematic  devastation  and  depopulation  of  the 
country.  He  built  elaborate  lines  of  those  famous 
block-houses  which  were  to  complete  the  process. 
Great  columns  of  British  troops  "netted"  the  country 
and  drove  the  population,  with  their  flocks  and  herds, 
up  against  these  lines.  De  Wet,  in  his  bitter  scorn, 
called  the  block-houses  "  block-heads,"  and  Botha 
often  walked  through  and  round  them ;  but  in  spite  of 
that  they  undoubtedly  played  a  great  part  in  bringing 
the  war  to  an  end. 

For  the  result  of  these  block-houses  was  that  by  the 
end  of  1 90 1  the  Boer  forces  no  longer  possessed  any 
organised  commissariat  or  transport;  and  the  two 
central  commands  could  maintain  their  organisation 
only  by  slender  and  precarious  filaments  of  despatch- 
riders.      The    armies    in    the    field    were    gradually 

^  Lord  Milner  was  opposed  to  it,  and  Mr.  Chamberlain  never 
liked  it.  The  policy  of  devastation  was  laid  down  by  Lord 
Kitchener  in  a  Memorandum  dated  Pretoria,  December  21,  1900. 
{"Times  History,"   Vol.   V,   p.   86.) 


THE   WAR   IN   EBB  105 

reduced  to  a  number  of  small,  scattered  forces,  often 
audaciously  and  splendidly  aggressive — even  up  to 
the  very  suburbs  of  Cape  Town — but  gradually,  as 
the  months  wore  on,  more  and  more  isolated  from  the 
centre,  and  more  and  more  dependent  for  resistance 
on  the  ammunition  which  they  could  capture  from  our 
troops,  and  the  food  they  could  buy  from  the  Kaffirs, 
or  from  the  few  remaining  white  farmers. 

Precisely  as  new  districts  were  devastated,  the 
country  in  which  they  could  operate  became  "  small 
by  degrees  and  beautifully  less";  and  as  the  spheres 
of  war  became  fewer  and  smaller,  the  British  columns 
could  be  concentrated  more  effectually  on  the  remain- 
ing districts.  All  the  time  the  risks  of  capture  became 
steadily  greater  for  the  remaining  commandos.  Week 
by  week  the  rumours  of  death  and  disease  in  the 
concentration  camps  carried  woe  into  the  commandos, 
and  led  to  the  gradual  thinning  of  the  fighting  ranks. 

It  was  Botha's  fixed  policy  to  continue  his  resistance 
as  long  as  there  was  even  the  faintest  glimmer  of  hope 
for  Republican  freedom.  With  a  mind  always  open 
to  the  faintest  whispers  of  "  peace  with  honour,"  he 
tuned  up  his  troops  to  uttermost  resistance,  and  he 
abated  no  jot  of  the  rigours  of  war. 

Several  times  during  this  year  (1901)  he  was  very 
nearly  captured.  There  was  one  day  when  his  sur- 
render seemed  inevitable.  He  had  been  driven  with 
his  Staff  and  about  two  hundred  men  right  to  the  edge 
of  the  "  High  Veldt  "  of  the  Eastern  Transvaal,  where 
the  high  ground  breaks    down  in  low  hills  and  long 


io6  GENERAL  BOTHA 

valleys  to  the  lower  country.  They  were  hanging 
on  to  the  extreme  edge  of  the  high  country  like  rooks 
on  the  edge  of  a  wood. 

On  that  afternoon,  at  4  p.m.,  the  Boer  scouts  came 
in  with  the  news  that  the  enemy  were  closing  in  upon 
them  from  north,  west,  and  south  in  columns  that 
would  reach  them  within  a  few  hours.  The  Repub- 
licans looked  down  across  the  plain  and  could  see  the 
rays  of  the  sun  glittering  on  the  roofs  of  a  long  line 
of  block-houses.  It  looked  as  if  Botha  had  absolutely 
no  chance  of  escape,  and  that  very  afternoon  a  report 
reached  London  that  it  was  fully  expected  that  he 
would  be  captured  on  the  morrow.  But  Botha  acted 
with  the  utmost  coolness.  He  decided  that  he  would 
descend  to  the  plain  as  soon  as  the  dusk  allowed  his 
men  to  move  without  being  discerned  from  the  block- 
houses; and  he  designed  to  escape  later  on  into  the 
Vryheid  district  which  he  knew  so  well.  There  was 
an  old  road,  no  longer  used  for  heavy  wagons,  but 
still  practicable  for  horse  riders,  leading  to  a  ford 
across  the  Buffalo  River.  This  ford  was  supposed 
to  lie  between  two  block-houses  that  stood  about  a 
mile  apart.  Boer  scouts  were  sent  ahead  to  find  out 
whether  that  road  was  still  open,  and  they  reported 
that  it  was. 

As  soon  as  darkness  fell,  Botha  and  his  men 
descended  the  slopes  eastwards  along  the  old  road. 
During  that  descent  they  were  joined  by  some  very 
embarrassing  recruits.  At  that  period  a  number  of 
Republican  farmers  who  had  been  driven  from  their 


THE  WAR   IN  EBB  107 

farms  were  tramping  up  and  down  the  high  veldt  with 
herds  of  cattle  which  they  hoped  to  save  from  the 
columns.  They  got  wind  of  Botha's  march  and  joined 
him  in  his  descent.  Their  one  object  was  to  trek  away 
from  the  British  Army;  and  as  it  is  the  fixed  rule  of 
the  Boer  people  to  help  one  another,  General  Botha 
could  not  prevent  these  farmers  from  joining  him.  So 
this  strange  column  started  off — soldiers,  farmers, 
cattle,  sheep — surely  the  most  conglomerate  host  that 
ever  faced  peril  since  the  days  of  Moses.  Either  they 
had  to  get  through  that  night  or,  if  they  were  held  up 
by  the  block-houses,  they  would  be  found  spread  out 
on  the  open  plain  in  broad  daylight  and  inevitably 
captured.  The  whole  host  moved  on  for^  some  hours 
and  then  halted  to  let  the  scouts  go  ahead  and  cut 
the  wires.  The  commando  stood  still  and  waited  for 
the  return  of  the  wire-cutters.  The  pause  seemed  an 
eternity.  Then  at  this  critical  moment  the  great  mass 
of  cattle  became  deeply  disturbed.  Cows  began  to 
low,  sheep  to  bleat,  and  horses  to  neigh.  Anger  and 
despair  seized  upon  the  commando.  A  sound  of  shots 
came  through  the  darkness  and  they  seemed  to  come 
from  three  sides,  although  it  turned  out  that  they  came 
from  the  front  only.  But  there,  in  the  darkness,  the 
Boers  seemed  to  be  waiting  for  certain  death. 

At  that  moment  the  Boer  scouts  came  riding  back 
announcing  that  they  had  found  a  new  block-house 
erected  a  few  paces  from  the  ford  which  they  had  to 
cross.  This  new  block-house,  erected  right  on  the 
brink  of  the  water,  made  the  gap  so  narrow  that  it 


io8  GENERAL   BOTHA 

seemed  impossible  for  the  Republican  column  to  pass 
through,  especially  as  all  the  block-houses  were  now- 
aroused  by  the  noises  of  the  cattle  and  were  firing 
fiercely. 

But  Botha  decided  to  go  straight  forward,  relying 
upon  the  notorious  difficulty  of  shooting  straight  in 
the  dark.  He  sent  forward  a  few  dozen  men  to  attack 
the  new  block-house — some  to  approach  it  from  the 
west  and  the  others  to  cross  the  ford  and  to  open  fire 
from  the  other  side  of  the  river — with  the  governing 
object  of  distracting  attention  from  his  own  column. 
Then  the  whole  confused  procession  of  Republicans 
and  cattle  were  set  in  motion,  and  moved  forward 
through  the  gap  cut  in  the  triple  line  of  wires.  The 
new  block-house  kept  up  a  continual  fire  on  them  from 
almost  point-blank  range.  One  who  was  marching 
with  Botha  has  described  to  me  the  effects  of  these 
shots  as  of  constant  blows  on  the  top  of  his  head. 
But  the  night  was  very  dark,  and  the  blows  were  not 
yet  actual  wounds  or  death. 

Botha  rode  forward  on  a  big  white  horse  without 
quickening  his  pace.  Next  to  him  on  the  left  rode 
his  little  son  of  fourteen  years,  the  younger  Louis. 
Botha  himself  sat  erect,  as  unconcerned  as  if  nothing 
were  happening;  but  he  had  ordered  his  boy  to  lie 
forward  on  his  own  horse  and  he  was  so  riding  as  to 
shield  the  child  with  his  body.  The  Republicans 
could  not  fire  and  could  not  gallop.  They  were 
moving  in  double  file  and  in  darkness.  The  front  men, 
in  descending  the  slope  to  the  water's  edge  and  in 


THE   WAR   IN   EBB  109 

wading  through  the  river,  had  to  go  slow;  and  there- 
fore, to  avoid  panic,  those  who  were  behind  must  go 
slow  also.  This  they  did  with  amazing  self-restraint, 
and  not  a  single  file  in  that  column  quickened  its  speed 
until  the  whole  column  was  through.  The  extra- 
ordinary thing  is  that,  according  to  credible  witnesses, 
Botha  did  not  on  that  night  lose  a  single  man.  The 
only  loss  was  that  of  a  Kaffir  boy,  who  got  a  shot  in 
the  leg,  and  of  some  few  cattle  and  horses,  who  got 
frightened  and  caught  in  the  barbed  wire.^ 

It  was  a  strange  life  for  civilised  men — this  Arab- 
like wandering  over  the  great  veldt.  It  must  not  be 
imagined  that  all  the  days  were  full  of  thrills.  There 
were  long  dull  seasons  when  they  had  shaken  off  the 
pursuing  columns,  and  were  lying  lost  to  sight  and 
memory  in  some  hidden  nook  of  the  hills,  guarded  by 
vigilant  scouts  and  attempting  to  rest  their  tired 
horses  and  replenish  their  exhausted  provisions.  At 
such  seasons  the  hours  dragged  slowly,  and  every 
device  of  recreation  was  precious.  Botha  was  at  that 
time  a  fine  whist  player,  just  as  he  is  now  reputed  to 
be  the  best  player  of  auction  bridge  in  South  Africa. 
But  sometimes  even  the  packs  of  cards  would  be  lost 
in  one  of  their  rapid  escapes.  On  one  occasion  an 
assistant  military  secretary  cleverly  manufactured  a 
pack  of  cards  out  of  a  large  piece  of  cardboard,  with 
sketchy  drawings  of  fancy  kings,  queens,  and  knaves. 
The  only  defect  of  this  pack  was  that  it  could  not  be 

1  This  great  feat  is  alluded  to,  but  not  described,  in  the 
^^  Times  History,"  Vol.  V,  p.  460. 


no  GENERAL  BOTHA 

shufHed.  After  a  time  they  took  to  shuffling  the  pack 
as  men  shuffle  domino-stones,  on  a  flat  surface.  They 
had  intended  to  present  that  strange  pack  of  cards  to 
a  Museum  if  it  had  survived  the  war,  but  unfortunately 
it  was  "  lost  in  the  foray,"  and  they  had  to  manufac- 
ture a  new  pack  out  of  large  pieces  of  paper,  which 
were  by  no  means  so  convenient.  But  by  that  time 
Botha  himself  had  given  up  playing  whist.  He  had 
discovered  that  the  old  Boers  looked  askance  at  his 
cards;  and  rather  than  offend  his  followers  he  gave 
up  this  diversion. 

Every  kind  of  life  brings  its  own  compensation,  and 
perhaps,  after  all,  these  long  months  on  the  veldt 
endowed  these  Boers  with  a  stock  of  health  that  was 
to  last  for  life.  It  was  a  kind  of  "  return  to  nature." 
They  could  not  read,  and  they  could  not  write.  What 
better  rest-cure  for  modern  men?  I  remember  one  of 
these  fighters  telling  me — as  soldiers  do  now  on  return 
from  a  larger  front — that  the  real  terror  of  civil  life 
was  having  to  sleep  in  a  bed  and  under  a  roof. 

After  the  war  Botha  often  affirmed  that  his  men 
enjoyed  better  health  than  in  times  of  peace.  They 
knew  where  to  rest  and  they  knew  what  to  drink. 
Their  food  was  simple  to  the  point  of  the  elemental; 
at  any  rate,  they  escaped  that  not  infrequent  malady 
of  a  high  civilisation — the  habit  of  over-eating.  It  is 
interesting  now  to  note  that  the  men  between  forty 
and  fifty  stood  the  life  as  well  as  the  younger  men, 
and  Botha  once  told  me  that  the  best  fighters  of  all  in 
his  army  were  his  "boys" — the  young  fellows  between 


THE  WAR   IN   EBB  in 

fourteen  and  twenty.  The  men  who  really  suffered 
were  the  fathers  and  grandfathers,  who  had  to  endure 
anxiety  for  absent  and  helpless  families. 

During  such  weeks  of  pause  their  occupation  was  a 
simple  one.  It  was  to  watch  for  a  weak  spot  in  the 
scattered  British  lines,  and  then  to  make  a  surprise 
attack.  One  day  it  would  be  a  convoy  and  on  another 
it  would  be  a  block-house.  The  great  thing  was  to 
descend  swiftly  and  without  warning,  to  destroy  and 
then  to  escape  with  the  least  possible  loss.  Those 
were  thrilling,  electric  moments  in  the  general  bore- 
dom of  war. 

The  85,000  men  which  was  the  total  fighting  strength 
of  the  Republicans  at  the  opening  of  the  war  were  all 
this  time  gradually  dwindling  away,  while  the  British 
Army  was  daily  increasing.  The  Boers  were  wholly 
cut  off  from  the  sea,  and  shut  in  from  the  surrounding 
countries  on  land.  Only  the  remoteness  of  their  country 
from  Great  Britain  and  the  difficulties  of  transport  gave 
them  any  chance  at  all.  The  desperate  hope  of 
European  intervention  had  gradually  faded  away. 
The  German  Emperor  had  failed  them.  The  British 
Navy  still  commanded  the  situation.  And  yet  the 
extraordinary  fact  remains  that  ap  to  the  very  last 
those  scattered,  harassed  remnants  were  amazingly 
confident  of  victory. 

It  was  in  1901  that  Mrs.  Louis  Botha  began  to 
play  the  woman's  part  as  peacemaker  between  the 
fighting  Generals.    At  great  risk  to  herself,  travelling 


112  GENERAL   BOTHA 

in  the  midst  of  war,  this  brave  woman  acted  as  peace 
messenger  between  Lord  Kitchener  and  General 
Botha  of  that  year.  She  took  a  verbal  message 
from  Lord  Kitchener  to  General  Botha,  and  brought 
back  a  letter  which  resulted  in  that  famous  meeting 
at  Middelburg  in  March,  1901,  which  was  really  the 
first  overture  of  peace.  The  Middelburg  terms  came 
into  the  world  before  their  time;  but  they  were  in 
substance  very  near  to  those  which  were  finally  ac- 
cepted in  the  Treaty  of  Vereeniging.  Lord  Kitchener 
already  showed  that  genius  for  peacemaking  which 
stands  so  high  among  his  qualities,  and  he  might  have 
had  better  fortune  if  other  influences,  both  at  home 
and  in  South  Africa,  had  not  stiffened  and  hardened 
the  terms  which  he  originally  proposed.^  Lord 
Kitchener  always  believed  that  he  could  have  obtained 
peace  in  March  of  1901  if  he  had  been  allowed  a  free 
hand.  But  the  stubborn  fact  stood  out  that  the  Repub- 
licans were  not  yet  ready  to  give  up  their  independ- 
ence. Their  resistance  had  not  reached  the  breaking 
point. 

One  governing  principle  ruled  the  policy  of  General 
Botha  and  those  other  Transvaal  leaders  who  knew  all 
the  facts  and  could  look  far  ahead.  It  was  that  as 
long  as  there  was  the  faintest  ray  of  hope  that  they 
might  preserve  a  single  shred  or  tatter  of  their  inde- 

1  See  the  White  Papers  (Cd.  528,  Cd.  546,  Cd.  663).  In 
the  crisis  of  the  Vereenig-ing-  Conference  the  British  Govern- 
ment revived   the  Middelburg  offer. 


THE   WAR   IN  EBB  113 

pendence,  they  must  fight  on.  Once  that  hope  were 
to  disappear,  then  they  must  make  the  best  terms 
they  could  as  a  Government  rather  than  leave  their 
peoples  to  the  uncovenanted  rigours  of  unconditional 
surrender. 

In  1901  the  moment  of  hopelessness  did  not  seem 
yet  to  have  come.  There  was  still,  it  seemed  to  them, 
just  the  faintest  fighting  chance.  So  they  returned 
to  the  veldt;  and  the  only  actual  result  of  the 
meeting  at  Middelburg  was  that  Botha  issued  a 
rousing  appeal  to  the  commandos  for  a  new  and  more 
desperate  resistance.  "  Let  us,"  he  wrote,  "  as  Daniel 
in  the  lions'  den,  place  our  trust  in  God  alone ;  for  in 
His  time  and  in  His  way  He  will  certainly  give  us 
deliverance."  ^ 

It  was  clear  that  Botha,  too,  could  well  talk  the 
daily  language  of  the  Republican  peoples  when  he 
wanted  to  touch  the  deepest  springs  of  feeling. 

If  General  Botha  did  not  despair  of  war,  Mrs. 
Botha  did  not  despair  of  peace.  The  perseverance  of 
this  noble  woman  as  a  peacemaker  is  one  of  the  most 
romantic  and  thrilling  episodes  in  the  last  phases  of 
this  war.  General  Botha  was  not  always  in  a  mood 
to  listen,  and  there  were  moments  when  he  by  no 
means  welcomed  the  coming  of  the  messenger  of 
peace.  On  one  occasion  Mrs.  Botha  had  travelled 
for  three  days  to  reach  her  husband  with  a  new  sug- 
gestion from  the   British  headquarters.     Arriving  in 

1  Ermelo,   March   15,    igoi. 

H 


114  GENERAL   BOTHA 

the  Republican  lines,  she  asked  that  her  presence 
should  be  reported  to  the  General.  At  first  they  did 
not  know  where  to  find  Botha ;  but  at  last  he  was  found 
walking  up  and  down  in  some  agitation.  Faced  by 
his  wife,  he  said  to  her  instantly  :  "  You  must  leave 
me."  He  had  just  arranged  a  battle.  "  You  must  get 
back  as  soon  as  you  can,"  he  said.  "  I  am  blowing  up 
the  line  !  " 

She  had  gone  only  a  few  miles  when  the  shrapnel 
fell  all  around  her.  She  came  back  into  the  British 
lines  and  reported  herself  to  the  British  General  who 
had  let  her  through.  He  told  her  to  get  back  to 
Pretoria.  "  But  my  husband  is  going  to  blow  up  the 
railway,"  she  remarked.  "  He  won't  blow  it  up  if  you 
are  on  it,"  replied  the  British  General  with  some 
plausibility,  and  so  she  went.  She  travelled  in  a  train 
full  of  soldiers ;  but  her  presence  on  the  train  did 
not  change  her  husband's  Spartan  purpose.  The  line 
was  blown  up  and  the  train  stopped.  The  soldiers 
marched  off;  Mrs.  Botha  and  a  companion  were  left 
for  three  days  with  the  engine-driver  and  the  stoker. 
During  most  of  that  time  they  played  cards,  and  at  the 
end  the  men  asked  her  for  a  favour.  "  Ours  is  a  risky 
job,"  they  said,  "and  anything  may  happen  to  us  with 
your  husband  still  about.  Will  you  write  us  a  letter 
to  say  we  have  treated  you  well  ?"  So  Mrs.  Botha  wrote 
them  the  letter  for  which  they  asked.  Later  in  the  war 
one  of  them  was  captured,  and  was  excellently  treated 
by  the  Republicans  as  a  reward  for  his  kindness  to 
Mrs.   Botha.     Shrewd  fellows,  those  railway  men  ! 


THE  WAR   IN  EBB  115 

As  the  year  of  1901  wore  to  a  close  a  strange  situa- 
tion developed  in  the  field.  The  Republicans  were 
winning  more  victories  than  ever  before,  and  yet  their 
chances  of  final  success  in  the  war  were  growing 
steadily  less.  During  the  South  African  summer  of 
1901-2  (between  September  and  March),  they  dealt 
the  British  forces  some  resounding  blows.  In  the 
Western  Transvaal  De  la  Rey  had  completely  re- 
modelled his  army,  and  now  had  behind  him  some  of 
the  sturdiest  fighters  that  the  world  has  seen  since 
the  days  of  Cromwell.  There  was  the  fierce  and 
bloody  attack  on  a  British  column  at  Moedwil  Farm 
on  September  29th,  when  General  Kekewich  was 
wounded  and  two  hundred  British  soldiers  were  put 
out  of  action;  there  was  the  resolute  attack  on  a  column 
under  Colonel  Von  Donop  at  Kleinfontein.  But  the 
greatest  blow  of  all  came  from  Botha  at  Bakenlaagte, 
in  October,  when  that  brave  and  daring  soldier. 
Colonel  Benson,  was  killed,  and  Botha  led  two 
thousand  horsemen  to  the  defeat  and  annihilation  of 
Benson's  rearguard.  This  was  one  of  Botha's 
greatest  military  achievements.  It  is  still  regarded  in 
military  history  as  a  model  of  swift  and  effective 
shock-victory. 

Never,  indeed,  did  the  Boer  name  stand  higher  for 

pure  military  achievement  during  these  last  months 

of  the   war.     As   the   months   of  the   South   African 

summer  wore  away  their  scattered  forces  became  more 

and  more  daring.     Down  in  the  Orange  Free  State, 

in   the   early  morning  of   Christmas   Day,    De    Wet 

H  2 


ii6  GENERAL   BOTHA 

stormed  the  precipice  of  Tweefontein  by  night  and 
destroyed  a  force  of  Imperial  Yeomanry.  On 
February  24,  in  the  Eastern  Transvaal,  De  la  Rey 
attacked  and  scattered  a  column  under  Colonel 
Anderson  at  Izerspruit,  and  finally,  on  March  7,  his 
commandos,  now  trained  to  the  discipline  of  the  finest 
cavalry  regiments,  smashed  and  pulverised  a  column 
marching  under  Lord  Methuen,  who  was  himself 
wounded  and  captured. 

But  ultimate  success  in  war  depends  on  many  things 
besides  victory  on  the  field  of  battle.  Victory  must 
be  supported  by  material  resources  in  men,  money, 
food,  and  war  material.  It  was  the  essence  of  the 
situation  that  both  by  sea  and  by  land  the  Republicans 
were  cut  off  from  all  chance  of  replenishment  in  any 
of  these  factors  of  success.  The  valour  of  their  com- 
mandos was  never  higher,  and  the  striking  power  of 
their  forces  never  greater.  But  their  material  reserves 
were  gradually  and  surely  dwindling  down  to  the 
vanishing  point.  During  the  early  months  of  1902, 
Lord  Kitchener  had  organised  his  military  "  drives " 
on  a  colossal  scale.  The  British  columns  had  swept 
bare  great  spaces  of  the  two  Republics.  Within  these 
spaces  it  was  now  impossible  for  the  commandos  to 
operate;  for  Lord  Kitchener  did  his  work  with  great 
thoroughness. 

While  abating  no  jot  of  resistance,  Botha  all  through 
these  days  still  steadily  kept  an  eye  and  ear  open  to 
every  chance  of  peace.     As  General  in  command  of 


THE  WAR   IN   EBB  117 

the  Transvaal,  he  received  reports  from  all  districts, 
and  therefore  he  was  not  deceived  like  many  of  the 
Boers  by  the  brilliancy  of  their  achievements  in  the 
field.  He  received  daily  news  of  the  bitter  sufferings 
of  his  people,  and  he  knew  that  there  were  districts 
where  the  commandos  were  unable  to  continue  their 
resistance.  He  shared  the  extreme  Boer  suscepti- 
bility to  the  cry  of  their  suffering  families;  and  he 
knew  only  too  well  what  that  suffering  meant. 
Perhaps  the  most  significant  fact  of  all  that  became 
known  to  him  was  the  gradual  swing  of  the  Kaffirs 
against  the  Boers.  Here  was  an  ominous  indication 
of  the  new  opinion  of  these  black  spectators,  hitherto  in 
the  main  neutral,  as  to  the  final  outcome  of  the  war. 
But  this  change  threw  a  very  black  shadow  over  the 
future.  There  was,  for  instance,  the  terrible  news 
from  the  Western  Transvaal  of  an  armed  Kaffir  com- 
mando that  had  taken  the  field  against  the  Re- 
publicans in  spite  of  the  policy  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment not  to  make  use  of  black  aid  in  this  war.  Worst 
of  all,  there  came  rumours  of  increased  peril  to  the 
women  and  children  still  on  the  farms — peril  from 
this  awful  spectre  which  ever  haunts  the  consciousness 
of  white  South  Africa,  and  blanches  the  cheek  of  the 
bravest  husband  or  father. 

On  this  situation  Botha  looked  out  with  the  masterly 
coolness  that  always  gave  him  his  power  over  events. 
Rather  than  see  his  race  destroyed,  he  was  always 
ready  to  surrender  on  terms.  Then,  even  if  inde- 
pendence were  lost,  the  race  could  be  kept  alive.     He 


ii8  GENERAL  BOTHA 

was  not  in  favour  of  a  resistance  that  would  imperil 
the  existence  of  his  race. 

Had  the  point  yet  come  at  which  that  peril  was 
already  in  sight? 

Not  even  William  of  Orange,  in  the  most  desperate 
days  of  an  even  mightier  struggle,  could  have  been 
faced  with  a  more  difficult  question.  It  required  all 
the  calmness  of  a  shrewd,  wary  mind,  exercised  in  the 
most  tranquil  circumstances.  Yet  it  was  in  the  midst 
of  daily  peril  and  escape  that  Louis  Botha  had  to 
decide  this  great  issue  for  the  future  of  his  race.  Hap- 
pily for  the  Republicans,  Botha  was  possessed  then, 
as  now,  of  a  great  fund  of  serenity.  Nothing  could 
shake  or  upset  him.  This  tranquillity  of  soul  was 
expressed  in  many  ways — especially  and  most  notably 
in  an  extraordinary  reserve  of  utterance.  In  war, 
violence  of  language  seems  to  proceed  as  a  miasma 
from  violence  of  action ;  and  the  best  of  men  become, 
in  Flanders  and  elsewhere,  hard  swearers.  Botha,  on 
the  contrary,  rarely,  even  in  the  most  extreme  trials 
of  these  months,  used  a  choleric  word. 

Perhaps  the  story  which  best  illustrates  this  rare 
self-control  over  the  tongue  is  one  which  has  been 
told  me  in  regard  to  the  fighting  which  took  place  in 
June,  1900,  east  of  Pretoria. 

One  day,  in  the  midst  of  that  bitter  fighting,  far  up 
on  the  '  High  Veldt,'  on  a  very  windy  day,  a  spark 
dropped  by  a  Kaffir  set  fire  to  the  grass.  The  flame, 
sweeping  over  the  plain,  reached,  with  its  swift,  fiery 


THE  WAR   IN   EBB  119 

tongues,  the  personal  headquarters  tent  of  General 
Botha,  devouring,  before  they  could  be  removed,  all 
his  own  personal  belongings — saddles,  blankets,  rifles, 
and  even  his  private  store  of  ammunition.  His  own 
coach,  with  his  private  papers  and  most  intimate  be- 
longings, was  barely  dragged  across  a  stream,  and 
just  saved  from  the  fire. 

At  the  time  of  this  accident,  Botha  was  away  from 
his  camp,  directing  an  attack.  When  the  messenger 
came  to  tell  him,  he  listened  and  said  nothing.  His 
only  sign  of  feeling  was  that  he  grew  very  pale.  The 
accident  meant  much  to  him.  By  one  piece  of  care- 
lessness, the  last  reserve  of  comfort  was  snatched  from 
his  life.  Yet  no  word  of  anger  escaped  him  then,  or 
at  any  other  time  on  that  day.  Only,  at  the  end  of 
the  day,  when  his  work  in  the  field  was  done,  he  turned 
to  his  staff  and  said  with  a  sigh  :  "  Well,  let's  go  back 
to  that  ash-heap  !  "  The  strange  thing  is  that  still 
to-day  one  at  least  of  his  officers  remembers  this  re- 
markably mild  utterance  as  perhaps  the  bitterest  phrase 
that  he  uttered  in  the  course  of  those  bitter  days. 

Well  was  it  for  South  Africa  that  at  this  crisis  in 
her  fate  she  possessed  a  son  so  serene  and  clear- 
sighted. This  it  was  that  enabled  him  to  recognise  the 
moment  for  peace  before  it  was  too  late  to  make  terms. 

It  was  quite  early  in  1902,  perhaps  along  with  the 
influences  of  Christmas-time  and  the  New  Year,  that 
the  first  white  light  of  this  dawn  of  peace  stole  along 
the  horizon  of  the  black  and  stormy  sky  of   South 


120  GENERAL  BOTHA 

Africa.     The  origins  of  this  new  dawn  have  still  a 
deep  human  and   dramatic  interest.     The  incidental 
opening  was  due  to  the  apparently  hopeless  efforts  of 
a  private  English  gentleman,  a  member  of  the  Society 
of  Friends,  bearing  the  honoured  name  of  Fox.^     Mr. 
Francis  Fox  had  little  encouragement  from  any  party 
or  section  of  Englishmen  when  he  started  upon  his 
errand.     The  "  Bitter-enders  "  were  still  very  strong 
in    London — stronger   even    than    in   the   Transvaal. 
But  beneath  the  surface  there  had  set  in  that  deep, 
remorseful  fatigue  which  the  violence  of  war  so  often 
brings  in  its  train.     The    brilliant    oration    of    Lord 
Rosebery    at    Chesterfield    in    December,    1901,    had 
recently  provided  a  centre  round  which  various  peace 
influences  might  respectably  gather.     While  doggedly 
adhering  to  the  policy  of  annexation,  the  British  people 
were  now  inclined  to  grant  the  Boers  any  terms  short 
of     independence.     The    enemy     had    won     British 
respect;   and   respect   is   the   first   step   towards   con- 
ciliation. 

What  was  wanted  was  a  bridge-builder — a  friendly 
Power  that  would  say  the  first  word  to  bring  together 
two  races  cut  off  by  all  the  misunderstanding  and 
brutalities  of  prolonged  bloodshed. 

It  was  just  here  that  Mr.  Francis  Fox  came  in. 
He  conceived  the  idea  of  persuading  the  Dutch 
Government    to     act     as    friendly     mediator     under 

^  See  "A  Brief  Narrative  of  Some  Recent  Historical  Incidents 
in  connection  with  the  Promotion  of  Peace,"  by  P'rancis  Wil- 
liam Fox  (London  :  West,  Newman  and  Co.,   1909). 


THE  WAR   IN   EBB  121 

the  well-known  "  Mediation "  clause  in  the  Hague 
Convention.^ 

On  such  occasions  there  are  always  mountains  of 
fear  and  pride  to  be  removed;  and  only  faith  will  do 
the  miracle.  Mr.  Fox  journeyed  to  and  fro  between 
the  Hague  and  London.  He  approached  the  Dutch 
Prime  Minister  and  the  Dutch  Court  and  found  them 
reluctant  to  be  drawn  in.  He  returned  to  London  and 
approached  the  chiefs  of  the  British  Government. 
He  found  Mr.  Chamberlain  implacable.  But  Lord 
Lansdowne,  representing  the  Foreign  Office,  and 
perhaps  aware  of  other  world  complications  besides 
South  Africa,  was  friendly.  Lord  Salisbury  was 
almost  eager.  All  that  remained  was  mainly  a  ques- 
tion of  etiquette.  Foreign  intervention,  of  course, 
would  be  impossible;  but  there  was  still  the  blessed 
word  "  mediation."  With  all  its  faults,  diplomacy  has 
still  discovered  some  soothing  charms  for  the  pride 
and  prudery  of  governments. 

The  upshot  was  that  the  Dutch  Prime  Minister 
visited  London  to  see  the  "  Dutch  Masters "  at  the 
National  Gallery — an  admirable  collection,  well 
worthy  of  his  attention.  In  a  visit  which  Lord  Rose- 
bery  wittily  compared  to  a  casual  call  at  "  a  wayside 
inn,"  Dr.  Kuyper  was  happily  able  to  satisfy  himself 
that  the  British  Government  would  welcome  a  friendly 
letter;  and  the  result  was  a  despatch  sent  by  the 
Netherlands    Government    to    Lord    Lansdowne    on 

^  Article  III  of  Part  I,  Second  Peace  Conference  (1907), 
Cd.  3857. 


122  GENERAL  BOTHA 

February  25.^  The  letter  proposed  mediation,  or  as 
an  alternative  the  return  of  the  Continental  Boer  Dele- 
gates to  South  Africa.  In  his  reply  Lord  Lansdowne 
refused  both  proposals;  and,  to  the  casual  eye,  that 
did  not  appear  very  hopeful.  But  in  diplomacy  things 
are  not  always  what  they  seem.  For  at  the  time  of 
his  reply  Lord  Lansdowne  casually  made  a  new  pro- 
posal— that  the  British  Government  would  be  quite 
willing  to  receive  in  a  friendly  spirit  direct  overtures 
from  the  Boer  leaders  in  South  Africa. 

This  was  just  the  opening  that  the  Dutch  Govern- 
ment was  aiming  after.  It  removed  the  technical  diffi- 
culty produced  by  the  banishment  proclamation 
recently  issued  by  the  British  Government  against  the 
Boer  Generals — that  there  was  no  one  officially  existent 
on  the  Republican  side  to  negotiate  with. 

So  the  letters  were  telegraphed  to  South  Africa. 
They  were  communicated  by  Lord  Kitchener  to  the 
Boer  leaders,  and  the  result  was  that  the  acting  Presi- 
dent of  the  Transvaal,  Schalk  Burger,  communicated 
to  Lord  Kitchener  his  desire  to  consult  the  President 
of  the  Orange  Free  State  as  to  his  reply. 

It  was  nearly  two  weeks  before  President  Steyn 
could  be  found  on  the  "  illimitable  veldt."  But  at 
last  he  was  tracked  down ;  and  then,  at  Klerksdorp  in 
the  Orange  Free  State,  there  opened  the  first  of  those 
critical  and  difficult  discussions  which  were  to  bring 
back  peace  to  South  Africa. 

1  Cd.  906. 


CHAPTER  VII 
PEACE     (1902) 


CHAPTER    VII 

PEACE    (1902) 

"  A  peace  is  of  the  nature  of  a  conquest : 
For  then  both  parties  nobly  are  subdued, 
And  neither  party  loses." 

Henry  IV,  Part  II,  Act  IV,  Sc.  II. 

The  part  which  General  Botha  had  to  play  in  the 
great  Peace  Conferences  which  followed  upon  the 
overture  of  the  Netherlands  Government  was  not  by 
any  means  easy.  He  had  to  deal  with  a  situation 
acutely  difficult  and  perilous.  His  own  people  were 
now  scattered  like  sheep  over  the  spaces  of  the  great 
veldt,  and  he  was  their  only  shepherd.  His  responsi- 
bility was  very  great.  It  was  his  first  duty  to  form 
and  declare  his  own  opinion.  But  the  Boers  are  a 
people  that  cannot  be  driven.  He  must  lead;  and  to 
lead  them  properly  he  must  feel  the  pulse  of  their 
national  life.  How  to  do  that  with  a  people  so  broken 
and  divided  by  the  grim  scourge  of  war  ? 

More  than  half  of  the  Boer  men  were  now  prisoners 
of  war,  and  of  the  10,000  Transvaalers  still  remaining 


126  GENERAL   BOTHA 

in  the  field  most  of  them  were  separated  from  their 
families,  homeless  wanderers  on  the  veldt. 

The  old  Boer  Government,  Kruger  and  his  friends, 
were  away  "  on  leave "  in  Europe.  Schalk  Burger 
and  Botha  represented  the  acting  Government;  and 
there  was  no  absolute  compulsion  to  consult  the  absent 
delegates.  But  it  was  a  great  responsibility  for  Botha 
and  Schalk  Burger  to  act  alone. 

There  were  other  and  even  greater  difficulties. 
General  Botha  had  to  deal,  not  only  with  his  own 
people,  but  with  the  resolute  and  formidable  fighting 
bands  of  the  Orange  Free  State.  In  that  State  the 
leading  personalities,  President  Steyn  and  General 
De  Wet,  the  Vice-President,  were  far  less  inclined  to 
peace  than  the  Transvaalers.  It  was  one  of  the 
strangest  facts  in  that  great  struggle  that  the  men 
who  came  most  reluctantly  into  the  war  were  in  the 
end  most  reluctant  to  make  peace.  The  Orange  Free 
State  had  at  the  beginning  little  desire  for  the  conflict. 
They  honoured  the  bond  of  their  defensive  alliance; 
but  they  would  readily  have  seized  upon  any  excuse 
to  stay  outside.  But  just  as  their  civilisation  was 
purer  and  less  diluted  than  that  of  the  modern  Trans- 
vaal, so  they  clung  to  their  independence  more  fiercely. 
Their  freedom  had  not  been  restricted  by  any  Con- 
vention :  the  loss  of  the  diamond  fields  had  saved 
them  from  much  temptation.  The  "  Orange  Free  " 
before  the  war  was  a  famous  model  State;  and  they 
had  not  yet  (in   1902)  been  brought  to  the  point  of 


PEACE  127 

weakness  that  easily  accepts  surrender.  Only  6,000 
men  left  in  the  field,  and  their  country  was  widely 
devastated ;  but  the  survivors  were  stalwarts,  and  there 
was  always  the  Cape  Colony  to  raid.  So  it  was  that 
in  these  discussions  their  leaders  still  proved  the  most 
obstinate  "Bitter-enders" — just  as  now,  in  the  politics 
of  to-day,  they  still  resist  most  obstinately  the  mingling 
of  their  racial  influence  with  that  of  the  British  stock. 

If  we  try  to  look  at  the  matter  from  the  side  of  the 
Republics,  we  can  see  that  there  was  real  ground  for 
an  honest  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  best  way  of 
ending  the  war.  Some  thought  that  there  was  still  a 
fighting  military  chance.  Some  still  dreamed  of 
European  complications — not  so  impossible  as  others 
imagined.^ 

It  was  the  strict  view  of  the  Republican  leaders  that 
if  they  should  once  accept  terms  as  British  subjects 
they  would  be  morally  pledged  to  their  plighted  word. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  they  should  persist  in  their 
refusal  to  make  terms,  and  slide  into  an  unconditional 
surrender,  then,  in  their  view,  they  would  always  re- 
serve the  right  to  rebel  in  the  future.  That  was  the 
great  argument  put  forward  by  Steyn  and  De  Wet, 
and  it  nearly  carried  the  day.  But  there  were  grave 
considerations  on  the  other  side.  There  was  the  fate 
of  the  Cape  rebels  and  of  the  prisoners  of  war,  who 
would  have  neither  military  nor  civil  rights  of  any 
kind  unless  the  Governments  came  to  terms.     Last, 

^  The  Morocco  trouble  was  just  beginning-  to  loom  up. 


128  GENERAL  BOTHA 

but  not  least,  there  were  still  thousands  of  Republican 
women  and  children  in  the  concentration  camps  and 
on  the  wrecked  farms,  towards  whom  the  fighting  men 
felt  with  an  intensity  of  grief  and  passion  possible 
only  in  a  scattered  pastoral  people. 

On  April  9,  1902,  the  representatives  of  the  two 
Republican  Governments  met  at  Klerksdorp  in  the 
Orange  Free  State.  On  the  Transvaal  side  were 
Botha,  Reitz,  De  la  Rey,  Lukas  Meyer,  and  Krogh — 
for  the  Orange  Free  State  Steyn,  De  Wet,  Brebner, 
Hertzog,  and  Olivier.  The  meeting  opened  with  prayer, 
after  the  excellent  fashion  of  the  ancient  world,  and 
the  correspondence  between  the  Governments  of  Great 
Britain  and  Holland  was  read.  Botha  and  De  la  Rey 
gave  their  reports  as  to  the  condition  of  the  country, 
and  then  President  Steyn  commenced  to  speak. 
Crippled  and  half  blinded  by  his  experiences  in  the 
war,  this  indomitable  man  still  from  his  chair  pleaded 
for  independence.  He  said  definitely  that  he  would 
rather  surrender  unconditionally  than  make  terms. 

Thus  the  great  issue  was  opened,  and  through  the 
whole  of  that  day  the  debate  swung  to  and  fro,  grave, 
eager,  and  critical — a  debate  on  which  there  hung 
the  future  fate  of  a  people. 

The  evening  closed  without  a  decision.  But  already 
there  was  a  slight  leaning  towards  peace.  For  on  the 
following  day  (April  10)  Judge  Hertzog  opened  the 
sitting  by  laying  a  definite  proposal  before  the  Con- 
ference.     It    was    that    Lord    Kitchener's    overtures 


PEACE  129 

should  be  accepted  as  a  basis  of  negotiations  and  an 
interview  asked  for.  This  proposal  was  adopted,  and 
the  request  for  such  an  interview  was  telegraphed  im- 
mediately to  Pretoria.  Then  Hertzog  proposed  that 
the  Republicans  should  frame  proposals  of  their  own 
to  lay  before  Lord  Kitchener  at  Pretoria  as  a  starting 
point  for  the  discussion.  A  sub-committee  went  apart 
and  framed  the  proposals.  These  were  accepted  and 
fixed  as  a  basis. 

It  is  pathetic  now  to  look  back  on  those  last  pro- 
posals of  the  little  Republican  Conference  at  Klerks- 
dorp.  Not  even  yet  did  they  abandon  the  last  linger- 
ing hope  of  preserving  their  independence.  There 
was  to  be  a  "  Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Peace  " — a 
Customs  Union — a  Union  of  Posts,  Telegraphs,  and 
Railways — a  Common  Franchise — demolition  of  forts 
— Arbitration — equal  use  of  languages — a  reciprocal 
amnesty.  Excellent  before  the  war  but  now  too  late, 
too  late  ! 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  Botha  had  the  smallest 
belief  that  these  terms  would  be  acceptable  to  the 
British  Government.  But  he  agreed  to  them  as  a 
starting  point  for  negotiations.  It  was  absolutely 
necessary  for  him  to  carry  his  people  with  him.  If 
he  had  refused  to  fall  in  with  these  proposals  he  would 
have  been  outvoted,  and  would  have  been  left  helpless 
and  apart.  The  Boers  had  to  be  convinced  that  the 
British  proposal  was  irrevocable.  They  had  to  be 
allowed  to  employ  their  engrained  racial  instinct  for 

I 


130  GENERAL   BOTHA 

bargaining.  Only  so  could  there  be  any  chance  of 
peace. 

Before  the  day  closed,  General  Wilson  came  to  the 
tent  where  the  Boers  were  meeting,  and  brought  Lord 
Kitchener's  reply.  He  was  willing  to  meet  the  repre- 
sentatives at  Pretoria;  and  trains  would  be  provided 
to  take  them  thither. 

The  Boer  representatives  arrived  at  Pretoria  on  the 
evening  of  April  12.  From  the  very  moment  of  their 
arrival  they  were  treated  by  the  British  Army  with  the 
utmost  cordiality  and  hospitality.  The  Transvaal 
leaders  were  quartered  in  a  house  next  door  to  Lord 
Kitchener,  and  the  Free  Staters  were  not  far  off.  It 
became  quite  clear  to  the  Boers  that  the  British  desired 
peace  if  they  could  obtain  it  on  any  terms  honourable 
to  themselves.  But  it  was  soon  also  brought  home 
to  them  that  their  independence  was  gone  beyond 
recall.  The  British  officers  mixed  freely  with  them, 
and  spoke  constantly  of  the  new  Colonies  as  estab- 
lished facts.  The  Free  State  leaders  refused  to  be 
drawn  into  talk;  but  the  British  officers  persisted  in 
their  invincible  cheerfulness,  and  the  Free  State  chap- 
lain reluctantly  records  that  their  stay  at  Pretoria  left 
with  them  the  most  pleasant  memories.^  After  break- 
fast on  the  following  morning  they  went  to  meet  Lord 
Kitchener  at  his  house.  They  met  in  a  big  hall,  and 
Lord  Kitchener  gave  them  a  most  amicable  greeting. 

^  Sec  "Through  Shot  and  Flame,"  p.  282,  by  Rev.  J.  D. 
Kestel.     (Methuen  and  Co.) 


PEACE  131 

Almost  immediately  he  cleared  the  room  of  strangers, 
and  proceeded  to  business. 

The  Republicans  placed  their  proposal  before  Lord 
Kitchener.  He  replied  that  the  British  could  enter- 
tain no  proposals  short  of  annexation.  But  there  were 
many  kinds  of  British  Colonies — he  ingeniously 
argued — and  there  could  be  no  indignity  in  their 
accepting  the  looser  kind  of  Colonial  status.  This 
great  stroke  of  persuasiveness  achieved  its  object. 
The  Republicans  began  to  be  led  into  discussion,  and 
those  who  begin  to  discuss  are  already  on  the  road  to 
agreement.  Why  then,  they  said — with  some  astute- 
ness on  their  side — could  not  the  British  Government 
regard  the  Republican  proposals — this  Treaty  of 
Friendship  and  Peace  with  its  Customs  Union — as 
equivalent  to  annexation?  Ireland  was  brought  into 
the  controversy — on  both  sides — and  Lord  Kitchener 
claimed  to  be  an  Irishman  himself.  Then  he  asked 
them  to  drop  their  proposals  and  to  argue  on  the 
British  basis.  But  the  Republicans  pressed  him  very 
strongly  to  telegraph  their  proposals  to  the  British 
Government.  Lord  Kitchener  clearly  did  not  want 
to  break  off  the  negotiations.  At  last  he  took  a  sheet 
of  paper  and  began  to  draft  the  Republican  proposal 
in  a  milder  and  more  presentable  form  for  home  con- 
sumption. At  the  end  of  the  telegram — with  a  touch 
of  true  diplomacy — he  added  a  phrase,  gently  sound- 
ing the  Home  Government  as  to  the  possibility  of  a 
middle    proposal,    satisfactory    both    to    Boers    and 

f  2 


132  GENERAL  BOTHA 

British.  This  vital  phrase  was  accepted  by  the  Repub- 
lican delegates;  and  so,  by  the  splendid  patience  and 
perseverance  of  Lord  Kitchener,  the  flickering  flame  of 
peace  was  kept  alive. 

The  answer  of  the  British  Government  did  not  come 
for  two  days — until  Monday,  April  14.  The  delegates 
had  just  reached  the  limits  of  human  patience  when 
they  were  summoned  to  Lord  Kitchener's  house.  The 
official  reply  had  arrived;  and  Lord  Milner  had 
arrived  also.  The  observant  Free  State  chaplain 
noticed  his  piercing  eyes,  his  pallor,  his  sleepless  fear 
of  a  precipitate,  emotional  peace. 

The  Free  State  chaplain  used  his  eyes  well.  For 
there  had  arisen  at  this  moment  a  strange  and  sur- 
prising difference  between  the  British  statesman  and 
the  British  soldier.  Lord  Kitchener  was  now  anxious 
and  even  eager  for  peace.  Ruthless  in  war — perhaps 
because  so  ruthless — he  could  translate  the  term  "  un- 
conditional surrender"  into  all  the  horrors  of  an  ex- 
terminated people.  Lord  Milner,  milder  in  war,  was 
less  anxious  for  peace.  His  great  anxiety  was  lest  a 
passing  phase  of  sentiment  should  give  back  to  the 
Boers  all  that  they  had  lost. 

This  strange  clash  of  able  minds  and  strong  wills 
now  began  to  make  itself  sub-consciously  felt  in  all 
the  details  of  this  great  discussion — especially  on  the 
question  of  the  period  which  should  elapse  before  the 
conquered  Colonies  should  enjoy  full  responsible 
Government. 


PEACE  133 

Lord  Kitchener  opened  the  new  debate  by  reading 
the  reply  of  the  British  Cabinet. 

The  British  Government  refused  to  accept  the  terms 
of  the  Boers.  But  they  asked  Lord  Kitchener  to 
encourage  them  to  put  forth  fresh  proposals  excluding 
independence. 

The  great  controversy  was  resumed.  The  Repub- 
lican leaders  urged  that  it  was  for  the  British  to  speak 
next.  But  both  Lord  Kitchener  and  Lord  Milner 
refused  to  make  any  further  proposals.  Then  Presi- 
dent Steyn  raised  the  point  that  the  Republics  could 
not  give  up  their  independence  without  consulting  their 
own  people.  On  this  there  arose  a  long  and  critical 
debate.  Over  and  over  again  it  seemed  as  if  they 
had  all  reached  a  deadlock;  but  on  every  occasion  of 
difference  Lord  Kitchener  persisted  with  the  same 
magnificent  display  of  patience  and  resource.  At  last 
he  agreed  to  telegraph  home  asking  the  British  Govern- 
ment to  state  terms  based  on  the  acceptance  of  annexa- 
tion, and  suggesting  that  they  should  allow  the  Boer 
leaders  to  consult  their  people. 

Again  there  was  a  long  delay — two  days.  In 
London,  too,  a  critical  struggle  was  going  on  between 
those  who  were  for  parley  and  those  who  were  for 
unconditional  surrender.  But  there,  too,  the  moderate 
party  had  won.  The  tone  of  the  telegram  sent  in 
reply  was  far  from  friendly  to  the  Boers;  but  the  essen- 
tial new  fact  was  that  the  Government  consented  to 
allow   the    Republican    leaders   to   consult   the    com- 


134  GENERAL   BOTHA 

mandos.  More  important  still,  the  British  Govern- 
ment made  the  first  definite  step  towards  a  compromise 
by  agreeing  that  the  Middelburg  terms  should  be 
revived  and  made  the  basis  for  a  new  attempt  at  agree- 
ment. The  Middelburg  terms  meant  practically  that 
once  annexation  was  accepted  every  other  concession 
might  be  granted. 

The  Republican  leaders  wished  to  modify  these 
terms  in  one  vital  respect.  They  wished  that  a  fixed 
date  of  three  years  should  be  named  in  the  Treaty 
within  which  they  should  enjoy  responsible  Govern- 
ment. Lord  Kitchener  was  willing  to  give  way.  Lord 
Milner  strenuously  opposed  and  carried  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain with  him.  The  date  was  left  open.  It  is  a 
curious  comment  on  the  vanity  of  human  schemes  and 
quarrels  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  new  Colonies 
did  actually  secure  responsible  Government  within 
four  years  ^ — or  only  one  year  later  than  they  had 
themselves  proposed. 

The  next  step  was  easily  arranged.  A  month  was 
allowed  to  the  Republicans  to  go  to  their  people  : 
meetings  were  to  take  place  under  terms  of  armistice, 
and  the  will  of  the  people  was  to  be  ascertained. 
President  Steyn,  now  entirely  incapacitated  by  illness, 
remained  behind  in  the  British  lines — implacable  but 
powerless.  All  the  rest  of  the  Republican  leaders 
dispersed  far  and  wide  to  conduct  the  strangest  kind 
of  Referendum  recorded  in  modern  history. 

1  In   1906. 


PEACE  135 

The  visits  to  the  commandos  soon  revealed  to  the 
Republican  leaders  that  they  would  themselves  have 
to  make  the  great  decision.  None  of  these  commandos 
were  in  a  position  to  give  any  really  national  verdict. 
It  is  difficult  to  visualise  now  the  utter  detachment  of 
these  fighting  bodies  from  the  outside  world.  They 
had  to  rely  entirely  for  their  news  upon  such  English 
newspapers  as  they  captured  in  the  convoys  and 
camps ;  and  few  of  those  were  of  recent  date.^ 

This  very  absence  of  news  produced  a  difficult  and 
troublesome  state  of  mind.  For  no  modern  man  is 
inclined  to  be  content  with  ignorance.  Deprive  him 
of  news  and  he  will  supply  its  place;  and  the  empty 
place  is  too  often  filled  with  all  manner  of  folly.  In 
this  case,  the  many  tongues  of  rumour  were  busy  with 
the  wildest  fictions  of  European  intervention.  The 
will  to  fight  was  kept  alive  and  active  by  the  most 
extravagant  legends  of  British  invasion  and  defeat. 

It  was  Botha's  hard  task  to  tell  the  Boers  the  simple 
truth.  He  told  them  without  qualification  that  all  hope 
of  European  intervention  must  be  put  aside.  And 
once  that  conviction  began  to  penetrate,  the  chances 

1  I  remember  asking  the  Republican  Generals  after  the  war 
whether  they  had  really  been  encouraged  in  their  resistance — 
as  was  commonly  asserted  in  England  at  the  time — by  the 
arguments  of  the  British  Radical  Press.  They  informed  me 
that,  as  they  obtained  all  their  newspapers  from  the  belongings 
of  captured  officers,  their  reading  had  been  almost  solely  con- 
fined to  the  British  Conservative  Press,  which  certainly  could 
not  be  accused  of  giving  them  encouragement. 


136  GENERAL   BOTHA 

of  peace  improved.  But  it  is  clear  that  the  commandos 
were  not  in  a  mood  for  the  influences  of  reason.  There 
was  no  general  armistice,  and  these  strange  meetings 
were  held  actually  in  the  intervals  of  fighting.  Lord 
Kitchener  did  his  best  to  help  forward  the  work.  Rail 
and  telegraph  were  placed  at  the  Republican  service; 
all  the  meetings  were  held  within  the  time-limit;  and 
the  Republican  Delegates  were  elected  before  the 
fixed  date  for  the  final  gathering  at  Vereeniging. 

But  there  were  accidents — fortuitous  attacks  and 
skirmishes — which  did  not  soothe  feeling.  The 
average  man  on  these  occasions  is  far  more  combative 
than  his  leaders.  He  is  more  subject  to  passion  and 
the  desire  for  revenge.  The  thoughts  of  peace  are  long 
thoughts,  and  most  men  prefer  the  briefer  thoughts 
of  strife.  So  on  this  occasion,  as  on  so  many  others, 
the  leaders  got  from  their  followers  the  answer  which 
they  wanted — the  echo  of  their  own  feelings.  De  Wet 
found  that  all  the  commandos  which  he  visited 
demanded  independence.  It  was  only  those  who 
deliberately  pleaded  for  peace  who  obtained  any  other 
results.  The  Referendum  became  a  General  Election 
campaign;  and  the  two  groups  of  Republican  leaders 
struggled  like  two  rival  parties  to  bring  the  commandos 
round  to  their  point  of  view. 

The  worst  course  of  all  would  have  been  that  the 
leaders  should  have  been  guided  by  these  random 
meetings.     The  voice  of  these  commandos  was  not  the 


PEACE  137 

voice  of  a  people ;  it  was  the  voice  of  an  army  in  the 
field ;  and  the  voice  of  an  army  is  the  echo  of  its  pride 
and  valour.  It  is  a  proof  of  the  real  shrewdness  of 
the  Commandants  that  they  refused  to  be  tied  by  these 
mandates  from  the  battlefields  when  they  finally  met 
at  Vereeniging. 

For  the  representatives  elected  by  the  commandos 
for  the  Conference  were  in  nearly  all  cases  the  officers 
leading  them  in  the  field.  Lord  Kitchener,  with  the 
consideration  and  good  sense  which  characterised  his 
action  throughout  these  proceedings,  granted  a  com- 
plete armistice  to  every  force  which  was  thus  deprived 
of  its  commandant.  Thus  the  Conference  which  met 
at  Vereeniging  on  May  13  was  practically  a  meeting 
of  tlie  officers  in  the  field;  and  for  the  moment  the 
armistice  was  general. 

It  was  a  good  omen  that  the  two  parties  to  this 
Conference  should  have  chosen  for  their  meeting-place 
this  little  town  on  the  frontier  of  the  Transvaal  and 
the  Orange  State  with  the  hopeful  name  of 
"  Union  "  (Vereeniging).  Lord  Kitchener  had  done 
his  utmost  to  make  the  Conference  a  success.  He  had 
spared  no  expense  on  the  preparations,  knowing  that 
peace  is  cheap  at  a  great  price.  A  great  marquee  had 
been  erected  for  the  debates  between  two  camps,  one 
for  each  of  the  Republics.  On  the  eastern  side  was 
a  camp  for  the  British  officers  in  charge,  who  did  their 
utmost  to  soften  the  labours  of   the   Conference  by 


138  GENERAL   BOTHA 

courtesy  and  hospitality.  It  was  Lord  Kitchener's 
admirable  and  generous  endeavour  to  surround  the 
fighting  Boers  with  a  genial  and  homely  atmosphere. 
For  it  may  be  said  of  peace,  as  Plato  said  of  virtue, 
that  no  man  can  help  loving  her  when  he  really  sees 
her  face. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  any  meeting  more 
dramatic  than  that  of  these  fighting  men,  still  in  their 
fighting  clothes,  gathered  from  all  the  fields  of  war, 
assembled  after  months  of  division  and  distraction — 
friends  and  brothers  who  had  imagined  one  another 
dead;  fellow-countrymen  and  comrades-in-arms 
who  had  lost  sight  of  one  another  in  the  fog 
of  war;  men  who  had  fought  on  blindly,  alone 
but  unconquered. 

In  this  assembly,  gathered  in  the  great  tented  taber- 
nacle prepared  for  them,  there  opened  on  the  morning 
of  May  15  a  great  and  critical  contention.  It  was  a 
renewal  on  a  larger  stage  of  the  argument  which 
opened  at  Klerksdorp — between  the  peacemakers  and 
the  "  Bitter-enders."  The  "  Bitter-enders  "  opened 
with  a  great  stroke  of  Parliamentary  tactics.  It  was 
known  that  the  majority  of  the  commandos  had  decided 
against  surrender.  It  was  now  the  aim  of  the  "  Bitter- 
enders "  to  make  this  mandate  prevail.  Their  method 
was  to  turn  the  representatives  into  delegates.  It  was 
at  once  maintained  by  the  Free  Staters  that  no  man 
present  could  go  beyond  his  instructions. 

General  Botha  saw  at  once  that  such  a  course  would 


PEACE  139 

render  all  discussion  futile.  He  instantly  appealed 
against  it.  Judge  Hertzog,  as  law  officer  of  the  Con- 
ference, threw  his  decision  on  the  side  of  a  free  vote, 
following  the  high  line  laid  down  by  Burke  in  his 
famous  Bristol  speech.^  Representatives  of  the  people, 
he  said,  unconsciously  echoing  that  great  utterance, 
were  not  delegates — they  could  be  bound  by  no  in- 
structions. 

General  Botha  then  opened  the  debate  with  a  broad 
review  of  the  whole  situation  in  the  field  of  war — 
the  shortness  of  food — the  state  of  the  women — the 
fear  of  the  blacks — the  peril  of  Kitchener's  new  block- 
house policy.  It  was  clear  that  Botha  leaned  towards 
peace. 

Then  came  General  De  la  Rey,  at  that  moment 
flushed  with  his  victories,  and  still  inclined  to  war. 
"  True,"  he  said,  "  there  is  great  scarcity  of  food  in 
the  Western  Transvaal.  But,"  he  went  on  cheerfully 
enough,  "  precisely  the  same  state  of  affairs  existed 
there  a  year  ago,  and  when  the  Burghers  were  at  that 
time  without  food — well,  he  went  and  got  it  for 
them !  " 

De  Wet  followed  with  a  fiery  appeal  for  resistance 
to  the  death.  His  was  the  language  of  the  Puritan 
faith  at  white  heat.  The  speakers  had  dwelt  on  the 
stern  facts.  De  Wet  replied  boldly  :  "  This  is  a  war 
of   faith !  "   he   cried.     "  I   have   nothing   to  do   with 

^  Speech  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Poll,  Thursday,  November  3, 
1774- 


I40  GENERAL  BOTHA 

facts !     The  only  concern  I  have  with  facts  is  when 
I  have  to  clear  them  out  of  the  way  !  " 

Then  came  the  long  series  of  war  reports  from  the 
various  parts  of  that  immense  and  scattered  field  of 
war.  As  they  were  read,  there  gradually  grew  up  a 
picture  of  woe  which  blotted  out  the  flaming  beacons 
of  the  "  Bitter-enders."  Outside  that  Conference 
tent  a  thick  white  mist  lay  on  that  fateful  morning, 
like  a  shroud  over  the  veldt,  and  as  the  hours  of  that 
African  autumn  day  crept  forward,  it  seemed  as  if  the 
gloom  of  that  dank,  damp,  chilly  cerement  were  creep- 
ing into  the  chamber  of  debate. 

The  Conference  met  again  early  next  morning,  and 
now  they  were  brought  closer  to  the  real  issue.  Having 
delivered  their  souls  on  the  general  question,  they  had 
now  insensibly  drawn  nearer  to  the  vital  issue  of  the 
situation  as  revealed  by  the  reports — should  they 
accept  the  Middelburg  terms  or  not? 

Once  more  the  great  debate  swung  to  and  fro. 

Gradually  the  Conference  began  to  crystallise  into 
definite  parties  for  and  against  the  terms.  On  the 
one  side  were  the  majority  of  the  Free  Staters,  still 
doggedly  opposed  to  peace  on  terms.  Their  motto 
was,  "  Independence  or  still  fight  on  !  "  On  the  other 
side  were  the  great  majority  of  the  Transvaalers,  who, 
as  the  Conference  went  on,  gradually  converted  their 
own  war  minority  to  the  peace  point  of  view.  The 
reports  revealed  a  country  on  the  verge  of  a  famine. 
The  last  year  of  war,  in  spite  of  all  their  victories, 


PEACE  141 

had  Teft  them  far  worse  off.  Speakers  told  stories 
of  men  clothed  in  sacking,  of  women  half-naked — 
of  commandos  attacked  by  blacks — of  whole  villages 
dying  out.  Brave  men  like  Viljoen  and  de  Clercq 
declared  that  it  was  impossible  to  go  on.  "  Let  us 
make  no  more  widows  and  orphans  !  "  cried  one  com- 
mandant. Out  of  the  great  agony  of  that  meeting 
there  came  one  last  desperate  bid  for  a  remnant  of 
independence.  It  was  to  surrender  the  goldfields — 
"  that  cancerous  growth,"  as  Botha  now  called  them 
— the  curse  of  their  country. 

General  De  la  Rey  knew  instinctively  that  no  such 
proposal  would  now  meet  that  situation.  Very  re- 
luctantly this  great,  large-hearted  patriot  now  declared 
that  he  had  been  converted  by  the  reports  to  become 
an  advocate  of  peace.  "Fight  to  the  bitter  end?" 
he  asked — and  then  in  one  mournful,  lingering  phrase 
he  struck  to  the  heart  of  the  situation  :  "  But  has  the 
bitter  end  not  come  ?  " 

The  "  Bitter-enders"  would  not  bow  to  the  chal- 
lenge. Still  they  struggled  desperately  against  the 
stream.  Bad  as  things  were — they  agreed — still,  they 
were  no  worse  than  they  had  been  for  a  long  time 
past.  These  men  fell  back  on  that  language  of  the 
old  world  which  is  at  once  so  thrilling  and  so  perilous. 
They  appealed  to  the  faith  of  their  fathers.  "  Have 
you  no  faith  in  God  ? "  they  said,  searching  the 
hearts  of  their  listeners.  The  answer  was  given 
mournfully  by  an  old  Boer  commandant :  "  We  asked 


142  GENERAL  BOTHA 

for  God's  answer  to  our  prayer.     He  has  answered 
us — His  hand  is  stretched  out  against  us." 

Once  more  Botha  stepped  in  with  one  of  those 
soothing  utterances  which  come  as  balm  in  Gilead  at 
such  moments  of  great  anguish.  No  one  could  accuse 
him  of  shirking.  No  one  could  say  that  this  great 
fighter  knew  the  meaning  of  fear.  No  one  could  say 
that  he  had  not  suffered — he  whose  elder  brother  had 
been  killed,  whose  younger  brother  was  a  prisoner, 
whose  nephews  and  nieces  lay  fever-stricken  in  the 
camps.  And  yet,  in  his  great  valour,  he  had  the  highest 
courage  of  all — the  courage  to  tell  his  people  when  they 
must  yield.  "  What  is  the  bitter  end  ?  "  he  asked  slowly. 
"  Is  it  to  come  when  all  of  us  are  either  banished  or  in 
our  graves?  When  the  nation  has  fought  until  it  can 
never  fight  again  ?  "  And  then,  with  a  note  of  passion, 
"  No  other  nation  in  the  world  would  have  fought 
as  our  nation  has  done  !  Shall  such  a  nation  perish  ? 
No  !     We  must  save  it  by  our  counsel !  " 

De  Wet  made  one  last  passionate  appeal.  "Our 
graves?"  he  cried.  "But  are  we  to  dig  the  grave  of 
our  independence?  If  so,  what  difference  is  there 
between  that  and  digging  our  own  graves  ?  " 

But  the  decision  had  already  gone  against  the 
"  Bitter-enders"  on  the  main  question.  On  the  third 
day  of  the  Conference  (May  17)  the  Conference  came 
to  the  point  of  empowering  the  two  Republican 
Governments  to  negotiate  peace  on  the  basis  of  a 
surrender   of    absolute    sovereignty.     A    Commission 


PEACE  143 

was  now  appointed  to  meet  Lord  Milner  and  Lord 
Kitchener.  One  last  pathetic  sketch  of  an  imaginary 
Protectorate  with  their  goldfields  surrendered  was  even 
now  mapped  out  and  presented  by  Botha. 

The  inevitable  followed.  Lord  Kitchener  and 
Lord  Milner  rejected  this  last  desperate  attempt  at 
escape  from  the  logic  of  surrender.^  It  now  remained 
for  the  Boers  either  to  accept  the  terms  or  to  renew 
the  desolating  war. 

Faced  with  these  alternatives,  the  Boers,  with  the 
excellent  bargaining  instinct  of  their  race,  showed  that 
they  knew  when  they  were  beaten.  Their  resistance 
instantly  and  suddenly  collapsed.^  The  Treaty  was 
drafted  in  its  final  form  for  submission  to  the  Con- 
ference.^ 

On  May  29  the  Conference  met  for  the  last  time 
to  receive  the  report  of  the  Commission.  A  deep 
gloom  lay  over  this  last  assembly  of  a  free  people. 
Invincibly  recalcitrant,  the  "  Bitter-enders"  put  up 
one   last   indomitable  fight.     The   motto   of   the   old 

1  Lord  Milner  told  Botha  that  the  British  Government  had 
already  gone  further  in  the  direction  of  peace  than  public  opinion 
would  tolerate. 

2  There  was  one  last  Sub-Committee — one  final  wrangle 
over  details — a  sharp  fight  over  the  money  grant  which  would 
enable  the  Republics  to  pay  off  their  debts  incurred  during  the 
war.  Botha  made  a  great  point  of  this  because  he  knew  the 
people  looked  to  him.  Lord  Kitchener  won  the  British  Govern- 
ment to  the  broader  course  of  a  generous  grant  of  ;^3,ooo,ooo. 

3  At  Botha's  request  an  ofifiicial  Dutch  translation  was  ap- 
pended to  the  draft.     See  Appendix  IL  for  the  governing  clause. 


144  GENERAL  BOTHA 

"  Die  Hards  " — the  stalwart  Puritans  of  South  African 
independence — was  that  of  Napoleon's  "  Old  Guard"  : 
"  We  die,  but  do  not  surrender."  But  the  moderates 
were  now  stronger,  and  they  steadily  resisted  the  ex- 
tremists. General  De  la  Rey  now  definitely  ranged 
himself  with  Botha  in  his  fight  for  the  salvage  of  the 
race,  and  De  Wet  was  left  alone,  still  fighting  against 
fate  like  a  dying  tiger.  His  one  cry  was  :  "  Fight 
on !  "  But  the  large  sanity  of  Botha  had  begun  to 
prevail. 

All  men  with  fine  feeling  will  look  with  respect  and 
awe  on  this  last  struggle  of  the  spirit  of  the  "  chainless 
mind."  They  will  honour  both  sides  in  this  last  con- 
troversy. In  a  famous  poem  ^  Tennyson  has  given 
us  such  a  scene — the  picture  of  Sir  Richard  Grenville 
at  bay,  crying — 

"  Sink    me   the    ship,    Master    Gunner — sink    her,    split   her    in 
twain  ! 
Fall  into  the  hands  of  God,  not  into  the  hands  of  Spain  !  " 

But  then  came  the  voice  of  reason  and  humanity — 

"And  the  gunner  said  'Ay,  ay,'  but  the  seamen  made  reply: 
'  We  have  children,  we  have  wives, 
And  the  Lord  hath  spared  our  lives. 

We  will  make  the  Spaniard  promise,  if  we  yield,  to  let  us  go; 
We  shall  live  to  fight  again  and  to  strike  another  blow.' 
And  the  lion  there  lay  dying,  and  they  yielded  to  the  foe." 

It  was  that  spirit  that  Botha  expressed  in  his  last 
appeal  to  the  wavering  Conference.     At  the  critical 
1  "The  Revenge." 


PEACE 


H5 


moment  there  came  to  his  support  a  man  who  has  since 
moved  to  the  very  front  rank  among  the  statesmen 
on  a  United  South  Africa — General  Smuts.  His 
speech  rose  to  the  finest  point  of  prophetic  oratory. 
"Perhaps  it  is  God's  will,"  he  cried,  "to  lead  our 
nation  through  defeat,  through  abasement,  yea  and 
through  the  valley  of  the  shadow  of  death,  to  the 
glory  of  a  nobler  future,  to  the  light  of  a  brighter  day." 
It  was  the  right  note. 

So  soothed,  the  "  Bitter-enders"  grew  less  bitter, 
and  the  Conference  swung  towards  the  sad  necessity 
of  submission.  There  was  one  last  peril — that  they 
might  enter  into  their  new  position  as  a  divided,  dis- 
tracted race,  torn  by  dissension  and  mutual  reproach. 
General  Botha  looked  ahead  into  the  future  and  made 
a  supreme  and  generous  effort  to  avert  this  disaster. 
Next  morning  he  went  with  General  De  la  Rey  to 
visit  De  Wet,  and  the  two  men  pleaded  with  their 
comrade  in  arms  that  they  should  not  end  this  con- 
tention in  division.  General  De  Wet  nobly  agreed. 
He  assembled  his  Free  Staters  that  morning,  and  in 
one  last  solemn  meeting  he  persuaded  those  iron  men, 
the  Commandants  of  the  Orange  State,  to  bow  their 
wills.  The  chaplain  has  left  us  a  picture  of  that  scene 
• — those  strong  men  gazing  in  front  of  them,  their  eyes 
filled  with  unshed  tears,  De  Wet  pleading  for  the 
Treaty  against  his  own  conviction.  Thus  appealed  to 
by  their  leaders,  the  Free  Staters  gave  way,  and  on 
that  afternoon  of  May  31,  1902,  the  Republican  Con- 

K 


146  GENERAL   BOTHA 

ference  voted  to  accept  the  British  terms  by  54  votes 
to  6. 

The  long  war  was  at  an  end.  That  very  evening, 
at  five  minutes  past  eleven  o'clock,  the  Treaty  of 
Vereeniging  was  signed  at  Pretoria  by  the  joint  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Boer  and  British  Governments. 

After  signing,  Lord  Kitchener  rose  and  held  out  his 
hand  to  General  Botha.  "  We  are  good  friends  now," 
he  said. 

So,  in  that  handclasp,  the  two  men  who  had  done 
most  to  restore  peace  to  South  Africa  vowed  their 
fealty  to  the  solemn  pact  of  Vereeniging. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
SALVAGE    (1903-6) 


K    2 


CHAPTER   VIII 

SALVAGE    (1903-1905) 

"  To  endure  is  a  part  of  justice,  and  men  do  wrong  involun- 
tarily. Consider  how  many  already,  after  mutual  enmity,  sus- 
picion, hatred,  and  fig"hting-,  have  been  stretched  dead,  reduced 
to  ashes,  and  lie  quiet  at  last." — Marcus  Aurelius. 

In  August  of  1902,  the  year  of  peace  in  South 
Africa,  Botha  came  to  London  with  De  la  Rey  and 
De  Wet.  The  Generals  lodged  off  the  Strand,  and 
during  the  following  six  weeks  frequent  conversations 
enabled  me  to  form  a  clear  impression  of  their  attitude 
and  policy  after  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of 
Vereeniging. 

They  had  come  to  London  with  a  touch  of  that 
rather  pathetic  faith  in  the  central  power  which  brought 
citizens  of  Ancient  Rome  to  Caesar.  In  South  Africa 
they  were  now  a  conquered  people,  and  on  the  con- 
quered falls  woe.  At  the  moment  they  had  little 
honour  in  their  own  country,  and  small  chance  of 
genial  audience  in  the  court  of  the  conqueror. 

Since  the  signing  of  the  peace,  indeed,  Botha's  had 
been  a  busy  and  arduous  life.  There  was  at  first  the 
immense  physical  relief  of  cessation  from  war.  On 
June  3,  1902,  there  was  a  gathering  of  the  Boer  leaders 


150  GENERAL  BOTHA 

at  Garden  House,  Pretoria.  General  Botha  remarked 
that  "  it  was  the  happiest  day  since  he  left  school !  " 

On  the  morrow  of  Vereeniging  Botha  and  his  fellow- 
leaders  had  addressed  an  open  letter  to  the  citizens  of 
the  dead  Republics.  He  made  to  them  a  solemn 
appeal  now  to  work  together  for  the  social  and  spiritual 
betterment  of  the  country.  He  urged  loyal  obedi- 
ence to  the  new  Government. 

Then  Botha  turned  immediately  to  the  great  tasks 
of  restoring  and  salvaging  this  scattered  and  suffering 
people.  He  and  his  colleagues  went,  according  to 
their  pledge  to  the  British  Government,  to  inform  the 
fragments  of  their  broken  nation — the  commandos  in 
the  field,  the  prisoners  of  war  in  their  camps,  and  the 
"  concentrated  "  women  and  children — of  the  loss  of 
their  independence,  and  to  advise  surrender.  The 
scenes  were  so  heartrending  when  these  people  heard 
of  the  failure  of  all  their  efforts  that  many  of  the 
bravest  men  found  that  they  could  not  endure  this 
pilgrimage.  De  Wet  refused  to  go  on ;  Botha,  deeply 
anxious  to  win  the  support  of  the  people,  spared  him- 
self nothing.  The  newspapers  of  the  day  gave  vivid 
impressions  of  the  bitter  scenes  in  the  camps.^ 

1  Here  is  the  description  in  the  Natal  Mercury  of  the  way 
in  which  the  people  in  the  Durban  camp  received  the  news  from 
Botha's  lips  : — • 

"Old  men,  dull  of  hearing,  held  one  hand  open  at  the  back 
of  their  ears,  so  that  they  might  not  miss  a  word,  while  in  the 
other  they  grasped  a  strong  stick  to  support  their  bent,  feeble 
frames.  From  the  low,  broad-slouched  crape-banded  hats  gazed 
eyes  that  slowly  filled  with  tears,  with  tears  that  were  allowed 


SALVAGE  151 

At  the  prisoners'  camps  Botha  found  that  the  great 
difficulty  was  to  make  the  old  fighters  take  the  oath  of 
allegiance,  even  although  it  meant  instant  release. 
Many  of  them  vowed  that  they  would  prefer  to  go  to 
America  or  German  South- West  Africa.^ 

Realising  on  these  journeys  the  utter  exhaustion  of 
the  country,  Botha  put  his  pride  in  his  pocket  and 
went  up  to  Pretoria  to  meet  Lord  Milner  and  plead 
the  cause  of  his  people.  He  even  consented  to  sit  at 
Milner's  luncheon-table  after  his  victorious  entry  into 
Pretoria,  braving  the  inevitable  misinterpretation  of 
that  bending  to  the  foe.  But  Lord  Milner  took  a 
strict  view  of  the  Treaty  terms.  He  was  in  no  mood 
to  enter  upon  any  general  scheme  of  charity  towards 
the  Boer  people. 

It  was  then  that  it  was  decided  among  the  Boer 

to  fall  unchecked  to  the  ground,  for  neither  hand  could  be 
spared  to  wipe  them  away.  Among  the  thousands  of  women 
there  was  scarce  one  dry  eye.  Bravely  did  they  try  to  force 
down  sobs  that  would  not  be  subdued,  for  they  feared  their 
weeping  would  drown  the  speaker's  words.  When  towards 
the  end  of  the  solemn  speech  their  leader  prayed  them  to  bury 
the  past  with  all  its  stjrife  and  bloodshed  and  to  live  together 
in  unity  and  harmony  with  the  nations  that  were  now  their 
friends,  hundreds  of  women  gave  way  to  unrestrained  weeping. 
Hundreds  of  sobs  choked  them  in  endeavouring  to  stay  the 
flood  of  feeling  that  was  surging  within  their  hearts  and  bosoms. 
One  woman  cried  out  through  her  sobs  that  he  must  not  leave 
them,  that  he  must  come  and  speak  to  them  in  their  huts,  and 
the  Boer  leader  sympathetically  assured  her  he  would  come 
back  on  Monday.  From  a  thousand  throats  came  broken 
expressions  of  thanks." 

^  Subsequently  a  modified  oath  was  agreed  upon,  but  many 
slipped  away. 


152  GENERAL  BOTHA 

leaders  that  Botha,  De  la  Rey,  and  De  Wet  should 
go  to  England  and  Europe  on  an  errand  of  appeal. 
They  were  to  attempt  to  secure  help  from  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain ;  but  if  they  failed,  they  were  to  raise  funds  in 
Europe  for  their  desolated  countries. 

Before  departing  for  South  Africa,  Botha  turned 
to  look  into  the  affairs  of  his  own  family.  He  visited 
Standerton  and  took  steps  to  secure  the  property  which 
was  afterwards  to  become  his  home.  Then  he  went 
to  Durban  to  meet  his  brothers  and  sisters. 

His  family  had  felt  the  full  shock  of  the  war,  and 
had  been  scattered  fully  as  much  as  the  simplest  Boer 
family  in  the  Republics. 

When  the  war  had  entered  upon  its  final  phase  at 
the  end  of  1901,  Botha  had  been  compelled  to  send 
his  wife  and  three-year-old  son  John  to  Holland, 
where  his  youngest  son  Philip  was  born.  His  two 
daughters  had  been  sent  to  a  sister  at  Greytown,  Natal, 
where  there  was  a  good  school.  But  the  mother 
yearned  for  her  two  girls  so  intensely  that  they 
were  sent  afterwards  in  charge  of  the  friendly  captain 
of  a  German  liner  direct  to  Rotterdam. 

At  Durban  he  met  sisters  who  had  gone  through 
every  form  of  war  experience — one  who,  having  been 
given  ten  minutes'  notice  to  leave  her  farm  before  it 
was  burned,  had  been  permitted  to  live  at  Durban; 
another  who,  also  ejected  from  a  burning  farm,  had, 
after  fearful  experiences,  been  allowed  to  live  with 
relations  at  Greytown;  and  a  sister-in-law  who,  her 
children  stricken  down  with  enteric,  had  suffered  an 


SALVAGE  153 

agonising  experience  in  the  Meer  Bank  Camp.  Such 
are  the  realities  of  war. 

This  family  reunion  at  Durban  revealed  fearful 
gaps.  Botha's  eldest  brother,  Philip,  General  De 
Wet's  Vecht-General  or  principal  Staff  Officer,  had 
been  killed  at  the  head  of  a  forlorn  hope — when  he 
and  three  others  had  volunteered  to  draw  the  fire  of 
a  British  regiment.  Philip  Botha  saved  his  commando 
and  paid  the  penalty  of  his  life.  Botha's  brother. 
Christian,  still  lived  and  was  present;  but  he  was 
already  stricken  with  the  illness  from  which  he  after- 
wards died.  Commandant  Gerhardt  Botha  had  found 
his  unfortunate  family  in  a  concentration  camp. 
Botha's  youngest  brother,  Theunis,  had  been  taken 
prisoner  towards  the  close  of  the  war,  and  had  just 
returned  from  St.  Helena.  Four  of  the  sisters  joined 
the  brothers.  Of  the  younger  generation,  one  of 
Botha's  nephews  had  been  killed;  and  his  nephew 
Hermanns — now  Brigadier-General  "  Manie  "  Botha, 
and  one  of  the  heroes  of  the  German  South-West  cam- 
paign— was  lying  severely  wounded. 

It  was  a  sad  regathering.  But  already  hope,  like 
the  first  flower  of  spring,  was  rising  from  the  ashes  of 
the  war.  They  had  all  suffered;  but  after  all  there 
was  nothing  here  for  tears.  They  had  all  done  their 
duty  through  that  fearful  time.  None  had  failed  in 
the  hour  of  trial. 

Before  leaving  South  Africa,  Botha  had  to  make  his 
position  clear  in  regard  to  a  great  political  crisis  which 


154  GENERAL   BOTHA 

followed  almost  immediately  on  the  signing  of 
peace. 

Lord  Milner  had  moved  up  into  the  Transvaal  and, 
as  High  Commissioner,  was  directing  the  affairs  of 
South  Africa  from  across  the  Vaal.  The  Orange 
Colony  was  a  conquered  Province;  and  Natal  was 
always  faithful  to  Lord  Milner.  His  only  trouble  was 
with  that  very  independent  Colony,  the  Cape.  Sir  Gor- 
don Sprigg  was  now  Prime  Minister  of  the  Cape — since 
the  fall  of  Mr.  Schreiner — but  though  Sprigg  held 
office  he  did  not  command  the  situation.  The  Cape 
Dutch,  led  by  Mr.  Merriman,  were  increasingly  hostile. 
Lord  Milner  found  that  Sprigg  was  unable  to  carry 
through  the  scheme  of  South  African  Union  which  now 
filled  his  own  mind.  So  Milnerhitupon  the  idea  of  bring- 
ing South  Africa  to  accept  Union  by  suspending  the 
Cape  Constitution.  In  that  design  he  was  supported 
by  Cecil  Rhodes  in  the  last  months  of  his  life.  But 
the  Cape  would  have  none  of  this  proposal.  The 
scheme  of  South  African  Union  was  far  too  splendid 
to  be  reached  along  the  road  of  suspended  liberties. 
Even  Sir  Gordon  Sprigg  was  opposed  to  Lord 
Milner's  plan;  and  Mr.  Chamberlain  finally  vetoed  it 
on  July  2. 

In  the  course  of  this  great  controversy  the  "  Suspen- 
sionists,"  with  some  effrontery,  had  quoted  Botha  as 
being  in  their  favour. 

It  was  while  Botha  was  at  Durban  in  July,  1902, 
on  this  visit  to  his  family  that  he  gave  an  unqualified 
denial  to  this  most  mischievous  rumour.     "  It  is  abso- 


SALVAGE  155 

lutely  false,"  he  said ;  "  I  am  in  favour  of  any  move- 
ment that  makes  for  progress;  but  the  suspension  of 
the  Cape  Constitution  in  my  opinion  is  nothing  but 
retrogression,  and  on  that  ground  I  am  opposed  to  it 
out  and  out."  ^  It  is  as  well  to  place  on  record  Botha's 
vigorous  and  virile  utterance  on  that  great  question. 

On  July  30,  the  Boer  Generals  sailed  for  England 
on  the  "  Saxon,"  and  arrived  in  London  on  August  16. 
They  remained  away  from  South  Africa  all  through 
the  European  autumn. 

Three  months  had  now  passed  since  the  signing  of 
the  Treaty  of  Vereeniging.  The  Boer  Generals  never 
for  one  moment  during  those  months  went  back  from 
that  great  decision.  They  regarded  it  as  fixed  and 
irrevocable.  In  all  the  conversations  of  that  period 
I  remember  no  sentence  that  breathed  a  shadow  or 
shade  of  disloyalty  to  their  pledged  word. 

"  Dutch  in  race  but  British  in  citizenship,"  was 
already  Botha's  formula  :  now  linked  in  honourable 
partnership  with  the  phrase  of  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  and 
his  French-Canadians,  "  British  in  citizenship,  but  in 
race  French."  For  with  all  the  steadiness  of  his 
allegiance  to  the  Empire,  Botha  has  always  been  abso- 
lutely true  to  his  own  race.  The  reason  for  the  sur- 
render— at  Vereeniging — so  he  openly  admitted — was 
that  it  was  the  only  way  to  save  the  Boer  people. 
Now,     for    the    moment,     his    absorbing     aim     and 

1  Natal  Mercury,  July  14,  1902.      In  an  interview. 


156  GENERAL   BOTHA 

object  was  to  restore  the  people  that  he  had  saved. 
"  Antiqua  conserves,  desolata  restaures  " — "  keep  what 
is  old,  restore  what  is  desolated " — those  noble 
words  of  the  Coronation  Service  sum  up  the  policy 
which  was  the  governing  motive  of  Botha's  visit  to 
England. 

For  the  need  was  desperate.  It  must  come,  if  pos- 
sible, through  England  :  if  not,  through  the  pity  of 
the  larger  outside  world.  His  appeal  was  to  humanity 
— "  Is  it  nothing  to  you  all  ye  that  pass  by  ? " 

The  first  step  of  the  Boer  Generals,  then,  after 
attending  Lukas  Meyer's  funeral  at  Brussels  and 
meeting  Kruger  at  the  Hague,  was  to  knock  at  the 
barred  portal  of  the  Colonial  Office.  The  atmosphere 
of  England  was  still  frosty  to  them.  Such  welcome 
as  they  received  came  as  yet  from  few  outside  the 
ranks  of  the  "Pro-Boers."  Perhaps  it  was  the  very 
warmth  of  this  welcome  that  irritated  Mr.  Chamber- 
lain. For  the  attitude  of  that  great  man  was  chilly. 
He  demanded  a  list  of  the  subjects  to  be  discussed 
before  he  would  agree  to  an  interview :  when  the  list 
was  delivered  he  knocked  out  most  of  the  subjects  on 
the  ground  that  they  had  already  been  settled  by  the 
Treaty  of  Vereeniging.  The  Generals  rather  "  slimly  " 
submitted  that  their  claims  as  Peace  Delegates  might, 
even  if  then  rejected,  be  now  raised  again  by  them  as 
subjects.  Mr.  Chamberlain  adhered  to  his  exclusions; 
and  the  Boer  Generals  were  perforce  compelled  to 
submit.^ 

1  Cd.  1284. 


SALVAGE  157 

The  interview  took  place  at  the  Colonial  Office  on 
September  5,  1902,  and  Lord  Kitchener  was  present 
with  Mr.  Chamberlain. 

Once  they  met  face  to  face,  Mr.  Chamberlain,  as 
so  often  happened  with  him,  was  courteous  and 
placable.  He  conceded  several  points,  and  was  open 
to  argument  on  others.  He  spoke  with  excellent  feel- 
ing of  the  new  oblivion  which  was  required  as  the 
anodyne  for  South  Africa : — 

"  The  war  is  over.  We  each  of  us  fought  as  well 
as  we  knew  how  during  the  war.  Now  there  is  peace. 
All  we  want  is  to  recognise  you  as  fellow-subjects  with 
ourselves,  working  as  we  shall  work  for  the  prosperity 
of  the  liberty  of  South  Africa."^ 

No  words  could  have  been  better.  But  when 
General  Botha  opened  the  all-important  question  of 
relief  for  the  widows  and  orphans,  Mr.  Chamberlain 
cut  him  short,  and  by  elaborating  the  case  of  the 
Southern  States  after  the  American  Civil  War,  he  left 
on  the  Generals  the  impression  that  Great  Britain 
would  add  nothing  to  the  ;^3,ooo,ooo  to  be  devoted 
to  repatriation  and  compensation  for  war-seizures. 

Botha  and  his  colleagues  came  away  from  the  inter- 
view deeply  disturbed  in  mind.  The  needs  of  the 
Transvaal  could  not  wait.  There  was  danger  of  famine 
unless  generous  relief  came  soon.  General  Botha  esti- 
mated the  number  of  farms  burnt  at  30,000,  and  the 

1  Cd.  1284,  p.  23.  This  paper  contains  a  full  report  of  the 
interview. 


158  GENERAL  BOTHA 

loss  in  property  to  the  Boers  at  ^70,000,000.  Some 
20,000  women  and  children — so  the  Generals  calcu- 
lated— had  died  in  the  camps,  and  many  of  the  Boer 
families  were  decimated. 

Partly,  then,  with  the  object  of  a  larger  appeal,  and 
partly  just  to  fetch  his  wife  and  children,  Botha  crossed 
to  Holland  in  September,  and  on  the  25th  of  that 
month  he  and  his  colleagues  issued  that  famous  appeal 
to  the  civilised  world  that  caused  so  much  offence  to 
Mr.  Chamberlain.^ 

On  behalf  of  the  widows  and  orphans,  who  would 
obtain  no  relief  from  the  Treaty  funds,  they  opened — 
so  they  announced — a  "  General  Boer  Relief  Fund." 
They  proceeded  to  tour  the  Continent  and  to  make 
speeches  on  its  behalf.^ 

Mr.  Chamberlain  watched  these  proceedings  with 
grave  and  growing  disfavour;  and  on  November  6  he 
wrote  to  them  from  Downing  Street  a  long  and 
reasoned  protest.  He  disputed  their  facts,  and  com- 
plained of  their  haste  to  doubt  the  British  Government. 
But,  as  often  with  Mr.  Chamberlain,  when  he  was  pro- 
testing most,  he  was  nearest  to  surrender.  For  now, 
both  in  the   letter  and   in   Parliament,   he  agreed  to 

^  "  Our  dwellings,  with  the  furniture,  have  been  burned  or 
destroyed,  our  orchards  felled,  all  agricultural  implements 
broken  up,  mills  destroyed,  every  living  animal  driven  off  or 
killed— nothing-,  alas  !  was  left  to  us.  The  land  is  a  desert. 
Besides,  the  war  has  claimed  many  victims,  and  the  land 
resounds  with  the  weeping  of  helpless  widows  and  orphans." 

2  They  visited  Paris  and  Berlin.  But  they  raised  only 
;^ioo,ooo,  and  perhaps  this  result  was  an  illuminating  revela- 
tion to  them  of  the  value  of  Continental  humanitarianism. 


SALVAGE  159 

extend  the  charity  of  the  Government  to  the  Boer 
widows  and  orphans. 

The  Boer  Generals  instantly  returned  to  London, 
where  they  attended  the  House  of  Commons  and  heard 
the  speech  in  which  Mr.  Chamberlain  foreshadowed 
this  new  act  of  generosity,  and  announced  his  intention 
to  visit  South  Africa  himself.  For  Mr.  Chamberlain 
was  always  an  impressionable  man,  and  probably  Botha 
had  "  builded  better  than  he  knew  "  in  the  recent  inter- 
view.    A  softer  mood  had  supervened. 

In  this  case,  the  softer  mood  lasted.  For  when 
Botha  replied  to  Mr.  Chamberlain  with  a  weighty  and 
dignified  statement  of  the  case  for  his  afflicted  race, 
Mr.  Chamberlain  adopted  a  milder  tone,  and  both 
correspondents  finally  joined  in  a  hope  that  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain's visit  would  help  towards  the  restoration  of 
peace  and  prosperity  to  South  Africa.^ 

It  was  during  the  period  of  this  dramatic  fight  for 
the  soul  of  a  people  that  an  interesting  development 
occurred.  Some  of  those  November  days  in  London 
were  gloomy  enough  for  the  Boer  Generals.  There 
were  moments  when  the  future  seemed  irredeemably 
black — when  there  seemed  no  hope  of  help  for  their 
people — no  glimmer  of  light  on  the  horizon  of  the 
future.  The  attitude  of  the  public  was  still  sulky  and 
unfriendly.  It  was  on  one  of  these  dark  days,  when 
we  were  all  sitting  together  at  the  little  Horrex's  Hotel, 
that  a  bright  suggestion  was  made  and  adopted.     It 

1  Cd.   1329,  pp.  8-9. 


i6o  GENERAL  BOTHA 

was  that  the  Generals  should  leave  cards  at  Bucking- 
ham Palace  on  King  Edward  VII. 

That  most  tactful  and  gracious  of  monarchs  had 
already  displayed  towards  them  that  large-hearted 
frankness  of  spirit  which  made  him  a  worthy  successor 
of  English  Kings.  On  August  17,  immediately  after 
their  arrival  in  England,  he  had  received  the  Generals 
on  board  the  Victoria  and  Albert,  off  Cowes,  and  intro- 
duced them  to  Queen  Alexandra.  I  still  remember  the 
joyful  pride  and  relief  with  which  Botha  told  us  of  this 
episode.  "  He  treated  us  as  equals,"  they  cried.  "  He 
showed  us  over  his  yacht,  and" — best  of  all  for  the 
Boers — "  he  introduced  us  to  his  lady  !  " 

It  was  now  clear  to  those  who  knew  the  ladder  of 
etiquette  that  the  Generals  had  the  right  to  call  at  the 
Palace.  In  their  simplicity  they  had  never  thought  of 
it.  But  it  was  shrewdly  urged  now  as  a  way  to  the 
heart  of  the  English  people — and  perhaps  of  the  Colo- 
nial Office. 

So  next  day,  accordingly,  they  rode  in  state  and 
broadcloth  down  the  Mall — in  hired  carriages  and  well- 
brushed  top-hats.  The  thing  was  well  staged.  The 
visit  was  excellently  reported  in  the  Press.  It  was 
well  received  by  the  Londoners.  The  popular  tide 
began  to  turn  in  their  favour.  The  rest  of  their  stay 
in  London  was  more  pleasant. 

The  King  was  pleased.  He  frankly  admired  the 
Boers,  and  sincerely  desired  their  willing  loyalty.  I 
remember  going  with  Lukas  Meyer,  just  before  he 
died,  to  visit  the  King's  stables.     The  King,  knowing 


SALVAGE 


lOl 


the  Boer  passion  for  horses,  had  given  the  old  man 
a  cordial  invitation.  It  was  pleasant  to  witness  the 
delight  of  the  long-bearded  Boer — so  soon  to  fall  into 
his  tired  death-sleep  at  Brussels — when  he  discovered 
that  many  of  the  King's  favourite  horses  were  named 
after  Boer  towns  and  Boer  fighters. 

The  Generals  returned  to  South  Africa  in  Decem- 
ber, just  in  time  to  join  in  the  reception  to  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain, and  to  help  draw  up  the  address  which  was 
presented  by  Mr.  Smuts  at  the  Raadzaal  in  Pretoria  on 
January  5,  1903.  Into  this  address  Botha  and  Smuts 
managed  to  place,  with  considerable  Boer  astuteness, 
the  very  demands — amnesty,  language,  and  so  forth — 
that  had  been  excluded  by  Mr.  Chamberlain  from  the 
topics  of  the  London  September  interview.  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain found  that  he  had  escaped  from  these  subjects 
in  London,  only  to  run  right  into  them  at  Pretoria. 

Now  that  the  issue  was  thus  enlarged,  nothing  but 
good  resulted.  There  followed  one  of  those  free  and 
frank  exchanges  of  view  in  which  Mr.  Chamberlain 
always  delighted.  The  end  of  it  was  that  he  drove 
away  amid  hearty  cheers  from  the  Boers. 

Mr.  Chamberlain's  visit  certainly  did  something  to 
help  forward  the  restoration  of  South  Africa.  But 
Mr.  Chamberlain  went  home.  Lord  Milner  stayed  on. 
It  was  he  who  really  moulded  the  new  Imperial  Policy. 

Lord  Milner's  theory  of  the  reconstruction  of  South 
Africa  was  that  it  should  be  treated  as  a  clean  sheet  of 
paper  on  which  to  draw  the  outlines  of  a  new  and 

L 


i62  GENERAL  BOTHA 

better  civilisation.  He  had  never  approved  the  devas- 
tation policy;  but  now  he  accepted  it  as  giving  him 
a  supreme  chance  of  substituting  a  better  order  for  the 
old  Boer  civilisation.  First  he  carried  out  the  repatria- 
tion of  the  200,000  exiles  with  great  thoroughness. 
Then  he  laboured  to  build  up  all  the  machinery  of  an 
up-to-date  modern  State,  with  little  regard  for  the  pre- 
judices and  passions  of  the  people  he  was  trying  to 
benefit.  Scientific  agriculture,  higher-grade  schools, 
linked  railways,  splendid  public  buildings — such  were 
the  gifts  that  he  freely  poured  from  his  Imperial  Pan- 
dora's box  during  the  next  few  years.  To  carry  out 
these  objects  he  brought  in  from  England  and  the 
Cape  a  steady  stream  of  clever  young  Englishmen. 
"  Milner's  Kindergarten,"  sneered  Merriman,  the 
South  African  master  of  flouts  and  gibes;  and  the 
phrase  stuck :  but  Lord  Milner  went  steadily  on. 

A  vital  question  now  arose.  The  military  rule  was 
now  being  superseded  under  the  Treaty  of  Vereenig- 
ing  by  Crown  Colony  Government.^  Should  Botha 
and  his  friends  join  the  Legislative  Council  which 
Lord  Milner  was  now  establishing?  Early  in  1903 
Lord  Milner  conveyed  to  Botha,  De  la  Rey,  and  Smuts 
a  cordial,  private  expression  of  his  desire  that  they 
should  do  so..  On  February  6  they  wrote  to  him  a 
careful  statement  of  their  reasons  for  refusing. 

Their  main  contention,  as  expressed  in  that  letter, 
was  that  the  responsibility  for  government  still  rested 
with  the  British.     The  Boer  leaders  did  not  wish  to 
1  See  the  Treaty  in  Appendix  II,  Clause  7. 


SALVAGE  163 

share  it  with  them.  They  even  argued  that  it  would  in 
their  eyes  be  better  if  there  were  no  Council  at  all 
until  the  time  came  for  full  responsible  government. 
Lord  Milner  replied  courteously,  but  he  decided  to  go 
forward  with  his  Council.  But  the  tone  on  both  sides 
was  at  that  moment  friendly,  and  the  correspondence 
was  cordial  enough  to  be  published  by  common  con- 
sent.^ 

Botha  steadily  adhered  to  this  position  throughout 
the  two  following  years.  He  definitely  decided  that 
he  would  take  no  part  in  the  Government  except  as  an 
elected  and  responsible  ruler.  When  in  1905  Lord 
Selborne  repeated  Lord  Milner's  invitation,  Botha 
gave  the  same  reply.  With  his  usual  breadth  of  tem- 
perament, Botha  was  quite  willing  to  be  on  friendly 
terms  with  the  British  Crown  Government.  He 
attended  the  Governor's  social  functions.  But  right 
through  the  period  of  Crown  Colony  government  he 
steadily  refused  at  any  time  to  accept  responsibility 
without  power,  or  power  without  responsibility. 

But  meanwhile  Botha  was  by  no  means  idle.  How, 
indeed,  could  any  leading  Boer  be  idle  at  that  moment? 
When  the  peace  came  in  May,  1902,  it  found  a  nation 
in  ruins.  Rarely,  since  the  days  of  the  Jewish  cap- 
tivity, has  a  people  been  so  scattered  to  the  winds  as 
the  Boers  at  the  end  of  the  South  African  War.  Half 
the  men  were  prisoners  of  war.  A  sixth  were  dead. 
The  majority  of  the  women  and  children  were  still  in 

1  See  the  letters  in  Mr.  Worsfold's  book,  Vol.  II,  pp.  225-8. 

L    2 


i64  GENERAL  BOTHA 

the  camps.  The  land  lay  untilled  and  unsown.  Lord 
Milner  and  Mr.  Chamberlain,  when  they  toured 
through  the  region  of  war,  were  both  appalled  at  the 
desolation.^  The  first  great  business  of  the  leaders 
of  the  people  was  to  bring  back  the  remnants  of  a 
scattered  race,  and  to  put  them  once  more  on  their  own 
countryside — to  build  up  their  houses  again  and  to 
give  them  a  fresh  start  in  life.  It  was  to  this  work 
that  Botha  now  devoted  himself — the  work  of  restora- 
tion. With  his  cool  common  sense,  he  stood  aloof 
from  all  dreams  of  expansion.  The  real  need  was 
more  immediate — not  to  expand,  but  to  build  up 
afresh. 

His  own  personal  fortunes  helped  to  bring  this  home 
to  him.  His  splendid  farm  near  Vryheid — the  beau- 
tiful and  well-beloved  "  Waterval  " — had  been  de- 
stroyed. For  the  moment  he  had  no  real  home.  His 
fortunes  were  disordered,  and  he  was  doubtless  touched 
by  that  deep  exhaustion  which  comes  to  men  after 
prolonged  warfare.  He  went  to  live  in  a  quiet 
boarding-house  in  Pretoria,  and  there  he  made  himself 
accessible  to  all  his  people. 

To  Botha's  house  in  Pretoria  there  came  a  steady 
stream  of  old  soldiers,  often  legless  or  armless,  for 
advice  and  help  on  their  return  to  civil  life — war-worn 
prisoners  from  far-off  Ceylon  and  bleak  St.  Helena — 
ragged    warriors    from  the  veldt,  men   who  returned 

1  See  the  passages  in  Lord  Milner's  diary  quoted  by  Mr. 
Worsfold,  e.g.,  Vol.  I,  p.  68.  Mr.  Chamberlain  went  through 
the  same  experience. 


SALVAGE  165 

to  their  homes  without  a  coin  in  their  pockets  to 
find  not  a  room  or  an  outhouse  beneath  which  to 
shelter. 

Those  who  visited  Botha  in  those  days  give  a  vivid 
picture  of  the  daily  scene — the  crowd  of  Boer  people 
on  the  "  stoep  " — the  men  talking  and  the  women  cry- 
ing, all  the  destitute  flotsam  of  the  great  war  looking 
to  him  as  their  sole  helper  and  protector.  He  never 
tired  in  the  work.  There  was  no  limit  to  his  generosity. 
He  helped  all  he  could  to  rebuild  their  shattered  farms, 
supplementing  the  slow-footed  aid  of  Government 
from  the  funds  that  he  had  collected  in  his  travels 
through  Europe.  He  assisted  them  to  restock.  He 
took  their  ragged  receipts  and  war  notes,  and  sent  their 
claims  to  the  Government.  He  employed  destitute 
Boers  rather  than  skilled  masons  in  building  the  new 
farm  which  he  was  planning  at  Standerton ;  for  he 
had  definitely  decided  to  leave  Vryheid,  which  had  now 
been  annexed  to  Natal,  and  no  longer  drew  his  whole 
heart.  At  no  time  was  he  a  truer  leader  of  his  people 
than  at  that  dark  and  forlorn  hour  of  their  fortunes, 
when  he  was  helping  them  painfully  up  from  the  valley 
of  the  shadow  once  more  into  the  sunlight  of  life  and 
hope. 

When  his  wife  returned  from  Holland  they  bought  a 
house  of  their  own  in  Pretoria.  Like  all  the  women 
of  the  Transvaal,  Mrs.  Botha  was  perhaps  even  more 
sad  and  sorry  than  her  husband.  She  was  very  heart- 
sore,  and  wanted  to  think  things  over.  But  ever 
through  those  days  she  was  patient,  sweet,  and  unselfish 


i66  GENERAL   BOTHA 

— unwearying  in  her  effort  to  help  her  husband  through 
this  season  of  suffering  and  depression. 

Before  the  war  the  Boers  had  been  growing  into  a 
rich  people.  Their  farms  were  growing  into  estates, 
and  their  farm-dwellings  to  country  houses.  For  the 
moment  the  effect  of  the  war  had  been  to  destroy 
practically  the  whole  of  their  accumulated  resources. 
Years  after  the  war  people  who  before  1899  had  been 
living  in  well-fitted  modern  houses  were  just  dragging 
on  an  existence  in  one  or  two  rooms  or  even  in  mere 
outhouses — so  much  more  difficult  is  it  to  build  up 
than  to  destroy.  But  there  was  great  vitality  in  the 
Boer  race;  and  very  gradually  things  began  to 
get  better.  Lord  Selborne  found,  when  he 
arrived  in  South  Africa  in  1905,  that  a  great 
proportion  of  the  farms  were  already  in  process  of 
rebuilding. 

Lord  Milner,  meanwhile,  was  rapidly  and  eagerly 
building  up  his  great  fabric  of  new  departments — his 
Land  Board;  his  Board  of  Education;  his  Railway 
Board;  his  inter-Colonial  authorities — a  costly  and 
elaborate  equipment,  valuable  in  many  ways,  but  not, 
in  Botha's  view,  rightly  adjusted  to  the  needs  of  a  war- 
scourged  country. 

From  all  these  activities,  therefore,  Botha  stood 
grimly  aloof,  absorbed  in  the  instant  work  of  pity  and 
help.  So  remote,  indeed,  did  he  stand  from  current 
politics  than  in  1905  his  detachment  nearly  led  to  a 
serious  misunderstanding. 


SALVAGE  167 

During  this  year  the  mine-owners  had  persuaded 
the  British  Government  to  add  to  the  immense  racial 
confusions  of  South  Africa — that  kaleidoscope  of 
human  colours — by  an  extensive  importation  of  yellow 
coolies  from  China.  The  blazing  outbreak  of  ele- 
mental wrath  which  instantly  greeted  this  move 
throughout  the  British  Empire  surprised  and  per- 
plexed its  authors.  They  had  not,  perhaps,  grasped 
the  sensitiveness  of  race-fears,  especially  when  com- 
bined with  the  dread  of  a  lower  standard  of  living. 
Searching  for  some  support  somewhere,  the  Crown 
Colony  Government  tried  to  draw  from  Botha's  silence 
the  conclusion  that  he  supported  the  Chinese  Labour 
policy.  Sir  Arthur  Lawley,  the  Governor  of  the 
Transvaal,  even  cabled  home  a  statement,  read  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  that  the  Transvaal  people  were 
in  favour  of  the  Chinese  policy. 

This  was  too  much  for  Botha  and  his  friends.  They 
drew  up  a  strong  letter,  pointing  out  that  the  question 
had  never  been  submitted  to  the  Transvaal  people; 
but  that  if  they  were  any  judges  of  Transvaal  opinion, 
the  "  overwhelming  majority  are  unalterably  opposed." 
"  It  would  be  a  fatal  mistake,"  they  wrote,  to  introduce 
this  labour  without  popular  consent :  it  would  be  "  a 
public  calamity  of  the  first  magnitude." 

This  letter  was  signed  by  all  the  chief  Transvaal 
leaders,  and  was  sent  on  by  Botha  to  Lawley  with  a 
covering  letter,  asking  that  it  should  be  cabled  ifz 
extenso   to   Downing  Street.       Remembering  certain 


1 68  GENERAL   BOTHA 

lapses  in  messages  cabled  to  England  in  earlier  days 
Botha  added,  "  I  enclose  a  blank  cheque  to  cover  the 
cost  of  the  cable."  ^     Here  was  a  thoroughness  char- 
acteristic of  the  man. 

It  was  too  late.  The  Chinese  had  begun  to  come. 
Later  on  it  became  Botha's  first  and  most  difficult  task 
of  achieved  rule  to  send  them  home. 

As  the  months  wore  on,  Lord  Milner's  policy  grew 
more  and  more  unpopular  in  South  Africa.  As  the 
months  wore  on,  South  Africa  grew  more  and  more 
dissatisfied  with  the  Crown  Colony  Government. 
Whatever  views  they  might  hold  as  to  Lord  Milner's 
policy,  all  parties  and  both  races — British  as  well  as 
Boer — began  to  agree  that  the  time  had  come  for  self- 
government.  Above  all,  the  Boer  leaders  were  of 
opinion  that  the  time  had  now  come  for  the  redemp- 
tion of  the  pledge  given  under  the  Treaty  of  Vereen- 
iging. 

In  that  ingenious  play.  The  Mollusc,  the  girl  is 
striving  to  explain  why  she  has  quarrelled  with  her 
lover.  At  last  she  breaks  in  a  passion  of  tears — "  He 
will  try  to  improve  me. "  So  it  was  with  the  Boers 
now  toward  Lord  Milner.  He  travelled;  he  wrote 
reports;  he  laboured  unceasingly.  But  South  Africa 
could  not  forgive  him  for  wanting  to  improve  her.  He 
had  not  enough  sympathy  with  her  faults  to  be  able 
effectively  to  correct  them. 

1  Worsfold,  pp.  235-7,  Vol.   II. 


SALVAGE  169 

The  thing  that  finally  brought  the  Milner  policy 
to  an  end  was  the  expense  of  it.  Lord  Milner  and  his 
men  worked  on  the  simple  theory  that  the  war  would 
bring  a  great  "  boom  "  in  its  train.  But  it  is  not  the 
habit  of  wars  to  bring  "  booms."  Instead,  there  de- 
scended on  South  Africa,  during  1904  and  1905,  a 
black  cloud  of  depression,  increased  by  the  accidents 
of  disease  and  bad  seasons.  It  was  this  great  depres- 
sion which  brought  the  crisis  to  a  head.  For  the  large 
imported  Civil  Service,  designed  for  a  prosperous 
community,  became  for  the  starved  and  impoverished 
country  an  expensive  Giant's  Robe,  which  bade  fair 
to  become  a  Shirt  of  Nessus. 

The  cry  of  extravagance  is  the  one  touch  which 
makes  all  citizens  kin.  In  this  case  it  brought  Briton 
and  Boer  together.  The  British  residents  of  the 
Transvaal  began  to  bury  the  hatchet  of  the  war  period. 
The  fatal  word  went  round  that  Milner's  scorpions 
were  worse  than  Kruger's  whips. 

The  notion  that  a  British  Colony  could  not  govern 

itself    could   not   indeed,    as   a   policy,    long   survive 

war   conditions.     Once    South    Africa    realised    that 

it   was    being    adopted    as    a    policy    of    peace,   the 

whole    population,    both    British    and  Boer,  rose  up 

against  it.^ 

1  In  a  despatch  to  Lyttelton  (May  2,  1904),  Lord  Milner 
bases  his  opposition  to  responsible  government  in  the  Trans- 
vaal on  the  incapacity,  not  of  the  Boers,  but  of  the  British 
population.  "  They  are  politically  inexperienced  and  thought- 
less to  a  degree." — (Worsfold,  Vol.  II,  p.  264.) 


I70  GENERAL  BOTHA 

It  was  in  1904  that  Botha  began  first  to  take  part  in 
the  agitation  for  self-government  that  was  now  spread- 
ing rapidly  through  the  whole  country.  The  first  move- 
ment of  awakened  national  feeling  began  with  the  pro- 
tests of  the  Boer  pastors  against  the  neglect  of  their 
religion  in  the  new  English  schools.  One  hundred  and 
thirty  Boer  delegates  assembled  at  Pretoria  on  May  23, 
1904,  and  chose  Botha  as  their  Chairman.  Then 
they  laid  their  case  before  Sir  Arthur  Lawley,  the 
Governor.  His  reply  gave  little  satisfaction.  The 
movement  grew.  On  December  3,  1904,  there  took 
place  another  Conference  at  Brandfort,  when  the 
speakers  were  more  daring  in  their  utterances.  On 
December  16  came  the  funeral  of  President  Kruger 
at  Pretoria — a  solemn  tribute,  in  which  both  Boer  and 
Briton  joined  with  a  new  and  remarkable  unity  of 
feeling. 

The  Home  Government  began  to  feel  the  force  of 
the  uprising.  They  foresaw  the  electoral  storm  and 
tried  to  meet  it  half-way.^  Early  in  1905  came  the 
news  of  the  Lyttelton  Constitution,  conceding  the 
gift  of  representative  government.  The  despatches 
of  Mr.  Alfred  Lyttelton  and  Lord  Milner  proposing 
this  reform  crossed  one  another  on  the  seas  between 
Great   Britain  and   South   Africa.      Both  had   simul- 


^  See,  on  this,  the  remarkable  correspondence  between 
Lyttelton  and  Milner  in  Vol.  II,  pp.  262-3,  of  Mr.  Worsfold's 
book.  Lyttelton  urg-es  his  Constitution  as  a  way  of  "dishing 
the  Whigs." 


SALVAGE 


171 


taneously  discovered  that  the  cause  of  Crown  Colony 
Government  was  lost.^ 

Botha  and  his  friends  were  now  resolved  not  to 
accept  any  compromise.  In  December,  1904,  they  laid 
before  Lord  Milner  their  objections  to  the  Lyttelton 
proposaal.  Lord  Milner  strenuously  supported  Lyttel- 
ton. But  the  proposed  compromise  of  representative 
rule  only  quickened  and  vitalised  the  national  move- 
ment. 

Lord  Milner  had  a  case.  The  Vereeniging  Treaty 
spoke  of  "  Representative  institutions  leading  up  to 
self-government."  The  Lyttelton  Constitution  seemed 
to  meet  those  conditions.  A  delay  seemed  permis- 
sible; it  seemed  prudent.  But  South  Africa  was  in 
no  mood  for  delay.  The  full  grant  seemed  risky. 
South  Africa  was  ready  for  the  risk. 

Early  in  1905,  two  great  Reform  organisations  were 
founded  with  the  sole  object  of  securing  responsible 
government — "  Het  Volk,"  in  the  Transvaal ;  and 
"  Orangie  Unie  "  in  the  Orange  Colony.  Louis  Botha 
became  the  leader  of  Het  Volk — "  The  People  " — and 
instantly  threw  himself  into  the  work  of  organisation. 

The  ground  was  prepared.  For  the  "  Representa- 
tive "  compromise  had  few  friends  in  South  Africa. 
They  had  already  tried  it.     Natal  had  long  endured 

^  In  the  Lyttelton  Constitution  there  was  to  be  a  Legislative 
Assembly  with  35  elected  members,  6  to  9  officials,  and,  of 
course,  a  nominated  Executive.  In  a  teleg'ram  to  Lyttelton 
in  April,  1905,  Milner  argued  that  with  proper  management  the 
Boers  could  be  left  in  a  minority. — (Worsfold,  \'ol.   II,  p.  270.) 


172  GENERAL   BOTHA 

that  system  of  government :  the  experience  had  left 
behind  a  very  bad  taste,  even  among  the  Natal  English. 
Among  the  Dutch  there  was  a  rooted  belief  that  the 
British  Government  did  not  propose  to  give  full 
responsible  government  until  they  had  built  up  a  British 
majority.  The  absolute  exclusion  of  the  Orange 
Colony  from  the  Lyttelton  scheme  confirmed  this 
impression,  and  roused  the  Boers  in  that  Colony  to 
the  point  of  fury. 

A  situation  was  now  arising  not  unlike  that  of  1881. 
Boers  were  combining  with  Britons  in  one  common 
resistance.  Both  claimed  the  grant  of  responsible 
government  as  a  right  under  the  Vereeniging  Treaty ; 
and  it  was  difficult  to  deny  them.  Branches  of  the  new 
party  were  formed  in  every  part  of  the  country.  There 
was  even  a  proposal  afloat  that  the  Boers  should  form 
a  Chamber  of  their  own  after  the  Hungarian  precedent. 

It  really  looked  for  the  moment  as  if  Transvaal 
affairs  were  about  to  start  again  on  the  same  old  vicious 
circle.  It  seemed  as  if  Africa,  as  well  as  Europe,  were 
destined  to  have  her  Ireland.  Botha  was  determined 
to  prevent  this  by  achieving  victory  for  his  policy.  He 
repressed  every  sign  of  disorder.  He  avoided  all  ex- 
travagance of  menace.  But  in  the  cause  of  respon- 
sible government  he  worked  steadily  forward,  address- 
ing meetings,  sending  forward  resolutions,  taking  on 
himself  the  full  burden  of  the  movement. 

Then,  at  the  very  nick  of  time,  came  a  great  wind- 
fall of  fortune  for  South  Africa. 


SALVAGE  173 

Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  became  Prime 
Minister  in  Great  Britain  (December,  1905).  The 
first  use  that  he  made  of  his  stupendous  majority  which 
he  secured  at  the  polls  in  January,  1906,  was  to  give, 
unsolicited  and  uncompelled,  both  to  the  Transvaal 
and  to  the  Orange  Colony  that  great  and  saving  boon 
of  complete  responsible  self-government,  which  was, 
in  the  end,  their  Treaty  right. 

We  can  see  to-day  that  this  daring  stroke  of  high 
policy  saved  South  Africa  for  the  Empire. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE    TRANSVAAL    PREMIERSHIP 

(1906-10) 


CHAPTER    IX 

THE  TRANSVAAL  PREMIERSHIP   (1906-IO) 

"When  States  that  are  newly  conquered  have  been  accus- 
tomed to  their  liberty,  and  lived  under  their  own  laws,  to 
keep  ihem  three  ways  may  be  observed  : — the  first  is,  utterly 
to  ruin  them ;  the  second,  to  live  personally  among  them ;  the 
third  is,  to  permit  them  to  enjoy  their  old  privileges  and  laws, 
erecting  a  kind  of  Council  of  State." — Machiavelli. 

The  gift  of  responsible  Government  to  the  Trans- 
vaal in  December,  1906,  now  brought  General  Botha 
back  into  full  public  life.  For  four  years  (1902-6) 
he  had  been  living  away  from  direct  power  and 
responsibility.  At  no  time,  indeed,  during  that  period, 
had  he  forgotten  or  neglected  his  people.  He  was 
always  working  for  them  and  thinking  of  them;  but 
he  had  consistently  and  deliberately  refused  to  accept 
responsibility  without  power.  This  trying  interval  had 
now  come  to  an  end.  Botha's  restraint  had  undoubtedly 
done  much  to  shorten  the  period.  But  now  prudence 
and  self-control  had  brought  their  full  reward.  Dur- 
ing the  last  two  years  he  had  already  been  accepted  in 
the  Transvaal  as  the  leader  of  the  new  popular  move- 
ment that  led  up  to  responsible  rule.     He  was  now 


178  GENERAL   BOTHA 

clearly  marked  out  as  the  one  man  to  accept  the  full 
burden  of  that  responsibility  which  he  had  done  so 
much  to  win. 

The  first  "  responsible"  General  Election  for  the 
new  Legislative  Assembly  under  the  Campbell- 
Bannerman  Constitution  in  the  Transvaal  Colony  took 
place  on  February  20,  1907.  General  Botha  put  up  for 
Standerton  and  he  had  his  own  personal  election  to 
look  after.  He  was  fought  very  keenly  by  a  young 
Englishman,  the  Hon.  Hugh  Wyndham,  who  had  a 
large  farm  at  Standerton;  and  it  was  necessary  for 
Botha  to  hold  many  meetings  to  place  his  position 
clearly  before  his  own  people.  But  it  was  also  his 
duty  to  act  as  guardian  of  the  new  cause  throughout 
the  Transvaal.  There  was  no  rest  for  him  during  this 
election.  He  had  to  defend  the  Boer  to  the  Briton, 
and  the  Briton  to  the  Boer.  He  had  to  justify  to  the 
old  back-veldt  Boer  his  acceptance  of  the  new  order : 
he  had  to  prove  to  the  Outlander  the  sincerity  of  his 
own  loyalty  to  the  Empire.  He  had  to  visit  many 
constituencies  in  that  vast  stretch  of  country.  He 
travelled  in  his  motor  from  town  to  town  and  spoke 
practically  every  night.  His  was  the  task  of  the 
appeal  of  a  British  leader  of  party,  to  a  smaller  public, 
but  over  a  larger  space. 

His  triumph  was  complete.  The  Crown  Colony 
Government  had  already  outlived  its  welcome.  The 
old  Outlander  party  was  divided.  Botha  stood  for  the 
magic  cause  of  reconciliation  between  the  races  :  and 


THE   TRANSVAAL   PREMIERSHIP       179 

the  public,  now  weary  of  strife,  took  up  the  cry  for 
peace.  He  pleaded  a  truce  to  war  memories ;  and  by 
that  great  plea  he  won  many  British  votes.  The  result 
of  the  election  stood  as  follows  : — 


Botha's  Party      .. 

-hi 

Progressives 

...       21 

Nationalists 

6 

Labour 

3 

Independent 

2 

^           • .  1                  1                           •         • . 

Thus  Botha  emerged  with  a  clear  majority — ■^'j  to 
32 — over  all  other  parties  combined;  although  by  no 
possibility  could  they  combine.  He  stood  out  in  this 
election  as  clearly  and  obviously  designated  to  be  the 
elected  ruler  of  a  self-governing  Transvaal.^ 

Thus  it  became  Lord  Selborne's  duty  to  send  for 
Botha  as  the  first  Prime  Minister  of  the  Transvaal ; 
and  for  the  next  three  years  these  two  men  worked 
together  for  the  good  of  the  country.  Here  began  a 
very  remarkable  partnership.  Lord  Selborne  had  not 
hitherto  displayed  in  British  public  life  any  decided 
sympathy  for  the  Boers.  He  had  already  held  high 
Cabinet  rank  in  an  Unionist  Ministry.  He  was  married 
to  a  daughter  of  the  late  Lord  Salisbury — a  lady   of 

^  In  his  own  constituency  of  Standerton  his  general  triumph 
was  reflected  : — 


Louis  Botha     ... 
Hon.    H.   Wyndham 


Majority 


1029 
354 

675 


M    2 


i8o  GENERAL  BOTHA 

high  social  charm  and  distinction.  Politically  he  was 
one  of  those  public  men  who  had  gradually  crossed 
from  a  mild  Liberalism  to  a  stout  Conservatism  by  the 
golden  bridge  of  Unionism.  It  would  not  have  been 
surprising  if  with  this  record  he  had  failed  to  sym- 
pathise with  the  feelings  of  the  conquered  Boers.  But 
the  stimulus  of  a  new  experience  in  a  new  country  had, 
as  not  seldom  happens,  an  awakening  effect  on  the  mind 
of  this  British  Peer.  There  is,  after  all,  a  great  deal 
in  common  between  the  Boer  and  the  English  country 
gentleman — in  their  joy  in  country  sports,  their  sus- 
picion of  change,  their  habit  of  command.  In  this 
case  a  close  and  sympathetic  tie  grew  up  between  the 
British  Governor  and  the  Boer  Prime  Minister.  They 
grew  to  respect  and  admire  one  another  during  the 
years  of  this  Transvaal  Premiership,  and  each,  within 
the  limits  of  his  own  position,  learned  to  work  with 
a  splendid  persistence — "  Too  great  for  haste,  too 
high  for  rivalry" — to  advance  the  cause  of  South 
Africa. 

In  forming  his  Cabinet,  Botha  was  able  to  give  high 
position  to  a  man  who  had  already  performed  great 
services  for  the  Afrikander  cause — General  Smuts. 
These  two  men  present  a  striking  and  vivid  contrast  of 
genius.  Botha's  is  a  triumph  of  nature.  His  charac- 
ter— deep,  broad,  and  strongly-knit — is  not  the  product 
of  any  elaborate  scheme  of  culture.  He  strikes  those 
about  him  rather  as  a  progressive  farmer  who  had 
taken  to  politics — one  of  those  old  country  types  that 


THE  TRANSVAAL  PREMIERSHIP       i8i 

presided  so  long  over  the  destinies  of  England.  But 
there  is  always  innate  in  him  a  habit  of  going  straight 
to  the  big  things  of  life — a  certain  large  breadth  of 
vision,  as  of  one  looking  on  life  from  a  hill  top.  With 
all  this  there  stands  combined  a  certain  serene  gift  of 
moral  balance,  as  of  a  mind  pivoting  on  a  fixed  centre 
— a  kind  of  splendid  faculty  for  common  sense.  In 
all  this  he  is  a  Boer  at  his  best — the  finest  flower  of  that 
remarkable  race — a  Dutchman  of  the  kind  that  look 
out  of  the  canvases  of  Rembrandt  and  Franz  Hals — 
one  of  those  rare  pieces  of  luck  that  have  come  to  our 
Empire  in  aid  of  its  task  of  bringing  other  races  under 
our  rule. 

It  is  perhaps  a  quality  of  this  high  common  sense 
that  Botha  has  always  had  a  great  gift  for  judging 
men.  Never  did  he  display  this  better  than  in  his  choice 
as  Colonial  Secretary  of  that  remarkable  man.  General 
Smuts,  who,  although  he  had  lost  his  son  in  a  concen- 
tration camp,  now  proved  his  acceptance  of  the 
covenant  of  reconciliation  and  oblivion  by  taking  office 
under  the  British  Crown.  That  was  the  first  great 
triumph  for  Botha's  spirit  and  policy. 

General  Smuts  provided  him  with  precisely  that 
outfit  of  expert  knowledge — in  law,  history,  and 
State  conventions — which  is  indispensable  to  a  com- 
munity that  is  to  take  its  place  among  well-equipped 
modern  societies. 

Lord  Gladstone,  who  has  since  had  great  experience 
of  these  two  men,  compares  the  partnership  to  that  of 


1 82  GENERAL   BOTHA 

Campbell-Bannerman  and  Asqulth  when  Gladstone 
himself  was  Chief  Liberal  Whip.  Bannerman  had  some 
of  that  bigness  of  outlook  which  characterises  Botha : 
Asquith  provided  the  same  expert  equipment  as  Smuts. 
"  Send  for  the  sledge-hammer  !  "  was  what  Bannerman 
used  to  say  when  he  was  hard  pressed  in  the  House; 
and  all  his  Whips  knew  instantly  that  he  meant 
Asquith.  Smuts  provides  the  same  Parliamentary 
sledge-hammer  power  for  Botha  in  South  African 
Parliamentary  life.  For  he  comes  to  it  highly  trained 
in  the  Universities  of  Europe — Cambridge,  Bonn,  and 
Leyden — a  man  of  the  highest  academic  degree,  with 
an  intellect  now  sharpened  by  years  of  Parliamentary 
cut  and  thrust. 

In  choosing  this  lieutenant,  Botha  took  a  vital  step 
towards  helping  to  build  up  the  Parliamentary 
supremacy  which  he  has  since  attained. 

In  accepting  the  Premiership  of  the  Transvaal, 
Botha  stepped  into  his  appointed  and  fated  place. 
Both  in  battle  and  in  peace  he  had  proved  himself  the 
chosen  man  of  his  people;  and  the  only  true  courage 
was  for  him  to  accept  the  leadership.  It  seemed  easy 
for  him  to  do  so  at  that  moment.  There  was  as  yet 
no  discordant  voice  in  the  general  harmony.  When 
the  Liberal  Government  of  1906  granted  the  Transvaal 
self-government,  a  great  wave  of  emotion  had  swept 
over  South  Africa.  This  sudden  gift  of  self-govern- 
ment, without  threat  or  pressure,  seemed  almost  too 
gbod  to  be  true.     The  action  of    Campbell-Banner- 


THE  TRANSVAAL   PREMIERSHIP       183 

man's  Government  for  the  moment  disarmed  race- 
hatred :  it  seemed  to  bear  out  all  that  the  most  san- 
guine Boers  had  said  about  the  British  Empire.  The 
Afrikanders  seemed  to  step  from  a  nightmare  of  dis- 
trust into  a  fairyland  where  hopes  came  true  and  pro- 
mises were  fulfilled.  Faith  reigned  supreme.  For  the 
moment  the  reconciliation  between  the  peoples  seemed 
complete.  It  is  Lord  Selborne's  opinion  that  at  no 
time  during  his  Governorship  were  the  two  races  so 
friendly  as  at  this  moment. 

Some  months  later  I  happened  to  meet  in  London 
that  excellent  man,  Mr.  Sauer/  a  Cape  Minister  who 
had  come  over  for  the  Conference.  He  assured  me  that 
the  gift  of  self-government  to  the  new  Colonies  had 
worked  a  miracle  in  South  Africa.  "  You  have 
trusted  them,"  he  said,  "  and  they  will  be  true  to  you. 
Depend  upon  it  if  your  Empire  ever  gets  into  trouble 
you  will  find  that  they  are  the  most  loyal  of  British 
citizens."  It  was  one  of  those  few  prophecies  that 
come  true.  When  the  stress  came,  the  great  generosity 
of  this  deed  bore  fruit  a  hundredfold. 

"  May  the  Lord  help  me  to  bear  the  responsibility," 
said  Botha  to  a  friend  as  he  started  out  to  be  sworn 
in  as  Prime  Minister  in  the  same  building  and  almost 
on  the  same  spot  as  where  in  other  days  he  had  argued 
against  Kruger's  policy.  This  swearing-in  of  Minis- 
ters in  public  is  in  South  Africa  a  very  solemn  occa- 
sion— a  sort  of  religious  service,  held  in  the  Parliament 
^  Since  deceased  (in   191 4). 


1 84  GENERAL   BOTHA 

buildings,  and  in  the  full  public  eye.  Only  a  shallow 
observer  would  scoff  at  such  a  ceremony.  Botha  was 
in  no  mood  for  scoffing.  Here,  as  in  other  things, 
Botha  was  a  Boer  of  the  Boers,  a  descendant  of  that 
old  Puritan  stock  that  was  not  ashamed  to  say : — 

"All  is,  if  I  have  grace  to  use  it  so, 
As  ever  in  my  great  Task-Master's  eye." 

Scarcely  had  Botha  assumed  the  position  of  Prime 
Minister,  when  he  was  called  to  London  as  Delegate 
in  the  Imperial  Conference  of  1907. 

This  visit  to  London  was  a  very  important  event  in 
Botha's  career.  It  was  indeed  an  act  of  genius  on 
the  part  of  the  Imperial  Government  to  ask  him  at 
all — an  act  which,  if  report  speak  true,  came  only 
after  much  travail  of  agonised  officialdom.  His  visit 
brought  General  Botha  into  the  company  of  the  Pre- 
miers from  the  whole  Empire;  and  doubtless  it  did 
a  great  deal  to  impress  on  his  mind  the  true  soldering 
forces  of  that  great  human  combination  into  which  he 
had  been  brought — freedom  and  self-government. 
The  sovereign  remedy  of  liberty,  indeed,  was  already 
working  on  the  woes  of  South  Africa.  The  splendid 
and  generous  reception  dealt  out  to  Botha  by  King 
and  people  in  1907  no  doubt  left  a  deep  mark  upon 
Botha's  very  human  temperament.  He  gave  a 
generous  return.  In  meeting  after  meeting  he  defi- 
nitely and  solemnly  pledged  to  the  British  people  the 
full  adhesion  of  the  Transvaal  to  the  British  Empire, 


THE   TRANSVAAL  PREMIERSHIP       185 

and  his  own  intention  to  work  for  the  welfare  of  South 
Africa  regardless  of  race  differences. 

In  1907,  as  on  his  previous  visit  of  1903,  he  was 
deeply  impressed  by  the  kindness  and  courtesy  of 
King  Edward  VII.  This  touch  of  personal  courtesy 
now  accorded  with  the  many-throated  welcome  of  the 
people  both  in  the  streets  of  London  and  at  many 
banquets  and  gatherings.  It  is  not  too  much 
to  say  that  Botha  was  the  hero  of  that  crowded 
hour. 

Such  triumphs  are  always  the  target  for  rancorous 
tongues;  and  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  Botha's 
popularity  in  England  should  pass  unscathed  at  the 
hands  of  all  his  own  old  followers.  That  same  type  of 
.Puritan  stalwart  that  fretted  Oliver  Cromwell  to  an 
early  grave  was  now  lying  in  wait  for  Louis  Botha 
when  he  landed,  flushed  with  success,  at  Cape  Town. 
It  is  difficult  to  know  where  the  cause  of  quarrel  came 
in.  A  crowd  of  English  witnesses  could  testify  that 
Botha,  in  those  days,  abated  no  jot  of  the  claims  of 
his  own  people.  At  the  greatest  City  banquets,  in 
the  midst  of  the  most  heady  acclamations,  he  was  never 
ashamed  of  his  origin  or  of  his  native  tongue.  "  I  count 
the  Taal  the  queen  of  languages,"  he  once  said.  In 
London  he  would  keep  great  audiences  waiting  while 
he  spoke  his  replies  in  that  simple  dialect,  and  waited 
while  the  interpreter,  standing  by,  slowly  translated 
his  message.  He  was  not  one  of  those  shepherds  of 
Israel     who     feed    themselves     before      the     flock. 


1 86  GENERAL   BOTHA 

He  had  never  forgotten  "  the  limit  of  his  narrower 
fate."  He  had  refused  golden  honours  for  him- 
self; but  he  had  come  back  bringing  gold  for 
his  people.^ 

But  "be  thou  as  chaste  as  ice  and  as  pure  as  snow, 
thou  shalt  not  escape  calumny."  It  had  been  a  perilous 
thing  for  a  new  Prime  Minister  to  leave  his  party  and 
Parliament  so  long.  As  soon  as  Botha  landed  in 
South  Africa  he  was  assailed  with  reproaches.  He 
was  accused  of  accepting  too  much  British  hospitality. 
General  de  Wet  began  to  write  letters  full  of  bitter 
criticism.  The  thing  came  to  a  head  in  Pretoria.  An 
individual  named  Breytenbach,  a  back-veldt  Boer, 
even  blackmailed  him  with  stale  slanders  of  his  share 
in  the  profits  of  the  old  Dynamite  Concession.  Botha 
faced  the  music.  Major  Fuge,  the  head  of  the  Police, 
hid  a  detective  in  the  adjoining  room,  and  the  man 
stated  his  terms  of  blackmail  within  the  hearing  of 
this  witness.  Just  before  the  trial  Breytenbach 
attempted  to  escape  along  the  railway  and  was  ac- 
tually seen  by  General  Botha,  who  was  saying  good- 
bye to  his  sister  at  the  station.  A  message  was  sent 
along  the  line  :  the  train  was  stopped  :  the  blackmailer 
was  arrested  and  brought  to  trial.  With  the  trial  and 
exposure  there  cam.e  a  revulsion  of  opinion  in  favour 
of  Botha.  But  the  old  Boer  "  Doppers  "  never  quite 
forgave  him  the  favours  of  the  British  public. 

^  He  had  secured  a  new  loan  of  ;£'5,ooo,ooo  for  the  Trans- 
vaal on  the  same  terms  as  the  previous  loan  of  ;£J35, 000,000. 


THE  TRANSVAAL  PREMIERSHIP       187 

The  first  publication  of  these  charges  had  been 
timed  to  appear  on  the  very  day  on  which  Mrs.  Botha 
was  to  give  a  great  reception  at  Pretoria  on  their  re- 
turn to  South  Africa.  The  General's  friends  feared 
that  his  Boer  following  might  stay  away ;  but  thousands 
came.  Botha  could  not  get  to  the  reception  until  after 
.Parliament  adjourned  in  the  afternoon.  Lord  Sel- 
borne  with  admirable  tact  refused  to  enter  the  room 
until  Botha  himself  had  arrived.  It  was  on  this  day 
that  Botha  for  the  first  time  had  "  God  save  the  King" 
played  at  his  house,  and  allowed  the  two  flags — the 
Union  Jack  and  the  Vierkleur — to  fly  side  by  side  in 
his  garden.  It  was  an  act  of  the  highest  courage.  He 
was  entering  upon  a  difficult  and  thorny  path — that 
road  of  the  peacemaker  which  is  always  strewn  with 
stones.  It  is  still  noted  in  South  Africa  that  when 
Botha  travelled  over  in  the  ship  to  the  Imperial  Con- 
ference of  1907  he  and  his  party  sat  thirteen  at  their 
ship  dinner-table. 

Another  incident  of  his  earlier  Premiership  fed  the 
flames  of  disfavour.  That  was  his  presentation  in 
the  year  of  1907  of  the  famous  CuUinan  ^  Diamond  to 
Queen  Alexandra.  This  splendid  jewel,  the  largest 
diamond  yet  found  on  the  world's  surface,  happened 
to  be  discovered  in  1905  on  the  famous  "  Premier 
Mine."     Its  discovery  was  due  to  one  of  those  acci- 

1  After  Sir  Thomas  CuUinan,  who  originally  purchased  the 
ground  on  which  the  Premier  Mine  is  situated,  and  is  now  head 
of  the  Premier  Mine.     The  diamond  weighed  3,025!  cts. 


1 88  GENERAL   BOTHA 

dents  which  are  in  themselves  romances.  A  certain 
mine-overseer  was  climbing  an  open  hill  in  the  mine 
on  a  day  of  brilliant  South  African  sunshine.  Far  up 
above  him  on  the  hill  he  saw  the  light  refracted  from 
an  object  which  instantly  drew  his  eager  steps.  The 
overseer  climbed  the  steep  hill,  mounting  an  almost 
precipitous  incline  until  he  reached  the  flashing  ob- 
ject. He  found  it  far  larger  than  he  expected.  He 
had  nothing  but  a  walking  stick,  and  with  that  he 
had  to  prize  out  the  big  stone  from  which  the  light 
was  sparkling.  Then  he  called  for  help,  and  it  was 
with  some  difficulty  that  the  diamond  and  the  man 
were  brought  down  the  hill.  The  stone  had  been  sent 
in  1905  to  be  cut  in  Holland,  where  alone  such  dia- 
monds can  be  prepared  for  use.  It  had  taken  two 
years  to  cut  the  stone  into  two  large  diamonds.  Botha, 
now  Prime  Minister,  presented  them  to  the  Queen; 
and  those  stones  now  adorn  the  Sceptre  and  the  Crown 
of  England.  A  fortune  was  made  out  of  the  chips 
alone. ^ 

Botha  was  vehemently  attacked  in  South  Africa  for 
the  extravagance  of  this  present  to  the  British  Crown. 
The  old  Boers  protested  angrily.  But  there  is  a 
notable  example  to  justify  Botha's  generosity.  In 
politics,  as  well  as  in  religion,  the  pot  of  spikenard 
need  not  always  be  given  to  the  poor. 

1  Under  the  law,  60  per  cent,  of  diamonds  found  in  the  Trans- 
vaal was  treasure-trove  to  the  Government.  All  that  Botha 
paid  therefore  was  40  per  cent. 


THE  TRANSVAAL  PREMIERSHIP   189 

For  the  next  three  years  Botha  was  Prime  Minister 
of  the  Transvaal  Colony.  The  ruling  object  of  his 
policy  during  this  period  was  to  draw  the  British  and 
Dutch  races  closer  together.  He  had  already  in  his 
mind  a  vision  of  unity  and  peaceful  development 
which,  he  knew  well,  could  only  be  turned  into  reality 
by  prolonged  and  patient  effort.  In  all  the  acts  of 
his  administration  he  endeavoured  to  hold  the  balance 
between  the  races. 

The  first  and  most  vital  task  that  he  had  to  face 
on  returning  to  South  Africa  from  London  in  1907 
was  the  sending  back  of  the  Chinese  labourers  to 
China.  The  Imperial  Government  was  insistent 
that  this  should  be  done  immediately.  It  was  one 
of  the  matters  on  which  British  public  opinion  had 
spoken  most  clearly  in  the  General  Election  of  1906. 

The  new  extension  of  Imperial  credit  made  to  South 
Africa  through  General  Botha  gave  the  Imperial 
Government  a  strong  claim.  It  was  only  fair  that  if 
South  Africa  were  to  be  benefited  by  the  aid  of 
the  Mother-Country  she  should  also  bow  to  her  view 
on  a  critical  question.  The  mine-owners  had  proved 
unable  to  pay  their  promised  contribution  to  the  war.^ 

Yet  Botha  found  himself  faced  with  the  defiance  of 
this  powerful  interest.  They  threatened  as  a  body  to 
close  down  the  mines  if  Botha  carried  out  the  wishes 
of  the  Imperial  Government.  But  Botha  had  foreseen 
this;  and  in  consultation  with  the  home  Ministry  he 

^  ;^30,ooo,ooo — promised  to  Mr.   Chamberlain. 


190  GENERAL   BOTHA 

had  devised  an  ingenious  way  of  meeting  their  hos- 
tility. 

Opinion  outside  Johannesburg  was  against  the 
mine-owners.  The  Chinese  had  on  several  occasions 
got  loose  from  their  compounds  among  the  Boer  farms, 
and  had  robbed  and  murdered.  There  were  dis- 
closures of  secret  societies  among  the  Chinese  which 
had  frightened  even  the  mine-owners  themselves.  But 
Johannesburg  as  a  whole  stood  together;  the  white 
employees  were  frightened  by  the  threat  to  close.  The 
problem  was  to  find  a  break  in  their  ranks. 

The  rift  was  found  in  that  remarkable  man,  Mr. 
(now  Sir)  J.  B.  Robinson.  He  was  one  of  the 
wealthiest  men  in  the  Transvaal ;  but  he  had  always 
taken  an  independent  view.  He  had  always  been  just 
to  the  Boers  :  now  he  was  willing  to  help  the  Imperial 
Government  to  send  back  the  Chinese.  He  was 
willing,  if  necessary,  to  become  Minister  of  Mines. 
He  would,  if  required,  help  the  Government  to  run 
the  mines  themselves  with  native  and  white  labour. 

Faced  with  this  threat,  the  mine-owners  hesitated. 
If  the  Government  once  began  to  run  the  mines, 
where  would  it  stop?  How  much  of  the  profits  would 
be  left  to  the  shareholders?  Would  the  mines  ever 
be  returned  to  their  owners  ? 

Capital  is  not  always  so  brave  as  it  looks.  Faced  with 
loss  of  profit,  its  courage  soon  dwindles.  This  threat 
of  Botha's  was  a  very  big  stick;  and  it  soon  brought 
about  the  necessary  results.     The  mine-owners  capitu- 


THE  TRANSVAAL  PREMIERSHIP   191 

lated  :  the  Chinese  were  sent  back,  and  Botha  was 
stronger  than  ever  in  the  saddle.  He  had  fought  and 
beaten  the  most  powerful  private  interest  in  South 
Africa.  For  a  long  time  it  had  been  clear  that  unless 
South  Africa  mastered  the  mine-owners,  the  mine- 
owners  would  master  South  Africa.  Now  Botha  had 
clearly  shown  that  South  Africa  intended  to  rule  over 
its  own  house. 

Next  in  order  of  difficulty  came  the  task  of  revising 
Milner's  Civil  Service — the  "  Kindergarten"  which 
was  disporting  itself  so  expensively  at  Pretoria. 

It  was  not  fair  to  the  Transvaal  to  leave  the  Gov- 
ernment Departments  so  thoroughly  overmanned.  It 
was  at  his  own  risk  that  Lord  Milner  had  imported  so 
many  officials  from  over-seas ;  and  it  was  at  their  own 
risk  that  they  had  come  to  serve  a  Crown  Colony 
which  was  known  to  have  a  precarious  lease  of  life. 
Botha  had  a  perfect  right  to  make  a  clean  sweep.  But 
what  is  legal  is  not  always  convenient.  Hertzog  and 
Steyn  in  the  Orange  Colony,  both  men  of  less  placable 
temper,  immediately  began  to  drive  out  Lord 
Milner's  English  immigrants  at  Bloemfontein,  both 
from  the  public  departments  and  from  the  Government 
schools.  They  filled  the  vacant  places  with  Free 
Staters.  The  result  was  a  feeling  of  triumph  on  the 
Dutch  side  and  of  injury  and  resentment  on  the  British. 
Botha  desired  to  avoid  both.  So  in  his  work  of  re- 
vision he  left  the  best  English  Civil  Servants.  He  was 
obliged  of  course  to   do  something    to    rectify     the 


192  GENERAL   BOTHA 

balance.  It  was  his  duty  to  his  electorate  that  he 
should  give  to  the  Boers  their  just  and  proper  share 
in  the  Government.  He  introduced  many  of  his 
countrymen  into  the  Service.  But  he  sternly  refused 
to  encourage  those  family  methods  of  helping  friends 
and  relations  which  so  often  grow  up  in  small  com- 
munities— and  are  not  entirely  unknown  in  great. 

From  the  reform  of  the  Civil  Service  Botha  turned 
to  the  primal  duty  of  state  defence.  Here  Lord 
Milner  had  abolished  the  old  system  of  Field  Cornets 
and  commandos  and  had  introduced  a  large  and  costly 
body  of  armed  constabulary,  a  force  unsuitable  for  a 
self-governing  country.  Botha  did  not  at  once  revive 
the  old  system  of  defence.  He  did  not  propose  that 
the  Boers  should  immediately  have  rifles  served  out, 
although  the  great  war  between  the  Germans  and  the 
natives  of  South-West  Africa  and  the  unrest  in  Natal 
might  have  justified  such  a  course.  He  thought  it 
wiser  to  muster  slowly.  It  was  by  his  especial  desire, 
expressed  at  the  Imperial  Conference,  that  30,000 
Imperial  troops  were  kept  in  South  Africa  at  a  time 
when  the  Home  Government  would  gladly  have  spared 
themselves  the  expense.  As  a  first  step  towards 
restoring  the  old  order,  he  reinstated  the  Field  Cornets 
for  civil  purposes. 

The  next  great  matter  to  draw  his  attention  was 
agriculture.  Botha  himself  has  always  been  a  progres- 
sive farmer,  and  he  did  not  fully  share  the  feeling 
of  some  of  his  supporters  towards  Lord  Milner's  agri- 


THE  TRANSVAAL  PREMIERSHIP   193 

cultural  reforms.  The  schemes  for  British  Land 
Settlement  had  already  proved  an  extravagant  failure ; 
and  no  one  wished  to  continue  them.  Botha  fully 
approved  all  those  central  arrangements  for  restoring 
the  vitality  of  Boer  agriculture — the  model  farms, 
the  supply  of  stock  and  seed,  and  central  laboratory 
work — which  Kruger  had  begun  and  Lord  Milner  had 
carried  on.  While  in  England,  Botha  had  kept  a  keen 
eye  on  stock,  and  he  was  now  able  to  develop  his  ideas 
in  the  Department  of  Agriculture;  for  he  combined 
that  portfolio  with  the  Premiership.  He  took  another 
and  even  more  important  step.  He  selected  a  number 
of  young  Boers  and  sent  them  to  Canada  and  America 
to  learn  new  methods  of  farming.  In  this  way  he 
trained  up  a  new  group  of  young  progressive  farmers 
who  soon  began  to  introduce  the  ideas  of  the  new  world 
to  the  veldt.  Then  he  developed  the  policy  of  settling 
on  the  land  those  landless  "  By-wooners  "  who  had  be- 
come the  chief  social  problem  of  South  Africa  since 
the  war. 

From  land  Botha  passed  to  the  even  thornier  prob- 
lem of  the  people's  schools.  Here  he  was  quite 
aware  that  there  was  much  room  for  improvement  on 
the  old  Boer  methods.  He  had  had  far  too  thorough 
an  experience  as  a  boy  himself  of  the  old  tutors  to 
believe  that  they  were  the  last  word  in  education.  The 
work  of  organising  schools  in  the  districts  of  scat- 
tered farms  was  by  no  means  easy,  and  the  Crown 
Colony    Government    had    not    made    schools    more 

N 


194  GENERAL  BOTHA 

popular  by  a  tendency  to  use  them  as  a  method  of 
spreading  the  ideas  and  language  of  the  conqueror. 
In  the  Transvaal  as  in  England  education  raises  many 
difficult  questions  of  language  and  religion;  for  every 
South  African  expects  religion  in  the  schools.  It  is 
certainly  not  for  Englishmen,  who  have  fought  over 
this  question  to  the  point  of  civil  distraction,  to  make 
light  of  the  difficulties  in  South  Africa.  Here  again 
Lord  Selborne  was  by  his  training  and  experience 
admirably  fitted  to  understand  the  difficulties. 

But,  perhaps,  after  all,  the  greatest  matter  now 
working  in  the  mind  of  General  Botha  and  his  col- 
leagues was  the  tremendous  idea  of  bringing  about  the 
Union  of  South  Africa.  During  the  election  of  1907 
General  Botha  had  already  placed  this  vital  question 
prominently  in  his  programme.  Speaking  at  Stander- 
ton  in  January,  1907,  some  fourteen  days  before  the 
election  day,  he  had  already  at  that  time  advocated  a 
complete  unification  of  the  five  Colonies.  He  had 
pointed  out  the  extravagance  and  peril  of  the  existing 
system  of  rule,  and  he  had  urged  the  peoples  of  South 
Africa  to  follow  in  the  steps  of  the  peoples  of  Aus- 
tralia and  Canada.  "  The  old  Boers,"  he  said,  "  were 
the  pioneers  of  the  Transvaal  and  as  they  were 
pioneers  in  that  matter  so  they  should  be  on  the  ques- 
tion of  Federation." 

It  was  to  that  great  question  that  Botha,  now  in  close 
consultation  with  Lord  Selborne,  began  to  direct  his 
mind. 


CHAPTER  X 
THE    COMING    OF    UNION     (1908-9) 


N    2 


CHAPTER    X 

THE   COMING  OF  UNION   (1908-9) 

"Oh!  my  sons,  see  how  strong  are  all  united  things!  If 
you  would  only  live  bound  together  by  love  and  friendship 
one  for  the  other,  no  mortal  power  could  hurt  you  !  " — The  old 
man  in  /Esop's  Fahle  of  the  Bundle  of  Sticks. 

During  the  last  fifty  years  there  have  been  three 
great  steps  in  the  building  up  of  the  British  Empire. 
The  first  was  the  British  North  America  Act  of  1867, 
which  united  the  Provinces  of  Canada  under  the 
central  Dominion  Parliament.  The  second  was  the 
Australian  Act  of  1900,  which  grouped  together  the 
States  of  Australia  under  a  central  Commonwealth 
authority.  The  third  was  the  drawing  together  of  the 
white  Colonies  of  South  Africa  under  the  South  Africa 
Act  of  1909,  which  placed  the  four  principal  Colonies 
of  South  Africa  under  the  Union  Assembly. 

While  the  Mother  Country  has  not  even  yet  fully 
achieved  the  resettlement  of  her  own  Constitution  by 
process  of  combat,  all  these  mighty  daughters  of  hers 
have  in  the  meantime  settled  their  machinery  of  Gov- 


198  GENERAL   BOTHA 

ernment  by  process  of  harmony.  If  we  thus  extend 
our  vision  over  the  Empire  it  really  would  seem  as  if 
the  genius  for  Constitutional  change  had  passed  from 
the  Mother  State  to  her  children. 

Who  can  doubt  that  much  strife  would  have  been 
avoided  in  South  Africa  if  earlier  generations  had  ac- 
cepted the  advice  of  those  far-seeing  statesmen,  Sir 
George  Grey  and  Lord  Carnarvon?  More  than  that, 
who  could  say  that  even  in  1907  that  great  and 
bloody  struggle  of  the  South  African  War  had  finally 
brought  peace  ?  By  presenting  South  Africa  with  two 
new  British  Colonies  it  had  created  a  fabric  of  four 
sovereign  Governments,  four  railway  systems,  four 
Customs  Houses,  and  four  legal  systems,  all  British, 
but  with  no  common  tie  except  the  timid  and  shadowy 
authority  of  a  distant  Imperial  Parliament  and  Execu- 
tive. Already,  after  a  few  months  of  experience, 
the  new  British  Governor  of  the  Transvaal  had  been 
turned  into  a  strenuous  advocate  of  Union.  He  found 
peaceful  government  impossible  without  it.  There 
have  been  few  more  remarkable  State  papers  in  the 
history  of  the  British  Empire  than  that  which  Lord 
Selborne  issued  in  July,  1907,  in  reply  to  the  request 
of  the  Colonies  for  his  judgment.^ 

There  had  been  already  some  beginnings.     Lord 

Milner  had  taken  some  important  steps  to  bring  the 

Colonies  together;  and  that,  indeed,  seemed  likely  to 

prove  the  most  valuable  and  abiding  part  of  his  work. 

1  Cd.    3564.      Price    i^">.    3d. 


THE  COMING   OF  UNION  199 

The  Inter-Colonial  Conferences  which  he  had  called 
together  in  1903  had  resulted  in  a  Customs  Union 
which  lasted  for  two  years;  and  in  the  July  of  that 
same  year  he  had  created  by  Order  in  Council  another 
joint  body  in  an  Inter-Colonial  Council,  which  was  en- 
larged in  1904  and  established  a  joint  control  over  the 
South  African  Railways.  This  body  had  probably 
saved  those  railways  from  bankruptcy;  but  it  had  not 
averted  all  the  losses  which  still  resulted  from  conflict- 
ing purposes.  The  Railway  Amalgamation  Confer- 
ence which  met  in  February,  1905,  as  a  result  of  the 
Conference  of  Premiers  in  June,  1904,  had  proved 
the  only  barrier  against  the  perpetual  strife  of  divided 
systems. 

But  in  July,  1905,  the  agreements  of  the  Customs 
and  Railways  terminated  and  had  to  be  renewed. 
When  Lord  Selborne,  then  Crown  Colony  Governor 
of  the  Transvaal,  approached  this  matter  he  became 
seriously  alarmed  at  the  grave  divergences  which  were 
revealed  by  the  discussions  between  the  Colonies.  A 
look  at  the  map  of  South  Africa  will  remove  any  sur- 
prise. The  frontiers  of  two  internal  Colonies  were 
wholly  cut  off  from  the  coast,  and  therefore  all  goods 
imported  into  the  Transvaal  and  Orange  Colony  had 
to  pass  first  through  Natal  and  the  Cape  and  were  at 
the  mercy  of  their  railway  rates.  The  only  alternative 
route  was  through  Delagoa  Bay,  and  the  permanent 
temptation  of  the  Transvaal  was  to  play  off  the  Portu- 
guese against  the  Southern  Colonies.     This  had  been 


200  GENERAL  BOTHA 

a  favourite  device  of  President  Kruger's  in  the  days  of 
the  Republics;  and  in  1895  it  had  nearly  produced  a 
war  between  the  Transvaal  and  Cape  Colony, 

What  Lord  Selborne  discovered  in  1905-6  to  his 
surprise  and  alarm  was  that  all  the  same  elements  of 
strife  still  existed  in  full  force.  Lord  Milner  had  pro- 
duced a  temporary  settlement  by  a  careful  balance 
between  Customs  and  Railway  rates — the  inner 
Colonies  granting  lower  Custom  duties  on  the  imports 
of  their  neighbours  in  return  for  lower  Railway  rates 
on  their  own  goods.  But  the  balance  was  very  un- 
steady, and  the  bargaining  was  becoming  more  and 
more  difficult.  Portugal  always  stood  ready  to  obtain 
profit  from  the  quarrels  of  the  Colonies.  It  was  clear 
that  if  at  any  stage  one  or  other  of  the  Colonies  became 
defiant  or  recalcitrant  the  peril  of  war  might  well  recur 
once  more.  Lord  Selborne  realised  this  awful 
possibility;  and  he  became  an  ardent  advocate  of 
Union. 

General  Botha  went  through  precisely  the  same  ex- 
perience when  later  on  (in  1907)  he,  too,  as  Prime 
Minister  of  the  Transvaal,  had  to  renew  these  agree- 
ments. His  ardour  for  Union  was  sensibly  increased. 
He  saw  the  terrible  possibility  of  the  Transvaal  and 
the  Orange  Colony  having  to  choose  between  ruin  and 
war.  He  had,  fortunately,  retained  in  his  service  the 
ablest  of  the  Civil  Servants  brought  to  the  country  by 
Lord  Milner;  and  those  young  men  were  now  pas- 
sionately on  his  side.     Men  like  Mr.  Patrick  Duncan 


THE  COMING   OF  UNION  201 

had  become  leaders  of  opinion,  and  were  founding 
Societies  in  favour  of  Union  all  over  the  country. 
These  men  did  admirable  spade  work  in  persuading 
the  English  section  to  co-operate  with  the  Dutch,  and 
undoubtedly  gave  valuable  aid  to  the  movement.  But 
in  the  end  the  issue  rested  with  the  elected  Ministers 
of  the  four  Colonies. 

All  the  difficulties  of  the  Transvaal  worked  towards 
Union;  and  the  terrible  memories  gave  an  urgent 
impulse  to  the  whole  movement. 

The  really  notable  fact,  indeed,  about  the  uniting  of 
South  Africa  was  the  speed  with  which  the  policy  now 
passed  from  the  region  of  ideas  into  actual  achieve- 
ment. In  this  work  of  acceleration  General  Botha 
played  throughout  a  great  part.  From  the  very  be- 
ginning he  threw  himself  strongly  into  the  movement, 
and  with  characteristic  largeness  of  mind  thrust  behind 
him  all  party  jealousy  and  race  prejudice.  His  passion 
for  unity  was  the  natural  result  of  his  passion  for  peace. 
For  his  genius  as  a  soldier  has  never  caused  him  to  fall 
in  love  with  war.  He  has  none  of  the  Napoleonic 
passion  for  the  battlefield.  His  nature  contains  no 
taint  of  what  is  known  in  the  jargon  of  the  day  as 
"  militarism."  He  never  dwells  with  any  delight  upon 
his  memories  of  war.  When  he  refers  to  the  great 
South  African  War,  it  is  in  terms  of  pain.  "  It  was  a 
terrible  time,"  he  is  accustomed  to  say,  "  and  I  hope 
never  to  go  through  such  a  time  again."  This  horror 
of  war  runs  through  all  his  work  and  fills  his  vision. 


202  GENERAL  BOTHA 

Like  Alexander  Hamilton  with  the  American  Colonies 
after  the  War  of  Independence,  he  now  ensued  union 
because  he  saw  clearly  that  it  was  the  only  alternative 
to  a  renewal  of  war. 

There  Botha,  like  so  many  other  leading  men  in 
South  Africa,  showed  his  real  mastery  over  realities. 
Perhaps  it  was  their  recent  experience  of  war  that  freed 
the  minds  of  these  men  from  illusions.  It  is  too  often 
the  effect  of  a  long  period  of  peace  that  men  come 
to  regard  war  as  a  rare,  deliberate  crime  of  a  particular 
statesman  or  Government,  conceived  in  conscious  and 
diabolical  villainy.  They  forget  that  the  real  marvel  of 
modern  life  is  not  war,  but  peace;  that  such  peace  as 
we  enjoy  from  time  to  time  is  a  coral  island,  beautiful 
but  fragile  and  precarious,  emerging  from  an  ocean  of 
strife,  and  always  tending  to  a  new  submergence. 
Thus  they  are  always  astonished  afresh  when  courtesy 
turns  to  slaughter. 

But  Botha  and  his  fellow  statesmen  had  been  recent 
pupils  in  a  sterner  school.  They  knew  that  the  causes 
of  war  are  as  often  accidents  and  incidents  as  de- 
liberate policies.  They  had  been  made  to  realise  the 
quarrelsomeness  of  the  natural  man;  they  knew  that 
wars,  like  revolutions,  can  be  lit  by  matches  as  well 
as  by  torches.  Such  matches  were  lying  about  freely  in 
the  questions  of  customs  and  railways  at  that  time 
dividing  South  Africa. 

Once  statesmen  realise  such  possibilities  it  becomes 
useless  to  "  prate  of  the  blessmgs  of  peace."     The 


THE  COMING   OF  UNION  203 

only  remedy  is  to  remove  the  causes  of  war.  Such,  to 
their  infinite  credit,  was  the  policy  of  the  leading  men 
of  South  Africa  at  that  critical  moment. 

Events  now  (in  1907)  began  to  move  swiftly. 

In  Cape  Colony  a  general  election  swept  away  Dr. 
Jameson's  party  and  installed  Mr.  Merriman  as  Prime 
Minister.  In  Natal  a  change  of  Government  brought 
Mr.  (now  Sir)  Frederick  Moor  to  the  Premiership,  in 
spite  of  his  well-known  sympathies  with  the  Natal 
Dutch  party.  The  Free  State  election  had  placed  Mr. 
Fischer  and  General  Hertzog  at  the  head  of  affairs. 
Thus  little  remained  anywhere  of  the  old  war  parties. 
Peace  Cabinets  ruled  South  Africa. 

It  was  the  heads  of  these  Cabinets  that  Botha  in- 
vited to  his  house  at  Pretoria  in  September,  1907,  and 
drew  together  in  a  common  league  and  purpose  for 
the  peaceful  unification  of  the  divided  Colonies. 
These  men  now  saw  that  although  the  war  had  settled 
the  race  question,  it  had  left  the  economic  problems 
unsolved. 

There  was  no  time  to  lose. 

In  May,  1908,  an  event  occurred  which  immensely 
increased  the  peril  of  the  situation.  For  the  very  thing 
happened  which  Lord  Selborne  had  always  feared. 
The  Railway  and  Customs  Conference  called  together 
at  Pretoria  failed  to  come  to  an  agreement.  So  deep 
were  the  divisions  of  the  delegates  and  so  strong  the 
pressure  of  local  interests  that  not  even  the  prospect  of 


204  GENERAL  BOTHA 

possible  disaster  to  the  peace  of  South  Africa  could 
bring  them  to  renew  their  understanding.  It  was  clear 
that  the  South  African  Colonies  would,  unless  they  now 
unified,  drift  further  and  further  apart.  It  was  use- 
less to  talk  to  the  delegates  about  the  interests  of 
South  Africa  as  a  whole  as  long  as  those  delegates 
were  the  instructed  servants  of  distinct  and  divided 
Colonies.  It  was  futile,  for  instance,  to  tell  the  Colo- 
nies on  the  coast  that  their  interests  were  the  same  as 
those  inland.  For  as  long  as  they  were  competing  for 
trade  and  railway  profits,  that  statement  was  simply  not 
the  fact.  There  was  only  one  possible  remedy  for 
the  "  present  discontents"  of  South  Africa — and  that 
was  to  merge  the  local  interests  in  a  larger  Union. 
The  only  cure  was  to  bind  together  these  parochial 
loyalties  in  the  greater  patriotism  of  South  Africa  as 
a  whole. 

Fortunately,  the  members  of  the  Railways  and  Cus- 
toms Conference  showed  at  this  moment  a  rare  and 
remarkable  public  instinct  for  the  right  move.  So 
deeply  were  they  impressed  by  the  calamitous  possi- 
bilities of  their  failure  to  agree  on  railways  and  cus- 
toms that  they  passed  two  strong  resolutions — one  in 
favour  of  South  African  Union  and  the  other  in  favour 
of  a  Convention  to  bring  it  into  being.  They  renewed 
for  one  year  the  Railway  and  Customs  agreements  al- 
ready in  existence,  and  sent  the  resolution  in  favour 
of  union  to  the  Colonial  Piarliaments.  Those  Par- 
liaments  promptly   responded.      Each   one   severally 


THE  COMING   OF  UNION  205 

adopted  the  Resolution,  and  delegates  were  appointed. 
The  number  of  the  delegates  was  fixed  in  proportion 
to  population — 12  for  Cape  Colony,  8  for  the  Trans- 
vaal, 5  from  Natal  and  the  Orange  River  Colony,  and 
3  from  Rhodesia. 

Among  these  delegates  the  Cape  sent  Mr.  Merriman 
and  Sir  Starr  Jameson;  the  Transvaal  General  Botha 
and  General  Smuts;  and  the  Orange  River  Colony 
sent  General  Hertzog,  "  President "  Steyn,  and 
General  de  Wet.  Lord  Selborne  would  un- 
doubtedly have  been  placed  in  the  chair  if  it  had  not 
been  deeply  felt  that  this  must  be  a  Convention  of 
South  Africans  and  South  Africans  alone.  Lord  De 
Villiers,  the  distinguished  Chief  Justice  of  the  Cape, 
was  appointed  President,  after  he  had  visited  Canada 
to  consult  statesmen  there  concerning  the  working  of 
the  Dominion  Act.  A  Vice-Presidency  was  created  for 
Mr.  Steyn  as  an  honourable  tribute  to  his  valorous 
defiance  of  adversity  and  ill-health.  He  played  a 
prominent  and  valuable  part. 

The  Convention  assembled  on  October  12,  1908, 
at  Durban — a  graceful  and  tactful  recognition  of  the 
importance  of  Natal  to  the  great  cause  of  Union. 
Four  armoured  cruisers  were  sent  to  Durban  by  the 
Imperial  Government  as  a  tribute  of  respect  to  this 
great  historic  gathering.  During  the  course  of  the 
Conferences  that  followed,  the  Convention  shifted  first 
from  Durban  to  Bloemfontein,  and  then  from  Bloem- 
fontein  to  Cape  Town.    Thus  different  parts  of  South 


2o6  GENERAL  BOTHA 

Africa  were  allotted  some  share  in  giving  hospitality 
to  these  famous  Councils. 

One  of  the  first  resolutions  passed  at  this  Conven- 
tion was  that  the  debates  should  be  secret.  It  was 
held  in  South  Africa — as  afterwards  at  the  London 
Conference — that  the  statesmen  concerned  would 
speak  more  freely  if  they  were  not  subjected  to  a 
running  fire  of  comments  from  outside.  In  such  dis- 
cussions proposals  are  made  which  can  only  be  rightly 
viewed  as  parts  of  a  large  scheme  of  agreement.  But 
it  is  inevitable  that,  viewed  alone,  such  concessions 
must  cause  grave  offence  to  the  party  man,  with  his 
inevitable  attachment  to  those  principles  which  repre- 
sent one  side  of  the  full  moon  of  truth.  Such  offence 
actually  arose  in  England  at  the  close  of  19 lo,  at  the 
crisis  of  our  own  constitutional  conference,  with  fatal 
results  to  the  success  of  that  effort. 

These  great  debates  have  now  passed  into  history ; 
and  history  has  a  lawful  claim  to  the  secrets  of  the 
past.  A  very  convincing  summary  of  the  speeches  has 
been  published  to  the  world  by  one  of  the  Cape 
members  and  witnessed  by  one  of  the  secretaries  to 
the  Convention.^ 

The  record  that  thus  leaps  to  light  brings  nothing 
but  credit    and    honour  to  the  public  men  of    South 

1  "The  Inner  History  of  the  National  Convention  of  South 
Africa,"  by  the  Hon.  Sir  Edgar  H.  Walton.  (T.  Maskew 
Millar :  Capetown  and  Pretoria.  Longmans,  Green  and  Co.  : 
London,  New  York,   Bombay.      1912.) 


THE   COMING   OF  UNION  207 

Africa.  Nothing  could  be  finer  than  the  spirit  of  grave 
patriotism  in  which  these  fathers  of  the  Union  debated 
the  issues  of  their  country.  There  were  on  many 
points  sincere  difficulties  of  principle  honourable  to 
both  sides  in  the  controversy.  It  was  inevitable  that 
in  an  assembly  drawn  from  Colonies  so  widely  divided 
in  space  and  so  differing  in  race  and  history  there 
should  be  serious  variations  in  outlook.  In  such  cases 
there  was  no  attempt  to  shirk  the  issue.  There  were 
clear  and  bold  statements  of  view  on  either  side ;  there 
were  always  reasonable  attempts  at  compromise.  But 
if  compromise  proved  impossible  it  was  then  recog- 
nised that  the  will  of  the  majority  must  prevail. 
The  Convention  went  to  a  vote,  and  the  minority 
gave  way  to  the  majority.  That  is  still,  in  the  last 
result,  when  all  attempt  at  compromise  fails,  the 
only  known  way  of  peace  in  arriving  at  political 
decisions. 

Perhaps  the  most  acute  of  all  the  conflicts  that  arose 
in  this  Convention  centred  round  the  questions  of 
language  and  colour.  On  these  points  a  settlement 
was  only  reached  after  searching  conflicts  of  heart. 
But  what  was  really  a  far  more  vital,  though  less 
inflamed,  conflict  arose  over  the  whole  question  of  the 
structure  of  the  Union.  The  debate  became  an  issue 
between  Federation  and  Union.  It  was  conducted  on 
a  very  high  level.  The  notable  fact  is  that  after 
careful  comparative  study  of  all  the  Federal  Constitu- 
tions   in    the   world    the    statesmen  of    South  Africa 


2o8  GENERAL  BOTHA 

definitely  decided  in  favour  of  Union  as  against 
Federation.  It  is  on  those  lines  that  a  settlement 
was  finally  framed  by  an  unanimous  Convention.  It 
is  not  the  least  remarkable  part  of  these  great  pro- 
ceedings that  four  sovereign  Parliaments  voluntarily 
handed  over  their  sovereignties  to  one  common 
authority  and  consented  to  take  the  lower  room  of 
mere  provincial  Councils. 

In  all  these  great  arguments  Botha  played  a  con- 
spicuous part.  He  spoke  always  in  Dutch,  and  his 
speeches  were  interpreted  to  the  Convention  by  his 
capable  and  devoted  secretary,  Dr.  Bok.  Botha  sup- 
ported Unification  against  Federalism.  He  spoke  up 
for  the  rights  of  the  "  Taal " ;  and  he  took  a  strong 
and  uncompromising  stand  on  the  question  of  giving 
the  franchise  to  the  coloured  races.  He  and  his 
colleagues  from  the  new  Colonies  said  definitely  that 
if  the  Cape  franchise  were  to  be  extended  to  the  more 
backward  natives  of  the  northern  Colonies  all  chances 
of  Union  would  be  at  an  end.  The  Transvaal  and 
the  Orange  Colony,  therefore,  simply  could  not  agree 
to  that  extension.  Here  Botha  found  himself  divided 
from  some  of  his  best  friends  at  the  Cape — especially 
Mr.  Sauer,  who  became  the  eloquent  and  inspired 
champion  of  the  native  franchise.  But  Natal,  where 
a  million  Zulus  live  side  by  side  with  100,000  whites, 
came  to  the  support  of  the  Transvaal ;  and  the  result 
was  a  compromise  which  left  the  question  of  franchise 
in  the  various  Colonies  as  it  existed  before  the  Union. 


THE   COMING   OF   UNION  209 

Thus  the  Cape  native  franchise  remains  in  force,  but 
is  not  extended  to  the  north. 

There  were  crises  inevitably  severe  in  the  proceed- 
ings of  the  Convention  before  the  whole  structure  of 
Union  was  firmly  established.  There  was  the  difficulty 
of  the  choice  of  Capital.  Each  of  the  most  important 
South  African  Capitals — Cape  Town,  Pretoria,  and 
Bloemfontein — put  in  their  claim  to  be  the  Capital  of 
South  Africa.  Such  rivalries  of  place  arouse  the 
keenest  feelings,  and  there  was  no  absence  of  stress 
in  this  discussion.  Committee  after  committee  was 
appointed  and  reported  their  failure  to  agree.  The 
Premiers  met  and  parted  without  yielding  to  one 
another.  The  President  proposed  a  decision  from 
outside.  No  one  cared  for  that.  It  was  only  at  the 
last  moment  that  a  decision  emerged  from  the  very 
hopelessness  of  a  definite  and  single  choice. 

For  it  had  gradually  become  clear  that  the  issue  lay 
between  Pretoria  and  Cape  Town.  But  it  was  also 
clear  that  if  either  were  chosen  exclusively  as  the  sole 
Capital  of  South  Africa  the  neglected  Colony  might 
be  lost  to  the  cause  of  Union.  So  desperate  did  the 
tension  become  that  Bloemfontein  seemed  likely  to 
come  in  as  the  "rejoicing  third,"  and  even  Pieter- 
maritzburg  began  to  lift  up  its  head.  Then,  at  the 
last,  with  a  sudden  flash  of  common  sense,  the  Con- 
vention recognised  that  honours  must  be  divided — 
that  neither  Cape  Town  nor  Pretoria  had  the  over- 
whelming claim — and  that  both  had  the  right  to  some 

o 


210  GENERAL   BOTHA 

share  of  the  glory.  So  the  Athanasian  paradox 
emerged  that  South  Africa  was  to  have  no  Capital  at 
all,  or,  if  any  Capital  at  all,  three  Capitals.  Cape 
Town  was  to  be  the  meeting  place  of  the  Assembly; 
Pretoria  the  centre  of  Administration;  and  Bloem- 
fontein  the  seat  of  Justice.  So  it  was  decided  and 
enacted.  There  were  grave  inconveniences  in  such  a 
settlement,  especially  in  the  separation  by  a  thousand 
miles  of  the  Parliament  from  the  departments.  But 
with  good  will  almost  any  arrangement  can  be  made 
to  work.  It  is,  indeed,  probable  that  most  States — 
including,  perhaps,  Great  Britain — suffer  from  an 
over-centralisation  of  energy.  At  the  present  moment 
in  South  Africa  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  spend 
half  the  year  in  Cape  Town,  and  the  other  half  in 
Pretoria ;  and  thus  the  varied  interests  of  that  immense 
country  have  all  a  chance  of  reaching  the  ear  of  the 
Government. 

The  tendency  to  a  settlement  in  these  disputed 
issues  was  greatly  aided  by  one  very  remarkable  and 
happy  result  from  the  meetings  of  the  Convention. 
General  Botha  and  Sir  Starr  Jameson  had  met  at  the 
Imperial  Conference  of  1907,  and  had  there  become 
friends  for  the  first  time.  In  the  ten  years  before  that 
Conference  each  had  played  a  great  part  in  the  moving 
drama  of  South  Africa.  It  was  Jameson  who,  far  back 
in  the  year  1896,  had  reopened  the  historic  strife 
between  Boer  and  Britain  by  that  strange  act  of 
impatience  and  violence,  the  "Jameson  Raid."    When 


THE   COMING   OF   UNION  211 

in  due  course  the  dragons'  teeth  sown  at  that  moment 
produced  their  iron  harvest  of  armed  men,  Botha  had 
taken  a  leading  part  alike  in  the  war  and  the  peace 
that  followed.  Meanwhile,  Jameson  had  in  the  course 
of  time  succeeded  Rhodes  as  leader  of  the  Progressive 
Party  at  the  Cape,  become  Prime  Minister  of  the  Cape 
Colony  for  three  years  (1904-1907),  and  finally  been 
thrown  from  power  by  the  party  of  the  Bond,  which 
had  first  employed  the  Senate  to  paralyse  his  finance, 
and  then  defeated  him  at  the  polls. 

Thus  Jameson  did  not  come  to  the  Convention  as 
Prime  Minister.  Merriman  had  taken  his  place.  But 
Jameson  was  still  regarded  as  the  hope  of  the  British 
Loyalists,  and  he  was  expected  to  maintain  their 
cause.  In  such  a  Convention  Jameson  represented 
the  British  cause  as  much  as  Botha  represented  the 
cause  of  the  Dutch. 

These  two  men,  then,  might,  if  they  had  been  small 
men,  have  prolonged  the  agony  of  a  divided  South 
Africa.  But  they  were  both  of  them  men  of  large, 
forgiving  temperament.  Jameson  has  been  always, 
at  all  times,  one  of  those  men  who  are  natural  hero- 
worshippers.  Not  a  man  of  great  original  genius 
himself,  he  possesses  a  certain  rare,  innate  capacity 
for  recognising  greatness  when  he  sees  it.  It  is  with 
him  a  kind  of  unreasoning  idealism. 

What  happened  now  was  that  Botha  took  the  place 
of  Rhodes  in  this  hero-worshipper's  niche  of  heroes. 
Jameson  believed  that  Botha  was  honest.    He  believed 

o  2 


212  GENERAL   BOTHA 

that  he  was  pursuing  the  good  of  South  Africa.  At 
the  same  moment,  Merriman  drifted  away  from  Botha ; 
for  often,  on  many  points,  the  interests  of  the  Trans- 
vaal and  the  Cape  clashed.  So  it  was,  by  one  of  the 
strangest  ironies  in  history,  that  Jameson  and  Botha 
worked  together  at  the  Convention  on  common  lines 
for  the  future  of  South  Africa. 

It  was  not  an  alliance  that  was  likely  to  be  popular 
with  extremists  on  either  side.  There  were  Boers 
from  the  back  veldt  who  had  never  quite  forgiven 
Botha  for  shaking  hands  with  Jameson  at  the  Imperial 
Conference  of  1907;  and  there  were  British  extremists 
who  could  never  quite  tolerate  that  Jameson  should 
have  any  dealings  with  Botha.  One  of  these  thought 
at  least  that  he  had  an  argument  which  would  prevail 
with  Jameson.  "Are  you  aware,"  he  said  to  Jameson 
one  day,  "  that  Botha  was  one  of  those  men  who 
wanted  to  shoot  you  at  Pretoria,  after  the  Raid?" 
Jameson  smiled.  "  Ah  !  "  he  said,  "  Botha  was  always 
right !  "  and  the  good  Loyalist  turned  away  dismayed. 

At  last  the  proceedings  of  the  Convention  drew  to 
a  close,  and  the  draft  Constitution  was  made  public 
on  February  9,  1909.  But  it  was  not  yet  through  all 
its  troubles.  The  draft  was  referred  first  of  all  to  the 
various  Colonial  Parliaments.  At  this  point  the 
Opposition  came  from  the  Cape  Dutch.  That  old 
political  leader,  Hofmeyr,  the  founder  of  the  Afrik- 
ander Bond,  managed  to  secure  the  passage  through 
the  Cape  Parliament  of  an  amendment  which  entirely 


THE   COMING   OF  UNION  213 

upset  the  compromise  over  the  distribution  of  seats. 
The  draft  Act  contained  a  complex  arrangement  con- 
structed of  three-membered  constituencies  and  pro- 
portional representation.  When  the  Convention 
assembled  again  in  Bloemfontein  it  was  discovered 
that  the  Cape  proposed  to  destroy  the  fine  balance  of 
representation  on  behalf  of  the  country  as  against  the 
towns.  It  was  here  that  Botha  and  Jameson  joined 
together  to  save  the  situation.  Proportional  repre- 
sentation for  the  Assembly  was  very  sensibly  aban- 
doned and  one-membered  constituencies  were  sub- 
stituted for  three-membered.  But  the  principle  of  one 
vote  one  value  was  strictly  maintained,  and  with  these 
alterations  the  draft  Act  was  signed,  and  the  Con- 
vention dissolved  on  May  11,  1909. 

One  difficulty  remained,  and  that  was  the  opposition 
of  a  party  of  zealots  in  Natal.  It  had  been  under- 
stood from  the  very  first  that  Natal,  in  return  for  her 
consent  to  join  the  Convention,  should  be  allowed  a 
Referendum  before  the  Union  Act  was  passed  into 
law.  The  Referendum  now  took  place  in  June,  and 
the  supporters  of  South  African  harmony  proved  to 
be  in  an  immense  majority — 11,121  for  the  draft 
Union  Act  and  3,701  against  it — making  a  majority 
for  the  Union  of  7,420.  There  was  a  separate  majority 
for  Union  in  every  constituency  throughout  Natal. 

The  next  step  was  to  send  to  England  a  Delegation 
carrying  the  draft  Act  for  submission  to  the  Imperial 
Parliament.     Botha  was  a  member  of  that  deputation, 


214  GENERAL   BOTHA 

and,  while  receiving  from  all  sections  of  the  British 
public  a  welcome  worthy  of  the  great  triumph  of  his 
ideas,  he  helped  to  lay  the  South  African  case  before 
the  Imperial  Government.  The  Union  Bill  was 
debated  in  the  British  House  of  Commons  and  House 
of  Lords  on  the  basis  of  the  good  common-sense 
assumption  that  on  the  whole  it  is  best  to  leave  a 
Dominion  to  settle  its  own  constitution.  This  instinct, 
which  has  carried  the  British  Empire  through  so  many 
of  its  crises  unscathed,  happily  prevented  the  men  at 
Westminster  from  putting  their  fingers  very  far  into 
any  of  the  complex  machinery  of  the  South  Africa  Act. 
The  only  question  which  raised  feeling  in  the  Imperial 
Parliament  was  the  Native  Franchise  compromise.  The 
refusal  to  extend  the  franchise  to  any  natives  outside 
the  Cape  was  vehemently  attacked  and  deplored,  but 
in  the  end  the  British  Parliament  passed  the  Act  with 
scarcely  any  amendment  of  substance. 

The  South  Africa  Act  received  the  Royal  assent 
on  December  20,  and  May  31,  1910,  was  fixed  as  the 
date  for  the  establishment  of  the  Union. 

Thus  after  stupendous  efforts  that  did  credit  to  all 
concerned  the  Union  of  South  Africa  was  accom- 
plished. Well  may  Britons  be  proud  of  those  great 
sons  who  brought  so  nobly  to  accomplishment  one  of 
the  most  difficult  tasks  that  ever  fell  to  the  lot  of 
statesmen. 


CHAPTER    XI 
THE    UNION    PREMIERSHIP     (1910) 


CHAPTER    XI 

THE   UNION    PREMIERSHIP    (1910) 

"Who  makes  by  force  his  merit  known 
And  lives  to  clutch  the  golden  keys, 
To  mould  a  mighty  state's  decrees, 
And  shape  the  whisper  of  the  throne." 

— Tennyson. 

Lord  Gladstone,  the  distinguished  younger  son 
of  England's  greatest  nineteenth-century  statesman,^ 
was  chosen  by  the  Liberal  Government  as  the  first 
Governor  of  the  Union  of  South  Africa.  He  left 
England  early  in  19 lo,  with  an  absolutely  free  hand 
as  to  the  choice  of  the  first  Prime  Minister  of  the 
Union.  The  new  order  was  to  open  on  May  31,  and 
all  the  Governments  of  the  four  Colonies  were  to 
come  to  an  end  on  that  day.  The  first  South  African 
elections,  however,  were  not  to  take  place  until  the 
following  September.  Thus  there  fell  on  the  new 
Governor  the  heavy  responsibility  of  selecting  a  Prime 
Minister  without  the  previous  guidance  of  a  General 
Election. 

The  new  Government  had  to  be  formed  immediately 

1  Member  of  the  House  of  Commons  from  1880  to  1909  for 
Leeds  W.  ;  known  as  Herbert  Gladstone ;  Chief  Whip  to 
Liberals,   1899-1906;    Home  Sec,   1905-1910. 


2i8  GENERAL  BOTHA 

after  Lord  Gladstone  arrived  in  Cape  Town  (May  17). 
For  there  were  many  important  legal  and  constitu- 
tional matters  which  would  have  to  be  settled  by  the 
new  Government  before  May  31. 

After  careful  consultation  and  reflection,  Lord 
Gladstone  called  upon  Botha  to  form  the  first  South 
African  Ministry.  Botha  accepted;  and  thus  in  May, 
19 10,  he  ceased  to  be  Premier  of  the  Transvaal  and 
became  Premier  of  South  Africa. 

Earlier  in  this  month  of  May,  19 10 — before  Lord 
Gladstone  had  landed — a  great  contention  had  arisen 
about  the  coming  Ministry.  Should  the  first  Ministry 
be  formed  out  of  one  party  alone  or  out  of  all  parties  ? 
A  wave  of  sentiment  had  passed  over  some  sections 
of  South  African  opinion ;  and  for  a  moment  there  had 
been  a  cry  for  a  "  Best  Man  "  Government,  selected 
from  all  parties.  We  all  know  these  moments  in 
politics,  when  all  politicians  combine  to  denounce  the 
discords  in  which  they  have  been  nurtured.  Angelic 
pauses — when  men  indulge  opiate  dreams,  forgetting 
that  difference  and  discussion  are  the  very  salt  and  oil 
of  progress.  Differences  may  be  just  as  fair  and 
honourable  as  agreements.  Civil  argument  is  often  the 
only  substitute  for  civil  war;  and  a  pretended  harmony 
may  be  only  the  prelude  to  a  worse  state  of  discord. 

In  this  case,  the  dream  soon  dissolved.  Botha  him- 
self is  always  a  placable  man;  and  for  a  brief  moment 
he  was  fascinated  by  this  vision  of  peace.   There  were 

conversations"  between  him  and  Jameson.  But  on 
both   sides   their   followers   took  their  principles   too 


THE  UNION  PREMIERSHIP  219 

seriously  to  allow  matters  to  go  far.  The  issue  fined 
itself  down  to  the  practical  question  of  "  under  which 
King?"  There  were  only  ten  places  allowed  in  the 
Cabinet  by  the  new  Constitution — lean  fare,  as  we  all 
know,  for  a  Coalition.  Neither  side  could  fit  in  its 
essential  men.  There  was  the  desperate  difficulty  of 
agreeing  as  to  the  Premiership.  There  were  the  claims 
of — well,  we  all  know  the  claims  that  press  or  count  on 
these  occasions — the  woe  and  grief  of  the  real  party 
man — the  anger  of  the  plain  man  who  has  taken 
his  political  quarrels  seriously.  If  England  does  not 
love  Coalitions,  certainly  South  Africa  loves  them  even 
less. 

Botha  had  to  recognise  that  the  thing  was  impos- 
sible. He  was  faced  with  the  revolt  of  his  own  follow- 
ing. Merriman  and  Sauer  at  the  Cape  had  just  won 
a  dearly-bought  political  triumph ;  and  they  could  not 
be  expected  to  throw  away  all  their  gains.  They  could 
not  so  easily  lay  aside  their  view  as  to  Jameson's  part 
in  the  calamity  and  suffering  that  had  befallen  their 
country.  The  Free  Staters  felt  likewise;  for  politics 
to  these  simple  men  were  grim  realities.  The  Trans- 
vaal Boers  stood  alone,  strangely  enough,  for  a  larger 
harmony.  They  had  had  enough  strife ;  and  Johannes- 
burg always  acted  as  a  meeting-place  of  both  parties. 

Botha  was  forced  to  abandon  the  halcyon  plan  of 
this  early  May.  Finding  it  impossible,  he  acted  with 
instant  decision  and  directness.  He  went  himself 
straight  to  Jameson  at  Groote  Schuur  and  told  him 
plainly     that    the  combination    of   which    they    had 


220  GENERAL   BOTHA 

dreamed  had  broken  down.  He  could  not  fulfil  the 
expectations  which  had  been  discussed.  Jameson 
generously  accepted  the  statement. 

Thus  Botha  was  compelled  to  draw  his  first  Cabi- 
net from  the  ranks  of  his  own  friends.  He  had  now 
combined  all  the  forward  political  organisations  of 
the  old  Colonies  into  one  big  group — the  South  Afri- 
can Party;  and  this  large  combination  enabled  him 
to  throw  his  net  very  wide.  His  great  desire  was  to 
secure  Mr.  Merriman,  the  Premier  of  the  Cape 
up  to  May  31,  as  Minister  of  Finance.  He 
left  no  stone  unturned  to  secure  this.  But  unhappily 
— perhaps  a  little  aggrieved  by  the  Imperial  preference 
shown  to  the  Transvaal  over  the  Cape — Mr.  Merriman 
found  himself  unable  to  accept  office  in  Botha's  Gov- 
ernment. Botha  managed,  however,  to  draw  the  Cape 
into  the  Ministry  by  making  Merriman's  old  friend,  Mr. 
Sauer,  Minister  of  Railways.  He  gave  the  Treasurer- 
ship  to  his  old  Transvaal  Treasurer,  Mr.  Hull. 
General  Smuts  became  Minister  of  the  Interior; 
General  Hertzog  became  Minister  of  Justice;  and  the 
veteran  Mr.  Abraham  Fischer,  up  to  May  31  Prime 
Minister  of  the  Orange  Colony — now  under  the  South 
Africa  Act  renamed  the  Orange  Free  State  Pro- 
vince— became  Minister  of  Land.  Natal  was  repre- 
sented at  first  by  Moor,  and  after  his  defeat  by  Mr. 
Leuchars.  Botha  himself  combined  the  portfolio  of 
Agriculture  with  the  Premiership.  Thus  he  succeeded 
in  constructing  an  Union  Cabinet  on  the  whole  tho- 
roughly representative  of  the  different  white  races  and 


THE   UNION   PREMIERSHIP  221 

opinions  of  South  Africa.  By  comprising  men  who 
had  been  in  arms  against  one  another  less  than  ten 
years  before/  the  new  Ministry  became  a  sign  and 
symbol  of  the  new  fraternity  of  the  new  South  Africa. 

Having  formed  his  Ministry,  Botha's  first  duty  was 
now  to  get  a  majority  for  it  at  the  General  Election 
of  September,  19 10.  During  the  following  months  he 
was  busy  speech-making  and  electioneering.  On 
June  14  he  issued  a  manifesto  to  the  country  and  fol- 
lowed it  up  with  many  speeches  in  various  parts  of  the 
country.  The  main  and  persistent  tenor  of  his  appeal 
was  that  now  they  should  all — Dutch  and  British — 
join  together  to  pull  South  Africa  straight.  They 
must  do  away  with  the  curse  of  racialism.  They  must 
form  a  new  South  African  nation.  It  was  not  alto- 
gether an  easy  appeal  to  stand  for.  He  was  exposed  to 
attacks  on  both  sides.  There  were  the  British  who 
had  not  laid  aside  the  bitterness  of  war.  There  were 
the  Boers  who  could  not  forgive  Botha  for  his  friend- 
ship with  the  author  of  the  Jameson  Raid.  Jameson 
himself  did  not  make  the  troubled  waters  smoother 
by  a  particularly  daring  and  unrepentant  defence  of 
the  Raid,  which  he  now  represented  as  an  attempt  to 
unite  the  Dutch  and  British  races  !  This  was  too  much 
for  Botha,  who  had  to  disavow  Jameson  and  all  hisworks. 

It  was  one  of  those  fences  at  which  the  best  poli- 
tical horses  spill ;  and  Botha  now  sustained  the  most 
disastrous  political  accident  of  his  career.     He  had 

^  Leuchars  on  the  British  side ;    Botha,  Smuts,  and  Hertzog 
on  the  Boer  side. 


222  GENERAL   BOTHA 

a  perfectly  safe  seat  at  Standerton;  and  the  circum- 
stances of  such  a  new  start  would  appear  to  most  ob- 
servers far  too  grave  for  adding  new  risks.  But  he 
was  persuaded  by  his  party  Whips  to  stand  against 
Sir  Percy  Fitzpatrick  in  East  Pretoria,  an  act  not 
altogether  harmonious  with  the  new  sentiment  of  union 
which  Botha  himself  had  favoured.  It  was  a  thrilling 
and  Homeric  contest  between  two  South  African 
giants,  conducted  with  infinite  personal  good  humour, 
but  inevitably  awakening  afresh  many  memories  of 
strifes  better  forgotten.  East  Pretoria  was  a  peculiarly 
difficult  seat  for  Botha  to  fight  at  that  moment. 
Government  servants  had  the  preponderating  vote, 
and  a  Prime  Minister  was  likely  to  draw  all  the 
fire.  He  was  beaten;^  and  two  other  Ministers  fell 
also — Mr.  Hull,  defeated  by  Sir  George  Farrar  on 
the  Rand;  and  Mr.  (now  Sir)  Frederic  Moor,  beaten 
by  Captain  Meyler  in  Natal. 

For  a  moment  Botha  reeled  under  the  blow,  and 
even  meditated  resignation.  But  as  the  returns  came 
in,  it  was  clear  that  his  party  had  secured  a  clear  work- 
ing majority.^    No  other  Ministry  was  possible;  and  so 

1  By  95  votes.     The  figures  were  : — 

Sir   Percy   Fitzpatrick  (W.)      1231 

Louis   Botha    (W.)  1136 

2  Of   13.     The  numbers  were: — 

South  African    Party  ...  ...  ...  67 

Unionists       ...          ...  ...  ...  ...  37 

Natal    Independents  ...  ...  ...  13 

Labour            ...          ...  ...  ...  ...  4 

121 


THE   UNION   PREMIERSHIP  223 

he  decided  that  it  was  his  duty  to  go  on.  He  found 
a  seat  at  Losberg,  and  took  his  place  in  the  new  Assem- 
bly as  Leader  and  Prime  Minister.  The  Senate  had 
been  wisely  and  carefully  selected  by  him — a  really 
"Best  Man"  chamber — earlier  in  the  year,  as  the 
Union  Act  provided. 

The  task  that  now  lay  before  Botha  was  not  easy 
or  simple.  He  was  called  to  the  highest  place  in  the 
government  of  a  country  inhabited  by  two  races  quite 
recently  divided  by  a  great  war.  He  had  to  combine 
in  his  administration  the  interests  of  four  Provinces 
notoriously  and  conspicuously  conflicting.  He  had 
to  maintain  the  ascendancy  of  the  enfranchised  white 
man  over  an  almost  unenfranchised  black  population 
more  than  three  times  as  numerous.  At  the  same 
time  he  had  to  see  that  that  great  black  population 
was  governed  with  justice  and  sympathy.  Last,  but 
not  least,  he  had  to  hold  the  balance  between  the 
claims  of  the  old  Boer  agricultural  population  and 
the  great  industries  of  the  Rand,  where  the  claims 
of  Labour  presented  a  problem  quite  new  to  South 
Africa. 


The  Natal  Independents  were  returned   largely  by  a   Dutch 
vote,  and  were  sympathetic  with  Botha. 
The  figures  by  Provinces  were : — 

Province.  Nat.     Unionists.     Inds.     Labour. 

Cape  ...         ...     29 

Transvaal  ...         ...     20 

Orange  Free  State     16 
Natal  I 


Unionists. 

Inds, 

21 

I 

12 

I 

4 

— 

12 

224  GENERAL   BOTHA 

In  a  word,  Botha  now  found  himself  the  ruler  of  a 
country  which  was  a  veritable  whirlpool  of  shifting 
racial  and  social  currents;  perhaps  the  most  puzzling 
country  to  govern  of  all  the  lands  of  this  distracting 
globe  yet  occupied  by  white  men.  Well  may  he  have 
taken  a  grave  view  of  the  responsibilities  that  lay 
ahead  of  him. 

On  November  4,  19 10,  the  new  Union  Parliament 
was  opened  by  the  Duke  of  Connaught  at  Cape  Town, 
amid  the  blaze  of  social  delights  in  which  that  beautiful 
town  knows  well  how  to  shine.  The  Royal  Duke  and 
Duchess  brought  to  South  Africa  a  message  of  hope 
and  good  will  from  King  George  V. 

It  was  now  necessary  for  Botha  to  move  from  his 
simple  home  at  Pretoria  into  Groote  Schuur,  the 
beautiful  country-house  outside  Cape  Town  left  by 
Cecil  Rhodes,  with  his  uncanny  gift  of  political  second 
sight,  in  perpetual  possession  to  the  Prime  Ministers 
of  United  South  Africa.  Botha's  entrance  into  this 
larger  home  was  typical  of  the  new  and  fuller  life 
which  now  lay  before  him  and  his  family. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  his  full  Premiership  was  the 
release  of  Dinizulu  from  the  imprisonment  to  which 
the  Natal  Government  had  condemned  him  after  the 
troubles  of  1907.  Botha  never  forgets  his  friends.  He 
now  remembered  those  days  of  golden  youth  when,  as 
a  young  pioneer,  he  had  gone  to  help  Dinizulu  against 
his  rebels,  and  had  received  at  his  hands  the  farm  that 
gave  him  his  first  start  in  life.  It  was  perhaps  at  some 
political  risk  that  Botha  now  took  Dinizulu  from  prison. 


THE  UNION  PREMIERSHIP  225 

gave  him  a  pension  and  placed  him  on  a  farm.^  But 
Botha  has  the  quality  rare  among-  rulers  of  always 
being  willing  to  take  risks  in  favour  of  mercy  and  cle- 
mency. All  through  his  career  and  ever  since — in 
the  release  of  his  blackmailer,  the  recall  of  the  de- 
ported men,  and  the  amnesty  to  De  Wet — he  has 
always  shown  towards  his  enemies  that  large  spirit  of 
forgiveness  and  oblivion  which  is,  after  all,  perhaps, 
a  surer  engine  of  peace  than  all  the  busy  mechanism  of 
hatred  and  revenge. 

The  first  session  (1910-11)  of  the  South  African 
Parliament  was  spent  in  putting  its  house  in  order. 
There  were  many  officers  to  be  appointed  and  many 
regulations  to  be  made.  Botha  wished  to  elect  Beyers 
Speaker  of  the  Assembly — a  wise  proposal — but  he 
was  beaten  in  the  party  caucus  meeting  by  Mr.  Merri- 
man  and  the  Cape  members,  who  perhaps  thought 
that  the  Transvaal  had  secured  enough.  So  the 
Speakership  was  given  to  Mr. — now  Sir  James — 
Molteno,  and  the  Presidency  of  the  Senate  to  Dr. 
F.  H.  Reitz.  It  was  decided  that  in  South  Africa, 
as  in  Canada,  the  proceedings  of  the  Parliament 
should  be  conducted  in  either  of  two  languages 
— a  decision  in  conformity  with  the  spirit  of  the  South 
Africa  Act,  which  had  already  extended  the  bilingual 
rule  very  far.^     The  same  spirit  has  run  through  all 

^  A  deputation  of  the  King's  wives  came  to  Botha  to  express 
their  thanks.  Mrs.  Botha  entertained  them  to  coffee  and  jam 
sandwiches. 

2  Clause  137. 

P 


226  GENERAL   BOTHA 

the  legislation,  and  has  governed  in  different  degrees 
the  Education  policy  of  the  Provinces.^ 

One  of  the  most  significant  incidents  of  the  session 
was  a  struggle  over  a  Land  Settlement  Bill,  during 
which  Hertzog  took  up  an  extreme  Afrikander  position, 
denouncing  British  immigration  as  a  trick  for  lowering 
wages,  and  boldly  atta(!king  the  capitalism  of  the  Rand 
as  anti-national  and  anti-patriotic.  It  was  a  straw  to 
show  the  way  of  the  wind. 

In  May,  191 1,  it  became  necessary  for  Botha  to  visit 
England  once  more  in  order  to  attend  the  quadrennial 
Imperial  Conference  of  the  Prime  Ministers  of  the 
Empire. 

This  was  his  third  visit  to  Great  Britain  since  self- 
government  had  been  given  to  the  Transvaal,  and 
Botha  has  thus  enjoyed  rare  opportunities  of  keeping 
in  touch  with  the  centre.  There  were,  of  course,  perils 
in  these  frequent  absences.  Our  Imperial  Conferences 
have  one  grave  drawback — the  danger  that  comes  to 
these  small  societies  from  the  withdrawal  of  local 
leadership.  We  have  seen  how  tares  could  be  sown  in 
the  wheat  while  the  owner  was  across  the  ocean;  and 
now  again  the  sowers  were  busy.  Never,  indeed,  did 
Botha  now,  any  more  than  in  1907  and  19 10,  forget  the 

1  Primary  education  has  been  left  for  the  present  to  the 
Provinces.  The  Transvaal  has  enacted  that  every  pupil  shall 
be  educated  in  his  or  her  home  language,  with  an  arrangement 
that  the  majority  in  a  class  shall  be  adopted.  (No.  5  of  191 1.) 
The  Orange  Free  State  had  passed  a  far  more  exacting  ordin- 
ance (No.  35  of  1908),  under  which  it  practically  becomes  neces- 
sary, on  demand,  for  every  teacher  to  teach  in  both  languages. 


THE   UNION  PREMIERSHIP  227 

rock  from  which  he  had  been  hewn.  Never,  at  the 
headiest  moments  of  applause  and  acclaim,  did  he  in  the 
central  gatherings  of  our  Imperial  Babylon  forget  the 
call  of  his  own  little  distant  farmer  people.  But,  despite 
all,  not  even  such  transparent  fidelity  could  save  him 
from  misunderstanding.  In  his  absence  the  impression 
was  sedulously  cultivated  by  tHe  extremists  in  South 
Africa  that  the  charmers  were  piping  him  away  from 
his  own  flock.  Such  seeds  were  destined  to  bear  dis- 
astrous fruit. 

He  was  still  a  sick  man;  and  he  was  glad  to  be  able 
to  re-visit  Kissingen,  an  old  haunt  of  his  which  always 
rested  and  refreshed  him.  The  labours  of  the  last 
few  years  had  told  on  his  strength;  and  he  had 
suffered  from  an  attack  of  ptomaine  poisoning. 

But  these  troubles  did  not  divert  him  from  his  great 
task  of  asserting  for  the  South  African  Union  her  full 
and  proper  place  in  the  Empire.  He  had  many  vital 
questions  to  discuss  and  decide — the  naval  defence 
of  South  Africa;  her  share  in  decisions  of  Foreign 
policy;  her  claim  to  be  consulted  in  African  matters. 
He  secured  on  this  visit  an  agreement  that  South 
Africa  should  be  consulted  in  regard  to  all  frontier 
matters  south  of  the  Equator;  and  she  has,  as  a  matter 
of  actual  fact,  been  so  consulted  since  191 1  in  regard 
to  Walflsch  Bay,  the  Portuguese  Colonies,  and  German 
South-West  Africa.  Thus  Botha  was  already  achiev- 
ing for  his  own  country  new  place  and  power  in  the 
councils  of  the  Empire.  He  was  staking  out  claims 
for  the  Continent  of  Africa. 


228  GENERAL   BOTHA 

On  the  other  hand,  he  was  then,  as  ever,  opposed  to 
the  passion  for  Imperial  centralisation  which  had 
found  so  much  favour  among  some  of  the  leaders  in 
Australasia,  and  especially  in  New  Zealand.  Sir 
Joseph  Ward,  the  Prime  Minister  of  that  Colony, 
moved  a  resolution  at  this  Conference  of  191 1  in 
favour  of  immediately  creating  an  Imperial  Council 
with  full  powers  of  control  over  the  Dominions.  Such 
a  change,  at  that  moment,  threatened  grave  injury  to 
Botha's  policy  in  South  Africa,  which  was  a  delicate 
equipoise  between  the  claims  of  race  and  Empire.  It 
was  necessary  for  him  at  once  to  speak  out  boldly 
for  the  older  and  saner  traditions  of  local  self-control ; 
and  he  did  so  in  a  speech  which  showed  that  this 
recruit  already  held  the  key  to  the  secrets  of  our 
Empire  as  firmly  and  soundly  as  any  veteran  : — 

"  It  is  the  policy  of  decentralisation  that  has 
made  the  Empire,  the  power  granted  to  the 
various  peoples  to  govern  themselves.  It  is  the 
liberty  which  these  peoples  have  enjoyed  and 
enjoy  under  the  British  flag  which  has  bound 
them  to  the  Mother  Country.  The  premature 
creation  of  such  an  Imperial  Council  would  tend 
to  make  the  connection  onerous  and  unpleasant 
to  the  Dominions.  Let  us  beware  of  such  a  result. 
Decentralisation  and  liberty  have  done  wonders. 
Let  us  be  very  careful  before  we  in  the  slightest 
manner  depart  from  that  policy.  It  is  co-opera- 
tion and  always  better  co-operation  that  we  want, 
and  that  is  what  we  must  always  strive  after."  ^ 

There  is  no  doubt  that    this    powerful    speech  of 
1  Minute  No.  559.     Conference  Blue  Book. 


THE   UNION   PREMIERSHIP  229 

Botha's,  supported  by  Mr.  Asquith  from  the  chair  in 
a  weighty  summing-up,  proved  fatal  to  this  proposal. 

Botha  was  now,  indeed,  walking  on  a  tight  rope 
between  the  extremes  of  Imperialism  and  Nationalism. 
It  happened  during  this  absence  of  his  in  England 
that  one  of  the  leading  newspapers  in  the  Transvaal, 
The  Volkste?n,  laid  down  the  doctrine  that  South  Africa 
need  not  take  part  in  an  Imperial  war.  This  would  not 
have  mattered  so  much  if  The  Volkstem  had  not 
maintained  that  Botha  agreed  with  this  view.  Botha 
hastened  to  issue  a  contradiction,  which  was  cabled 
from  England.  "  There  was  no  such  thing,"  he  wired, 
"  as  optional  neutrality."  When  he  reached  South 
Africa  he  took  the  occasion  to  speak  out  even  more 
clearly  on  this  vital  matter.  "  Should  the  unhappy 
day  ever  dawn,"  he  said,  "when  the  common  Father- 
land is  attacked,  Dutch  and  English  Afrikanders  will 
be  found  defending  the  Fatherland  to  the  very  last." 
A  notable  vow — which,  since  that  day,  Botha  and  his 
people  have  sealed  with  their  blood. 

During  this  stay  in  England  Botha  was,  in  191 1  as 
in  1907,  the  central  figure  among  the  Colonial 
Premiers.  The  romance  of  his  rise  to  power,  the 
memories  of  the  past,  and,  perhaps,  some  slight  and 
natural  British  complacency  at  the  winning  of  so 
great  a  friend,  made  him  always  the  popular  hero. 
He  was  feasted  at  the  Reform  Club,  and  dined  at 
Norfolk  House ;  he  was  given  degrees  by  the  great 
Universities  of  England  and  Scotland;  he  was  pre- 
sented with  the  "  freedom  "  of  Glasgow.     He  was  the 


230  GENERAL   BOTHA 

guest  of  great  English  nobles,  and  he  was  the  centre 
of  many  public  banquets. 

Take  one  of  these — the  luncheon  given  to  him  by 
the  Eighty  Club  at  the  Hotel  Cecil  on  May  27.  It 
was  the  sequel  to  a  historic  dinner  given  to  him  and 
his  fellow-Premiers  by  the  same  club  of  April  16, 
1907,  when  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  took  the 
chair.  On  that  occasion  Botha  had  solemnly  thanked 
Campbell-Bannerman  on  behalf  of  his  nation  for  the 
grant  of  self-government.  "  We  shall  prove  by  our 
acts,"  he  had  said,  "  that  we  are  worthy  of  the  con- 
fidence reposed  in  us."  Four  years  had  now  passed; 
Campbell-Bannerman  was  dead,  and  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  was  taking  his  place  in  the  chair.  Botha  was 
able  to  record  the  success  of  the  great  policy  which 
Campbell-Bannerman  had  initiated.  In  those  four 
years  tl.e  grant  of  self-government  to  the  Transvaal 
had  led  direct  to  the  Union  of  South  Africa — hitherto 
the  distant  dream  of  all  who  had  loved  that  land. 
Botha  was  able  to  bear  witness  that  he  now  received 
the  help  of  English  as  well  as  Dutch;  and  that  the 
leaders  of  the  two  races  were  now  combining  to  banish 
racialism  from  South  Africa.  He  now  spoke  with  the 
same  note  of  assurance.  "  We  only  ask  for  time," 
he  said,  "  and  to  be  left  alone ;  and  then  we  shall  show 
you  what  wonders  we  can  do  in  that  part  of  the  British 
Empire."  He  ended  on  a  note  of  affection  to  Great 
Britain.  "  There  is  only  one  message,"  he  said,  "  I 
have  to  bring  from  South  Africa,  and  that  is  the  offer 
of  the  hand  of  brotherhood,  friendship,  and  of  love 


THE  UNION  PREMIERSHIP  231 

of  our  people  towards  yours."  No  wonder  that  this 
straight  and  simple  speech  was  received  with  a  hurri- 
cane of  applause.^ 

While  he  was  in  London  this  time,  Botha  carried 
forward  another  scheme  of  organisation  on  which  his 
heart  was  set.  In  1907  a  conversation  had  taken  place 
between  Botha  and  Lord  Haldane  in  which  there  had 
been  outlined  a  general  scheme  of  defence  for  the 
Empire.  Lord  Haldane,  who  was  then  the  central 
brain  of  those  great  plans  of  defence  which  alone 
have  saved  the  Empire  in  the  great  war,  threw  himself 
cordially  into  Botha's  proposal ;  and  as  a  consequence 
Lord  Methuen  was  sent  out  to  South  Africa  in  the 
following  year  to  work  out  details  of  defence  with 
General  Botha  and  General  Smuts.  In  the  meantime, 
Lord  Haldane  had  drawn  all  the  other  Dominions 
into  the  scheme;  and  in  July,  1909,  when  Botha  had 
visited  London  to  discuss  the  details  of  the  South 
Africa  Act,  an  Imperial  Defence  Conference  was 
assembled  at  the  Foreign  Office.  At  this  Conference 
important  decisions  were  reached,  and  the  general 
groundwork  of  a  large  scheme  was  laid  down.  This 
enterprise  was  now  carried  forward  still  further  in  the 
Conference  of  191 1.  A  further  Imperial  Defence 
meeting  was  held  at  the  War  Office,  and  the  discus- 
sions led  up  to  the  framing  of  the  South  Africa 
Defence  Bill,  which  was  first  introduced  into  the  Union 
Assembly  during  this  year  and  was  passed  into  law 

1  See  the  reports  of  these  speeches  published  by  the  Eighty 
Club,  1907  and  igii. 


232  GENERAL   BOTHA 

in  19 1 2.  That  was  the  Act  which  supplied  Botha  with 
the  force  which  has  enabled  him  to  play  his  part  in 
the  Great  War.  To  such  large  issues  did  these  191 1 
talks  with  Lord  Haldane  lead. 

Botha  arrived  in  South  Africa  on  August  29.  His 
health  was  now  greatly  improved.  "  I  am  ready  to  be 
inspanned  again,"  he  said  cheerfully  to  his  friends. 
He  was  received  with  enthusiasm — lunched  by  the 
Bond  at  the  Cape — and  received  at  his  constituency 
(Losberg)  by  "  a  procession  of  carts  and  carriages  a 
mile  long."^ 

Imperial  honours  were  now  offered  to  him;  but  he 
refused  all  titles.  There  was  only  one  honour  which 
drew  him,  and  that  was  the  offer  of  an  Honorary 
Generalship  in  the  British  Army,  never  before  offered 
to  anyone  outside  the  sacred  circle  of  Royalty.  He 
accepted  this  new  position ;  and  on  the  whole  the  pro- 
motion was  popular  in  South  Africa. 

Botha  was  now,  in  1911-12,  coming  face  to  face 
with  those  grave  and  deep  problems  which  arise  in 
the  government  of  that  land  owing  to  the  differences 
of  colour  and  of  civilisation  among  the  human  beings 
who  inhabit  it. 

Over  all  these  problems  there  always  looms  the 
great  overshadowing  fact  that  in  British  South  Africa 
eight  out  of  every  ten  of  the  inhabitants  are  black.^ 

1  South  Africa. 

2  The  census  of  igii  showed  that  there  were  6,000,000  black 
and  1,300,000  white  inhabitants  south  of  the  Zambesi. 


THE   UNION  PREMIERSHIP  233 

Perhaps,  happily  for  South  Africa,  the  three  native 
territories — Bechuanaland,  Basutoland,  and  Swaziland 
— had  been  left  by  consent  outside  the  Union,  and  still 
remain  under  the  Imperial  Government.  But  Botha 
still  found  himself  within  the  Union,  with  a  population 
of  nearly  5,000,000  blacks  as  against  1,250,000  whites 
to  govern  and  administer.^ 

The  natives  in  South  Africa  vary  from  a  degree  of 
relatively  high  education  to  great  backwardness;  and 
it  is  indeed  difficult  to  apply  to  their  case  any  common 
policy.  Botha  has  always  been  a  follower  of  the  old 
Boer  "  fatherly"  policy  towards  the  black  races.  Per- 
haps for  that  very  reason  he  has  always  stood  for  jus- 
tice and  equity  in  white  dealings  with  the  blacks.  Of 
late  years  he  has  leant  towards  a  policy  of  segrega- 
tion, and  has  now  passed  an  Act  with  that  end  in  view. 
The  model  of  such  a  policy  is  to  be  found  in  Basuto- 
land and  in  the  Transkei.  In  those  countries  the  black 
man  can  enjoy  far  larger  rights  of  self-government, 
both  moral  and  legal,  precisely  because  he  is  alone  and 
apart  from  the  whites.  Such  segregation  has  obvious 
dangers ;  but  its  advantage  is  that  the  black  man  can 
enjoy  his  own  laws  and  customs,  and  his  own  land 
tenure.  He  can,  in  short,  possess  Home  Rule.  Is 
that  to  be  the  future  of  the  black  race  in  South 
Africa? 

There  are  still  in  South  Africa  deep  and  searching 
differences  of  opinion  on  this  question — grading  from 
those  who  hope  to  attain  equality  through  education 

1  Census  of   igii. 


234  GENERAL   BOTHA 

between  white  men  and  black  down  to  those  who  regard 
the  difference  of  colour  as  fundamental  and  unchange- 
able. The  men  of  the  Cape  lean  towards  equality; 
the  men  of  the  Transvaal  to  distinction.  But  the  ex- 
treme views  are  all  in  process  of  abatement;  and  be- 
fore the  end  agreement  may  be  reached.  It  is  clearly 
a  question  that  South  Africa  must  in  the  main  settle 
for  herself. 

She  has  always  before  her  the  sombre  spectacle  of 
the  southern  States  of  America,  where  the  too  pre- 
cipitate gift  of  the  franchise  to  the  blacks  has 
since  been  modified  by  the  shot-gun  and  the 
fiery  stake. 

There  was  another  problem  of  colour  facing  Botha 
— the  trouble  of  the  imported  Indian  coolie.  The 
tendency  of  the  white  man  in  South  Africa  to  rely 
upon  the  labour  of  other  races  for  their  comfort  and 
sustenance  does  not  stop  short  with  the  black  man. 
The  Natal  planters  and  coal-owners  have  not  found 
the  supply  of  black  labour  sufficient  for  their  needs; 
and  they  have  called  for  a  continuous  supply  of  in- 
dentured labour  from  India  and  the  Malay  States. 

This  human  flow  from  East  to  West  is  a  very  old 
story.  Anyone  who  glances  at  a  map  of  the  earth  will 
see  how  easily  accessible  to  Asia — and  especially  to 
India — is  the  east  coast  of  South  Africa.  Trade  has 
flourished  between  the  two  Continents  from  Biblical 
times  onward.  There  has  always  been  a  constant 
Portuguese  traffic  between  Goa  and  Delagoa;  and  the 
long  use  of  the  Cape  by  the  Dutch  and  British  as  a 


THE  UNION   PREMIERSHIP  235 

half-way  house  to  the  East  has  quickened  the  overflow 
westward  from  the  vast  human  reservoirs  of  the  seeth- 
ing East.  Hence  the  drift  of  Indian  traders  to  Natal, 
where  shop-keeping  as  well  as  labour  has  largely 
passed  out  of  the  hands  of  the  white  races.  These 
Indians  brought  their  families  and  came  in  increasing 
numbers.  The  Census  of  191 1  revealed  so  rapid  an 
increase  since  1901  that  they  now  largely  outnumbered 
the  white  inhabitants.  The  white  man  in  Natal  found 
himself  not  only  engulfed  in  a  multitude  of  black 
natives  but  in  danger  of  being  also  submerged  by 
Indian  immigrants.^ 

The  fears  of  the  white  man  had  already  led  to  a 
gradual  tightening  up  of  the  restrictions  and  disabili- 
ties for  the  Indians,  both  in  Natal  and  in  the  Trans- 
vaal. The  law  varied  greatly  in  all  the  Provinces ;  but 
there  were,  except  in  the  Cape,  many  humiliating  con- 
ditions of  life — the  finger-print  test,  inseparably  asso- 
ciated in  India  with  the  criminal  law;  ^  the  £3  licence, 
practically  a  poll-tax;  and,  in  the  Transvaal,  oppres- 
sive marriage  and  trade  restrictions.  The  Transvaal 
had  in  1907,  while  still  a  Colony,  passed  a  very  stiff 
law  to  keep  the  flood  of  Indians  from  penetrating 
beyond  Natal. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  things  in  South  Africa  as  a 
whole  when  the  Union  came  into  being.    It  now  (19 10) 

1  133,000  Indians  and  Asiatics  to  98,000  Europeans.  The 
natives  at  the  same  time  numbered  962,000. 

2  A  method  that  had  some  time  before  been  most  ingeniously 
applied  to  the  detection  of  criminals  in  India  by  Sir  Edward 
Henry,  who  has  since  adopted  it  at  Scotland  Yard. 


236  GENERAL   BOTHA 

became  necessary  to  unify  the  law  of  South  Africa. 
Gradually  out  of  this  necessity,  there  arose  a  very  deli- 
cate situation  between  different  parts  of  the  Empire. 
Natal  now  wished  to  obtain  the  coolies  without  their 
families;  but  the  Indian  Government  refused  to  give 
permission.  Public  opinion  in  South  Africa  was  dead 
against  the  "  open  door."  There  was  the  white  man's 
terror  of  being  swamped ;  and,  reinforcing  it,  the  black 
man's  jealousy  of  any  privilege  being  given  to  the 
Indian,  whom  the  haughty  Zulu  regarded  as  a  low-born 
alien.  The  general  feeling  was  in  favour  of  adopting 
the  Australian  Alien  Law,  which  applies  an  education 
test  to  all  immigrants.  But  for  the  moment  (191 1)  the 
Union  Parliament  had  no  leisure  to  legislate  on  this 
question.  A  temporary  arrangement  was  arrived  at 
between  Ghandi,  the  Indian  leader,  and  General 
Smuts,  who  conducted  most  of  these  negotiations.  It 
gave  some  relief  to  the  well-educated  Hindoo,  but  it 
left  the  grievance  of  the  respectable  Indian  trader 
untouched.^ 

The  quarrel  was  now  spreading  outside  South  Africa 
to  the  Empire  at  large.  India  took  up  the  case  of  the 
Indians  with  the  fervour  of  a  growing  nationalism; 
and  awkward  questions  began  to  be  asked  about  the 
realities  of  Imperial  citizenship.  The  Indian  Govern- 
ment and  Viceroy  took  up  the  cause  of  the  Indians  and 

1  The  well-educated  Indians  were  freed  from  the  necessity 
of  fingfer-prints.  Deported  Indians  were  allowed  to  return,  and 
Indians  who  had  refused  to  register  were  allowed  to  apply 
again. 


THE  UNION   PREMIERSHIP  237 

complained  loudly  to  the  Imperial  Government.  That 
Government — like  an  anxious,  flustered  mother, 
striving  for  peace  among  her  children — pleaded  pa- 
tiently with  both  sides  for  compromise. 

In  June,  19 13,  the  Union  Government  passed  an 
Act  which  brought  some  improvements  to  the  Indians, 
but  certainly  left  a  great  many  grievances  unsettled.^ 
The  disappointment  of  the  Indian  population  resulted 
in  a  great  passive  resistance  movement.  One  of  the 
provisions  of  the  law  was  that  every  Indian  should 
possess  a  licence  before  entering  the  Transvaal. 
Ghandi  determined  to  defy  that  provision.  He  put 
himself  at  the  head  of  a  dramatic  procession  of  2,500 
Indians  through  Laing's  Nek  into  the  Transvaal — a 
new  "  passive"  type  of  invasion.  The  Mayor  of  Volks- 
rust,  the  frontier  town  of  the  Transvaal,  happened  to 
be  a  very  stiff-lipped  Labour  leader,  who  instantly 
summoned  all  the  white  men  on  the  countryside  to 
meet  in  the  Market  Square  and  oppose  forcible  resist- 
ance to  the  Indians.  The  licences  were  demanded. 
None  of  the  Indians  possessed  them.  Ghandi  was 
thrown  into  prison,  and  the  movement  was  checked. 

Then  came  the  famous  Indian  "  strike"  in  Natal, 
which  for  the  moment  threatened  a  paralysis  of  trade 
and  industry.  There  were  riots  and  imprisonments; 
and  the  agitation,  fed  from  both  shores  of  the  Indian 
Ocean,  looked  grave  and  menacing.     The  Viceroy  of 

1  It  opened  the  door  a  little  wider,  but  enforced  an  education 
test,  excluded  undesirables,  deported  offenders,  and  prohibited 
farming,  trading,  and  land-holding  to  Asiatics  in  the  Free 
State. 


238  GENERAL  BOTHA 

India,  Lord  Hardinge,  who  had  always  taken  the  strong 
pro-Indian  view,  issued  his  famous  protest  on  behalf 
of  the  Indian  race — a  protest  which  was  received  by 
the  South  African  Ministry  with  some  resentment. 

But  Botha  and  his  Ministry  did  not  allow  themselves 
to  be  moved  by  any  passing  emotion  from  their  policy. 
Lord  Gladstone  steadily  strove  for  peace ;  and  Botha 
heartily  concurred.  While  steadily  asserting  the  law 
against  the  violence  of  the  Indian  agitators,  Botha  wel- 
comed any  suggestion  towards  the  restoration  of  har- 
mony. He  accepted  Lord  Gladstone's  suggestion  of  a 
Commission,  and  readily  agreed  that  a  high  Indian 
officiaP  should  sit  side  by  side  with  eminent  South 
Africans  in  order  to  find  a  way  out.  There  could  not 
have  been  a  better  proposal  for  soothing  angry  feelings 
on  both  sides;  and  gradually  through  1913-14  there 
was  a  movement  towards  settlement,  splendidly  helped 
by  the  labours  of  General  Smuts. 

Botha  persuaded  Natal  to  accept  the  findings  of  the 
Commission,  and  in  July,  19 14,  the  Union  Government 
passed  through  Parliament  a  measure  of  appeasement, 
long  after  other  and  graver  troubles  had  thrown  the 
Indian  difficulty  into  the  shade.  Many  concessions 
were  made  in  this  Act,  and  the  hateful  licence  was 
abolished.  Ghandi  accepted  it  as  a  "  Magna  Charta 
of  Indian  liberty  in  South  Africa";  and  so  for  the 
time  one  very  grievous  and  threatening  peril  was 
averted.    Working  together,  Botha,  Smuts,  and  Glad- 

'   Sir  Benjamin  Robertson,  Chief  Commissioner  of  the  Central 
Provinces,   who  did  very  g"ood  work. 


THE  UNION  PREMIERSHIP  239 

stone  had  gone  a  long  way  to  settle  one  of  the  great 
race  troubles  of  South  Africa. 

Once  more  Botha  had  displayed  himself  as  a  great 
"  smoother" — one  who  throws  oil  on  troubled  waters. 
But  long  before  the  Indian  problem  had  reached  its 
crisis,  he  was  faced  by  other  dangers  far  more  acute 
and  perilous,  applying  searching  tests  to  the  very 
existence  of  the  South  African  Union. 


CHAPTER  XII 
THE    HERTZOG    SPLIT    (1912) 


CHAPTER    XII 

THE    HERTZOG    SPLIT  (1912) 

"  Fame,  if  not  double-faced,  is  double-mouthed, 
And  with  contrary  blast  proclaims  most  deeds; 
On  both  his  wings,  one  black,  the  other  white, 
Bears  greatest  names  in  his  wild  aery  flight." 

— John  Milton. 

It  is  with  societies  as  with  individuals.  Grievous 
wounds  sometimes  seem  to  be  healed  for  ever;  the 
skin  has  grown  over  them  and  the  torn  tissues  have 
joined  together;  there  are  moments  when,  in  the  flush 
of  health  and  strength,  the  very  fact  of  the  wound  is 
forgotten.  But  then  come  other  moments,  perhaps  of 
strain  and  pressure,  when  the  whole  agony  seems  to 
come  back.  The  skin  breaks  and  the  tissues  crack. 
The  blood  flows.  The  old  wound  has  reasserted  its 
power. 

So  it  has  been  in  South  Africa  with  the  deep 
wound  inflicted  by  the  South  African  War.  In  the 
first  flush  of  enthusiasm  over  the  Union  the  effects 
of  the  hurt  seemed  to  be  disappearing.  Perhaps  in 
those  years  before  the  actual  achievement  of  Union 
(1909-10)  the  smart  was  at  its  lowest  power.  The 
agony  of  racial  hatred  seemed  to  be  passing  away. 
It  was  Lord  Selborne's  impression  at  that  time  that 

^43  Q    2 


244  GENERAL   BOTHA 

the  process  of  cure  was  going  on  rapidly.  The  women 
were  the  least  placable.  The  ache  for  the  lost  chil- 
dren still  lived  on ;  even  in  those  brighter  days  Rachel 
refused  to  be  comforted. 

But  with  the  General  Election  of  19 lo  the  whole 
wound  began  to  be  galled  afresh.  The  Opposition 
conducted  the  struggle  with  that  intense  party  bitter- 
ness which  is  the  temptation  of  every  electioneering 
strategist,  but  is  full  of  peril  to  a  country  like  South 
Africa.  Botha  was  between  two  fires.  He  was  trying 
hard  to  appease  the  extremists  of  his  own  party.  But 
the  attack  of  the  "  Unionists  "  ^  on  Hertzog  made  this 
very  difficult  for  him.  Hertzog,  a  combative  man, 
returned  shot  for  shot;  and  both  feeling  and  speech 
grew  steadily  more  acute. 

This  revival  of  extreme  Dutch  feeling  was  fomented 
by  certain  religious  feelings  of  the  older  Boers, 
supported  by  their  Church  and  expressed  in  many 
villages  by  the  Predikants.  Some  Dutch  Reformed 
Churches  were  the  rallying  centres  of  an  intense  con- 
servatism, which  resented  reforms  of  the  new  order 
as  almost  profane  and  sacrilegious  interferences  with 
the  ordered  life  of  a  Chosen  People.  All  this  feeling 
was  reinforced  by  the  discontent  of  a  class  that  was 
an  especial  product  of  the  war,  the  "  Poor  Whites," 
many  of  whom  were  Dutch. 

1  The  name  adopted  by  the  South  African  Opposition,  but 
with  no  reference  to  Irish  Home  Rule  and  no  identification  with 
the  British  party  of  that  name. 


THE   HERTZOG   SPLIT  245 

The  first  hint  of  trouble  had  come  to  Botha  over 
the  Land  Settlement  controversy  of  191 1,  when 
General  Hertzog  had  so  violently  opposed  the  idea 
of  South  African  help  to  British  immigrants.  On  that 
quarrel  Botha  achieved  a  compromise.  But  the  embers 
that  then  only  glowed  broke  out  into  living  flame  a 
few  months  later.  The  incidental  cause  of  strife  arose 
from  the  proposal  to  enlarge  the  contribution  of  South 
Africa  towards  the  Imperial  Navy. 

The  total  contribution  of  South  Africa  to  the 
Imperial  Navy  is  ^85,000  a  year,  which  is  higher 
than  the  contribution  of  Canada,  but  lower  than  that 
of  Australia  and  New  Zealand.  A  substantial  increase 
was  proposed  in  1912  by  the  "Unionist"  opposition, 
led  by  Sir  Thomas  Smartt,  the  successor  to  Sir  Starr 
Jameson,  who  had  retired  from  ill-health.  Botha  was 
inclined  to  agree  that  South  Africa  ought  to  do  more 
for  her  defence  from  the  sea.  But  South  Africa  was 
at  that  moment  taking  upon  itself  the  burden  of  local 
defence  in  the  shape  of  the  new  Defence  Act,  which 
laid  upon  South  Africans  the  ultimate  duty  of  com- 
pulsory service  for  the  defence  of  their  own  country.^ 
By  that  great  measure.  South  Africa  was  taking  on 
herself  a  new  burden  of  ;(J5oo,ooo  a  year.  The  Land 
Settlement  Act  would  cost  £1,000,000  a  year  for  five 
years.     The   Union   finance   had  not  yet  reached   a 

1  Enacting  compulsion  for  South  African  defence  as  a  last 
resort  in  case  of  volunteers  proving  insufficient,  and  extending 
it  in  case  of  war  to  all  between  17  and  60. 


246  GENERAL   BOTHA 

stable  equilibrium,  and  the  year  before  the  war  showed 
a  deficit  of  over  £300,000.  It  was  reasonable,  there- 
fore, that  Botha  should  plead  for  delay  in  facing  a 
great  new  obligation.  Smartt,  however,  pressed  his 
motion  and  was  defeated  by  56  votes  to  35.^ 

In  the  course  of  these  discussions  Botha  laid 
down  his  own  naval  policy  for  South  Africa,  which 
was  that  the  Union  should  build  a  Navy  for  its  own 
protection — a  plan  already  put  forward  by  Sir  Wilfrid 
Laurier  for  Canada,  and  actually  adopted  by  Australia 
with  vital  results  in  the  great  war.  It  was  this  pro- 
posal which  instantly  awoke  the  violent  hostility  of 
General  Hertzog,  at  that  time  still  a  member  of 
Botha's  Cabinet.  Hertzog  scented  Jingoism,  or  at  the 
least.  Imperialism.  South  Africa  was  to  be  sacrificed 
to  the  Empire.  While  still  within  the  Cabinet,  he 
began  to  speak  openly  and  defiantly.  "  Imperialism," 
he  said  at  Rustenburg  on  December  8,  "  is  only  im- 
portant to  me  when  it  is  useful  to  South  Africa."  He 
attributed  the  movement  for  a  bigger  Navy  to  the 
capitalists  of  the  Rand.  He  refused  to  be  drawn  into 
the  intrigue.  Then  speaking  more  openly  a  few  days 
later  he  openly  laid  down  as  his  ideal  for  South  Africa 
the  now  famous  "  two-stream  "  policy — "  Two  nation- 
alities each  flowing  in  a  separate  channel." 

These     speeches     of    General    Hertzog    instantly 

brought  about  that  kind  of  inner  political  disturbance 

known    as    a    Cabinet   crisis.      They  destroyed   that 

delicate  balance  of   South  African  forces  which  had 

1  On  March  26,  1912. 


THE   HERTZOG   SPLIT  247 

been  created  by  General  Botha.  The  first  sign  of  the 
crisis  came  from  Natal.  Colonel  Leuchars,  a  soldier 
who  had  succeeded  Sir  Frederick  Moor  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  Natal  in  the  Cabinet,  demanded  a  with- 
drawal of  the  opinion  expressed  by  General  Hertzog. 
General  Hertzog  refused  to  withdraw,  and  Colonel 
Leuchars  resigned.  It  was  clear  that  General  Botha's 
Cabinet  was  in  danger.  The  Unionist  policy  of 
driving  a  wedge  between  the  parties  seemed  to  be 
succeeding. 

Following  ordinary  precedents,  Botha  would  have 
got  rid  of  both  Leuchars  and  Hertzog.  But  he  could 
not  follow  any  precedents.  Hertzog's  violent  speeches, 
the  inflamed  result  of  bitter  "  Unionist "  attacks, 
had  created  a  new  peril  to  South  Africa.  If  Hertzog 
were  to  continue  this  policy  it  was  clear  that  Botha 
could  not  any  longer  hold  the  balance.  The  fact  of 
Hertzog's  remaining  in  the  Cabinet  would  be  a  new 
challenge  to  British  power  in  South  Africa — a  reversal 
of  the  Treaty  of  1902.  It  was  necessary,  therefore, 
that  he  should  either  consent  to  obey  Botha,  or  leave 
the  Cabinet. 

But  Hertzog  had  already  been  goaded  by  attack 
and  abuse  to  the  point  of  implacability;  and  the 
responsibility  for  what  followed  must  be  shared  by 
those  whose  attacks  had  so  seriously  hampered  and 
hindered  Botha's  task  of  pacification. 

Botha  asked  Hertzog  to  modify  his  speeches. 
Hertzog  replied,  like  Pilate,  with  a  question.  All  he 
had  said   was  that   South   Africa  should  come   first : 


248  GENERAL  BOTHA 

did  Botha  deny  that?  Botha  answered,  "No."  But 
Botha  insisted  that  the  discipline  of  the  Cabinet  was 
at  stake.  "  The  Government,"  he  said,  "  must  speak 
with  one  voice."  So  he  demanded  that  Hertzog  should 
write  a  letter  promising  not  to  speak  on  such  matters 
again  without  the  consent  of  the  Prime  Minister.  Hert- 
zog refused.  Botha  asked  him  to  resign.  Hertzog 
again  refused.  Botha  then  resigned  himself.  Lord 
Gladstone  accepted  his  resignation,  but,  as  he  was  the 
only  possible  Premier,  asked  him  to  form  a  new 
Cabinet.  Botha  then  reconstructed  his  Ministry  with 
the  omission  of  Hertzog.  Thus  by  this  roundabout 
method  Hertzog  was  expelled  from  the  Cabinet. 

Crises  of  this  nature  do  not  end  with  expulsions. 
Expulsion,  indeed,  was  perhaps  not  altogether  a  mis- 
fortune for  General  Hertzog.  It  gave  him  martyr- 
dom, and  martyrdom  was  the  best  seed-ground  for  a 
new  party  if  he  wished  to  form  one.  For  that  was  the 
point  which  had  now  been  reached  between  the  old 
Boer  school  and  the  new — the  Hertzogites  and  the 
Bothaites. 

Those  who  have  lived  through  crises  of  this  nature 
know  that  many  causes  go  to  produce  them — causes 
that  are  personal  and  causes  that  are  political.  In 
such  cases,  these  threads  often  become  ravelled  beyond 
all  power  of  disentanglement.  Points  of  principle 
become  interwoven  with  the  quarrels  of  persons;  and 
it  is  often  impossible  to  see  where  the  principle  begins 
and  the  personal  issue  ends.  Thus  even  if  we  per- 
ceive in  Hertzog's  conduct  some  element  of  personal 


THE  HERTZOG   SPLIT  249 

rivalry,  yet  it  is  fair  and  just  to  admit  that  the  differ- 
ence which  now  came  to  light  had  its  origins  far  back. 
There  have  been  phases  of  both  sweet  and  bitter  in 
the  relations,  between  the  Free  State  and  the  Trans- 
vaal. The  Free  State  had  in  the  old  days  prided 
itself  on  its  model  administration  at  the  time  when  the 
reputation  of  the  Transvaal  was  being  tarnished  by 
rumour.  Kruger  had  early  drawn  the  Free  State  into 
a  defensive  alliance ;  and  when  it  came  to  the  moment 
of  trial  the  Free  State  had  been  true — even  to  its  own 
hurt.  During  the  war  the  Free  Staters  had  fought 
fully  as  fiercely  as  the  Transvaalers ;  and  when  it  came 
to  the  question  of  peace,  the  Free  Staters  had  been 
for  holding  out  when  the  Transvaalers  had  been  for 
terms.  We  have  seen  how  reluctantly  in  the  last  agony 
of  the  peace  controversy  the  Free  Staters  had  accepted 
the  unwilling  advice  of  General  De  Wet,  Since  the 
peace  the  Free  Staters  had  been  slower  to  accept 
the  new  situation,  less  contented,  less  resigned,  less 
conciliatory  in  regard  to  the  schools  and  the  Civil 
Servants,  less  inclined  to  forget  and  forgive. 

Not  having  any  mines  to  tax,  the  Free  State  had 
recovered  far  more  slowly  than  the  Transvaal  from 
the  devastation  of  the  war.  Perhaps  the  selection  of 
Botha  as  Premier  of  South  Africa  had  awakened  some 
twinge  of  the  jealousies  that  divided  the  Boers  in  the 
old  days.  Perhaps  the  easy  recovery  of  the  Trans- 
vaal from  its  misfortunes  touched  some  chord  of 
envy. 

Events  had  served   to   feed  the  fire  of   these  dis- 


250  GENERAL  BOTHA 

contents.  Botha's  frequent  visits  to  England;  his 
frank  acceptance  of  partnership  in  the  British  Empire ; 
his  friendship  with  Jameson — all  these  things  had 
quickened  among  the  Free  Staters  suspicion  and  ill- 
feeling.  His  progressive  agriculturalism  was  little  to 
their  taste.  Now  that  they  found  that  he  had  accepted 
the  idea  of  a  South  African  naval  policy,  the  limit 
of  endurance  seemed  to  them  passed.  Here  was  an 
inland  people,  so  utterly  cut  off  from  the  sea  that  many 
of  them  had  never  set  eyes  on  its  blue  surface  :  a 
people  that  still  regarded  sea-power  as  the  enemy  of 
all  their  hopes.  The  proposal  that  they  should  con- 
tribute from  their  narrow  resources  to  this  alien  thing 
brought  all  their  grievances  to  a  head.  At  this  moment 
they  found  a  leader  in  General  Hertzog.  Thus  it 
was  that  at  a  critical  point  in  Botha's  work  of  recon- 
ciliation the  twist  and  turn  of  politics  suddenly  crys- 
tallised all  the  vague,  wavering  remnants  of  the  old 
Boer  feeling,  and  produced  the  hard  fact  of  a  formid- 
able National  party. 

For  a  time  the  revolt  was  kept  under  by  other  and 
graver  troubles — the  strikes  at  Johannesburg.  But 
the  whole  issue  came  to  a  head  in  19 13  at  the  Annual 
Congress  of  the  South  African  Party  in  November. 
At  this  Congress  General  Hertzog  and  his  followers 
determined  to  challenge  the  position  of  General  Botha. 

This  was  the  third  Annual  Congress  of  the  South 
African  Party.  It  assembled  in  the  very  heart  of 
Cape  Town,  in  the  Hofmeyr  Hall,  next  to  the  great 
Metropolitan  church  of  the   Dutch   Reformed  Com- 


THE   HERTZOG   SPLIT  251 

munion.  There  was  a  very  full  attendance  of  the 
party  from  all  over  South  Africa,  and  from  the  begin- 
ning the  diligent  scrutiny  of  the  delegates'  credentials 
showed  how  tight  the  tension  had  become.  Both  the 
Transvaal  and  the  Free  State  delegates  were  in  full 
force,  each  intent  on  backing  their  own  champion — 
the  Transvaalers  practically  unanimous  for  Botha  and 
the  Free  Staters  for  General  Hertzog.  The  delegates 
from  the  Dutch  farming  districts  in  the,  north  of  Natal 
were  known  to  be  divided.  The  issue  rested  with  the 
representatives  of  the  Dutch  in  the  Cape  Province, 
who  provided  by  far  the  largest  delegation  in  the 
South  African  Party  meeting.  No  one  knew  how  they 
would  vote. 

The  leaders  of  both  sides  were  conspicuous  on  the 
platform  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  Chairman. 
Prayers  were  uttered ;  letters  and  telegrams  were  read 
from  the  back  veldt,  often  referring  the  Congress, 
after  the  old  Boer  fashion,  to  texts  in  the  Bible  as 
guides  to  judgment;  and  then  the  grim  secular  fight 
began. 

It  was  opened  by  General  De  Wet.  He  stepped 
in  front  of  the  platform,  a  grim  figure  of  resistance, 
and  proposed  a  motion  which  was  practically  a  vote 
of  censure  on  General  Botha.  The  Government  was 
to  be  asked  to  resign;  President  Steyn  was  to  be 
invited  to  become  leader  of  the  party  outside  Parlia- 
ment; and  Steyn  was  to  be  asked  as  his  first  duty  to 
nominate  a  Prime  Minister  acceptable  to  both  wings 
of  the  party. 


252  GENERAL   BOTHA 

Faced  with  this  instant  challenge,  Botha  met  it 
without  flinching.  He  told  the  Congress  clearly  and 
frankly  that  he  stood  for  the  unity  of  South  Africa 
— unity  and  conciliation  between  the  British  and 
Dutch  races.  General  Hertzog's  speeches  had  en- 
dangered that  unity.  Botha  had  felt  compelled  to 
make  plain  the  issue  between  them.  He  defended 
Hertzog's  expulsion  from  the  Cabinet ;  but  denied  that 
there  was  any  personal  feeling  against  him.  Then  he 
dwelt  on  the  effects  of  the  resolution.  If  it  were 
carried,  the  Government  would  have  to  resign.  But  he 
was  not  content  with  this  negative.  He  went  on  to 
make  an  offer.  If  General  Hertzog  would  agree,  they 
should  appear  together  before  a  Commission  of  seven 
members  of  the  party,  with  the  object  of  finding  a  way 
out  from  their  unhappy  differences.  In  other  words, 
Botha  offered  to  accept  arbitration;  and  the  offer  was 
in  tune  with  the  mood  of  the  meeting.  The  rank  and 
file  now  began  shouting  for  Hertzog,  clearly  hoping 
that  the  Free  State  leader  would  accept  the  olive 
branch  held  out  to  him  by  General  Botha. 

When  Hertzog  stepped  forward  the  contrast 
between  the  men  became  vivid.  Botha,  soldier  and 
statesman,  strong,  thick-set,  well-built,  had  faced  the 
audience  with  a  frank,  determined  gaze,  speaking 
simply,  plainly,  and  clearly.  There  now  advanced  to 
the  edge  of  the  platform  a  man  in  every  way  con- 
trasted to  Botha — a  thin,  eager,  nervous  man — fluent 
and  clever,  but  with  little  of  Botha's  weight  and 
solidity  of  character.     Hertzog's  speech  was  one  long 


THE    HERTZOG    SPLIT  253 

outpouring  of  grey  complaint;  and  as  it  went  on  it 
became  clear  that  Hertzog  had  made  up  his  mind  to 
a  definite  parting  of  the  ways.  On  personal  grounds 
he  would  be  willing  to  give  Botha  his  hand  (cries  of 
"  Do  it  now ! "),  but  on  political  grounds  he  must 
withdraw  it.  (No  movement  of  the  hand.)  His  case 
against  Botha  was  that  he  was  too  kind  to  the  Unionist 
opposition — that  he  was  playing  up  to  the  spirit  of 
Imperialism — that  he  had  been  captured  by  the  forces 
at  the  centre  of  the  Empire.  There  was  a  subtle 
appeal  to  the  old  Boer  independence,  with  a  refrain 
of  memories  from  all  the  tragedy  and  bitterness  of  the 
South  African  War. 

For  several  days  this  great  struggle  went  on ;  and 
Botha,  never  leaving  his  place,  listened  unmoved  to 
all  the  speeches.  The  division  between  the  Free 
Staters  and  the  Transvaalers  gradually  widened;  and 
there  were  even  to  be  heard  in  the  lobbies  and  corridors 
eager  arguments  as  to  whether  the  Free  State  or  the 
Transvaalers  had  made  the  greater  sacrifice  during 
the  war.  For  the  first  time  the  whisper  was  heard — 
that  whisper  which  became  a  shout  in  the  subsequent 
rebellion — that  the  Treaty  of  Vereeniging  had  no 
binding  power  because  it  had  been  imposed  by  force. 

But  meanwhile  the  Cape  Dutch  delegates  sat  listen- 
ing, taking  little  part  in  the  debate,  but  slowly  swinging 
in  opinion  towards  Botha,  with  his  broader  outlook 
and  that  constant  appeal  of  his  to  the  spirit  of  pledged 
constancy  which  is  after  all  the  deepest  and  strongest 
instinct  of  the  Dutch  race. 


254  GENERAL   BOTHA 

As  General  Botha  moved  about  Cape  Town  in  the 
intervals  of  the  sittings,  there  were  many  signs  that 
he  was  winning  his  way  with  the  South  African  people 
outside  his  own  Province.  The  Cape  shop-keepers 
and  the  Cape  farmers  openly  avowed  themselves  more 
sympathetic  to  him  than  to  the  leaders  of  the  old  South 
African  Unionist  party — a  party  that  had  not  been  able 
to  resist  the  tendency  to  alliance  with  those  two  un- 
popular forces,  the  Rand  capitalists  and  the  Natal 
planters.  There  were  even  signs  of  secession  from  the 
Unionist  party  itself  at  the  Cape  as  they  watched  day 
by  day  the  struggle  between  Botha  and  the  extreme 
Nationalists.  Many  began  to  talk  of  leaving  their  own 
party  and  joining  Botha.  Perceiving  this,  Botha's  ad- 
visers decided  to  select  a  Cape  delegate  to  wind  up  the 
debate  on  Botha's  behalf.  They  chose  Mr.  Burton,  the 
Minister  of  Railways.  He  opened  with  a  reference  to 
a  revered  memory,  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman, 
whose  name  as  the  founder  of  the  New  South  African 
liberties  was  received  with  a  remarkable  outburst  of 
enthusiasm  from  all  sections.  Botha's  duty  to  South 
Africa,  said  Burton,  was  to  make  an  end  of  racialism; 
and  General  Hertzog's  charge  of  Imperialism  was  a 
red  herring  drawn  across  the  track  of  conciliation. 
Burton  then  told  the  meeting  plainly  that  the  exclusion 
of  General  Hertzog  from  the  Cabinet  was  the  act,  not  of 
General  Botha  personally,  but  of  the  whole  Cabinet, 
which  was  united  in  opposition  to  General  Hertzog's 
"  two-stream  "  policy.  No  one  in  the  Cabinet,  he  de- 
clared, had  been  more  determined  to  get  rid  of  General 


THE  HERTZOG   SPLIT  255 

Hertzog  than  the  late  Mr.  Sauer,  who  was  known 
in  the  Cape  Colony  to  be  an  uncompromising 
friend  of  the  Boers,  and  quite  above  all  suspicion  of 
Imperialism.  No  fact  could  have  brought  more 
vividly  home  to  the  Cape  Dutch  the  true  meaning  of 
the  situation,  or  made  them  realise  more  sincerely  the 
reasonableness  and  necessity  of  Botha's  conciliation 
policy. 

Botha's  proposal  for  a  Commission  was  carried;  but 
Hertzog  refused  to  appear  before  it,  so  that  it  was 
unable  to  suggest  a  solution.  Debate  had  gone  on 
long  enough,  perhaps  too  long.  A  motion  was  made 
that  the  Government  should  proceed  with  the  busi- 
ness of  administration — practically  equivalent  to 
what  ,is  known  in  England  as  "  the  previous 
question."  It  was  a  critical  moment.  Every  dele- 
gate gave  his  vote  separately;  for  it  was  realised 
that  these  votes  were  momentous  to  the  future  of  South 
Africa.  It  was  the  parting  of  the  ways  for  many.  As 
the  votes  proceeded,  the  issue  hung  in  the  balance; 
there  would  be  no  great  majority  for  either  party. 
Then  the  Botha  party  forged  ahead  and  finally  won 
by  131  to  90. 

The  declaration  of  the  result  was  followed  by  a 
remarkable  and  dramatic  scene.  The  followers  of 
General  Hertzog  all  stood  up,  hesitating  as  to  whether 
they  should  leave  the  Congress  or  not.  The  issue  was 
vital;  they  had  defied  the  Botha  leadership  and  it 
seemed  difficult  for  them  to  remain  sitting  under  it. 
General  De  Wet  decided  the  matter  for  them.     Push- 


256  GENERAL   BOTHA 

ing  his  way  to  the  back  of  the  hall  he  turned  and  waved 
his  hand  to  the  chairman,  shouting,  "  Adieu  !    Adieu  !  " 

Then  his  followers  rose  in  a  body  and  left  the  hall 
in  silence.  Out  of  the  90  who  voted  against  Botha, 
50  belonged  to  the  Free  State ;  and  thus  it  was  clear 
that  the  situation  amounted  to  a  secession  of  that  pro- 
vince from  the  Botha  party.  There  was  a  pause  of 
silence  when  the  Free  Staters  left  the  room. 

General  Botha  then  stepped  into  the  breach.  He 
rose  and  asked  the  chairman  to  call  on  the  next  busi- 
ness, the  election  of  the  party  committee.  It  was  a 
bold  move  for  the  undoing  of  the  Hertzog  party; 
and  it  split  them  in  twain.  Many  of  those  who  had 
voted  with  General  Hertzog  were  not  now  prepared  to 
leave  the  party;  and  those  who  had  remained  in  the 
hall  called  for  an  adjournment  until  they  could  con- 
sult with  their  friends.  Botha  conceded  the  adjourn- 
ment and  many  of  the  opposition  came  back  at  the  ad- 
journed meeting.  But  General  Hertzog  and  his 
friends  never  entered  the  Congress  again;  and  from 
that  moment  forward  he  and  General  De  Wet  began 
to  form  the  nucleus  of  that  formidable  new  party 
which  has  been  the  political  shadow  of  so  many  grave 
events. 

At  the  adjourned  meeting,  Botha  very  characteris- 
tically swung  back  to  conciliation.  He  was  far  too  big 
a  man  to  regard  lightly  the  prospect  of  a  split  in  his 
party.  He  was  again  all  for  peace.  Even  at  the 
eleventh  hour  he  tried  to  preserve  unity.  He  went  so 
far  as  to  support  the  nomination  of  both  General  Hert- 


THE   HERTZOG   SPLIT  257 

zog  and  General  De  Wet  as  members  of  the  Execu- 
tive Committee  of  the  party.  Then  he  threw  open  the 
Congress  for  delegates  to  question  him  on  all  points 
of  his  policy  as  Prime  Minister,  even  down  to  the 
minutest  detail.  For  hours  he  sat  answering  questions 
of  every  kind — urban,  agricultural,  social,  economic — 
all  the  details  of  South  African  housekeeping — 
patiently  and  good  humouredly  playing  the  part  of  the 
servant  of  the  nation.  This  prolonged  catechism  he 
faced  without  flinching — promising,  explaining,  assent- 
ing, consenting,  and,  hardest  of  all,  when  necessary, 
refusing. 

The  result  was  that  some  of  the  Hertzogites  began 
to  return  to  the  discussions.  They  were  humanly 
anxious  to  hear  Botha's  replies.  They  were  subdued 
by  his  untiring  placability.  So  he  gradually  began 
to  detach  members  from  the  new  party,  and  to  diminish 
the  importance  of  the  split. 

Never  did  Botha  make  a  more  masterly  display  of 
his  parliamentary  powers  than  in  this  great  effort  to 
save  his  party.  It  was  not  a  moment  for  standing  on 
pride  or  dignity.  He  was  truly  battling  for  the  soul 
of  a  nation.  With  our  knowledge  of  subsequent  events 
we  can  now  realise  that  on  those  African  summer  days 
in  Cape  Town  Botha  was  fighting  to  save  South  Africa. 
He  already  must  have  seen  the  infinite  peril  of  this 
new  movement.  He  must  have  already  realised  that 
its  only  logical  conclusion  was  the  rebellion  which  it 
actually  produced. 

But  it  was  a  moment  for  patience.     The  curse  of 

R 


258  GENERAL   BOTHA 

South  Africa  up  to  that  time  had  been  precisely  the 
impatience  of  its  rulers.  Hence  a  certain  readiness 
to  appeal  to  force  and  to  rely  upon  force  had  become 
the  ingrained  political  habit  of  the  South  African, 
whether  Dutch  or  English.  Perhaps  it  was  a  tradition 
handed  down  from  slave-owning  days.  But  it  was 
necessary  for  Botha  to  cure  it  if  he  was  to  have  a 
chance  for  his  policy. 

So  Botha  stood  during  those  days,  like  Aaron,  be- 
tween the  living  and  the  dead — the  living  hopes  and 
dead  memories — between  the  war  that  had  been  and 
the  peace  that  was  to  be. 

There  were  extreme  men  on  both  sides  who  looked 
at  the  peace  merely  as  a  truce,  and  were  ready  to  fly 
asfain  at  one  another's  throats.  It  was  Botha's  oreat- 
ness  that  he  saw  in  that  policy  the  seeds  of  ruin  for 
South  Africa. 

But  it  was  useless  to  be  angry.  Botha's  duty  was 
to  persuade.  He  had  to  deal  with  a  public  that  knew 
little  of  Parliamentary  Government,  and  still  less  of 
the  British  Constitution.  They  knew  Botha  only  as 
their  leader,  and  they  were  feverishly  anxious  and 
jealous  of  his  troth.  He  had  to  make  clear  to  them 
his  duties  as  a  British  Dominion  Prime  Minister,  not 
merely  to  them  but  to  the  Empire.  He  had  to  educate 
his  masters. 

He  made  the  effort.  In  clear  and  simple  language 
he  explained  to  them  his  new  position  and  responsi- 
bilities. He  spoke  of  his  duty  to  the  King  as  well  as 
to   Parliament  and  to   Party.     He  pointed    out    that 


THE   HERTZOG   SPLIT  259 

neither  in  South  Africa  nor  even  in  Great  Britain  could 
any  Prime  Minister  appoint  his  own  successor.^  He 
spoke  earnestly  and  persuasively.  He  showed  no  anger 
against  those  who  had  left.  He  wound  up,  as  he  had 
begun,  with  a  plea  for  conciliation ;  and  the  Congress 
ended  very  seriously,  very  solemnly — as  it  had  begun 
— with  a  prayer. 

Thus,  in  this  characteristic  way,  these  men  parted, 
the  friends  and  comrades  of  other  days — Botha  and 
De  Wet — each  to  his  own  tent.  It  was  a  difference  of 
temperament  as  well  as  of  principle.  A  stern,  silent, 
brooding  man,  De  Wet  had  allowed  the  imagined 
wrongs  of  his  country  to  eat  into  his  soul  during  the 
years  of  detachment  through  which  he  has  lived  since 
the  war.  More  of  a  soldier  and  less  of  a  statesman 
than  Botha — far  less  a  man  of  the  world — De  Wet  had 
never  really  consented  to  surrender.  He  had  given 
way  against  his  will.  He  and  "  President"  Steyn  had 
stood,  remote  and  forlorn,  following  an  impossible 
policy  in  a  changed  world,  refusing  to  recognise  facts 
or  to  admit  faults. 

Botha  was  moulded  after  quite  another  fashion. 
He  was  always  essentially  a  practical  man — a  man 
to  recognise  facts — to  make  the  best  of  any  situation 
however  bad.  He  mourned  the  lost  independence  as 
much  as  De  Wet.    Through  all  the  changes  he  has  re- 

1  See  Morley's  "Gladstone,"  Vol.  Ill,  512.  "He  (G.)  told 
me  that  he  had  now  reason  to  suppose  that  the  Queen  might 
ask  him  for  advice  as  to  his  successor.  After  some  talk,  he 
said  that  if  asked  he  should  advise  her  to  send  for  Lord  Spencer. 
As  it  happened,  his  advice  was  not  sought." 

R    2 


26o  GENERAL   BOTHA 

mained  a  Dutchman,  a  man  of  the  "  Taal,"  his  "  Queen 
of  Languages."  But  he  was  never  a  man  to  repine  or 
to  sulk.  He  knew  that  the  only  true  and  lasting  con- 
quest— the  defeat  of  the  soul — could  come  by  their 
own  default,  if  he  and  his  friends  stood  aside  and 
handed  over  the  new  South  Africa  to  the  sole  com- 
mand and  caprice  of  the  conqueror.  He  refused  to  do 
so.  From  the  beginning  he  set  the  example  of  redeem- 
ing the  situation  from  within — of  building  up  a  larger 
and  greater  South  African  nation  on  the  new  ground  as 
a  composite  edifice  within  the  wide  and  free  domain  of 
the  British  Empire. 

It  was  only  by  the  good  fortune  of  possessing  such 
a  man  at  this  moment  that  South  Africa  was  destined 
to  pass  unscathed  through  the  fiery  trials  that  now 
awaited  her. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
THE    LABOUR    CRISIS     (1913-14) 


CHAPTER    XIII 

THE    LABOUR    CRISIS    (1913-I4). 

"  If  we  command  our  wealth,   we  shall  be  rich  and  free ;   if 
our  wealth  commands  us,  we  are  poor  indeed." 

— Edmund  Burke. 

Early  in  19 13,  before  the  Hertzog  split  had  reached 
its  final  crisis,  General  Botha  was  faced  with  a  situa- 
tion of  even  greater  immediate  gravity  in  the  quarrel 
between  Capital  and  Labour  on  the  Rand. 

Imagine  for  a  moment  that  the  great  coal  and  iron 
industries  of  Great  Britain  were  owned  and  financed 
by  groups  of  cosmopolitan  companies,  controlled  from 
distant  centres  in  remote  Continents.  It  is  probable 
that  such  companies  would  exercise  a  formidable  in- 
fluence over  British  Governments.  For  it  is  inevitable 
that  those  who  own  the  resources  of  a  country  should 
have  a  potent  voice  in  its  fortunes.^ 

But  of  such  a  nature  is  the  actual  ownership  and 
control  of  the  South  African  Rand  Mines,  those  still 
unplumbed  sources  of  wealth  which  already  stretch  for 
over  fifty  miles  along  the  Reef  and  supply  nearly  half 
of  the  world's  gold.    However  freely  we  may  admit  all 

^  So  seriously  is  this  possibility  regarded  in  Norway,  for 
instance,  that  one  great  party,  the  Conservatives,  are  in  favour 
of  the  restriction  of  ownership  to  nationals. 

263 


264  GENERAL   BOTHA 

the  benefits  of  labour  and  revenue  which  South  Africa 
derives  from  these  mines  and  from  the  capital  that 
works  them,  it  still  remains  a  grave  matter  for  that 
country  that  the  control  of  her  wealth  should  rest  so 
largely  in  alien  hands. 

Consider,  for  example,  the  effect  of  this  situation  on 
the  outlook  of  Labour.  It  is  already  difficult  enough  in 
any  modern  community  for  the  workman  to  feel  the 
same  regard  for  a  Company  as  for  an  individual  em- 
ployer. But  the  difficulty  becomes  nigh  to  an  impossi- 
bility when  the  object  is  a  foreign  Stock  Exchange. 
It  is  useless  to  ask  a  man  to  cultivate  respect  or  affec- 
tion for  a  Kaffir  Market. 

So  in  South  Africa  the  modern  Labour  problem  has 
developed  a  phase  peculiarly  acute  and  perilous,  be- 
cause free  from  the  restraining  loyalties  of  a  common 
patriotism. 

Here,  then,  was  one  of  the  first  problems  that  lay 
before  the  Union  Government.  The  very  city  of 
Johannesburg  itself — with  the  motley  population  that 
swarms  in  its  streets,  the  masses  of  hired  black 
labourers  penned  at  night  like  folded  sheep,  the  fringe 
of  criminals  and  miscreants  drawn  by  the  scent  of  the 
earth-treasure — stood  out  as  a  challenge  to  the  power 
of  the  new  order.  The  Transvaal,  whether  as  Repub- 
lic or  as  Colony,  had  signally  failed  to  control  the 
Rand.  Would  the  Union  be  strong  enough?  That 
was  the  question  now  in  front  of  Botha. 

Labour  was  now  feeling  the  stirrings  of  the  great 


THE  LABOUR  CRISIS  265 

new  birth  which  had  come  to  South  Africa  as  a  whole. 
For  there  had  now  (in  19 12- 13)  sprung  up  on  the  Rand 
a  Labour  movement  indifferent  to  the  race  quarrel — 
South  African  in  its  nature,  but  violent  in  proportion 
to  the  bitterness  and  intensity  of  its  disappointment 
with  the  results  of  the  war — cosmopolitan  in  its  leader- 
ship, but  easily  subject  to  new  and  perilous  influences. 

The  grim  central  fact  on  which  this  new  movement 
concentrated  its  fury  at  this  moment  happened  to  be 
the  spread  of  the  White  Death^  among  the  under- 
ground workers.  From  the  recesses  of  the  mines  this 
new  horror  had  emerged,  and  seemed  to  be  growing 
into  a  more  awful  peril  as  the  industry  delved  deeper 
into  the  Reef. 

Those  who  are  familiar  with  Cornwall  and  Cornish 
life  will  know  that  there  returns  from  South  Africa 
to  that  beautiful  English  county  a  trickle  of  young 
men  in  the  prime  of  life,  upon  whose  cheeks  there 
already  flames  the  hectic  flush  of  death.  They  look 
strong;  but  their  lungs  are  rotted  with  the  mine-dust 
of  South  Africa.  They  went  forth  with  all  the  hopes 
of  Eldorado  to  a  country  where  the  solid  earth  is 
literally  built  on  buttresses  of  gold.  That  gold  has 
brought  with  it  the  touch  of  death,  and  they  come 
back  only  to  die. 

But  they  do  not  all  return  to  Cornwall.  Many  of 
them  still  haunt  the  streets  of  the  "  Golden  City," 
dwindling  spectres,  dying  in  the  sight  of  all  men.    The 

^  Silicosis,    a    disease    arising-    from    the    inhaling-    of    dust. 
Popularly  known  as  "miners'  phthisis," 


266  GENERAL  BOTHA 

spectacle  of  these  doomed  men  in  19 12  played  no 
small  part  in  maddening  their  comrades  to  threats  and 
deeds  of  violence. 

Botha  had  already  been  prompt  to  act,  and  the 
mine-owners,  at  his  instigation,  had  not  been  idle.  A 
powerful  Commission  had  been  appointed  immediately 
after  the  General  Election  of  19 10,  and  this  body 
began  very  soon  to  issue  a  stream  of  startling,  peremp- 
tory reports,  throwing  a  terrible  searchlight  on  the 
extent  of  the  evil  and  urging  immediate  remedies.^ 
The  new  Department  of  Mines  began  immediately  to 
enforce  these  remedies  as  orders.  To  relieve  the  dis- 
tress, a  contributory  Insurance  Act  was  passed  through 
the  Union  Parliament  in  19 12.  The  mine-owners  had 
opened  a  fine  sanatorium.  The  whole  power  of  the 
Government  steadily  pressed  for  stricter  regulations  of 
the  conditions  in  the  deep  underground  workings.^ 

But  for  the  moment  everything  else  was  forgotten 
in  the  terrible  revelations  of  the  Reports.  The  long- 
smouldering  fire  of  resentment  against  the  mine-owners 
began  to  burst  into  flames ;  the  new  Trade  Union  grew 
stronger.  The  miners  began  to  chaffer  for  new  rights 
and   privileges.      They  exhibited   a   new   hostility   to 

1  On  examiningf  3,000  underground  miners,  the  Commission 
discovered  that  990,  or  a  third,  were  suffering  from  miners' 
phthisis  (p.  15).  They  reckoned  that  out  of  a  permanent  popu- 
lation of  12,000  miners  90  per  cent,  would  ultimately  contract 
this  fatal  disease  (p.  23). 

2  The  latest  Reports  show  an  improvement  in  the  precautions 
and  a  reduction  in  mortality.  But  the  Annual  Report  on  the  In- 
surance Act  (July  13,   1914)  shows  3,500  applications  for  relief. 


THE   LABOUR   CRISIS  267 

black  labour.  In  the  opening  months  of  19 13  there 
were  all  those  symptoms  of  inflammation  which  so 
often,  in  modern  industrial  communities,  precede  a 
big  Labour  struggle. 

The  political  agitation  had  come  to  little.  The 
white  workman's  movement,  headed  by  that  remark- 
able engineer,  Mr.  Cresswell,  had  been  defeated. 
Labour  was  still  very  weak  in  Parliament.  But  there 
had  arisen  outside  a  formidable  and  daring  group  of 
leaders,  skilled  in  appeal  to  Labour,  and  not  inclined 
to  fear  or  caution. 

When  the  actual  strike  came  it  had  its  origin  in  one 
of  those  trivial  industrial  skirmishes  which  recall 
the  old  Greek  observation  that  great  events  are  apt 
to  arise  out  of  small  incidents.  Early  in  May  there 
broke  out  in  one  of  the  mines — the  New  Klein- 
fontein — an  obscure  squabble  between  the  under- 
ground workers  and  a  new,  "  hustling  "  manager  with 
an  excess  of  zeal  to  increase  the  production  of  the  mine. 
It  turned  round  the  right  to  the  Saturday  afternoon 
holiday,  a  sacred  privilege  of  the  modern  town  worker. 
The  manager  grew  impatient.  According  to  the  able 
Commission  which  afterwards  investigated  these 
events,  he  became  "  tactless  and  precipitate."  He 
began  with  breaking  the  law ;  the  workmen  replied  by 
defying  it.  The  inflammation  of  the  disturbed  area 
became  steadily  worse. 

Then  there  followed,  in  due  and  rapid  sequence,  all 
those  incidents  of  industrial  strife  with  which  we  are 


268  GENERAL  BOTHA 

only  too  familiar  in  this  country — the  threat  to  strike — 
the  refusal  of  the  Directors  to  meet  the  men — the  reply 
of  the  men  by  raising  their  demands — the  mild  inter- 
vention of  the  Government  authority,  pleading  for 
peace  with  both  parties,  but  with  powers  unequal  to 
commanding  it — finally,  the  sudden  spread  of  the 
strike-fever  along  the  Reef,  from  mine  to  mine. 
Within  a  few  days  a  local  quarrel  had  become  a 
national  menace. 

Then,  at  the  opening  of  June,  came  the  strike  itself, 
bringing  with  it  a  sudden  heightening  of  passion,  a 
feverish  quickening  of  the  pulse.  The  big  body  of 
white  workmen  thrown  idle  at  the  Kleinfontein  Mine 
acted  with  a  startling  fierceness.  They  armed  their 
pickets  with  pick-handles.  They  threatened  the 
natives  with  dynamite.  A  meeting  at  Kleinfontein 
was  followed  by  an  attempt  to  rush  the  mine;  and  it 
was  with  difficulty  that  the  small  number  of  police 
available  saved  it  from  destruction. 

A  small  body  of  resolute  and  violent  men  steadily 
worked  towards  an  industrial  paralysis.  A  body  of 
workmen,  gradually  swelling  to  a  great  mob,  pro- 
ceeded from  shaft  to  shaft  and  dragged  the  men  out. 

As  the  trouble  increased,  the  authorities  grew  more 
apprehensive.  Fresh  police  were  brought  up,  and 
finally  Lord  Gladstone,  as  Governor  of  South  Africa 
and  entirely  on  his  own  responsibility,  although  on  the 
suggestion  of  General  Smuts, ^  but  without  any  request 

^  See  Cd.  6941.  Telegram  No.  I.  Botha,  however,  signed 
a  minute  asking  for  a  second  1,000.     (No.  666.) 


THE   LABOUR   CRISIS  269 

from  Botha,  sent  to  his  aid  Imperial  troops — at  first 
500,  and  in  the  end  3,000  in  all. 

The  coming  of  soldiers  always  has  an  electric  effect 
on  strikers.  The  approach  of  armed  men,  instead  of 
quelling  and  overawing  the  unarmed,  always  seems 
to  infuriate  and  madden.  Instantly  that  the  tramp  of 
marching  men  sounded  on  the  Rand,  a  new  and  fiercer 
fever  seized  upon  the  miners.  Great  meetings 
advocated  a  general  strike  of  all  the  workers  in  South 
Africa,  including  those  who  worked  the  railways,  the 
very  arteries  of  South  African  life.  On  July  4  the  threat 
became  a  reality  along  the  Rand,  and  every  mine 
ceased  work.  Simultaneously  a  meeting  was  an- 
nounced for  that  day  by  the  Labour  leaders  on  Market 
Square,  Johannesburg. 

Then  came  that  confused  clash  of  forces  which  was 
destined  to  take  in  the  memories  of  South  African 
labour  the  place  held  in  the  heart  of  the  English  work- 
ing classes  by  such  incidents  as  the  "  Peterloo  mas- 
sacre."^ On  such  occasions  events  move  too  swiftly  for 
judgment,  and  blame  falters  between  two  extremes. 
The  first  challenge  to  the  men  was  the  prohibition  of 
the  meeting,  issued  too  late  to  be  effective,  and  here  as 
always  arousing  the  deep  resentment  of  rights  assailed 
and  privileges  molested.  The  right  of  public  meeting  in 
the  open  air  does  not  exist  in  South  Africa,  but  depends 
on  permission  obtained.     But  the  crowd,  largely  Eng- 

1  The  name  generally  given  to  the  breaking-  up  of  the  Man- 
chester Reform  meeting  by  cavalry  on  August  i6,  1819.  Eleven 
people  were  killed  and  600  wounded. 


270  GENERAL   BOTHA 

lish  in  origin,  was  not  in  a  mood  to  appreciate  fine 
legal  distinctions.  Like  all  Englishmen,  they  regarded 
the  right  of  public  meeting  as  something  more  sacred 
than  life. 

So  it  was  that  the  first  spark  caught  the  dry  tinder 
of  mob-anger  and  worked  to  a  devouring  flame.  The 
crowd  had  already  assembled  when  the  prohibition 
of  the  meeting  was  declared.  They  would  not  dis- 
perse. Bold  speakers  addressed  them  from  wagons. 
The  police  moved  forward  and  tried  to  stop  the  speak- 
ing. The  reply  was  a  volley  of  stones  and  broken 
bottles.  Then  all  was  confusion — rushes  and  stam- 
pedes— ebbs  and  flows  of  helpless,  storm-tossed  mul- 
titudes, lashed  by  fear  and  fury.  The  cavalry  drew 
their  swords — a  new  heat  of  desperation  seized  the 
crowd.  They  began  to  break  windows.  They  went  on 
to  stop  the  trams.  They  rushed  the  power-station  and 
cut  off  the  electric  current.  They  took  possession  of 
the  railway  yards.  They  attacked  the  very  centre  and 
heart  of  Rand  financial  power — "the  Corner  House," 
the  offices  of  those  kings  of  gold,  Wernher,  Beit  and 
Co. 

Then  began  the  wounding  and  the  killing — first  the 
wounding  of  the  police  and  soldiers  with  stones  and 
broken  bottles,  harassing  and  angering  these  men 
beyond  human  endurance.  Then,  in  reply,  the  wound- 
ing and  the  killing  of  the  crowd  with  rifle-shots,  first 
in  single  firing,  then  in  platoons.  The  crowd  replied 
— for  this  was  no  ordinary  crowd,  this  cosmopolitan 
gathering  of  adventurers,  most  of  them  trained  in  war 


THE   LABOUR   CRISIS  271 

— at  first  with  revolver  shots,  then  with  rifles  and  shot- 
guns looted  from  the  gun-shops.  The  unarmed 
then  applied  a  weapon  always  in  the  hands  of  any 
man  who  has  a  box  of  matches — the  weapon  of  fire. 
The  Park  Station  was  burned,  and  the  Star  office. 
On  all  sides  there  was  a  smashing  of  windows  and  a 
looting  of  shops.  The  streets  were  littered  with  dead 
and  wounded.  Johannesburg  was  actually  in  danger 
of  destruction,  with  all  the  horrors  of  a  sacked  and 
assaulted  town. 

It  was  at  this  point  in  the  strife  that  General 
Botha  and  General  Smuts  arrived  from  Pretoria; 
for  the  grave  news  had  already  reached  the 
Administrative  Capital,  and  General  Botha  had 
immediately  decided  to  go  himself  to  the  scene  of 
violence. 

Lord  Gladstone  in  his  report  to  the  Home  Govern- 
ment gives  a  graphic  picture  of  General  Botha's 
actions  on  this  occasion.  He  behaved  with  that 
cautious  daring  which  characterises  him  in  times  of 
crisis.  He  moved  freely  about  in  the  disturbed  area, 
taking  unmoved  those  serious  personal  risks  which 
every  brave  man  must  take  if  he  is  to  guide  and  con- 
trol the  passions  of  men.  He  made  every  endeavour 
to  effect  a  settlement,  with  that  genius  for  peace- 
making which  goes  so  amazingly  along  with  his  genius 
for  war.  He  talked  to  both  sides  and  attempted  to 
bring  them  together.  He  found  the  situation  "  alarm- 
ing in  its  gravity."  His  aim  was  to  bring  an  instant 
end  to  the  violence  before  it  grew  worse.     If  he  could 


272  GENERAL  BOTHA 

not  effect  a  settlement  he  hoped  at  any  rate  to  bring 
about  a  truce. ^ 

Botha  succeeded.  By  the  following  day  (July  5)  he 
had,  for  the  moment,  brought  the  strike  to  an  end. 
He  had  persuaded  both  sides  to  agree  that  all  the 
men  should  go  back,  or  be  taken  back,  to  work.  There 
was  to  be  no  punishment  or  dismissals  for  strike 
offences.  The  representatives  of  the  workers  were 
to  be  at  liberty  to  lay  any  other  grievances  before  the 
Government,  who  promised  to  inquire  into  them. 

This  agreement  brought  the  violence  to  an  end,  at 
any  rate  for  the  time  being.  It  is  true  that  on  July  6, 
when  the  terms  were  laid  before  the  men,  they  were 
greeted  at  first  with  shouts  of  passion.  During  the 
rioting  of  July  4  no  fewer  than  20  people  had  been 
killed  and  250  had  been  wounded,  while  on  the  side 
of  the  police  there  were  88  casualties  out  of  the  264 
men.  On  such  occasions  the  death  of  men  leaves 
between  the  parties  a  gulf  which  requires  all  the  labour 
of  the  most  skilful  bridge-builder.  "  What  about  the 
shooting?"  cried  angry  voices  from  the  crowd  when 
the  labour  leaders  laid  the  terms  before  them.  "  What 
about  the  dead  ?  You've  been  bought " ;  cries  of 
suspicion  from  abysses  of  distrust  and  fury.  On 
July  6  there  was  another  outbreak  of  rioting,  and  for 
several  days  the  issue  hung  in  the  balance. 

But  Botha  knew  that  this  was  the  last  ground  swell 
of   the    storm,  and    he    faced  the  situation  with  that 

1  See  Lord  Gladstone's  despatch  of  July  7,  1913,  pp.  12-16. 
Cd.  6942. 


THE  LABOUR    CRISIS  273 

unswerving  patience  which  Palmerston  declared  to 
be  the  greatest  quality  of  the  statesman.  He  threw 
aside  all  the  pedantries  of  officialism  and  extended 
inquiry  to  the  grievances  of  South  African  labour  in 
their  largest  scope  and  interpretation.  He  had  an 
open  ear  for  all  troubles.  He  held  a  Conference  with 
representatives  of  all  federated  trades;  and  he  listened 
to  all  the  grievances  and  demands  of  the  railwaymen 
as  well  as  of  the  miners.  He  appointed  a  small, 
strong  and  sympathetic  Commission^  to  inquire  into 
the  whole  circumstances  of  the  rioting;  and  he  per- 
suaded the  mine-owners  to  issue  a  list  of  concessions. 
The  fury  of  the  extremists  still  raged;  but  for  the 
moment  there  was  a  lull  in  the  storm ;  peace  prevailed, 
and  the  strikers  sullenly  and  slowly  went  back  to  work. 
By  August  4  the  troops  could  be  withdrawn. 

Then  there  arose  a  fierce  debate,  which  spread  to 
England,  as  to  the  employment  of  the  troops  in  the 
shooting  of  civilians  during  these  events.  Lord  Glad- 
stone knew  as  well  as  any  man  how  undesirable  it  is 
to  bring  soldiers  into  industrial  strife.  Doubtless,  if 
every  man  had  behaved  with  wisdom,  troops  would  not 
have  been  necessary  and  no  rioting  would  have 
occurred.  If  the  employers  had  responded,  for  in- 
stance, to  Botha's  appeal  and  met  the  workmen,  per- 
haps the  whole  trouble  would  have  been  averted.  "  If 
ifs  and  ans  were  pots  and  pans "    But  the  strike 

1  Consisting  of  Sir  J.  W.  Wessels  and  Mr.  Justice  Ward. 
It  is  from  their  admirable  report  that  the  facts  in  this  narrative 
have  been  mainly  drawn. 

S 


274  GENERAL   BOTHA 

had  broken  out  from  circumstances  over  which  the 
Government  had  no  control,  and  in  spite  of  their 
appeals  for  peace.  They  acted  as  far  as  the  existing 
laws  would  allow  them.  Then  there  had  broken  on 
them  the  sudden  blazing  perils  of  anarchy  and  social 
dissolution  in  a  country  with  a  black  population  always 
on  the  leash. 

For  it  was  no  ordinary  situation  that  had  faced  them 
— no  ordinary,  mild,  European  industrial  disturbance. 
Behind  the  whites  on  the  Rand  there  was  a  quarter 
of  a  million  of  these  black  men,  the  labourers  of  the 
mines,  half  savage,  corralled  in  their  compounds, 
hungry  for  lust  and  violence,  their  wild  eyes  looking 
through  the  bars  of  their  prison  at  the  strifes  of  their 
white  masters. 

By  a  coincidence  which  was  probably  a  cause,  South 
Africa  was,  at  the  moment  of  the  outbreak,  practically 
defenceless.  The  old  forces  had  been  disbanded,  and 
the  new  citizen  force  under  the  Defence  Act  was  not 
yet  formed.  The  police  were  not  adequate.  Botha 
was  reluctant  to  call  out  the  Dutch  burghers  under  the 
old  commando  law,  lest  he  should  fan  again  into 
flame  the  old  racial  strife.  It  seemed  simplest  to  call 
for  the  aid  of  the  Imperial  troops  who  still  remained 
in  South  Africa. 

Unhappily,  this  quarrel  was  not  to  end  with  the 
settlement  of  July,  191 2.  Those  who  speak  lightly  of 
the  employment  of  violence  as  an  instrument  of  order 
are  apt  to  forget  the  heavy  and  inevitable  recoil.  The 
memory  of  those  twenty  deaths  worked  feverishly  in 


THE   LABOUR   CRISIS  275 

the  blood  of  South  Africa,  and  it  was  only  a  question 
of  opportunity  when  another  outbreak  should  occur. 
The  opportunity  arose  in  January  of  next  year  (19 14) 
over  the  organisation  of  the  South  African  railways 
under  the  South  Africa  Act.  That  Act  placed  in 
the  hands  of  the  Union  Government  the  ownership 
of  the  already  unified  railway  system  of  South  Africa. 
It  had  been  one  of  the  special  objects  of  the  Union 
Convention  that  there  should  be  a  drastic  reduction 
in  the  expenses  of  a  very  extravagant  railway  system. 
In  order  to  place  the  control  as  far  as  possible 
outside  party  politics  the  South  Africa  Act  had 
created  an  independent  Railway  Board — under  a 
Minister — with  the  specific  duty  of  reorganising  the 
system. 

The  very  first  steps  to  reduction  instantly  brought 
the  new  Board  and  Minister  into  violent  conflict  with 
Labour.  The  South  African  Railway  Board  thought 
it  their  duty  to  dismiss  sixty  men  doing  temporary 
work  on  the  Government  Railways.  This  action  was 
vehemently  resented  by  the  employees.  Thus  there 
sprang  up  a  furious  conflict  between  the  interests  of 
the  community  and  the  interests  of  a  trade,  the  railway- 
men  advancing  a  theory  that  the  Government  had  no 
right  to  dismiss  hands  without  the  consent  of  the 
railwaymen's  Union.  The  secretary  of  the  Union, 
Mr.  Poutsma,  put  forward  this  demand  to  Mr.  Burton, 
the  Minister  of  Railways.  Mr.  Burton  decisively 
refused  to  agree,  saying  that  it  would  mean  an 
abdication  of  his  duty  to  the  public.     Mr.  Poutsma 

s  2 


276  GENERAL   BOTHA 

threatened  a  railway  strike,  which  the  Union  Parlia- 
ment, by  an  Act  passed  since  19 lo,  had  declared  an 
illegal  act.  The  Government  refused  to  yield.  A 
strike  was  called ;  and  the  Executive  of  the  Federation 
of  Trades  then  appealed  to  all  South  African  workers 
to  support  the  railwaymen. 

South  Africa  was  now  faced  with  a  fearful  crisis. 
The  stoppage  of  the  railways  in  South  Africa  has  no 
parallel  in  any  European  possibility.  It  would  far 
more  than  paralyse  trade ;  to  great  artificially-fed  com- 
munities like  Johannesburg  it  meant  the  rapid  approach 
of  famine.  Here  you  have  a  new  type  of  the  labour 
problem — the  growth  of  industries  in  which  strikes 
are  impossible,  and  where  all  conflicts  and  disputes 
must  be  settled  by  processes  of  arbitration  and  con- 
ciliation. This  new  problem  burst  with  a  terrible 
suddenness  on  South  Africa,  a  country  mostly  agri- 
cultural, and  hitherto  quite  unfamiliar  with  the  acute 
phases  of  labour  conflict. 

For  the  moment  the  extreme  Labour  Party  ruled. 
The  Syndicalists — for  such  they  were — had  laid  their 
plans  carefully.  The  strikers  had  almost  complete 
control  of  Johannesburg.  Many  houses  flew  the  red 
flag,  and  a  system  of  permits  was  set  up  by  the 
Strike  Committee,  which  now  regulated  the  whole 
trade  of  Johannesburg.  This  was  not  a  moment  for 
laying  down  any  broad  lines  of  settlement.  It  was  a 
moment  for  action.  The  Labour  forces  were  most 
carefully  marshalled,  and  everything  was  prepared  for 
revenge;  they  were  under  the  control  of  a  group  of 


THE   LABOUR   CRISIS  277 

determined  and  vehement  men  who  would  not  shrink 
from  extreme  violence.  These  men  were  now  known 
to  believe  in  the  new  and  perilous  doctrine  that  the 
State  exists  for  its  trades  and  not  its  trades  for  the 
State.  It  was  therefore  a  question  of  life  and  death 
between  them  and  the  State. 

Botha  was  not  a  man  to  go  under  easily.  "  I  am 
a  man  of  peace,"  he  said  once,  "  but  if  a  man  puts  a 
pistol  to  my  head,  I  hit  back."  He  had  at  his  call 
all  the  necessary  machinery  of  prompt  executive  action 
against  disorder  devised  and  manufactured  for  South 
Africa  during  the  South  African  War  by  the  Imperial 
Privy  Council.  Perhaps  he  might  be  excused  for 
thinking  that  what  was  good  enough  for  Boers  and 
Dutch  rebels  was  good  enough  also  for  anarchists  and 
revolutionaries. 

So  now  he  acted  with  swift  resolution.  On  his 
advice  Lord  Gladstone  declared  martial  law.  Under 
martial  law,  Mr.  Poutsma  and  a  number  of  other 
leaders  were  instantly  arrested  for  breaking  the  law 
prohibiting  strikes  on  Government  railways.  Being 
unwilling  again  to  use  Imperial  troops,  Botha  used 
the  Defence  Act  for  the  first  time,  and  60,000  men 
were  called  out  in  the  threatened  areas.  In  reply  the 
Trade  Federation  threatened  a  general  strike.  A 
ballot  was  taken,  and  two-thirds  of  the  men  voted 
for  striking.  Things  were  going  from  bad  to  worse. 
The  railway  service  was  now  intermittent;  the  Basutos 
had  broken  out  in  one  of  the  mines;  a  Committee  of 
Public   Safety  had    been    set    up    at    Johannesburg. 


278  GENERAL   BOTHA 

Ministers  went  about  under  arms  and  guards.  The 
State  was  in  danger. 

It  was  on  one  of  these  days  of  January,  19 14,  that 
General  Botha  jumped  into  his  motor  at  Pretoria  and 
drove  at  full  speed  to  Johannesburg.  His  secretary, 
Dr.  Bok,  was  with  him,  and  the  strikers  recognised 
Botha  immediately.  Some  of  the  most  desperate 
seized  the  car,  and  demanded  their  rights  with  pointed 
pistols.  He  calmly  replied  :  "  Shoot  if  you  like ;  but 
remember  I  have  come  to  make  peace,  and  if  you 
shoot  me  there  will  be  no  peace."  The  men  lowered 
their  weapons. 

But  the  time  for  peace  had  not  come  yet. 
Threatened  with  arrest,  the  President  and  Secretary 
of  the  Trades'  Federation,  along  with  200  of  their 
followers,  barricaded  themselves  in  the  Trades  Hall 
at  Johannesburg.  A  citizen  Defence  Force  under 
De  la  Rey  surrounded  the  hall,  and  machine  guns 
were  trained  against  the  building.  Faced  with  over- 
powering force  the  Labour  leaders  surrendered  and 
were  placed  under  arrest.  Deprived  of  all  their 
leaders,  the  workers  in  every  part  of  South  Africa 
now  showed  hesitation  and  indecision.  "The  strike 
gradually  collapsed,  and  on  January  21  it  was  declared 
at  an  end. 

It  was  on  January  27  that  Botha  took  that  drastic 
step  which  at  the  time  caused  so  much  surprise  and 
emotion  throughout  the  Empire.  Using  that  special 
interpretation  of  law  which  had  been  invented  by  the 
Privy  Council   for  South  Africa  in  order  to  deport 


THE   LABOUR   CRISIS  279 

Boers  and  Dutch  rebels,  and  advised  by  General 
Smuts,  he  applied  these  rulings  to  the  Labour  leaders, 
and  deported  them  in  a  batch  to  England.  This 
stroke  was  carried  out  with  a  ruthless  and  irrevocable 
decision.  The  Labour  leaders  were  conveyed  secretly 
to  Natal  and  with  equal  secrecy  placed  on  board  a 
steamer  going  to  England — the  Umgeni.  They  were 
already  on  the  high  seas  before  the  attention  of  the 
Courts  could  be  called  to  their  arrest,  and  they  had 
then  already  gone  beyond  the  reach  of  South 
African  law.^  Following  up  this  action,  Botha's 
Government  refused  to  take  a  legal  decision,  and 
covered  anything  doubtful  in  their  conduct  by  a 
sweeping  and  comprehensive  Act  of  Indemnity. 

In  England  these  events  had  a  violent  echo  in  the 
debates  of  the  House  of  Commons,  where  the  British 
Labour  Party  for  the  time  took  up  the  cause  of  the 
deported  men,  and  afterwards  attempted  to  persuade 
the  Government  to  "  reserve "  the  Indemnity  Act. 
But  somehow  when  the  British  Labour  men  came  face 
to  face  with  the  South  African  leaders  they  realised 
a  certain  difference  between  Labour  ideas  and  con- 
duct in  Great  Britain  and  in  South  Africa.  There  was 
an  element  of  violence  in  these  men  that  repelled 
the  British  Labour  man,  the  child  of  an  old  and 
ordered  community.  Thus  it  was  that  very  slowly 
British  opinion  swung  round  to  the  Liberal  argument 

1  The  names  of  the  deported  were  as  follows : — Messrs. 
Watson,  Poutsma,  Bain,  Mason,  Crawford,  Waterson,  Kendall, 
McKerrell,  Livingstone,  and  Morgan. 


28o  GENERAL   BOTHA 

that  South  Africa  ought  to  be  left  to  manage  its  own 
affairs  in  its  own  way. 

Looking  back  on  these  events  to-day  (1916)  it  is 
clear  that  Botha  displayed  great  qualities  of  decision 
and  resolution.  It  would  be  flattery  to  deny  that  his 
action  was  open  to  criticism.  But  revolutionary  events 
require  revolutionary  remedies ;  and  only  those  who 
have  lived  in  South  Africa  understand  what  the  rail- 
way system  means  to  the  life  of  that  scattered  com- 
munity. Who  can  doubt  that  for  the  moment  in  those 
critical  days  of  the  South  African  midsummer  a  grave 
danger  menaced  the  Union?  We  now  know  that  but 
for  this  rapidity  of  decision  South  Africa  might  have 
found  herself  later  on  threatened  at  one  and  the  same 
time  with  two  civil  wars — one  of  Labour  and  the  other 
of  Race.  It  was  from  such  possibilities  of  chaos  that 
Botha  saved  his  country. 

And  yet  at  the  same  time  no  wise  man  will  admit 
that  the  Labour  problem  of  South  Africa  can  be 
finally  settled  by  the  use  of  force.  If  any  proof  were 
needed  to  the  contrary,  it  came  almost  immediately 
after  the  strike  in  the  sensational  victory  of  the  Labour 
Party  in  the  elections  for  the  Transvaal  Provincial 
Council,  on  which  they  secured  a  majority  of  one. 

Botha  was  ready  for  that  result.  Perhaps  the 
greatest  feature  of  his  policy  at  this  time  was  that 
while  he  wielded  a  sword  with  one  hand  he  always 
held  the  olive  branch  in  the  other.  In  his  large  view 
there  could  be  no  conflict  between  the  claim  of  order 
and  the  duty  of  redress  and  reform.     A  countryman 


THE   LABOUR   CRISIS  281 

himself,  with  little  experience  of  towns  or  industries, 
he  came  new  to  these  problems  of  labour;  but  he 
approached  them  w^ith  an  open  and  sympathetic  mind. 
He  had  already  begun  to  realise  the  vital  fact  that  if 
South  Africa  were  to  control  her  fate,  the  South 
African  mine-owners  must  bow  to  the  State.  During 
the  months  that  followed  these  disorders  he  drafted 
a  series  of  Labour  Laws  marked  by  great  strength 
and  courage.^  The  prolonged  debates  over  the  strikes 
and  the  Indemnity  Bill  prevented  him  from  passing 
these  Bills  into  law  during  this  Session  of  19 13.  But 
the  Bills  displayed  a  resolution  to  deal  with  the  Labour 
problem  on  the  broadest  and  humanest  lines. 

It  was  just  when  he  was  midway  in  these  tasks  that 
events  occurred  in  Europe  which  called  him  suddenly 
and  dramatically  to  even  graver  matters. 

^  Of  these  measures,  one  for  Workmen's  Compensation 
framed  on  the  Enghsh  Act  was  passed  in  1914,  as  also  a 
Wages  Protection  Act  and  an  Industrial  Disputes  Act.  Others 
have  been  inevitably  delayed. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
THE    REBELLION     (1914) 


CHAPTER    XIV 

THE   REBELLION    (1914) 

"  Unthread  the  rude  eye  of  rebellion 
And  welcome  home  again  discarded  faith." 

— King  John. 

General  Botha  was  away  on  a  holiday  in  Rhodesia 
when  the  news  reached  South  Africa  that  Germany 
had,  by  issuing  the  Ultimatum  to  Russia,  taken  the 
first  fatal  step  in  the  great  European  War.  Two  days 
later  Great  Britain  declared  war  on  Germany,  and 
from  that  moment  South  Africa  was  also  at  war. 

General  Botha  hurried  back  immediately  to  Pretoria 
and  faced  the  situation.  The  tremor  of  this  world- 
shaking  event  was  already  being  felt  throughout  the 
Union. 

Botha  returned  instantly  to  Pretoria,  and  summoned 
a  Cabinet.  As  a  result  of  their  deliberations  he  cabled 
to  London  ^  that  if  the  Imperial  Government  wanted 
to  withdraw  their  troops  for  use  elsewhere,  South  Africa 

1  On  August  4,  1914.  See  Minute  686  in  the  Correspondence 
published  in  April,   1915,  to  the  British  Parliament.     Cd.  7873. 

28s 


286  GENERAL   BOTHA 

would  be  willing  to  defend  itself.  The  Imperial 
Government  accepted  the  offer.  The  troops  were  now 
being  gradually  embarked  at  the  ports,  and  the 
Defence  forces  were  already  warned  for  action  when 
Parliament  met  in  September. 

But  the  Imperial  Government  had  already 
approached  Botha  with  a  larger  suggestion.  Mr. 
Harcourt  on  behalf  of  the  British  Cabinet  cabled  to 
Botha  on  August  7  informing  him  that  if  the  South 
African  Government  would  seize  such  parts  of  "  Ger- 
man South-West"  as  would  give  them  comm.and  of 
the  wireless  stations,  this  would  be  regarded  as  a  great 
and  urgent  Imperial  service.^  The  South  African 
Government  "  cordially  "  agreed  on  condition  that  the 
Imperial  Government  would  undertake  the  naval  part 
of  the  undertaking.-  In  his  speech  Botha  clearly  and 
firmly  defended  the  policy  he  had  adopted.  "  To  my 
mind,"  he  said,  "  there  could  be  only  one  reply  without 
creating  a  position  of  a  much  more  serious  nature  than 
the  one  we  are  faced  with." 

Botha  never  hesitated  for  one  moment.  Why 
should  he?  In  191 1  he  had  really  anticipated  the 
present  situation  when  he  had  denounced  the  idea  of 
"optional  neutrality."  Then  he  had  prophesied  that 
if  ever  war  came  to  the  Empire,  Briton  and  Boer  would 

^  Minute  No.  9/18.  Id.  The  teleg^ram  went  on: — "You 
will,  however,  realise  that  any  territory  now  occupied  must  be 
at  the  disposal  of  the  Imperial  Government  for  purposes  of  an 
ultimate  settlement  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war." 

2  Minute  No.  7/18.     Id.     August  10. 


THE    REBELLION  287 

stand  "  shoulder  to  shoulder."  He  was  now  about  to 
show  that  that  pledge  was  no  idle  word. 

Botha's  instant  decision  was  the  more  courageous 
since  he  must  clearly  have  foreseen  some  of  those 
tragic  consequences  which  were  to  follow.  It  was  no 
light  thing  for  Botha  to  contemplate  the  division  of  his 
own  people.  He  was  now  entering  what  was  destined 
to  be  the  grimmest  episode  in  his  whole  career.  Those 
who  dream  that  the  hearts  of  rulers  are  made  of  ada- 
mant can  have  little  conception  what  it  means  for  a 
leader  of  men  to  be  asked  to  kill  and  wound  his  own 
old  comrades,  and  to  stand  on  the  battlefield  and  look 
down  on  the  dead  bodies  of  men  who  have  fought  by 
his  side  in  other  days.  Yet  such  was  the  fate  that  now 
lay  ahead  of  Botha. 

Why  did  the  decision  to  invade  German  South-West 
Africa  become  the  spark  to  fire  a  rebellion?  Many 
reasons  have  been  given  in  the  British  Press — German 
gold,  Dutch  treachery,  personal  ambitions.  There  are 
always  baser  threads  in  every  strand  of  human  life, 
and  probably  all  these  elements  played  some  part  in 
the  amaleam  of  revolt.  But  he  who  should  attribute  the 
rebellion  entirely  to  bribery  and  ambition  would  griev- 
ously misunderstand  recent  South  African  history.  For 
two  years  past  there  had  been,  as  we  have  seen,  a 
definite  cleavage  of  opinion  among  the  Dutch  as  to  the 
part  that  South  Africa  should  play  in  the  wars  of  the 
British  Empire.  The  Hertzog  split  had  marked  the 
dramatic  moment  in  that  division  of  opinion;  and 
Hertzog  had  taken  with  him  into  secession  a  very  large 


288  GENERAL   BOTHA 

part  of  the  Orange  Free  Staters,  and  a  considerable 
following  in  other  districts.  His  arduous  and  strenu- 
ous campaigning  had  perilously  revived  the  old  Boer 
craving  for  independence  and  the  memories  of  the  old 
war.  Hertzog's  most  definite  doctrine  had  been  that 
South  Africa  should  not  bleed  for  the  Empire.  His 
whole  conflict  with  Botha  turned  round  this  very  ques- 
tion of  the  responsibility  of  South  Africa  for  Imperial 
quarrels.  The  occasion  of  the  split  had  been  the 
proposal  to  increase  the  South  African  contribution  to 
the  Imperial  Navy.   Here  was  the  same  issue — on  land. 

It  is  difficult,  indeed,  to  estimate  exactly  the  aims  of 
Hertzog  and  his  advisers.  Did  he  mean  that  South 
Africa  was  to  accept  the  defensive  aid  of  the  British 
Navy  and  contribute  nothing  to  it.'^  That  was,  indeed, 
to  pursue  a  policy  of  subjection.  Or  did  he  mean  to 
aim  at  the  recovery  of  their  lost  Republican  indepen- 
dence ?  If  so,  Hertzog  was  always  careful  to  fall  short 
of  so  bold  a  confession  of  faith.  But  it  is  clear  that  his 
action  was  so  construed  by  thousands  of  the  simpler 
folk  who  accepted  him  as  their  leader.  Without  accus- 
ing him  of  any  direct  intention  to  create  rebellion,  it  is 
certain  that  the  political  movement  which  he  headed 
played  a  great  part  in  these  unhappy  conflicts. 

The  special  war  session  of  the  South  African  Parlia- 
ment now  summoned  by  Botha  was  opened  on  Septem- 
ber 9,  at  Cape  Town,  by  Lord  Buxton,^  the  Governor 
newly    arrived     in    succession    to    Lord    Gladstone. 

1  Until  recently  Mr.    Sydney  Buxton,   M.P.  for  Poplar,   with 
a  distinguished  record  as  Liberal  Cabinet  Minister  in  England. 


THE   REBELLION  289 

General  Botha,  as  Prime  Minister,  moved  an  address 
to  the  King  in  which  he  pledged  the  loyalty  of  South 
Africa  to  the  British  cause  and  announced  the  new 
policy  to  the  House.  "  The  road  of  treason,"  he 
said  boldly,  "was  an  unknown  road  among  the  Dutch 
and  English-speaking  of  South  Africa.  There  were 
only  two  possibilities  before  them  now.  The  one  possi- 
bility was  one  of  faith,  duty  and  honour.  The  other  was 
of  dishonour  and  disloyalty."  He  would  admit  no 
doubt  as  to  which  course  the  South  African  people 
would  follow. 

He  then  told  the  Assembly  that  the  Germans  were 
already  in  force  on  the  borders  and  some  of  them  had 
even  crossed  the  borders.  There  had  already  been  a 
fight  on  an  island  between  the  countries,  and  two  men 
had  been  killed.  It  was  clearly  Botha's  opinion  that 
the  war  in  the  South-West  was  inevitable ;  and  he  im- 
pressed that  fact  early  on  the  Union  Assembly.  As  a 
soldier  he  fully  understood  that  there  was  no  possible 
distinction  between  an  aggressive  and  a  defensive  war. 
It  has  become  a  commonplace  of  war  that  to  defend 
you  must  always  also  be  ready  to  attack.  No  man 
knew  that  better  than  Botha. 

Botha  added  that  touch  of  clemency  which  he  always 
mingles  with  his  schemes  of  war.  He  ended  his  speech 
with  a  strong  appeal  for  consideration  towards  the 
naturalised  German  citizens  of  South  Africa.  There 
happened  to  be  living  in  Natal  the  descendants  of  the 
German  Legion  which  had  volunteered  on  our  side 
during  the  Crimean  War.    Botha  announced  that  these 

T 


290  GENERAL   BOTHA 

men  would  be  exempted  from  service,  because  "  surely 
it  would  not  be  right  to  make  brother  fight  against 
brother,  or  father  against  sons."  Here  was  a  soldier 
who  did  not  forget  that  even  in  war  time  he  was  still 
a  man. 

But  no  smooth  words  or  acts  could  avert  the  crisis 
which  was  certain  to  follow  on  Botha's  statement. 
Without  any  hesitation,  Hertzog  instantly  threw  him- 
self into  full  opposition  to  the  policy  of  aggression. 
He  spoke  against  the  whole  proposal  to  carry  the  war 
into  German  South-West  Africa.  "  His  duty,"  he  said, 
"  in  the  first  place  was  to  his  own  people  and  not  to  the 
Empire."  He  went  further — he  refused  even  to  decide 
which  of  the  great  combatants  was  in  the  right,  thus 
openly  already  exercising  the  "  option  of  neutrality." 
He  now  moved  an  amendment  asserting  willingness  to 
join  in  all  measures  of  defence,  but  protesting  against 
a  policy  of  attack  on  German  territory. 

This  debate  was  the  first  indication  of  the  grave 
difference  of  opinion  which  was  now  to  divide  South 
Africa.  The  amendment  by  General  Hertzog  was  re- 
jected by  92  votes  to  12.  But  it  was  not  the  size  of 
the  minority  that  counted ;  it  was  the  spirit  in  which 
they  were  working.  The  Parliamentarians  seemed  to 
be  keeping  within  the  law ;  but  already  in  the  month  of 
September  grave  rumours  began  to  spread  that  there 
were  persons  in  high  authority  within  the  Union  who 
were  contemplating  acts  of  treason.  Among  the  names 
bandied  about  were  those  of  General  Beyers,  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  South  Africa  Defence  Force; 


THE   REBELLION  291 

General  De  Wet,  the  greatest  military  name  in  the 
Orange  Free  State;  and  even,  according  to  some  whis- 
pers, the  great  and  respected  Transvaaler — General 
De  la  Rey.  Botha  was  slow  to  believe  these  rumours, 
but  as  a  soldier  he  kept  a  vigilant  eye  upon  the  move- 
ments of  all  the  suspected  persons. 

The  first  definite  news  of  rebellion  that  reached  him 
was  of  the  certain  proposed  defection  of  Maritz. 

Colonel  Solomon  Maritz  was  a  Cape  Dutchman,  a 
friend  of  De  Wet's,  who  had  fought  with  distinction 
in  the  Boer  War  and  had  since  served  with  the  Ger- 
mans against  the  Hereros.  He  had  passed  through  the 
Military  Training  School  at  Bloemfontein,  and  had 
been  appointed  to  the  command  of  his  own  district 
along  the  north-western  Cape  Border.  He  had  also 
joined  the  Hertzog  party.  General  Beyers  had  re- 
cently made  him  Lieutenant-Colonel  in  command  of 
the  Union  Forces  on  the  German  frontier. 

It  was  now  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Govern- 
ment that  Maritz  was  stealthily  carrying  with  him  into 
rebellion  the  majority  of  his  officers  and  men. 

At  this  critical  moment,  on  the  eve  of  the  shedding 
of  brother's  blood  by  brother,  General  Botha  made  one 
last  desperate  effort  to  preserve  peace.  He  sent  a 
long  telegram  to  "  President "  ^  Steyn  at  his  farm  in 
the  Free  State  and  implored  him  to  intervene  to  pre- 
vent bloodshed.  President  Steyn  replied  to  this 
appeal  in  a  strange    letter.      He   insisted  that  if  he 

1  This   is   a   courtesy   title   generally   given  to    Mr.    Steyn   in 
South  Africa. 

T    2 


292  GENERAL   BOTHA 

appealed  to  the  people  who  abstained  from  the 
Rebellion  he  must  also  add  that  he  most  strongly  dis- 
approved of  the  policy  of  the  Government  in  their 
attack  on  German  West  Africa.  He  would  have  to 
say  that  he  had  warned  them  against  that  policy  three 
years  before,  and  repeated  the  warning  to  General 
Smuts  on  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  As  a  result  of  that 
policy  a  number  of  officers  and  men  had  gone  into 
rebellion.  But  a  letter  written  in  the  only  terms 
possible  to  him  would  have  no  effect  on  them.  He 
preferred  to  remain  outside  the  conflict.^ 

In  vain  did  Botha  endeavour  to  shake,  by  every 
possible  argument,  "  President "  Steyn's  position.  It 
was  clear  that  reasoning  was  vain,  and  that  besides 
those  actually  engaged  in  the  rebellion  there  were 
those  who,  while  taking  no  risk  themselves,  preferred 
to  look  on  and  to  garner  the  fruits  of  that  bloody 
harvesting. 

Events  moved  rapidly. 

The  next  sensation  was  the  resignation  of  General 
Beyers,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Defence 
Force. 

General  Beyers  had  been  one  of  those  ardent  and 
formidable  fighters  w^ho  had  revived  the  spirits  of  the 
Boer  commandos  during  the  later  stages  of  the  South 
African  War.  He  was  known  as  a  rapid  and  efficient 
soldier,  and  it  was  hoped  that  he  would  lead  the  same 
commandos  to  victory  against  the  Germans.    But  it  was 

1  P.  67,  "Rebellion  and  German  War."  South  Africa  White 
Paper. 


THE   REBELLION  293 

gradually  whispered  round  that  he  was  one  of  those 
who  had  been  strongly  influenced  by  General  Hert- 
zog's  criticism  of  Botha's  policy;  and  on  September 
22  he  wrote  a  letter  to  the  Government  giving  up  his 
post  as  Commander-in-Chief.  It  was  afterwards 
remembered  that  some  time  before  General  Beyers 
had  visited  Berlin  to  witness  the  German  manoeuvres 
and  had  been  entertained  by  the  German  Emperor. 

At  this  moment  there  occurred  an  incident  both 
tragic  and  mysterious.  On  the  day  on  which  General 
Beyers  handed  in  his  resignation — September  15 — he 
sent  an  invitation  to  De  la  Rey  to  come  and  meet  him. 
De  la  Rey  replied  to  him  at  Pretoria  asking  him  to 
come  to  Johannesburg  and  discuss  matters.  General 
Beyers,  being  unable  to  leave  Pretoria,  sent  over  his 
motor-car  to  fetch  De  la  Rey.  Arrived  at  Pretoria, 
De  la  Rey  told  Beyers  that  he  was  despondent  and 
perplexed.  He  then  went  to  a  bedroom,  fell  on  his 
knees,  and  prayed  for  guidance.  Later  on  he  took 
up  his  Bible  and  opened  it  by  chance  at  the  famous 
prayer  of  Solomon  in  the  second  book  of  Chronicles. 
He  read  those  great  chapters  and  became  happy  and 
contented.     He  had  reached  a  decision. 

The  strange  thing  is  that  we  shall  never  know  quite 
what  that  decision  was.  For  a  sudden  and  untoward 
fate,  both  trivial  and  terrible,  stepped  between  De  la 
Rey  and  his  design.  That  night  Beyers  was  driving 
De  la  Rey  back  to  Johannesburg  in  his  motor-car  with 
the  object — so  it  is  believed — of  attending  a  meeting 
of  commandos  assembled  under  the  Defence  Act  at 


294  GENERAL   BOTHA 

Potchefstroom.  It  is  a  curious  coincidence  that  the 
police  at  Johannesburg  were  at  the  same  time  especi- 
ally on  the  "  qui  vive  "  to  capture  three  motor-burglars 
known  as  "  the  Foster  gang,"  who  were  trying  to  escape. 
They  had  instructions  Id  stop  every  car.  Beyers'  chauf- 
feur, on  the  other  hand,  from  a  totally  different  cause, 
had  instructions  not  to  stop.  Beyers'  car  was  challenged 
several  times  as  it  passed  through  the  suburSs  of 
Johannesburg ;  but  each  time  it  ignored  the  challenge 
and  went  on  at  increased  speed.  One  policeman 
stepped  in  front  of  the  car  and  was  nearly  run  over. 
He  sprang  aside  just  in  time  to  save  his  life,  and 
slipping  a  cartridge  into  his  rifle  he  fired  from  behind 
at  the  car  as  it  passed  beneath  the  glare  of  an  electric 
lamp.  The  car  went  on  for  a  few  hundred  yards  and 
then,  turning  slowly,  came  back  to  the  policeman.  "  Are 
you  going  to  stop  this  time?"  said  the  policeman. 
General  Beyers  put  his  head  out  of  the  car,  and  said  : 
"  I  am  General  Beyers — this  is  General  De  la  Rey, 
whom  you  have  shot !  " 

General  De  la  Rey,  indeed,  was  stone  dead.  He 
had  been  shot  through  the  back.  Some  years  before, 
an  old  Boer  who  set  up  to  be  a  prophet.  Van  Rensburg 
by  name,  had  affirmed  that  he  had  seen  a  vision 
regarding  De  la  Rey.  He  had  seen  a  cloud  with 
number  15  on  it.  There  was  blood  issuing  from  the 
cloud  and  General  De  la  Rey  was  seen  returning 
home  without  his  hat  followed  by  a  carriage  covered 
with  flowers.  The  Boers  had  interpreted  this  as  a 
prophecy  of  triumph.     Now  the  vision  had  come  true, 


THE   REBELLION  295 

but  in  quite  another  sense  than  triumph.  A  few  days 
later,  General  De  la  Rey,  perhaps  happy  in  the 
moment  of  his  death,  was  taken  to  be  buried  at  Pretoria, 
followed  by  a  carriage  full  of  flowers.  General  Botha 
uttered  the  old  General's  funeral  oration,  ignoring  the 
rumours  of  his  defection,  and  dwelling  only  on  those 
dazzling  deeds  which  will  always  be  the  pride  of  all 
who  live  in  South  Africa. 

At  the  funeral  Beyers  made  a  violent  attack  on 
those  who  had  reproached  him  with  the  intention  to 
rebel.  Never  was  it  more  true  that  he  who  excuses 
himself  also  accuses.  Within  a  very  few  weeks — by 
the  middle  of  October — the  full  treason  of  Beyers, 
Kemp,  and  De  Wet  came  to  the  knowledge  of  the 
Government.  In  vain  did  Botha  make  one  last  effort 
to  employ  "  President "  Steyn  as  a  peacemaker.  The 
efforts  of  that  veiled  oracle  were  too  obviously  half- 
hearted. The  full  scheme  of  treason,  linked  up  with 
Beyers  at  one  end  and  the  Germans  at  the  other,  with 
Maritz  as  the  handy  intermediary,  became  gradually 
clear  to  the  Government,  Proclamations  were  issued 
by  the  rebels.  The  die  was  cast.  Botha  saw  that 
there  was  nothing  before  him  but  to  maintain  the 
authority  of  the  Government. 

Faced  with  this  situation,  Botha  instantly  acted 
with  his  customary  mixture  of  shrewdness  and  swift- 
ness. The  towns  at  this  moment  were  full  of  volun- 
teers for  the  German  War;  and  the  provisions  of  the 
Defence  Act  were  already  in  operation.  But  Botha 
especially  did    not  wish  to  use   Englishmen    to    put 


296  GENERAL   BOTHA 

down  a  Dutch  rebellion.  Except  in  cases  where  no 
Dutch  forces  were  available  he  was  determined  to 
use  men  of  Dutch  blood  only.  He  therefore  applied 
for  this  purpose  the  old  commando  law,  which  prac- 
tically corresponds  with  the  old  common  law  right  of 
levy — the  fyrdd — part  of  the  law  of  England  until 
recent  days.  But  Botha  found  himself  able  to  fill  his 
ranks  with  volunteers.  For  these  men  it  was  necessary 
to  find  officers;  so  Botha  went  to  ask  his  old  com- 
mandants of  the  Boer  War  to  accompany  him  on  this 
expedition  against  the  rebels.  There  were  some  thirty 
of  these  men,  and  Botha  only  wanted  ten.  He  ex- 
plained the  position  to  them;  and  the  result  was  that 
all  wanted  to  go.  Botha  proposed  a  ballot,  and  the 
ten  wanted  were  chosen  in  that  manner.  All  the  rest 
asked  to  go  as  troopers — a  remarkable  evidence  of 
the  trust  in  Botha's  leadership  that  existed  among  his 
own  old  soldiers. 

The  situation  was  certainly  becoming  very  grave. 
The  rumours  of  German  aggression,  which  had  been 
very  shadowy  all  through  August,  took  on  a  very  real 
substance  in  September.  A  British  force  under 
Colonel  Grant  crossing  the  frontier  to  Warmbad  w^as 
left  isolated  by  Maritz  and  ambushed  by  Germans, 
who  thereupon  marched  boldly  into  British  territorv 
and  seized  a  block-house  on  the  Orange  River. 
Maritz  sent  an  impudent  ultimatum  to  Botha.  Mean- 
while, the  tide  of  rebellion  rose  high  both  in  the 
Transvaal  and  the  Free  State;  and  it  really  seemed 
possible  that    unless    bold    and    definite    action  were 


THE   REBELLION  297 

taken,  South  Africa  would  drift  into  anarchy  and  ruin. 
These  were  days  of  wild  rumour  and  panic,  spreading 
terror  through  a  country  only  recently  recovered  from 
war. 

The  great  thing  was  to  act  swiftly,  before  these 
vague  groups  of  rebels  became  organised  and  dis- 
ciplined into  armies.  It  was  known  to  the  South 
African  Government  that  the  rebels  lacked  ammuni- 
tion and  arms ;  it  was  urgent  that  they  should  be  broken 
up  before  they  obtained  these  resources.  The  surest 
way  to  check  the  rebellion  was  to  inspire  confidence 
by  a  rapid  defeat.  For  it  is  agreed  by  those  who  lived 
through  that  period  in  South  Africa  that  Botha  alone 
stood  between  the  Empire  and  disruption.  If  he  had 
spoken  the  wrong  word,  we  should  have  lost  South 
Africa. 

General  Botha  first  made  the  momentous  announce- 
ment that  he  himself  would  take  Beyers'  place  in 
the  field.  He  removed  the  arms  and  ammunition 
up  North,  and  brought  the  loyal  recruits  to  Pre- 
toria out  of  the  rebel  districts.  He  then  sent  an 
experienced  soldier,  Major  Enslin,  one  of  his  own 
Staff  during  the  Boer  War,  to  cope  with  Maritz, 
nominally  as  Maritz's  Chief  of  Staff.  Major  Enslin 
{jad  an  extremely  difficult  task;  and  it  is  greatly  to 
his  credit  that  he  managed  to  escape  with  full  proofs 
of  Maritz's  treason.  It  was  to  his  subordinate.  Major 
Bowyer,  that  Maritz  showed  that  famous  document, 
the  unsigned  draft  of  a  Treaty  drawn  up  between  him- 
self and  the  Governor  of  German  South-West  Africa, 


298  GENERAL   BOTHA 

as  the  representative  of  the  German  Emperor.  The 
terms  of  this  Treaty  were  certainly  very  astonishing. 
Maritz  was  to  announce  the  independence  of 
South  Africa  and  to  declare  war  against  England. 
The  Governor  of  German  South-West  Africa  was  to 
support  Maritz,  and  promised  to  obtain  measures  to 
respect  the  South  African  claim  to  full  independence 
in  the  case  of  German  victory.  In  return  Germany 
was  to  have  Walfisch  Bay,  and  the  new  South  African 
Republic  was  to  be  allowed  to  seize  Delagoa  Bay. 

Armed  with  this  revelation,  Botha  now  published 
the  facts  to  the  world,  and  proceeded  to  strike  hard 
and  fast  at  the  head  of  the  rebellion.  Colonel  Brits 
was  ordered  to  march  instantly  against  Maritz,  who 
had  now  gone  into  open  rebellion  and  had  brought 
nearly  the  whole  of  his  force — except  a  few  intrepid 
loyalists — over  to  the  Germans.  Colonel  Brits  in- 
stantly defeated  Maritz  in  a  smart  action  south  of 
Upington,  and  during  the  next  few  weeks  there  was 
a  rapid  and  effective  concentration  of  troops  against 
the  rebel  Colonel  from  all  parts  of  Cape  Colony.  Thus 
cornered,  Maritz  could  make  no  headway.  Instead  of 
striking  for  Pretoria,  as  he  had  intended  to  do,  he  was 
forced  to  stand  at  bay  on  the  frontier.  There  he  was 
severely  wounded  in  the  knee,  driven  to  take  refuge 
on  the  German  side  of  the  frontier,  and  afterwards, 
when  Botha  advanced  into  German  territory,  passed 
out  of  the  scene  of  war  into  Portuguese  Angola.  His 
men  were  scattered,  and  that  part  of  the  rebellion  was 
brought  to  an  end. 


THE   REBELLION  299 

But  in  the  meanwhile  far  greater  and  more  formid- 
able leaders  had  entered  the  field — no  smaller  men 
than  those  old  Republican  veterans,  Generals  De  Wet, 
Beyers,  and  Kemp.  It  is  quite  clear  now  that  among 
these  leaders  there  was  a  serious  conflict  of  policy. 
General  Beyers  seems  to  have  been  drawn  by  the 
perilous  and  seductive  spell  of  the  Ulster  precedent. 
He  talked  of  "  armed  protests";  he  seemed  to  imagine 
that  Sir  Edward  Carson  had  invented  a  new  half-way 
house  between  loyalty  and  rebellion.  There  was  a 
dramatic  meeting  at  the  house  of  a  Dutch  Reformed 
Minister  named  Ferreira.  At  that  meeting  General 
De  Wet,  like  Brennus  at  Ancient  Rome,  roughly  threw 
his  sword  into  the  scales.  He  was  a  soldier;  and  he 
could  see  no  distinction  between  armed  protest  and 
open  war.  He  declared  for  war.  Instantly  after  the 
meeting  De  Wet  began  to  collect  men  and  to  com- 
mandeer supplies.  General  Beyers,  having  definitely 
thrown  in  his  lot  with  De  Wet,  had  no  choice  but  to 
follow  his  lead.  On  October  12  the  Union  Govern- 
ment had  declared  martial  law;  on  October  25  the 
Government  had  issued  a  grave  statement  announc- 
ing that  De  Wet  had  taken  the  field  . 

On  the  next  day  Botha  followed  up  this  manifesto 
with  instant  action.  The  rebels  under  Beyers  were 
now  close  to  Pretoria,  and  were  actually  visible  from 
the  town  on  the  kopjes.  Botha  struck  straight  at  the 
heart.  Issuing  from  Pretoria  with  a  picked  force  of 
police  and  burghers  on  October  28,  he  attacked  Beyers 
and  his  commando  at  Rustenburg  before  noon.     Still 


300  GENERAL   BOTHA 

bemused  with  the  dream  of  an  "  armed  protest," 
Beyers'  commando  was  utterly  confounded  by  the  at- 
tack of  their  Dutch  compatriots,  and  fell  into  headlong 
rout.  It  was  for  the  most  part  an  affair  of  police. 
Eight  fully-armed  men  were  captured  without  a  shot, 
and  only  at  the  end  of  the  day,  when  passions  were 
roused,  was  there  any  bloodshed.  Beyers'  power  was 
already  broken  in  the  Transvaal.  He  fled  south  to 
join  De  Wet  in  the  Free  State.  All  the  world  knows 
how  later  (December  7),  in  one  desperate  effort  to 
escape  capture,  he  was  miserably  drowned  in  the  Vaal 
River. 

During  the  first  few  weeks  after  the  affray  at  Rusten- 
burg,  Botha  struck  blow  after  blow  at  the  forces  in  the 
Transvaal,  determined  first  to  free  the  administrative 
Capital  from  danger.  There  were,  of  course,  strange 
ups  and  downs  in  this  terrible  warfare  of  brothers  and 
cousins,  where  slimness  met  slimness  and  ambush  ran 
into  ambush.  Botha  was  held  back  at  times  from 
crushing  victory  by  his  reluctance  to  employ  British 
troops  to  crush  Dutch ;  for  he  was  still  resolutely  deter- 
mined not  to  revive  the  embers  of  old  race-passions. 
Gradually  and  grimly,  Botha's  old  lieutenants 
achieved  the  mastery.  By  the  end  of  November,  19 14, 
all  the  rebel  Transvaal  leaders — Miiller,  Kemp, 
Fourie — had  been  put  to  flight  or  captured.^ 

Botha  now  turned  to  the  Free  State,  where  De  Wet 
had  necessarily  been  left  to  run  his  course.     There 

1  Fourie,   a   Major   in   the  Defence   Force   at  the  moment   of 
his  treason,  was  defeated  at  Nooitgedacht  and  shot  at  dawn. 


THE   REBELLION  301 

were  strange  episodes  of  elemental  fury  in  that  wild 
ranging  of  the  old  guerilla  chieftain.  All  the  pent-up 
wrath  of  years  seemed  to  burst  forth.  He  amazed  even 
his  own  followers  with  his  fierce,  frenzied  speeches — 
such  as  the  notorious  "  five  shillings  "  speech  at  Vrede  ^ 
— breathing  wrath  on  the  verge  of  madness.  But  there 
were  deeds  as  well  as  speeches.  He  was  still  a  master 
of  war.  He  was  soon  in  possession  of  many  of  the 
chief  towns — Heilbron,  Reitz,  Vrede,  Harrismith.  The 
rebellion  broke  into  flame  at  half  a  dozen  places  at 
once,  and  for  a  moment  it  looked  as  if  the  Free  State 
had  definitely  broken  away  from  the  Union  of  South 
Africa. 

De  Wet  fought  and  behaved  with  the  fury  of  a 
forlorn  hope.  His  troops  caught  his  temper.  The 
captured  towns  were  submitted  to  looting  and  insult, 
and  the  loyalists  of  the  Free  State  felt  that  they  had 
been  deserted. 

Against  this  savagery  some  few  places  held  out  gal- 
lantly. Bethlehem  and  Kroonstad — assisted  by  the 
late  General  Philip  Botha's  gallant  soldier  son,  Manie 
— organised  resistance  and  still  held  back  De  Wet's 
attacks. 

But  it  was  high  time  that  Botha  himself  should  come 
to  their  help.  He  had  given  the  rebels  every  oppor- 
tunity for  peace,  again  and  again  offering  amnesty  and 
clemency  even  after  rebellion.  All  his  offers  had 
been  treated  with  contempt.      It  was   clear  that  the 

1  Where  De  Wet  broke  into  a  violent  rage  against  a  magis- 
trate who  had  fined  him  five  shilHngs  for  beating  a  black  boy. 


302  GENERAL   BOTHA 

rebels  intended  war.  He  was  now  to  show  that  the 
merciful  can  be  also  strong. 

On  November  ii,  Botha  proceeded  to  the  Free 
State,  put  himself  at  the  head  of  the  Government 
forces,  and  making  a  rapid  night-march,  surprised  De 
Wet  at  dawn  at  Mushroom  Valley.  It  was  a  tremen- 
dous blow.  De  Wet's  main  force  of  3,500  men  was 
broken  up,  and  he  became  from  this  time  a  hunted  fugi- 
tive. 

De  Wet  now  knew  that  he  was  beaten.  Hitherto 
he  had  ignored  all  Botha's  overtures.  Now — perhaps 
encouraged  by  Botha's  mildness  even  in  victory — he 
attempted  to  obtain  a  discussion  of  terms.  Botha 
replied  sternly,  through  General  Smuts,  that  the  time 
has  passed  for  anything  but  unconditional  surrender. 

So  the  fearful  struggle  went  on  to  its  bitter  close, 
along  a  road  marked  by  brothers'  deaths  : 

"  For  friend  and  foe  were  shadows  In  the  mist, 
And  friend  slew  friend,  not  knowing  whom  he  slew." 

If  it  were  not  for  the  horror  which  always  haunts 
civil  war  there  would  be  a  profound  interest  about  this 
final  stage.  Age  had  told  on  De  Wet ;  and  he  was  now 
a  less  agile  man  than  at  the  period  of  his  great  achieve- 
ments; but  he  still  retained  all  the  ardour  and  genius 
of  a  great  partisan  warrior.  In  his  flight  from  his  old 
comrades  in  arms  he  displayed  all  those  gifts  of  rapid 
and  perplexing  movement  which  had  puzzled  so  many 
British  Generals  in  the  past.  But  in  this  new  pursuit 
of  De  Wet,  the  South  African  Governments  had  one 


THE   REBELLION  303 

great  advantage  which  was  lacking  to  the  British 
Generals.  They  had  the  use  of  the  modern  motor-car. 
It  was  only  thus  that  De  Wet  was  finally  cornered.^ 

The  last  phase  of  all  in  the  hunting  down  of  that 
indomitable  old  man  was  indeed  sufficiently  notable 
and  dramatic.  De  Wet's  commandos  had  been  killed, 
captured  or  dispersed,  and  at  last  there  remained  with 
him  only  four  companions.  He  had  crossed  the  Vaal 
River,  and  these  five  men  were  fleeing  on  swift  horses 
through  the  waterless,  sandy  tract  of  Bechuanaland 
that  lies  to  the  west  of  the  Transvaal.  On  Novem- 
ber 25  he  turned  to  gallop  westward  some  eighteen 
miles  north  of  Vryberg  in  the  country  known  as  Stella 
Land.  But  this  time  he  was  pursued  by  a  force  that 
knew  not  fatigue.  The  motor-cars  used  by  Colonel 
Brits,  the  actual  captor  of  De  Wet,  had  been  specially 
constructed  for  the  work  of  driving  across  this  rough 
and  broken  desert.  Even  so  the  achievement  was 
amazing.  They  had  to  face  rain  as  well  as  sand ;  and 
it  was  not  till  two  days  that  they  got  on  to  the  spoor  of 
De  Wet's  following.  Then  alternate  cars  moved  to 
right  and  left,  and  in  one  great  sweep  of  these  mechani- 
cal pincers  they  crept  round  De  Wet  and  his  faithful 
companions.  Even  at  that  supreme  moment  the  going 
was  so  bad — up  hill  and  down  dale,  and  through  the 
thickest  bush — that  De  Wet  again  and  again  eluded 
them.  Pouring  in  water,  "  letting  all  out,"  and  plough- 
ing through  the  deep  sand  on  their  first  gear,  they  went 

1  See  "The  Capture  of  De  Wet,"  by  Philip  Sampson  (Edward 
Arnold),  which  contains  a  good  account. 


304  GENERAL   BOTHA 

on  at  four  miles  an  hour  until  only  ten  cars  were  left. 
They  held  every  water  hole ;  and  yet  De  Wet  still 
pushed  on  with  incredible  speed.  Cut  off  from  water, 
he  determined  to  go  forward  without  it.  When  the 
thirst  of  De  Wet's  companions  became  intolerable  they 
killed  a  horse  and  drank  its  blood.  But  at  last  they 
stopped,  utterly  beaten  with  fatigue,  at  a  farm  named 
Waterbury,  where  they  slept  the  sleep  of  utter  ex- 
haustion.    The  old  warrior  was  dead-beat  at  last. 

In  the  early  dawn  seventy  men  crept  round  the 
house ;  and  De  Wet  and  his  companions  woke  to  find 
themselves  surrounded.  They  rushed  out,  but  were 
met  with  the  glint  of  the  rifle  barrels  facing  them  from 
every  point.  Men  could  do  no  more.  There,  at  that 
little  farm  in  the  desert,  this  master  of  escape  was  for 
the  first  time  captured. 

It  had  required  a  Botha  to  capture  a  De  Wet ! 


CHAPTER    XV 
THE    GERMAN    WAR     (1915) 


George  Philip  i  Son.Lh 
To  face  page  307. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE   GERMAN   WAR  (1915) 

**  Our  cry  for  cradled  Peace,  while  men  are  still 
The  three-parts  brute  which  smothers  the  divine, 
Heaven  answers  : — Guard  it  with  forethoughtful  will. 
Or  buy  it :  all  your  gains  from  war  resign  !  " 

— George  Meredith. 

After  rebellion,  the  German  War.  Without  rest 
or  pause,  Botha  had  no  sooner  suppressed  the  revolt 
in  his  own  country  than  he  resumed  the  interrupted 
invasion  of  German  South-West. 

German  South-West  Africa,  a  country  nearly  three 
times  the  size  of  the  United  Kingdom,  fell  as  a  Colony 
to  Germany  under  the  general  European  division  of 
Africa  that  took  place  by  consent  in  the  eighties  and 
the  nineties  of  last  century.  It  was  with  no  hearty 
approval  from  Cape  Colony  that  the  Imperial  Govern- 
men  handed  over  this  great  tract  of  country  to  Ger- 
many; and  it  was  as  a  result  of  a  protest  from  the 
Cape  that  that  Colony  was  allowed  to  retain  her  hold 
over  the  one  and  only  effective  harbour  in  the  centre 
of  German  South-West  Africa — Walfisch  Bay. 

During  the  thirty  years   which  had   elapsed   since 

'°'  u  2 


3o8  GENERAL   BOTHA 

Germany  secured  her  hold  over  this  country  she  had 
spared  no  effort  to  provide  her  new  Colony  with  the 
latest  equipment  of  modern  civilisation.  She  had 
spent  in  the  course  of  those  years  no  less  than 
;{J5o,ooo,ooo  on  South-West  Africa — on  railways, 
wireless,  mining  machinery,  and  water  supply.  It 
was  not  an  easy  country  to  make  fit  for  European 
habitation,  for  although  it  contains  many  rich  and 
fertile  tracts  of  land  in  the  centre,  those  tracts  are 
surrounded  with  an  arid  and  inhospitable  belt  of  desert, 
as  if  devised  by  nature  as  a  defence  for  those  who 
should  have  the  courage  to  live  there.  Even  the  con- 
siderable mineral  resources  of  South-West  Africa — its 
copper  and  diamonds — lie  in  remote  and  difficult 
regions. 

The  purely  mechanical  side  of  this  problem  of 
settlement  had  been  faced  by  Germany  with  character- 
istic industry  and  resourcefulness;  and  our  invading 
armies  were  amazed  at  the  perfection  and  ingenuity 
of  the  buildings  and  plant  dumped  down  in  that  torrid 
and  sterile  land — machinery,  buildings,  irrigation- 
works.  It  was  on  the  human  side  that  the  Germans 
had  so  dismally  failed.  In  spite  of  the  million  sterling 
annually  granted  to  German  South-West  Africa  by  the 
Imperial  Government,  it  still  remained  the  most 
sparsely  populated  Colony  in  the  world.  The  total 
European  population  was  still  short  of  15,000 — less 
than  one  human  being  to  two  and  a  half  square  miles. 
Even  the  German  inhabitants  tended  to  drift  into 
Cape  Colony;  and  there  was  little  love  lost  between 


THE   GERMAN   WAR  309 

the  civilians  and  their  military  masters.  The  white 
Colonists  appealed  in  vain  to  Berlin  for  those  ele- 
mentary rights  of  self-government  which  they  saw  in 
full  development  across  the  border.  The  free  and 
spacious  life  of  a  Colony,  such  as  we  know  it,  was 
strangled  in  official  regulations.  It  is  a  notable  and 
remarkable  fact  that  the  majority  of  even  those  irrecon- 
cilable Boers  who  drifted  into  the  German  Colony  after 
the  South  African  War  came  back  willingly  into 
British  territory,  preferring  the  easy-going  freedom  of 
our  rule  to  the  pipe-clay  rigidity  of  the  Germans.  The 
trail  of  militarism  was  best  shown  by  the  fact  that  even 
out  of  the  15,000  white  inhabitants  no  fewer  than  3,000 
were  soldiers  or  police. 

But  where  German  colonisation  had  chiefly  here 
broken  down  was  in  its  dealings  with  the  blacks.  Before 
the  coming  of  the  Germans  this  part  of  Africa  had 
been  inhabited  by  a  tribe  of  the  Bantu  race  called  the 
Hereros,  ruling  over  an  inferior  population  of  abori- 
ginal Hottentots.  There  had  been  the  usual  incidents 
of  sordid  cunning  and  trickery  between  white  man 
and  black  in  the  struggle  for  the  possession  of  the 
land — incidents  that  have  marked  the  early  stages  of 
nearly  all  European  contact  with  inferior  races.  In 
such  cases,  let  that  nation  which  is  without  guilt  throw 
the  first  stone.  But  the  real  trouble  with  the  Germans 
was  that,  having  once  quarrelled  with  the  blacks,  they 
seemed  unable  to  find  any  settlement  short  of  exter- 
mination. Their  war  with  the  Hereros  in  the  early 
twentieth  century  was,  by  admission  of  the  Germans 


3IO  GENERAL   BOTHA 

themselves,  perhaps  the  worst  of  all  the  struggles 
which  have  marked  the  white  man's  claim  to  South 
Africa.  It  became  gradually  one  monotonous  tale  of 
outrage  and  massacre.  It  absorbed  the  energies  of 
20,000  of  the  best  German  troops,  and  before  the  close 
became  a  matter  of  scandal  and  strife  to  the  Reichs- 
tag. To  achieve  success,  British  help  had  to  be  called 
to  the  aid  of  German  military  power.  The  Cape 
Police  were  ordered  by  the  Cape  Government,  at  the 
request  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  to  hand  over  Herero 
rebels  who  escaped  across  the  border,  and  for  this  a 
British  officer  was  decorated  by  the  German  Emperor. 

The  treatment  of  the  Hereros  brought  a  terrible 
Nemesis.  For  in  the  course  of  that  war  the  German 
Colonists  had  largely  crippled  their  own  energies. 
In  destroying  the  natives  they  had  destroyed  their  only 
supply  of  labour.  Already  before  the  European  War, 
the  German  Colony  was  languishing  for  the  lack  of 
the  black  workers  whom  they  had  so  freely  massacred 
a  few  years  before. 

Yet  the  Germans  now  looked  forward  to  the  British 
invasion  with  an  amazing  complacency.  They  had 
some  reasons.  Although  few  in  numbers  compared 
to  the  inhabitants  of  British  South  Africa,  the  Germans 
had  the  power  of  the  desert  and  the  sun  to  protect 
them.  It  was  no  easy  venture  to  march  an  army  into 
that  vast  waterless  land  through  the  fierce  blaze  of  a 
South  African  summer;  and  it  was  freely  prophesied 
by  many  wise  persons  even  in  South  Africa  that  Botha 
would  never  return.    It  would,  indeed,  have  been  easy 


THE   GERMAN   WAR  311 

enough  for  a  larger  army  than  Botha's  to  have 
perished  in  that  vast  and  homeless  furnace,  protected 
by  every  resource  of  the  latest  military  art. 

For  there — in  war-equipment — the  Germans  spared 
neither  money  nor  scruple.  Their  army  was  provided 
with  multitudes  of  the  finest  machine  guns  and  the 
best  artillery;  the  whole  line  of  march  along  which 
the  British  advanced  was  sown  with  explosive  mines 
of  the  most  formidable  character;  the  railways  were 
wrecked;  the  wonderful  wells  sunk  by  German 
engineers  in  the  dry  river-beds  were  either  destroyed 
or  poisoned.  It  seemed  impossible  that  troops  could 
live  in  a  land  so  devastated  and  armed  with  so  much 
lurking  death.  No  wonder  that  the  German  Staff 
looked  forward  with  some  serenity  to  the  successful 
defence  of  South-West  Africa  against  a  foe  thus 
to  be  met,  and  with  a  rebellion  simmering  in  his 
rear. 

But  they  had  reckoned  without  a  General  whose 
motto  was  "  swiftness  "  and  an  army  that  knew  not  the 
word  "  impossible."  For  in  the  remarkable  campaign 
that  now  followed,  Botha  himself  is  the  first  to  admit 
that  he  could  not  have  succeeded  without  the  wonder- 
ful troops  under  his  command.  He  was  not  now 
hampered  by  the  necessity  of  employing  troops  of  one 
race  only.  For  this  war  he  put  into  force  the  full 
provisions  of  the  Defence  Act.  He  called  for  volun- 
teers :  and  he  found  himself  with  a  full  complement 
of  splendid  fighters,  some  50,000  men  drawn  from 
both  races,  composed  equally  of  Dutch  and  British. 


312  GENERAL   BOTHA 

These  were  men  who  had  learned  to  live  hard  and 
simple  lives  on  farms  in  the  open  veldt,  good  shots  and 
riders,  inured  to    cold    and   heat,  hardened   to   great 
fatigue,  capable  of  prolonged  thirst  and  hunger.    They 
were   ready   for  long    forced   marches  on  a  few    dry 
biscuits  and  a  little  "biltong" — soldiers  who    could 
learn    to   assuage  thirst  with    a    pebble,  or  drive  off 
famine  with  a  raisin — hard  and  tough  men,  devoted  to 
their  leader  and  sure  of  their  cause.     They  were  not, 
indeed,  disciplined  as  Europe  understands  discipline ; 
for  they  would   talk  to  their  officers   as    friends,  and 
many  of  them  would  possess  and  pronounce  their  own 
opinions  about    strategy.      To  them   Botha  was  just 
"  Oom  Louis,"  and  Smuts  was  "  Jannie."    There  would 
be    strange    moods   among    those   commandos — times 
when  Botha  would  have  to  go  and  temper  the  wind 
with  smooth  words.     But  what  was  lost  in  discipline 
was  won  back  in  individual  alertness  and  intelligence 
— precious  qualities  in  such  a  war.     Those  wonderful 
troops  had  a  hundred  eyes.    They  could  see  and  feel 
water  miles  away ;  they  learnt  to  know  by  the  smallest 
surface  signs  where   one   of  those   deadly  mines  lay 
beneath  the  sand.     It  is  due  precisely  to  this  develop- 
ment of  individual  skill  and  knowledge  which  Botha 
always  encourages    that  so  few    lives  were  lost,  and 
that  only  once  did  a  German  mine  succeed  in  spreading 
"  frightfulness "    through    the    ranks    of    the    South 
Africans.^ 

^  Total  killed  in  the  whole  of  this  war,  88.     Died  of  wounds, 
25.     Wounded,  311. 


THE   GERMAN   WAR  313 

Botha's  plan  of  campaign  had  the  simplicity  of  all 
great  military  schemes.  He  divided  his  forces  into 
three  invading  armies  which  were  to  march  into  South- 
West  Africa  from  three  different  points — one  con- 
centrating from  the  southern  border  of  the  German 
Colony  at  Keetmans  Hoop,  and  the  other  two  advanc- 
ing inland  from  the  coast — Mackenzie  from  Liideritz- 
bucht,  and  Botha  himself,  with  the  northern  force, 
from  Swakopmund  straight  along  the  railway  to  the 
heart  of  the  enemy  at  Windhuk.  These  armies 
were  to  converge,  occupying  the  country  as  they 
advanced,  and  finally  surrounding  the  main  German 
army  of  occupation  with  an  overwhelming  superiority 
of  force.  For  it  is  characteristic  of  Botha  and  a  proof 
of  his  real  military  genius  that  he  carries  on  the 
Napoleonic  tradition  of  achieving  victory  by  the  con- 
centration of  numbers  and  power. 

It  was  in  the  month  of  April,  19 15,  that  the  great 
advance  began  from  all  points.  Once  Botha  moved 
he  moved  with  a  rapidity  which  upset  all  the  calcula- 
tions of  the  enemy.  He  himself  with  his  army  marched 
from  the  coast  inland  along  the  railway  practically 
night  and  day,  achieving  in  five  days  an  amazing 
record  of  190  miles  over  scorching  desert.  As  he 
came  on,  the  German  troops,  perplexed  by  the  news 
of  other  advances  from  south  and  west,  retreated 
rapidly,  and  the  march  soon  became  a  chase.  As  Botha 
entered  one  end  of  the  towns  he  would  see  the  German 
rearguard  leaving  at  the  other;  and  so  the  movement 
went  forward.     On    May    5    he   entered  the  town  of 


314  GENERAL   BOTHA 

Karibib,  only  to  find  the  German  army  already  flown. 
The  German  civilians  had  for  the  most  part  refused 
to  join  their  army,  and  they  showed  little  hostility 
towards  the  invader.^ 

In  return  the  German  civilians  were  treated  with 
every  kind  of  lenity  and  courtesy;  for  Botha  believes 
with  Henry  V.  that  when  men  strive  for  a  kingdom 
"the  gentler  gamester  is  the  surer  winner."  At  last, 
on  May  12,  without  a  check  or  break,  Botha  reached 
the  capital  city,  Windhuk,  and  entered  it  in  triumph. 
There  he  was  joined  by  the  armies  from  the  south, 
and  a  few  weeks  were  spent  in  refreshment  and  repair. 
The  rapid  mending  of  the  railway  behind  them  enabled 
Botha  to  refit  his  army  and  recruit  his  horses  before 
the  next  advance. 

At  the  end  of  June  Botha  set  out  again  into  the  desert 
at  the  same  breakneck  speed.  This  time  he  marched 
northward,  covering  120  miles  in  a  week.  Rapidly  he 
drew  near  the  German  forces,  who  retreated  further 
and  further  along  the  railway  into  the  desert,  putting 
up  no  resistance  except  an  occasional  skirmish.  Ad- 
vancing with  superior  numbers,  Botha  was  able  to 
outflank  them  every  time  they  tried  to  make  a  stand. 
But  they  w^re  not  merely  outnumbered ;  they  were  also 
again  and  again  beaten  in  fair  fight,  by  Manie  Botha, 
by  Wyburgh,  Brits,  Van  de  Venter,  Mackenzie — all 
those  remarkable  leaders  of  men  who  seem  to  spring 
up  freely  from  the  soil  of  trust  and  confidence.    Faced 

1  See  an  excellent  description  of  this  march  in  "  With  Botha 
in  the  Field,"  by  Moore  Ritchie  (Longmans,  Green  and  Co.). 


THE   GERMAN   WAR  315 

by  these  rapidly  moving  Afrikanders,  the  German 
troops  proved  too  slow  and  mechanical  even  in  retreat. 
The  Boers  walked  round  them. 

The  end  came  far  north  at  Tsumeb  on  July  9,  19 15. 
The  German  Commander,  Von  Franke,  still  had  4,000 
men  with  him  and  he  was  not  wanting  in  courage.  But 
he  suddenly  awoke  to  find  that  he  was  surrounded — 
not  by  the  whole  of  Botha's  army,  but  by  a  force 
smaller  than  his  own.  With  one  of  those  great  strokes 
of  the  military  art  which  seem  to  come  instinctively 
from  General  Botha,  he  had  sent  General  Brits  for  a 
detour  of  200  miles  through  wild  country  to  the  rear 
of  the  Germans,  and  had  blocked  their  retreat  to  the 
North.  At  the  same  time  he  sent  General  Wyburgh  to 
the  East  and  the  two  claws  of  the  pincers  almost  met. 
A  savage  tribe  eager  to  be  revenged  on  the  Germans, 
completed  the  circle.  Franke  had  no  choice — he  must 
either  perish  or  surrender. 

It  is  narrated  of  General  Botha  that  when  he  had 
secured  the  success  of  this  movement  and  found  the 
Germans  within  his  power  an  onlooker  suggested  that 
instead  of  awaiting  the  surrender  of  the  Germans  he 
should  destroy  them  by  a  concentrated  gun  fire.  "  No," 
said  General  Botha,  "  for  we  shall  have  to  live  with 
their  people  afterwards  !  "  It  was  characteristic  of  him 
that,  having  the  choice  of  peace  or  destruction,  he  pre- 
ferred peace. ^ 

Having  once  achieved  the  mastery  he  sought,  Botha 

1  Cp.    Tacitus.      "They   make  a   desert,    and  call   it    peace." 
(Solitudinem  faciunt  pacem  appellant.) 


3i6  GENERAL   BOTHA 

now  softened  the  surrender  for  the  German  Army  by 
terms  that  seem  to  Europe  amazingly  generous.  The 
officers  were  allowed  to  retain  their  arms  and  to  live 
on  parole  in  such  South  African  towns  as  they  might 
select.  The  reservists  were  to  surrender  their  arms, 
but  having  signed  the  parole  were  to  be  allowed  to  re- 
turn to  their  homes  and  resume  their  civil  occupations. 
All  reservist  prisoners  of  war  were  released  on  the  same 
terms.  Civil  officials  were  to  be  allowed  to  remain  in 
their  homes  provided  they  signed  the  parole.  The 
rank  and  file  were  to  be  interned  under  proper  guard, 
but  w^ere  to  be  allowed  to  retain  their  rifles  without 
ammunition.  Botha  had  the  immense  advantage  of 
remoteness  from  Germany,  and  could  therefore  run 
certain  risks  which  are  impossible  to  the  Home  Country. 
But  it  is  clear  that  in  these  terms  it  was  the  statesman 
rather  than  the  soldier  who  was  speaking.  Botha 
turned  his  back  on  "  reprisals."  He  met  "  frightf ulness" 
with  mercy.  He  had  in  view  the  large  and  broad  aim 
of  achieving  civil  peace  between  all  the  white  races  of 
South  Africa — including  not  only  Dutch  and  English 
but  also  even  Germans. 

Throughout  this  war  Botha  campaigned  with  the 
absolute  simplicity  of  the  old  Boer.  The  travelling 
wagon,  replete  with  modern  comforts,  prepared  for 
him  at  Cape  Town,  was  left  behind ;  a  magnificent  tent 
constructed  for  him  was  never  unpacked ;  he  slept  out 
both  in  good  weather  and  bad;  he  lived  like  the  sim- 
plest trooper  in  his  own  army.     His  only  relaxations 


THE   GERMAN  WAR  317 

were  auction  bridge  and  chess;  and  instead  of  taking 
with  him  the  French  cook  recommended  he  took 
"Malaboch,"  an  old  Cape  "boy." 

It  was  now  time  for  Botha  to  return  to  his  own 
country,  where  much  remained  to  be  done.  He  took 
ship  again  and  was  back  in  Pretoria  by  July  30.  He 
came  as  a  conquering  hero,  and  it  was  a  tremendous 
welcome  that  the  Pretorians  gave  him.  A  crowd  of 
over  12,000 — a  mighty  gathering  for  South  Africa — 
greeted  the  victorious  soldier.  He  spoke  to  this  people 
in  straight  and  simple  words.  He  was  not  ashamed  to 
claim  that  he  had  done  the  right  thing.  "  We  took  the 
more  difficult  course,"  he  said,  "  and  that  was  the  road 
of  honour,  truth,  and  justice." 

Then  he  put  in  a  word  for  South-West  Africa.  The 
country  had  been  ill  spoken  of  and  it  was  bad  for  cam- 
paigning. But  it  was  a  splendid  country  for  settlement 
and  farming;  and  he  intended  to  setttle  10,000  of  his 
own  people  there.  "  It  is  now  British  South-West 
Africa,"  he  said,  "  and  it  must  remain  a  Province  of  the 
Union."  In  those  words  he  defined  a  policy  that  may 
still  become  of  vital  moment  for  the  future  of  the  world. 

From  the  Transvaal  he  passed  into  the  Free  State 
and  to  Cape  Colony,  to  Bloemfontein,  and  Stellen- 
bosch;  and  at  each  great  centre  he  received  a  trium- 
phant welcome.  In  his  speeches  he  gave  all  the  praise 
to  his  soldie.rs ;  and  he  showed  that  he  had  lost  none  of 
that  old  Boer  piety  which  had  upheld  him  through  the 
Boer  War,  and  which  he  has  never  blushed  to  confess 


3i8  GENERAL   BOTHA 

before  men.  "  When  you  consider  the  hardships  we 
met,"  he  said — "  the  lack  of  water,  poisoned  wells,  and 
land  mines,  and  how  wonderfully  we  were  spared — you 
must  realise  and  believe  that  God's  hand  protected  us. 
It  is  due  to  His  intervention  that  we  are  safe  to-day  !  " 
The  time  had  now  come  for  Botha  to  put  his  war 
policy  to  the  test  of  public  opinion.  Under  the  South 
Africa  Act  it  is  laid  down  that  there  should  be  an 
election  for  the  Assembly  every  five  years;  and  the  first 
term  of  five  years  had  come  to  a  close  in  November, 
19 1 5.  It  would  not  have  been  possible  to  postpone 
this  election  without  passing  a  new  Bill  through  the 
Imperial  Parliament;  and  public  opinion  in  South 
Africa  was  strongly  bent  upon  observing  the  exact  pro- 
visions of  their  great  constitutional  statute.  Elections 
in  our  Colonies  do  not  bring  those  great  convulsions  of 
society  that  we  associate  with  General  Elections  in 
England.  The  quick  one-day  decision  of  a  modern 
colonial  democracy  is  a  very  different  thing  from  our 
long-dragging  national  suspense.  For  his  part,  Botha 
welcomed  the  election — even  in  a  country  which  had 
only  just  emerged  from  a  rebellion.  He  regarded  it 
as  a  safety  valve  from  all  the  violent  emotions  accumu- 
lated during  the  last  few  months.  He  was  not  ashamed 
to  vindicate  his  policy  before  the  people.  He  has  al- 
ways had  a  great  belief  in  his  power  of  persuasion  over 
the  multitude.  With  consummate  bravery  he  passed 
straight  from  the  field,  to  face,  unguarded,  on  the  plat- 
form, the  brothers  and  cousins  of  the  men  who  had 
fallen  in  fighting  against  him.     The  risk  was  by  no 


THE  GERMAN  WAR  319 

means  small.  There  was  at  least  one  conspiracy  to 
kill  him ;  and  General  Smuts,  his  lieutenant,  was  actu- 
ally received  by  pistol-shots  when  he  appeared  on  the 
platform  at  Newlands,  the  suburb  of  Johannesburg. 

General  Botha  fought  this  election  with  fierce  and 
resolute  energy.  He  realised  that  the  future  of  South 
Africa  depended  on  the  result.  It  was  a  difficult  and 
critical  political  situation  he  had  to  face.  As  leader 
of  the  South  African  party  he  was  confronted  by  three 
rival  organisations — the  Unionists,  the  Nationalists, 
and  the  Labour  Party.  It  was  practically  impossible 
that  he  should  obtain  a  majority  over  all  these  groups. 
Fortunately  for  him,  the  Labour  Party  had  been  split 
in  half  by  the  war;  some  of  them  had  entered  upon 
the  difficult  and  dubious  course  of  "war  against  war"; 
others  were  following  Mr.  Cresswell  in  support  of  the 
Government  policy.  The  Unionist  Party  under  Sir 
Thomas  Smartt  had  agreed  to  a  truce ;  and  in  some  dis- 
tricts a  division  of  seats  had  been  arranged  between 
the  Unionist  and  South  African  parties.  The  real  fight 
was  between  the  party  of  Botha  and  the  party  of  Hert- 
zog — the  leader  of  the  new  Nationalists.  This  contest 
was  fought  throughout  the  country  with  great  bitter- 
ness and  violence.  In  many  of  the  country  districts 
meetings  were  broken  up.  Botha  had  to  face  the  vit- 
riolic virulence  of  that  unbridled  hatred  which  comes 
only  from  men  who  once  were  friends. 

He  "  faced  the  music  "  with  serene  courage.  He 
went  into  every  part  of  the  country  and  met  his  oppo- 
nents.    There  were  places  in  the  back  veldt  where 


320  GENERAL   BOTHA 

not  a  single  politician  could  be  found  to  take  the  chair 
for  him.  In  such  places  Botha  would  become  both  his 
own  chairman  and  his  own  orator.  He  never  flinched 
from  hecklers;  and  in  that  field  of  war,  indeed,  the 
Dutchman  divides  honours  with  the  Scotchman. 

The  election  took  place  on  October  20,  191 5;  and 
Botha  emerged  with  a  following  which  put  all  the  pes- 
simists to  rout.  The  South  African  Party  in  the  new 
Assembly  numbered  54,  and  was  easily  the  largest 
party  in  the  House.  The  Unionists  numbered  40. 
The  Labour  Party  secured  only  four  seats;  and  the 
Independents  five.  The  Nationalists  emerged  as  a 
formidable  group  of  27.  The  election  showed  that 
their  power  was  concentrated  in  the  Free  State,  where 
Hertzog  had  swept  the  board.  The  voting  power  be- 
hind them  was  greater  than  the  proportion  of  seats — 
77,000  as  against  95,000  for  the  South  African  Party. 
Thus  there  was  still  an  element  of  peril  in  the  situa- 
tion; but  there  could  be  no  doubt  that,  with  such  a 
following,  it  was  Botha's  duty  to  continue  his  task  as 
Prime  Minister  of  the  South  African  Union. 

So  at  the  close  of  19 15  Botha  entered  upon  his 
second  South  African  Premiership.  Within  a  few 
months  he  had  given  the  world  another  mark  of  his 
characteristic  clemency  by  the  release  of  De  Wet ;  and 
during  19 16  he  had  increased  the  obligation  of  the 
Mother  Country  by  preparing  the  East  African  expedi- 
tion. So  we  leave  him,  the  African  pillar  of  our 
Empire,  bearing  on  his  broad,  humane  shoulders  the 
future  hopes  of  British  rule  in  that  vast  Continent. 


CHAPTER    XVI 

THE    MAN 


X 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  MAN 

"The  duration  of  the  lives  of  such  men  as  these  is  to  be 
determined,  I  think,  by  the  length  and  importance  of  the  parts 
they  act,  not  by  the  number  of  years  they  pass  between  their 
coming-  into  the  world  and  their  going  out  of  it." 

— BoLiNGBROKE  on  his   "Chosen  Men." 

Strong  in  frame  and  substantial  of  build — as  burly 
as  that  great  Minister  on  whose  size  Elizabeth  loved 
to  jest^ — Louis  Botha  is  a  living  magnet  to  the  affec- 
tions of  men.  Statesman  and  soldier,  South  African 
Premier  and  British  General,  he  would  pass  in  a  new 
country  as  a  well-to-do  farmer,  with  a  great  gift  for 
friendship  and  kindly  humour. 

He  can,  indeed,  be  stern  at  need,  and  In  battle 
terrible.  But  he  prefers  to  rule  by  love  rather  than 
fear.  To  his  followers  he  is  just  "  Oom  Louis  " ;  to  his 
troops  Botha;  to  his  children  a  brother;  to  his  Cabinet 
a  kindly  father.    He  governs  men  by  their  hearts. 

It  is  worth  while  before  we  leave  him  to  forrn  a 
picture  of  his  life  to-day  in  South  Africa. 

1  "My  Lord  Burleigh,  you  are  burly." 

3-3  X   2 


324  GENERAL  BOTHA 

The  new  Parliament  of  the  Union  sits  in  Cape 
Town;  the  administration  is  carried  on  at  Pretoria. 
Thus  it  is  that  Botha  has  to  spend  half  the  year  by 
the  sea  at  Cape  Town,  and  the  other  half  at  Pretoria 
in  the  heart  of  the  veldt  country. 

His  life  in  Cape  Town  during  the  sittings  of  Parlia- 
ment is  strenuous  enough,  but  it  has  its  pleasant  side. 

The  Session  lasts  from  January  to  July — from  the 
South  African  summer  to  the  winter.  During  that 
period  Botha  has  since  19 lo  lived  outside  the  town  at 
"  Groote  Schuur,"  the  country  mansion  which,  under 
Rhodes's  will,  now  stands  to  South  Africa  as  Downing 
Street^  does  to  the  Government  of  Great  Britain. 

"  Groote  Schuur,"  with  its  picturesque  Dutch  gables, 
its  gorgeous  summer-houses,  its  gardens  glowing  with 
all  the  tints  of  the  South  African  hydrangeas,  forms  a 
splendid  home  for  a  Prime  Minister.  Its  character- 
istic natural  feature  is  the  great  open  pillared  verandah 
facing  Table  Mountain — a  kind  of  glorified  South 
African  "  Stoep."  The  verandah  is  richly  furnished 
with  tables,  chairs,  and  sofas,  and  there  any  resident 
or  visitor  can  live  a  delightful  open-air  life,  so  pleasant 
and  easy  in  that  clear  and  dry  climate  of  South  Africa, 
rarely  too  hot  in  summer  or  too  cold  in  winter. 

From  this  "Stoep"  can  be  seen  the  gigantic 
memorial  to  Cecil  Rhodes,  far  up  the  mountain,  erected 


1  Left  by  vSir  George  Downing-  (i 623-1684)  in  perpetuity  to 
the  First  Ministers  of  tlie  Crown,  just  as  "Groote  Schuur"  has 
been  left  to  the  Prime  Ministers  of  South  Africa  by  Cecil 
Rhodes. 


THE  MAN  325 

at  the  very  spot  where  the  "  Colossus  "  used  to  spend 
his  Sunday  mornings  dreaming  and  scheming.  One 
looks  down  from  that  memorial,  as  Rhodes  looked,  on 
the  far-spread  city  of  Cape  Town — with  the  distant 
twinkling  waters  of  the  Atlantic  on  one  side  and  the 
blue  mountains  on  the  other. 

Standing  there  now  we  can  think  of  those  large  and 
generous  words  that  Botha  wrote  of  Rhodes  in  August, 
1912^ : — 

"  Criticism,  at  such  a  time  as  this,  gives  place  to 
reverent  and  sincere  appreciation  of  what  was  best  and 
most  unselfish  in  our  friend  :  and  the  heart  in  reverence 
bows  to  the  silent  prayer  that  what  was  greatest  and 
highest  and  noblest  in  Cecil  Rhodes  may  remain  a 
living  influence  in  the  country  he  loved  so  well." 

There,  in  those  words  spoken  after  such  bjtter 
experiences,  you  have  a  reflection  of  the  great  and 
humane  spirit  of  the  speaker,  always  seeking  for  what 
is  best  in  all  men. 

Botha  has  reason  to  feel  and  know  the  splendour  of 
Cecil  Rhodes's  imagination.  For  in  this  house, 
"  Groote  Schuur,"  Rhodes  lavished  his  great  wealth 
with  both  hands — splendidly  furnishing  it  and  filling  it 
with  precious  treasures — rare  antique  furniture  and 
silver — old  Dutch  china,  a  great  collection  of  pictures, 
and  a  gallery  of  tapestry  worked  with  an  emblematic 
allegory  of  peace  and  war. 

^  His  Foreword  to  the  published  edition  of  Earl  Grey's  speech 
on  Cecil  Rhodes  at  the  dedication  of  the   Memorial. 


326  GENERAL   BOTHA 

It  is  not  a  very  big  house.  The  reception  rooms  are 
large,  but  there  are  not  more  than  twelve  bedrooms. 
A  remarkable  feature  is  a  marble  bathroom  which  fills 
every  visitor  with  admiration.  It  is  an  adapted  sar- 
cophagus, and  so  big  that  five  people  can  bathe  in  it 
at  once.  There  is  a  marble  table  at  the  side,  and 
altogether  it  seems  to  embody  one  of  those  visions  of 
splendid  living  which  filled  the  minds  of  the  later 
citizens  of  Imperial  Rome. 

In  the  gardens  of  "  Groote  Schuur"  is  a  special 
"  Zoo,"  filled  with  the  animals  which  Cecil  Rhodes 
collected  from  every  part  of  the  world,  including  the 
famous  lions — one  of  the  sights  of  Cape  Town. 

During  the  six  months  of  residence  in  this  house 
the  Bothas  freely  entertain  visitors  to  Cape  Tow^n. 
Both  Dutch  and  English  are  equally  welcome.  The 
Bothas  like  to  have  the  house  full,  and  they  are  fond 
of  sharing  it  with  their  friends.  To  the  people  it  is 
a  great  show  place,  and  from  morning  till  night  visitors 
from  England  and  the  world  at  large  are  wandering 
through  its  rooms.  Here  you  meet  the  officers  of  an 
English  man-of-war  side  by  side  with  members  of  the 
Legislative  Assembly  from  far  Transvaal,  all  sorts 
and  conditions.  Mrs.  Botha  is  always  a  charmino;- 
hostess,  and  is  ready  to  entertain  all  reasonable  visitors 
from  Dutch  school  teachers  lo  English  tourists  and 
Girl  Guides. 

The  one  room  which  Mrs.  Botha  never  opens  to  her 
guests  is  the  bedroom  of  Cecil  Rhodes.  That  room 
is  kept  exactly  as  it  was  in  his  lifetime — a  people's 


THE  MAN  327 

tribute    to    the    man    who    gave    his    house    to    the 
people. 

The  South  African  Parliament  sits  from  two  in  the 
afternoon  until  twelve  o'clock  at  night,  and  it  shares 
with  the  Imperial  House  of  Commons  the  unpleasant 
habit  of  all-night  sittings.  That  being  so,  General 
Botha  has  often  to  come  home  very  late  at  night  from 
his  work;  but  in  spite  of  that  he  is  a  very  early  riser, 
and  he  is  often  to  be  seen  sitting  on  the  verandah 
reading  his  papers  by  six  o'clock  on  the  following 
morning. 

Like  all  hard  pressed  men  he  is  forced  to  live  a 
very  simple  life.  He  used  to  smoke,  although  never 
excessively;  but  now  he  has  had  to  give  it  up  alto- 
gether. He  is  a  practising,  but  not  a  professing, 
teetotaler,  and  refuses  wine  even  at  public  banquets. 
His  favourite  drink  on  such  occasions  is  lemon  and 
plain  water.  He  has  a  curious  passion  for  sweets, 
which  have  probably  taken  the  place  of  smoking  in 
his  case. 

It  is  always  a  great  trial  for  a  man  to  transfer  his 
energies  from  an  active  out-of-door  life  to  the  indoor 
mental  existence  of  a  brain  worker.  This  is  especially 
the  case  with  a  Boer,  who  belongs  to  the  most  out-of- 
door  race  in  the  world.  When  he  was  young.  General 
Botha  practically  lived  on  horseback  and  in  the  fields ; 
now  he  has  been  compelled  to  spend  most  of  his  time 
in  the  study  and  the  Council  Chamber.  The  first  result 
was  that  he  grew  much  stouter.    He  is  now  dieted,  and 


328  GENERAL  BOTHA 

is  engaged  in  one  of  those  anxious,  strenuous,  uphill 
fights  against  assailing  adiposity  which  makes  the 
whole  middle-aged  world  kin.  Like  so  many  British 
statesmen  he  has  taken  to  golf — another  link  with 
Empire  !  It  is  his  frequent  habit  to  motor  out  to  his 
golf-course  at  five  o'clock  in  the  morning  and  to  play 
until  eight.  He  will  do  this  even  when  Parliament  has 
kept  him  sitting  until  after  m.idnight — a  striking  proof 
of  his  immense  physical  energy.  In  very  hot  weather 
he  sometimes  varies  this  by  motoring  down  to  Muizen- 
berg  and  taking  a  dip  in  the  sea  in  the  early  morning. 
During  his  visit  to  England  he  greatly  impressed  an 
English  Tennis  Club  at  Hampstead  by  arriving  for 
a  game  at  six  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

He  reaped  the  reward  of  this  physical  steady  self- 
discipline  during  the  campaign  in  German  South-West 
Africa.  Throughout  that  campaign  he  had  to  ride, 
and  he  showed  himself  capable  of  extraordinary 
physical  endurance.  After  a  long  day's  ride  he  would 
be  as  fresh  as  any  of  his  officers ;  and  he  wore  out  many 
horses  in  the  course  of  the  campaign. 

He  takes  his  duties  with  that  grave  systematic 
seriousness  which  is  still  a  strong  trait  of  the  Dutch 
character  at  its  best.  He  has  the  true  public  man's 
habit  of  putting  public  affairs  first.  But  that  is  not 
to  say  that  he  will  not  unbend.  On  the  contrary,  no 
man  is  more  ready  to  "  rejoice  with  those  who  rejoice." 
For  Botha  is  essentially  of  a  jovial,  good-humoured 
nature,  although  the  calls  upon  him  often  make  him 
very  grave.      But   in  the  intervals  of  work  he  gives 


THE  MAN  329 

many  dinner-parties,  although  he  does  not  himself  ^o 
much  to  the  houses  of  others,  but  prefers  to  spend  his 
free  evenings  at  home.  He  has  a  desk  in  his  bedroom 
at  "  Groote  Schuur "  where  he  writes  many  of  his 
letters.  He  never  goes  to  a  theatre  in  South  Africa. 
He  will  play  cards  or  billiards  with  his  family  all  the 
evening — take  a  drink  of  water,  and  then  go  to  bed. 
He  is,  I  believe,  accounted  a  very  good  bridge-player 
by  the  best  bridge-players  of  the  Cape.  Such  are  the 
lesser  details  of  a  greatly  lived  life. 

Like  many  men  with  that  broad,  humane  tempera- 
ment of  his,  Botha  has  a  special  aversion  from  gossip. 
He  will  very  quickly  check  personal  remarks  among 
the  young  people  of  his  family.  He  loves  to  hear  his 
children  talk,  but  he  is  a  remorseless  foe  of  that  very 
tempting  and  seductive  form  of  light  conversation 
which  battens  upon  the  smaller  faults  and  failings  of 
neighbours  and  acquaintances.  This  form  of  gossip 
brings  from  him  a  rapid  and  decisive  rebuke.  He  is, 
perhaps,  at  his  best  when  he  is  telling  his  war  stories ; 
but  that  is  a  rare  mood  with  him  and  will  come  only 
when  he  is  with  intimate  friends. 

But,  after  all,  perhaps  the  most  characteristic  picture 
of  Botha  is  to  be  seen  during  the  Recess,  when  he 
moves  to  Pretoria,  the  capital  of  his  own  province,  and 
lives  in  his  own  house  among  his  own  people. 

His  home  in  Pretoria  is  just  a  big  bungalow  of  the 
old  Dutch  type.  At  the  Cape  all  his  servants  are  white, 
but  here  at  Pretoria  he  is  waited  upon  by  white  and 


330  GENERAL   BOTHA 

black.  He  has  an  old  black  servant  named  Asia. 
When  the  Boer  War  broke  out  it  was  proposed  that 
Asia  should  stay  behind;  but  Asia  refused.  "  If  Baas 
goes  to  the  war,"  said  the  faithful  black  servant,  "  Asia 
goes  too.  If  Baas  gets  killed,  Asia  gets  killed  too." 
The  two  came  home  alive,  although  Botha  had  a  horse 
killed  under  him  and  several  times  narrowly  escaped 
death.  Asia  was  duly  promoted  to  be  Botha's  coach- 
man. 

Black  servants  are  not  always  quite  adapted  to  the 
civilised  usages  of  public  life.  The  story  is  told  that 
when  Lord  and  Lady  Selborne  called  on  Botha  at 
Pretoria  at  the  beginning  of  his  Premiership,  Mrs. 
Botha  ordered  tea,  but  no  tea  came.  When  after  a 
time  Mrs.  Botha  sought  the  reason,  she  found  that  it 
was  because  the  Kaffir  girls  had  given  the  tea  to  the 
Governor's  lackeys,  whom  they  judged  by  their  cos- 
tume to  be  the  real  rulers  of  South  Africa. 

At  Pretoria,  Botha  lives  in  far  less  "  state  "  than  at 
Cape  Town.  His  evenings  are  less  occupied,  and  he  is 
able  to  see  more  of  his  own  family.  Like  most  Boers, 
Botha  is  devoted  to  his  family,  and  he  would  be  very 
unhappy  if  any  of  his  children  forgot  to  come  and 
give  him  a  good-night  kiss.  He  is  very  fond  of  his 
grandchildren. 

His  study  at  Pretoria  is  decorated  with  some  fine 
prints  of  Napoleon,  whose  campaigns  he  has,  of  course, 
carefully  studied.  For  his  public  correspondence  he 
has  that  admirable  secretary,  Dr.  Bok,  who  has  been 
his  confidential  adviser  ever  since  he  has  been  Prime 


THE  MAN  331 

Minister.  But  there  are  many  things  he  keeps  to  him- 
self and  many  letters  he  writes  with  his  own  hand. 
Botha  never  forgets  that  he  is  head  of  the  great  party 
as  well  as  Prime  Minister.  The  South  African  Party 
is  closely  organised,  and  Botha  has  party  agents  in 
every  district;  but  he  never  leaves  affairs  entirely  to 
agents,  and  he  makes  a  rule  of  visiting  a  number  of 
constituencies  each  vacation  time. 

We  must  not  think  of  these  small,  close-knit  Govern- 
ments in  our  Dominions  as  being  in  any  relation  of  size 
to  our  Government  at  home.  The  first  thing  that  strikes 
a  visitor  to  any  of  the  great  Colonies  is  the  homeliness 
and  friendliness  of  politics.  The  circle  is  so  much 
smaller.  I  can  remember  arriving  in  Montreal  from 
England  with  a  bare  note  of  introduction  to  Sir  Wilfrid 
Laurier,  presenting  my  note,  and  dining  with  him  the 
same  evening  in  the  public  room  at  the  Windsor  Hotel. 
In  London  all  that  would  have  taken  at  least  a  week. 
Similarly,  in  Pretoria  all  the  Ministers  meet  one 
another  several  times  every  day.  The  Government 
offices  are  all  in  one  building  and  frequently  all  lunch 
together.  That  makes  it  much  easier  for  a  Prime 
Minister  to  keep  his  Cabinet  united. 

In  Pretoria,  as  in  Cape  Town,  the  Bothas  keep  open 
house,  and  their  life  is  still  half-public.  Their  real 
intimate  private  life  is  lived  during  their  holidays,  which 
they  spend  at  "  Rusthof,"  their  farm  near  Standerton 
in  the  Transvaal.  Standerton  was  Botha's  first  con- 
stituency under  the  Transvaal  Constitution  of  1906, 
and  he  is  thoroughly  at  home  there.    There  he  becomes 


332  GENERAL  BOTHA 

the  Boer  farmer.  He  lives  a  happy  domestic  life  with 
his  wife  and  such  of  his  children  as  are  not  yet 
detached  from  home  by  other  calls. ^ 

Dutch  is  his  domestic  language,  and  he  generally 
speaks  Dutch  in  public.  But  he  speaks  English  in 
Natal,  and  he  is  willing  to  speak  English  anywhere 
by  special  request.  The  only  difficulty  is  that  he  has 
to  write  his  speeches  in  English  before  he  delivers 
them.  He  is  always  willing  to  have  his  speeches 
repeated  or  summarised  in  either  Dutch  or  English 
according  to  the  need.  When  we  remember  that  he 
can  also  talk  Zulu  and  Sesuto  it  becomes  fair  to  say 
that  General  Botha  is  a  considerable  linguist. 

But  it  is  not  the  accomplishments  that  make  the 
man — it  is  the  inherited,  habitual  trend  of  character. 
There  we  come  back  to  the  fact  that  Botha  is  before 
all  things  a  countryman,  brought  up  on  the  land  and 
loving  nothing  better  than  the  land.  Contact  with 
mother  earth  seems  to  have  given  him  some  of  the  large 
serenity  and  sane  endurance  of  nature  herself.  A 
strange  fortune  has  taken  him  by  the  hand  and  led  him 
to  places  of  great  pomp  and  power.  Still,  in  his 
moments  of  leisure  he  loves  to  throw  off  the  robes  of 
State  and  to  become  the  farmer  once  more.     He  feels 

"A  distant  clearness  in  the  hill 
A  secret  sweetness  in  the  stream." 

He  is  never  happier  than  when  he  is  riding  about 

1  His  eldest  daughter  has  married  and  is  now  Mrs.  De 
Waal.  His  eldest  boy  was  aide-de-camp  in  the  German  cam- 
paign. 


THE  MAN  333 

his  lands  on  his  country  farm.  For,  as  we  have  seen  in 
so  many  episodes  of  his  career,  he  ever  loves  peace 
and  ensues  it;  and  that  is  a  great  piece  of  luck  for 
South  Africa.  For  there  are  great  temptations  attach- 
ing to  that  genius  for  war  which  Botha  possesses.  The 
coming  of  such  men  into  the  world — men  gifted  with 
that  rare  power  of  mastery  in  the  field  of  violence 
which  men  call  generalship — has  not  always  been  a 
blessing  for  the  country  that  has  produced  them.  They 
possess  a  power  against  which  there  seems  no  appeal. 
Fortunate,  then,  is  humanity  when  the  possessor  of 
such  skill  employs  it  only  for  great  humane  ends,  and 
himself  fixes  a  limit  to  his  own  awful  power.  To  that 
class  of  warrior  Botha  emphatically  belongs. 

In  his  peaceful  ventures  he  has  been  prosperous. 
The  farm  at  Vryheid  destroyed  in  the  war — the 
"  Waterval  " — was  a  famous  establishment.  There  he 
indulged  in  his  passion  for  trees,  and  he  rejoiced  in 
planting  avenues  of  silver  wattle,  a  very  beautiful 
growth.  He  laid  out  at  Vryheid  a  large  agricultural 
show  ground,  and  he  made  a  great  deal  of  money  as 
the  district  grew.  He  was  then,  as  now,  a  great  judge 
of  stock,  especially  of  sheep,  and  on  his  various  visits 
to  England  he  made  a  special  point  of  choosing  speci- 
mens of  the  best  British  breeds  to  strengthen  and  im- 
prove the  South  African  cattle  after  the  war.  In  every 
respect,  indeed,  his  interest  in  farming  has  been  of 
great  value  to  his  country;  for  it  has  led  him,  as 
Minister  of  Agriculture,  to  make  great  and  important 
efforts    for    the    improvement   of   what   must   be,    in 


334  GENERAL  BOTHA 

the  end,  the  really  enduring  industry  of  South 
Africa. 

It  is  probably  his  up-bringing  on  the  land  which  has 
made  Botha  so  patient  and  good-tempered  under  criti- 
cism, and  has  given  to  his  character  its  permanent 
background  of  large  tolerance  and  generosity.  Woven 
into  this  background  is  all  the  shrewdness  and  "  slim- 
ness"  of  a  man  who  knows  the  great  world ;  and  it  is 
this  combination  of  contrasting  qualities  that  gives  to 
his  character  its  real  distinction.  A  master  of  war  and 
politics,  he  yet  talks  to  the  people  in  the  vernacular  of 
their  own  beloved  "  Taal,"  and  uses  their  own  homely 
Dutch  proverbs.  "  No  man  accuses  another  of  hiding 
behind  the  door  to  listen  unless  he  has  been  there  him- 
self " — is  a  good  specimen  of  such  familiar  lore  of  the 
old  Dutch.  When  Hertzog  thought  to  improve  rela- 
tions between  the  races  by  talk  about  the  possible 
treachery  of  the  British  rule,  Botha  remarked  :  "  He 
reminds  me  of  a  man  on  his  honeymoon  telling  people 
what  he  would  do  if  his  wife  became  unfaithful  to  him." 
It  would  be  difficult  to  improve  on  the  comparison. 

But  it  is  not  only  from  Mother  Earth  that  Botha 
draws  his  strength.  It  is  also  from  those  earlier  races 
which  are  the  human  soil  of  South  Africa.  He  un- 
doubtedly owes  much  to  his  lifelong  knowledge  and 
observation  of  the  natives  of  South  Africa.  Those  who 
have  watched  him  much  in  Parliament  observe  that  he 
is  very  slow  to  reply.  He  prefers  allowing  all  his 
critics  to  exhaust  themselves  before  he  reveals  his 
defence.    This  was  one  of  the  favourite  habits  of  those 


THE  MAN  335 

remarkable  men,  the  old  native  African  chiefs,  who 
carried  on  the  last  long  fight  against  the  invading 
white  man — men  like  Cetewayo  and  Lobengula.  It  is 
probable  that  Botha  in  his  early  days  learnt  much  of 
his  ready  power  of  expression  and  skill  in  argument 
from  listening  to  the  talk  of  those  admirable  debaters 
of  the  black  race. 

But  behind  it  all  is  the  Dutchman,  full  of  shrewd 
proverbs  and  excellent  Veldt  similes — "  of  wise  saws 
and  modern  instances  " — of  pawky  familiar  strokes  of 
humour  that  put  him  at  ease  with  his  audiences  and 
blunt  the  edge  of  wrath  with  laughter. 

The  astonishing  thing  is,  of  course,  that  Botha  com- 
bines with  all  this  such  high  ideals  of  honour  and 
principle;  and  it  is  even  more  remarkable  that  with  so 
little  education  he  has  such  immense  influence  over 
educated  men.  Such  miracles  of  character  often  put 
to  shame  the  pride  of  the  schools.  But  in  Botha's  case 
he  has  the  advantage,  which  high  character  so  often 
secures,  of  being  surrounded  by  intellectual  helpers. 
There  is,  for  instance,  Mrs.  Botha,  his  gifted  and 
highly-educated  helpmate — his  parliamentary  Lieu- 
tenant, Smuts,  the  finest  flower  of  an  English  Univer- 
sity— his  keen  and  clever  secretary,  Dr.  Bok — and  last, 
but  not  least,  his  well-educated  children — all  these  are 
helping  Botha  to  meet  his  enemies  in  the  gate. 

Then  we  come  again  to  another  phase  of  the  old 
contrast  in  his  character — that  with  all  his  instincts 
for  war,  Botha  is  an  exceptionally  humane  man.  Dur- 
ing his  youth  he  shot  a  great  deal.     Like  most  of  the 


336  GENERAL  BOTHA 

young  Boers  he  delighted  to  hunt  and  shoot  types 
of  antelope  known  in  South  Africa  as  "Buck";  and 
without  doubt  this  sport  taught  him  a  great  deal  of  the 
elements  of  war.  But  in  later  life  he  has  lost  his 
love  of  shooting,  and  very  rarely  indulges  it.  Perhaps 
because  he  has  seen  so  much  life  taken  in  anger,  he 
now  finds  little  pleasure  in  the  taking  of  life  in  sport. 

With  all  these  contradictions,  Botha  is  just  a  great 
piece  of  astounding  good  fortune  for  the  British 
Empire;  and  perhaps  it  is  precisely  the  con- 
tradictions that  make  him  so  big  a  piece  of 
fortune.  Governing  a  mixed  population  of  English 
and  Dutch,  he  is  always  being  blamed  by  both 
parties;  and  that  is  perhaps  the  best  proof  that  he  is 
working  on  the  right  lines.  Standing  between  the 
races,  he  cannot  expect  to  have  the  hearty  enthusiastic 
support  of  either;  for  the  entire  support  of  one  would 
mean  the  entire  enmity  of  the  other.  But  it  takes  no 
ordinary  man  to  stand  the  fret  of  constant  blame. 
There  have  been  times  in  Botha's  life  when  even  his 
strong  spirit  has  seemed  to  bend  beneath  the  burden. 
There  was  a  moment  after  his  defeat  at  East  Pretoria 
in  1 910  when  a  great  fatigue  seemed  to  seize  him;  and 
for  a  long  time  after  that  misfortune,  Botha's  health 
was  bad.  For  beneath  it  all  he  is  a  sensitive  man ;  and 
his  endurance  must  not  be  mistaken  for  callousness. 
But  he  has  found,  as  so  many  men  find  in  such  a  posi- 
tion, that  enduring  victory  is  to  be  sought  only  through 
the  power  of  accepting  defeat  without  being  defeated. 

The  wishes  of  all  men  of  good  heart  will  go  out  to 


THE  MAN  337 

General  Botha  in  his  great  task.  For  they  see  him,  in 
a  country  harassed  and  devastated  by  wars,  standing 
steadily  for  unity  and  peace.  To  the  vast,  multitu- 
dinous confusion  of  races  and  colours  that  makes  up 
South  Africa,  he  preaches  steadily  and  calmly  that  the 
only  secret  of  future  well-being  lies  in  mutual  toler- 
ance and  forgiveness.  Such  a  gospel  at  such  a  moment 
shines  star-like,  "  like  a  good  deed  in  a  naughty  world." 

In  glancing  back  over  the  life  of  the  modern  world, 
there  are  several  figures  recalled  by  the  career  of 
Botha.  Conspicuously,  there  is  Washington,  the  vic- 
torious soldier  who  combined  skill  in  war  with  modesty 
and  public  spirit,  and  who  after  a  great  war  helped  to 
lead  the  people  to  a  larger  unity. 

But  an  even  more  striking  parallel  is  that  of  William 
III.,  the  great  Dutch  King  who  ascended  the  throne 
of  Great  Britain.  He,  too,  was  called  in  middle  life 
from  his  own  people  to  rescue  another's  country  from 
the  hell  of  civil  war,  and  to  rule  over  men  of  another 
tradition  and  another  tongue.  He,  too,  had  to  bring 
into  harmony  the  men  of  those  two  races,  the  English 
and  the  Dutch,  who  have  not  always  loved  one  another 
so  dearly  because  they  are  so  near  akin.  With  William 
III.,  as  with  Botha,  his  Dutch  followers  accused 
him  of  preferring  England,  and  his  English  subjects 
denounced  his  Dutch  friends.  Both  had  to  deal  with 
extremists  on  either  side — William  III.  with  Jacobites 
who  wanted  to  restore  the  old  dynasty,  Botha  with 
Nationalists  who  have  craved  after  the  old  Republics. 
Both  have  had  to  strike  a  compromise ;  and  a  compro- 

Y 


338  GENERAL   BOTHA 

mise  has  few  friends.  Both  have  suffered  defeat; 
both  have  drawn  out  of  defeat  victory.  Both  have 
been  men  sparing  in  words,  but  strong  in  deeds. 

The  same  aim  and  object  have  been  placed  before 
both,  to  draw  two  sundered  races  together. 

Only  one  thing  remains  to  make  the  parallel  com- 
plete. William  III.  succeeded.  As  they  have  proved 
alike  in  so  much  else,  is  it  not  probable  that  these  two 
men — these  two  great  Dutchmen  who  have  both 
wielded  the  British  power — will  in  this  also  prove 
alike  ? 


ABYSSINIA 


200  400  600  800 

^-^-  Principal  Railways 


George  Philip  &  Son,L';'' 

Tojuce  page  338, 


APPENDIX    I 

BOTHA'S     LIFE 

PRINCIPAL    DATES 

Born  at  Greytown,  Natal  September  27,   1862 

Expedition   to   Zululand   1884 

Married  and  settles  in  Vryheid   1885 

Becomes  member  for  Vryheid  in  Transvaal  Volksraad  ...      1895 
Goes  on  active  service  as  Field  Cornet  in  Boer  War   October,  1899 
Becomes   Assistant   Commandant-General   of   the   Trans- 
vaal           November,   1899 

Commands  at  Battle  of  Colenso  December  15,  1899 

Saves  the  day  for  Boers  at  Spion  Kop  January  24,  1900 

Becomes  Commandant-General  of  Transvaal  on  Joubert's 

death      March  27,   1900 

Commands  Boers  at  Battle  of  Berg--en-dal     Aug-ust  25-27,   1900 

Wins   Battle   of  Bakenlaag-te    October   30,    1900 

Signs  Peace  at  Vereeniging  May  31,  1902 

Visits  England  July-November,   1902 

Founds  Het  Volk  and  agitates  for  responsible  Government     1905 

Responsible  Government  given  to  Transvaal   1906 

First  General  Election  February  20,  1907 

Becomes  Premier  of  Transvaal  March,  1907 

Visits     Great    Britain    as     Delegate    to     Imperial    Con- 
ference        July)  1907 

Attends  Union  Convention  October  12,  1908 

Draft  Act  signed  May  11,  1909 

Visits  Great  Britain  to  secure  assent  to  Union  Act     July,  1909 

Union  Act  receives  Royal  Assent  December  20,  1909 

Premier  of  South  African  Union  May  31,  1910 

First  General  Election  September,  1910 

Visits  Great  Britain  again  as  Delegate  to  Imperial  Con- 
ference         May,  191 1 

Returns  to  South  Africa  August  29,  191 1 

Indian  Coolie  Crisis  1912 

The  Hertzog  Split  November,  1913 

The  Great  Rand  Strike  July-August,  1913 

The  Railway  Strike  January,  1914 

339 


340  APPENDIX   II 

Deports  Labour  Leaders  January  27,   1914 

Puts  down  Rebellion  in  British  South  Africa 

October  and  November,  1914 

De  Wet  Captured  December  2,   1914 

Invaded  German  South-West  April,   1915 

Surrender  of  German  Army  July  19,  191 5 

Returns  to  South  Africa  July  30,  191 5 

Wins  Second  General  Election  October  20,  191 5 

Premier  of  South  African  Union  for  second  time  November,  1915 


APPENDIX    II 

THE  DINIZULU  AGREEMENT 

PROCLAMATION. 

To  all  who  may  see  or  hear  this  read — Salute. 

I,  Dinizulu,  King-  of  the  Zulus  and  of  Zululand,  with  the 
advice  and  counsel  of  my  chief  Ministers  and  Headmen  and  of 
William  Grant  as  my  representative  and  adviser, 

PROCLAIM 

by  these  presents  make  known  that  I,  with  my  Ministers  and 
Headmen  before  mentioned,  have  given  in  full  and  free  posses- 
sion to  a  certain  number  of  South  African  Boers  in  Zululand, 
certain  portion  of  Zululand  bordering-  on  the  South  African 
Republic  and  the  Reserve,  to  the  extent  of  approximately  one 
million  three  hundred  and  fifty-five  thousand  morg-en  ^  of  ground, 
with  the  right  to  establish  there  an  independent  Republic  under 
the  name  of 

THE  NEW  REPUBLIC, 

and  I  proclaim  further  that  henceforth  the  remaining-  portion 
of  Zululand  and  the  Zulu  nation  shall  be  subject  to  the  control 
of  the  Executive  Council  of  the  said  New  Republic. 

Given  under  my  hand  at  Hlobane  in  the  New  Republic  on 
this  1 6th  day  of  August,  a.d.   1884. 

(Mark   x  )  Dinizulu. 

William  Grant. 

^  A  morgen  =  2  acres. 


APPENDIX   III 


PROCLAMATION. 


341 


Be  it  known  to  all  who  may  see  or  hear  this  read,  that  I, 
Lukas  Johannes  Meyer,  acting-  President  of  the  New  Republic, 
with  the  advice  and  counsel  of  the  Executive  Council,  and  by 
virtue  of  Resolution  of  the  Volksraad  of  this  date,  and  with 
the  voluntary  consent  and  at  request  of  Dinizulu,  King-  of 
the  Zulus  and  Zululand,  and  his  chief  Ministers  and  Headmen, 
hereby 

PROCLAIM 

and  make  known  the  protectorate  of  the  New  Republic  over  the 
whole  of  the  territory  comprising  the  kingdom  of  King  Dinizulu. 

All  powers  and  persons  are  requested  to  take  cog^nisance  of 
this  Proclamation  and  to  conduct  themselves  in  accordance 
therewith. 

God  preserve  the  land  and  people. 

Given  under  my  hand  at  Hlobane,  in  the  New  Republic,  on 
this  sixteenth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  eighty-four. 

L.  J.  Meyer,  Acting  President. 

D.  J.  EssELEN,  Acting  States  Attorney. 


APPENDIX     III 

THE  TREATY  OF  VEREENIGING   (1902) 

The  g-overning-  clauses  of  this  Treaty,  which  at  present  regu- 
lates the  relations  between  Great  Britain  on  the  one  side  and 
the  Transvaal  and  Orange  Free  State  on  the  other,  run  as 
follows  : — 

"  I.  The  burgher  forces  in  the  field  will  forthwith  lay  down 
their  arms,  handing-  over  all  guns,  rifles,  and  munitions  of  war 
in  their  possession  or  under  their  control,  and  desist  from  any 
further  resistance  to  the  authority  of  His  Majesty  King- 
Edward  VII,  whom  they  recognise  as  their  lawful  sovereign.  The 
manner  and  details  of  this  surrender  will  be  arranged  between 


342  APPENDIX   III 

Lord  Kitchener  and  Commandant-General  Botha,  Assistant 
Commandant-General  De  la  Rey,  and  Chief  Commandant  De 
Wet. 

"5.  The  Dutch  language  will  be  taught  in  public  schools  in 
the  Transvaal  and  Orange  River  Colony  where  the  parents  of 
the  children  desire  it,  and  will  be  allowed  in  courts  of  law  when 
necessary  for  the   better  and   more  effectual   administration   of 

justice. 

***** 

"7.  Military  administration  in  the  Transvaal  and  Orange 
River  Colony  will  at  the  earliest  possible  date  be  succeeded  by 
Civil  Government,  and,  as  soon  as  circumstances  permit,  repre- 
sentative institutions,  leading  up  to  self-government,  will  be 
introduced." 


INDEX 


Africa,      South-West       German, 

how  equipped,  308 
Agriculture,    Boer,    sctiemes    for 

improving,    192 
Anderson,  Colonel,  116 
Asquith      opposes    resolution    for 

creating   Imperial  Council, 

229 


B 


Bakenlaagte,  battle  of,  115 

Benson,  Colonel,  killed  at  Baken- 
laagte, 115 

Berg-en-dal,  Boers  defeated  at, 
90,  91 

Beyers,  General,  93 ;  defection  of, 
290-292  ;  treason  discovered, 
295  ;  follows  De  Wet  in  re- 
bellion, 299;  defeated  and 
drowned,  300 

Birkinstok,  56 

Bloemfontein  captured  by  Lord 
Roberts,  88 

Boer  War,  first,  26 

Bok,  Dr.,  Secretary  to  General 
Botha,  208,  278 

Botha,  General  {see  Appendix  I. 

•  for  all   chief  dates   of   life, 

P-  339) 
—  Christiaan,  brother  of  General 
Botha,  54,  93,  153 


Botha,  Hermanus,  nephew  of 
General  Botha,  nicknamed 
"  Manie,"  153;  resists  De 
Wet's  rebellion,  301,  314 

—  Louis,      father      of      General 

Botha,  17,  18;  death 
or,  31 

—  Louis,       Mrs.,       mother       of 

General  Botha,  death  of, 
52 

—  Louis,  son  of  General  Botha, 

108 

—  Louis,   Mrs.,  wife  of  General 

Botha,  nie  Emmet,  55 ; 
acts  as  peace  messenger, 
III,  113,   152,  165,  187 

—  name,  origin  of,   14 

—  Philip  Rudolf,  born  1749,  15 

—  Philip  Rudolf,  General  Botha's 

grandfather,    16 

—  Philip,  Hon.,  uncle  of  General 

Botha,  19;  death  of,  153 

—  Theunis    Jacobus,    born    1773, 

15  . 

—  Theunis,   youngest  brother   of 

Louis,    153 

Brebner,   128 

Breytenbach,    186 

Brits,  Colonel,  defeats  Maritz  at 
Upington,  298;  captures 
De  Wet,  303 ;  General  in 
German  South-West  cam- 
paign, 314 

Buller,  Sir  Redvers,  68,  89 

Burger,  Schalk,  75,  122,  126 


344 


INDEX 


Burton,  supports  policy  of  Botha 
against  Hertzog,  254,  275 

Buxton,  Lord,  Governor  of  South 
Africa,  288 

"  By-wooner,"  38,    193 


Campbell-Bannerman,  Sir  Henry, 
British  Prime  Minister, 
173,   182 

Cape  Town,  316;  Botha's  Life  in, 

324 

Cetewayo,  Zuhi  King,  32 ;  ban- 
ished, 33;  sent  baclv,  36; 
death  of,  36 

Chaka,  Zulu  Chief,   16 

Chamberlain,    Joseph,    121,    1:52, 

154,  156,  157.  158,  159.  161, 

164 
Chinese  Labour,  167,  189,  190 
Clerq,  141 

Cloefe,  Dr.  Henry,  17 
Colenso,  battle  of,  67 
Cresswell,  engineer,  heads  white 

workmen's  movement,  267 
Cronje,  General,  86,  89 
Cullinan    diamond     presented    to 

Queen  Alexandra,  187 

D 

Dalmanutha,  90 
Defence  of  South  Africa — 
Act,     South    African    Defence, 

used  in  German  War,  311 
Bill,     South    African     Defence, 

231 
Conference,    Imperial    Defence, 

231 
Haldane       supports       Botha's 

scheme  of  defence,  231 
Methuen   sent  to  South  Africa 

to     work     out     details     of 

Botha's  scheme  of  defence, 

231 
Smuts,  General,  helps  Botha  in 

scheme  of  defence,  231 
De  la  Rey,  58,  83 ;  meeting  with 

Methuen,  85;  93,  115,  116, 

T28,  139,  144,  145,  149,  152, 

162 


Oe  la  Rey  leads  Citizen  Defence 
Force  against  strikers,  278, 
291 ;  shot,  293-294 

Depening,  58 

De  Wet,  83  ;  escapes,  84,  86, 88,  92, 
115,  126,  127,  128,  142,  144, 
145;  149.  150,  152,  186;  at 
Union  Convention,  205; 
leads  attack  on  Botha  at 
South  African  Congress, 
251  ;  joins  Hertzog  in  form- 
ing new  party,  256;  con- 
trasted with  Botha,  259, 
291 ;  treason  discovered, 
295 ;  takes  the  field  in  re- 
bellion, 299;  rebellion  of,  in 
Free  State,  300-301 ;  de- 
feated by  Botha  at  Mush- 
room Valley,  302-303 ;  cap- 
ture of,  304 ;  release  of,  320 

De  Villiers,  Lord,  president  of  the 
Union  Convention,  205 

Dinizulu,  36,  37;  crowned  King, 
39;  47,  48;  released  from 
prison  by  Botha,  224 

Doornkop,  57,  89 

Duncan,  Patrick,  works  for 
Union,  200 

Dundee,  63 

Dundonald,   72 


Education,    South    African,    193; 

language  question,  226 
Edward  VH."   160,  185 
Elandslaagte,  63 
Emmet,   Annie,   wife  of   General 

Botha,  50 
—  Cheere,  37 
Enslin,   Major,  sent  by  Botha  to 

deal  with  Maritz,  297 


Farrar,  Sir  George,  defeats 
Mr.  Hull  in  Rand  election, 
222 

Fischer,  Abraham,  head  of  affairs 
in  Orange  Free  State,  203 


INDEX 


345 


Fischer,  Minister  of  Land,  220 
Fitzpatrick,     Sir    Percy,     defeats 

Botha     in     East     Pretoria 

election,  222 
Fourie,  Elizabeth,  married  P.  R. 

Botha,  1770,  15 
—  rebel  Transvaal   leader,   300 
Fox,    Francis,    persuades    Dutch 

Government     to      act      as 

mediator  in  Boer  war,  120 
Fuge,  Major,   186 
Franchise,  Cape  native,  209 
French,  General,  88,  89,  90 


German  Emperor,   iii 

Germany,  Bureau  from,  sent  to 
South  Africa  to  study 
trench  warfare,  68 ;  Great 
War  opens,  285;  war  with 
HereiX)s,  309 

Gladstone,  Lord,  181 ;  Governor 
of  South  Africa,  217,  238, 
271,  273 

Grant,  Mr.  W.,  Aborii^ines  Pro- 
tection Society,  47 

Grant,  Colonel,  left  isolated  at 
Warmbad  by   Maritz,  296 

Grey  town,  home  of  Botha's 
parents,  17,  18 

Groote  Schuur,  home  of  Botha, 
324  et  seq. 


H 


Haldane  supports  Botha's  scheme 
of  defence  for  the  Empire, 
231 

Hamilton,  Bruce,  90 

Hamilton,  Ian,  89,  90 

Harcourt  cables  to  Botha  to  seize 
such  parts  of  German  S.W. 
Africa  as  would  give 
command  of  wireless  sta- 
tions, 286 

Hardinge,  Lord,  237 

Hart,  72 


Hawkin,  Mrs.  R.  C,  nee  Marie 
Botha,    13 

Hereros,  Bantu  tribe  that  fought 
Germans  in  S.W.  Africa, 
309 

Hertzog  lays  definite  proposal  of 
peace  before  meeting  at 
Klerksdorp,  128,  129,  139, 
191,  203,  205,  220;  attacks 
of  Unionists  on,  244,  245; 
events  leading  to  his  expul- 
sion from  Cabinet,  246-248 ; 
contrasted  with  Botha,  252  ; 
becomes  leader  of  discon- 
tent in  Free  State,  250-251, 
255-256,  288,  290 

Het  Volk,  171 

Hildyard,  72 

Hofmeyr,  amendment  to  Consti- 
tution, 212 


Isandhlwana,  battle  of,  32 
Izerspruit,   116 


J 


Jaeger,  Gert  de,  at  battle  of  Dun- 
dee, 63 

Jameson,  Dr.  (afterwards  Sir 
Starr),  raid,  56;  delegate 
at  Union  Convention,  205  ; 
work  at  Union  Convention, 
210-212,  218,  219;  defence 
of  raid,  221 

"Jannie,"  nickname  for  General 
Smuts,  312 

Johannesburg,  87,  90 

Joubert,  General,  57,  62,  65; 
thrown  from  his  horse  and 
obliged  to  relinquish  com- 
mand, 66,  76 ;  dies,  88 


K 


Kafifir      commando      takes      field 
against  Republicans,   117 


346 


INDEX 


Keetmans  Hoop,  starting-point  of 
South    African    Expedition, 

313 
Kekewich,  General,  115 
Kemp,     treason     of,     discovered, 

295,  300 
Kitchener,    Lord,    104,    112,    116, 

122,    130;   peace   policy   of, 

131,  132,  136,  137,  138,  143, 

146,   157 

Kleinfontein,  115 

Klerksdorp,  meeting  at,  128 

Krogh,  128 

Kroonstadt,  88 

Kruger,  57,  88 ;  proposes  to  raise 
revenue  by  sale  of  under- 
ground mining  rights,  8g, 
126,    170 

Kuyper,   121 


Ladybrand  Basin,  surrender  of 
4,000  Boers  under  Prinsloo 
in 

Ladysmith,  64,  74,  76,  78;  siege 
raised,  79 

Laing's  Nek,  89 

Lansdowne,  Lord,  121 

Lawley,   Sir  Arthur,    167,    170 

Lindley,  surrender  of  Imperial 
Yeomanry  at,  88 

Long,  Colonel,  72 

Loveday,  58 

Liideritzbucht,  Mackenzie's  start- 
ing-point into  German 
Africa,  313 

Lyttelton,  Constitution  of,  170 


M 


Maritz,  Colonel  Solomon,  16,  De- 
fection of,  291  ;  draft  of 
treaty  between  and  Gover- 
nor of  German  S.W. 
Africa,  297;  wounded  and 
defeated,  298 

Marks,  Mr.  Samuel,  negotiations 
at  house  of 

Merriman,  154,  162 ;  Prime 
Minister  of  Cape  Colony, 
203 ;  delegate  at  Union 
Convention,  205,  219;  re- 
fuses office  in  Botha's 
Government,  220 

Methuen,  Lord,  meeting  with  De 
la  Rey,  85,  116;  sent  to 
South  Africa  to  work  out 
details  of  Botha's  scheme 
for  defence  of  South 
Africa,  231 

Meyler,  Captain,  defeats  Moor  in 
Natal  election,  222 

Meyer,  Lukas,  32,  40;  President 
of  new  Republic,  46,  48, 
56,  58,  62,  63,  86,  128,  156, 
160 

Middelburg,  meeting  at,  in  1901, 
112;  terms  of  peace,   134 

Milner,  Lord,  132-4,  143,  151, 
154,  161-3,  164,  166,  168, 
169,  170-1,  192-3,  200;  his 
steps  to  bring  Colonies  to- 
gether, 198-9 

Moedwil  Farm,  attack  on,  115 

Molteno,  Sir  James,  Speaker  of 
First  Union  Parliament, 
225 

Moor,  Frederick,  Prime  Minister 
of  Natal,  203 ;  defeated  in 
Natal  election  by  Captain 
Meyler,  222 

Muller,  304 


Mackenzie,  General,  in  German 
S.W.  campaign,  314 

Mafeking,  relief  of,  87 

Malaboch,  Botha's  cook  in  South- 
West  campaign,  317 

Mamese,  41 

Mapelo,  34 


N 


Napier,  Sir  George,   17 
Nicholson's  Nek,  64 
Nkandhla,  37 

Nyama,    chief   Minister   of   Cete- 
wayo,  36 


INDEX 


347 


o 

Orangie  Unie,  171 
Olivier,  128 


Robinson,    Mr.    (afterwards    Sir) 

J.  B.,   190 
Rosebery,    Lord,    oration    of,    at 

Chesterfield   (igoi),    120 


Paardeberg,  battle  of,  capture  of 
Cronje,  86 

Parliament  of  Union,  324,  327 

Phthisis,  miner's,  "white  death," 
265 ;  Commission  to  in- 
quire into,  266 

Pietersmith,   78 

Poutsma  puts  forward  demand  of 
railwaymen,  275 ;  arrested, 
277 

Pretoria,  87;  last  sitting  of 
Volksraad  at,  88,  90 ;  wel- 
comes Botha  after  German 
campaign,  317;  life  of 
Botha  in,  329 

Prinsloo,  92 


R 


Race  Problem  :  Native,  233 ;  In- 
dian   Coolie,    234-37 

—  Lord     Hardinge     protests     on 

behalf  of  Indian  race,  237 

—  Lord  Gladstone  suggests  com- 

mission     to     inquire     into 
Indian  difficulty,   238 

—  Complicates       industrial      up- 

heaval,  274 

—  Basutos    in    mine    break    out 

during   railway   strike,   277 

Reddersburg,  87 

Rhodes,  Cecil,  memorial  to,  324- 
325;  bedroom  at  "  Groote 
Schuur,"  326 

Reitz,  Dr.  F.  H.,  128;  President 
of  Senate,  225 

Rietfontein,  64 

Roberts,  Lord,  his  only  son 
killed,  73  ;  enters  Johannes- 
burg and  Pretoria,  87,  88, 
89,  90 


Sannah's  Post,  87 

Salisbury,   Lord,   121 

Sauer,  champion  of  native  fran- 
chise, 208,  219;  Minister  of 
Railways,  220 

Selborne,  Lord,  163,  166,  179; 
strongly  advocates  Union, 
183,  187,  193,  198-200,  243 

Smartt,  Sir  Thomas,  proposes  to 
increase  South  Africa's 
contribution  to  Imperial 
Navy,  245 

Smuts,  General,  145  ;  presents  ad- 
dress to  Chamberlain,  161, 
162,  180 ;  delegate  at 
Union  Convention,  205; 
helps  Botha  in  scheme  for 
defence  of  South  Africa, 
231,  238,  271  ;  advises  de- 
portation of  labour  leaders, 
279 ;  received  by  pistol 
shots  on  platform  at  New- 
lands,  319 

Spion  Kop,  battle  of,  74 

Sprigg,  Sir  Gordon,  154 

Standerton,   152,   165 

Steyn,  "  President,"  122,  126,  127, 
128,  134,  191  ;  vice-presi- 
dent of  Union  Convention, 
205 ;  contrasted  with 
Botha,  259 ;  refuses  to  in- 
tervene to  prevent  rebel- 
lion, 291-92 

Strikes   at  Johannesburg,   250 

—  of  miners,  origin  of,  267 ;  de- 

velopment      of,        269-70 ; 
riots,  272  ;  settlement,  272 

—  of  railwaymen,  275-78,  et  seq. 
Swakopmund,    Botha's    starting- 
point   into  German  Africa, 

313 
Symons,  General  Penn,  63 


348 


INDEX 


Talana  Hill,  63 
Thornycroft,  75 
Tinta's  Drift,  37 
Tweefontein,  116 
Tsunieb,  315 


"  Volkstem  "   lays  down 
that  South  Africa 
take      part      in 
War,  229 

Von  Donop,  115 

Vrede,  20 

Vroodepoort,   20 


doctrine 
need  not 
Imperial 


u 


Ubombo,   retreat   of   Usibepu   at, 

41 

Ulundi,      British      victory      over 

Zulus  at,   32 
Umkuso,    R.,    Usibepu    defeated 

by  Lukas  Meyer  at,  41-42 
Union,     established      May     31st, 

1910,   214 
Union    Convention,    Constitution 

draft,   212 
- —  Debate  in  House  of  Commons 

on,    214 

—  Delegates  at,  205 

—  Referendum  on,  213 
Union  Parliament  opened,  222 
Usibepu,  rival  of  Dinizulu,  mur- 
ders four  Usutus,  40 

Usutus,  tribe  of,  40,  41,  42 


w 

Walfisch  Bay,  retained  by  Cape 
Colony,  307 

Ward,  Sir  Joseph,  moves  resolu- 
tion at  191 1  Conference  for 
creating  Imperial  Council 
with  full  powers  of  control 
over  the  Dominions,  228 

Waterval,  56,   164,  333 

Wepener,  87 

White,   Sir  George,  64 

Wilson,   General,    130 

W'indhuk,  capital  city  of  Ger- 
man S.W.  Africa,  314 

Wolscley,  Sir  Garnet  (afterwards 
Viscount),  32 

Wyburgh,  General,  in  German 
S.W.  campaign,  314-5 

Wyndham,  Hon.  Hugh,  178 


V 


Van  de  Venter,  General  in  Ger- 
man South-West  campaign, 

314 
Van   Rooyen,  Minnie,   mother  of 


Botha, 
Vereeniging,       112, 

treaty  at,   146 
Viljoen,   89,    141 
Virginia  Siding,  88 


136,      137' 


Yule,   General,   63 


Zalf  Lager,  Dinizulu  crowned 
King  at,  39 

Zululand,  conquest  of  and  parti- 
tion of,  by  Wolseley,  32 ; 
unrest  in,  33-34 

Zulu  War,  32  et  seq. 


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